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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Analysis of Critical Issues and Incidents
in the
New York City School Crisis 1967-1970
and their
Imp]. icat ions for Urban Education
in the 1970's
(May 1971)
Rhody A. McCoy
B.S. Howard University
M.A. New York University
Ed.D. University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Dr. Robert Woodbury
The impact on education resulting from the attempt of the
Ocean Hill-Brownsville Demonstration School District to teach its
children was of such substance as to have created a crisis in the New
York City public schools and across the nation that will never be fully
told or explained. The study was designed to give a more complete
accounting than presently exists of the events of the New York City
crisis and the Ocean Hill-Brownsville school district in particular.
Hopefully, this effort will provide parents, teachers, politicians, in
addition to those educators involved in educational reform with a com-
pilation of data and a series of options that can assist them in bring-
ing quality education to all children.
The attack on the practice of urban education has been led by
black and Third World people who are not directly affected by racial
ix
discrimination and class warfare. In Ocean Hill-Brownsville a broad
spectrum of educators, politicians, socia] scientists, and political
scientists lent, for varying lengths of time, their hatred of the
schools and their analytic skills to the revolutionary efforts of the
people in Ocean Hill. For the purpose of data collection, the dis-
sertation assembled for panel discussions as many as was humanly pos-
sible of the key figures or representatives from organizations that
were intimately involved in the critical incidents of the New York
school crisis. Those who accepted and participated were:
1. Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, representing the Board of Regents of
the State of New York;
2. Dr. Bernard E. Donovan, former Superintendent of Schools of
New York City;
3. Dr. Mario Fantini, former Program Officer of the Ford Founda-
tion
;
4. Reverend Milton Galamison, former New York City School Board
member and President of the People’s Board of Education of
New York City;
3. Dr. Marilyn Gittell, Director of the Institute for Community
Studies at Queens College, New York City;
6. Reverend C. Herbert Oliver, former chairman of the Ocean Hill-
Brownsville Demonstration School District's Governing Board;
7. Mrs. Esther Swanker, former representative of the New York State
Department of Schools in New York City;
x
8. Mr. Fred Ferretti, representing the mass media;
9. Dr. Allan Calvin, President of the Behavioral Research Labo-
ratories, Ladera Professional Center, Palo Alto, California;
10.
Rhody A. McCoy, former unid administrator of the Ocean Hill-
Brownsville School District.
To no avail, many attempts were made to involve the President of the
United Federation of Teachers or his chosen representative. The assump-
tion could be made that had he or his representative been present,
this dissertation could have taken a different form.
The group of participants convened one full day per month for
five consecutive months in an effort to first establish their points
of view as to what the critical issues were and then, either indivi-
dually or jointly, to formulate hypotheses which could be considered
as alternatives or, at least, as explanatory statements to the violence
of Ocean Hill-Brownsville
.
The theoretical assumptions of this design can be discerned as
reformist in nature. However, midway in the panel sessions it became
evident that these nationally known figures committtcd to educational
improvement would reach one conclusion: that the New York confrontation
was inevitable; that there exists a pre-determined script, established
by racist, capitalist America, which makes the education of black, poor
white, and Third World children in this country impossible; that not only
are there no options, but that there is no imaginable reform to the
school system operating under the constraints of the socialization neces-
sary for capitalism that would educate all children.
x.i
As a result of blatantly clear patterns In the data and the
analyses, the candidate concludes that a violent revolution is neces-
sary in order to have America's public institutions serve all of its
people. Finally, the contents of this dissertation are presented in
two volumes. The first volume contains:
1. the Design of the Study;
2. the Statement of the Problem;
3. the Review of the Literature;
4. five chapters, each an analysis of the retrieved data from
each of the panels which were audio and video taped;
5. a summarizing chapter;
6. a thematic index to the transcripts; and
7. the Bibliography.
Volume Two contains the transcripts of each of the five panels. It is
the intention of the candidate to have these transcripts sealed and
placed in the Library of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, until
such time as the various panelists grant permission to make this volume
a public document.
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DEFINITION OF TERMS
I
Bundy Report -
(or Panel)
1
A Reconnection with Learning" - the report
of a special committee commissioned by
Mayor Lindsay to redesign the New York City
public schools for the retrieval of addi-
tional funds. McGeorge Bundy, President of
the Ford Foundation, was its chairman.
C . S . A . - Council of Supervisory Associations likewise
is the legal bargaining agent for the con-
sortium of supervisory associations, i.e. the
Assistant Principals Association, the Princi-
pals Association, and the Assistant Superintend
dents Association.
Governing Board - Each of the three demonstration districts was
able to create a governing body to set poli-
cies and make decisions within the framework
of the experiment. The process of creation
of these boards differed in time in all three
districts. The Ocean Hill-Brownsville Govern-
ing Board included parents (elected)
,
teachers
(selected), and community people (selected).
I.S. 201 It technically was a school in Harlem, New
York City (Manhattan), and was a focal point
of a major confrontation on desegregation.
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It later became the "seat" of a demonstration
district
.
L.E.A. - The Local Education Agency comprises boards of
education.
M.A.R.C. - The Metropolitan Applied Research Center is an
agency funded to conduct research in a broad
spectrum of education.
M.E.S. - The More Effective Schools Program.
Passow Report - A report on the conditions of the public schools
of Washington, D.C., done by Harry Passow of
New York City, with recommendations. It is
signif icant in the fact that though there were
extensive recommendations made, none were im-
plemented, and the cost was ostensibly high.
Subsequent reports for the same purpose have
been commissioned.
P.E.A. - Public Education Association
U.F.T. - The United Federation of Teachers is the legal
bargaining agency of the teachers of New York
City. It was conceptualized in 1960.
Unit Administrator - A title which is bestowed on the titular educa-
tional leader of/and for the three demonstration
districts. It is in fact comparable to a
district superintendent since the qualifications
are practically the same.
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chapter I
INTRODUCTION: DESIGN OF THE STUDY
Background and Context
Public school systems in urban areas have been faced with a
series of confrontations focusing around the issues of student rights,
bussing, union militancy, integration, black studies, relevancy, paren-
tal participation, and community power in decision-making. As the demo-
graphic context continues to become predominantly black and Spanish,
i.e. Washington, D.C., New York City, Detroit, St. Louis, these educa-
tional issues become inextricably bound in the continuing revolution of
the powerless in America. At this writing, there exists no resolution
of the conflict acceptable to either the entrenched, bourgeois interests
or to die urban poor; an absence which forces educators to respond with
either impotent confusion, or repressive measures of varying degrees of
subtlety or brutality. However, this nexus does not abrogate the res-
ponsibility of educators to discharge their responsibilities to them-
selves, and to the children they supposedly serve.
Those attempting to meet this challenge, regardless of their
race or political posture, agreed that there should not, in fact that
there must not be a repetition of the crisis engendered by New York
City's experimentation with bureaucratic reorganization. Members of
the black community are attempting to develop a more effective stra-
tegy to achieve control over the education of their own children.
2On the other hand, it is typical for those "observers" who desire to
give the impression that they are involved, or at least interested in
institutional change, to assert that future "experiments" must be less
violent and more gradual. This latter group attempts to neutralize the
debatable merits of Ocean Hill-Brownsville
' s challenge to the school
system by suggesting that it was tantamount to a political revolution.
In retrospect, this writer is convinced that the events of
1967-70, which had the public school system as their superficial focus,
were, in fact, political in nature; the issues being not simply teachers
rights or decentralization, but rather the broader alignment of power in
New York City. The various studies over the past years have claimed
that actual power in the schools was exercised by the professional staff
of the central agency, the support administrators in the field, and the
teachers via their union, and not, as was theoretically the case, by
the Board of Education and its Superintendent. Rejecting both of these
hypotheses, I wish to investigate the possibility that power in the
field of education rests and rested directly in the hands of the poli-
tical chieftains of New York City: the giant unions, the major corpora-
tions, and the governmental agencies they employ. Attention has been
focused on the Teacher's Union and on the educational bureaucracy
because of the nature of their duties and their exposed position. But
proximity is not power. Thus, the broadest context of this study is
of an investigative procedure designed to uncover the original authors
of what I shall attempt to demonstrate was a predetermined script.
3Objectives of the Study
The structure of the New York City school crisis exhibits a
paradim, with identical, or roughly similar, constituent elements in
urban school systems across the country. This study will attempt to
isolate, identify, and then examine the most critical incidents and/or
issues in the New York City school crisis in order to suggest alterna-
tive actions, or, in the absence of alternatives, to identify the given
consequences from the elements that are present.
Sound and tested alternative educational strategies are not
available to the educator. In response to this situation and without
prior bias, this study will simultaneously pursue two contradictory
reactions to this situation: (1) to develop a number of options for
educator s which they may utilize when and where there are similar educa-
tional decisions; (2) that given the social and political constraints
under which educators must operate, there is not an effective resolu-
tion of the conflict. Thus a summary of the objectives of this study
could be rendered as follows:
1. To examine the most critical incidents of the New York
City school crisis and determine if other options or
alternatives were available; and in the absence of such
options, what results could be anticipated.
2. To identify for educational decision makers, as a result
of this examination, possible courses of action based
on the options and alternatives for urban school systems
in reform.
43. To provide direction and evidence for such direction to
all participants involved in change in urban areas.
By examining the literature on urban education, and by assembling a
panel of participants in the New York crisis, the candidate hopes to
effectively examine the following questions in pursuit of the above
objectives
:
1* When Boards of Education (or institutions) decide to
involve indigenous community people, what does it mean
and what types of processes should be applied to faci-
litate implementation thereof? What policies or prac-
tices impede reform (or experimentation) which, by
their nature, have implications beyond the perimeter
of the experiment?
2. What piocess can be developed to neutralize or mini-
mize the potential conflict, and preserve the vested
interests? Can vested interest be protected if gra-
dual or radical change is the objective? Can it be
presumed that there can be mutual agreement on an
issue or issues for change?
3. How can decisions be made that are educationally
sound and which do not create pressure groups when
change is inevitable or needed? What kinds of rela-
tionships must be developed with all of the partici-
pants to effect change and to what extent do they
participate?
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4. Can "sign posts" be identified as predictors of conse-
quences in a volatile solution? Or can a change process
be designed to provide for adjustments?
5. What processes can urban educators establish that will
incorporate all of the factions concerned?
6. How can all of the factions involved be identified?
7. Are compromise and negotiation possible in urban
educational crises?
Procedure
The organization of the dissertation centers around a series
of five panel sessions held in Amherst, Massachusetts and New York
City from November, 1970 to March, 1971. The study begins with an
introductory chapter which delineates the nature of the dissertation.
This introduction is followed by a chapter which defines the nature
of the questions under investigation. The third chapter on the lit-
erature related to urban education is designed to establish a context
in which to present the subsequent panels, i.e. an examination of this
literature to ascertain if the problems were correctly identified aid
if solutions or options were offered. The core of the study is com-
prised of the subsequent five chapters, each one devoted to an analysis
of a particular panel session described below. The body of the
dissertation will terminate with a conclusion drawn from both the
general considerations raised in the opening chapters and the original
data collected during the exercise of the study, together with a
thematic index to the transcripts. The complete, unedited version of
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all five panel sessions comprise Volume Two of the dissertation.
Familiarity with the transcripts is a prerequisite to an adequate
understanding of the analytical chapters.
The organization of the study was designed to assemble either
the principal persons or their representatives involved in the New
York City school crisis. This spectrum of legitimately involved per-
sons is typical of the levels on which decisions are either influenced
or made in urban educational systems; thus their contributions to the
realization of the objectives of the dissertation represent an unusual
level of expertise. Also, the manner of the design of the study, i.e.
an assembled panel engaged in discussion of the most critical issues
in an objective fashion should provide a significant- body of data.
The panel sessions convened once per month: November 16, 1970,
at the School oi Education, Amherst, both audio and video taped;
December 7, 1970, at the School of Education, Amherst, both audio and
video taped; January 18, 1971, at Automation House, New York City,
both audio and video taped; February 17, 1971, at M.A.R.C., New York
City, audio taped only; and March 1, 1971, Automation House, New York
City, both audio and video taped. Those invited were:
1. Esther Swanker, from the New York State Department of
Education, assigned by Commissioner Allen to the special
demonstration districts;
2. Dr. Kenneth Clark, from Metropolitan Applied Research
Corporation and the New York State Board of Regents
(and an arbitrator)
;
• 7
3. Dr. Bernard Donovan, ex-Superintendent of Schools in
New York City, presently head of Center for Urban Redevel-
opment in Education;
4. Albert Shanker, President o£ the United Federation of Teachers;
5. Reverend Milton Galamison, former New York City Board
of Education member and civil rights leader;
6. Mr. Fred Ferretti, a reporter with the New York Times :
7. Di
. Mario Fantini, ex-Chief Education Program Officer for the
Ford foundation, now Dean of the School of Education of State
University College at New Paltz;
8. Dr. Marilyn Gittell, political scientist, consultant on urban
education, and Director of the Institute for Community
Studies at Queens College;
9. Reverend C. Herbert Oliver, ex-Chairman of the Ocean Hill-
Brownsville Governing Board.
The broader structure of the dissertation which encompasses
this study includes a chapter defining the problem per se, including
some of the history of the unrest in urban education; a chapter on the
literature related to urban education in order to establish a context
in which to present the data, i.e., an examination of such literature
to ascertain if the problems were correctly identified and if solutions
or options were offered; five chapters devoted to the analysis of the
panel sessions; and finally, a chapter devoted to the summary and con-
clusions drawn from both the review of the literature and the original
data collected d
• 8
uring the exercise of the study.
The design of the panels is crucial to the objectives of the
dissertation in that all of the panelists not only played radically
different roles in the New York City school situation, but were also
pre-crisis participants in a variety of capacities. Thus the design
bungs together a "seasoned" spectrum of people with the awareness,
sensitivity, and skill to develop a method of creating and then imple-
menting an effective educational process. This group of panelists
represented one of the most unique data banks on urban education. To
have brought them together and to have elicited from them reactions,
concerns, prognoses, represented a major increment to the collective
information available on the field.
The resulting data is compiled and then assessed from two
perspectives. First, the usefulness of the data to an understanding
of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville experiences is explored; and from
this foundation, an attempt is made to determine the overt and
covert background to the establishment of the demonstration districts.
While it is assumed that the reader will scan the transcripts
prior to the analytical chapters, the analytical chapters deal with
a very limited number of the direct statements of the panelists.
The analysis can be characterized as lengthy discussions of short
quotes. This particular form evolved from two considerations. First,
the panelists spoke in a form of code. While their signals were
understandable to those who already knew the reality which the words
represented, the symbolic level alone transmitted little of import.
9
Thus, the analysis seeks to translate this code into the political and
social realities which the symbolic system obscures. Secondly, either
out of ignorance or omission, the panelists failed to delineate the
implications of their assertions. Often the deductions that can be
drawn from the statements of the panelists are of far more value than
the initial statements themselves. Simply, the data solicited was
viewed as a framework in which to structure an analysis of the New York
school crisis rather than as a scripture to be presented to the public.
Limits to the Delineation of the Study
It is crucial that it be initially understood what this study
is not, and what difficulty does exist in realizing its stated ob-
jectives. This examination does not attempt to blame all the problems
of today’s urban poor upon the schools, but rather it assesses some
of the effects of these external variables upon the educational system.
This position does not affect the writer's assertion that the failure
to provide decent education is one of the major sources of urban unrest
Secondly, the writer does not attempt to either defend or attack the
pedagogical effectiveness of Ocean Hill—Brownsville. Unfortunately,
the district s ability to educate never became a serious focal point
of discussion. Thus, the study rather attempts to explain why peda-
gogical skill was an irrelevant isse, than to define or defend the
methods or programs begun in the brief existence of the demonstration
district
.
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The candidate's experience and interests constituted a substan-
tial input into the proceedings of the panel. The purposes were to
assess the role of an administrator faced with overt and covert manipu-
lation of his district as he attempted to implement relevant and quali-
tative educational reform in an urban community. An attempt is
made to assess the actions and decisions made by the local board as
translated and implemented by the titular educational leader to deter-
mine if, in fact, he had other options.
Unfortunately, the panel sessions lacked representation from
the United Federation of Teachers. Numerous inquiries were made
directly to Mr. Shanker and his assistant, Sandy Feldman, in regard
to participation in the study through either attendance at the sessions
or through response to a series of assertions and questions drawn from
the transcripts. For understandable reasons, neither individual
responded positively to these overtures. None of the active partici-
pants held a position at the time of the study which directly involved
he or she as active participants in the New York school system. This
altered relationship permitted the panelists to state in a more frank
fashion their observation of the demonstration district. Mr. Shanker,
however, remains directly involved in much the same role as he played
in the period of 1967-70. Such ongoing relationship obviously would
have made it difficult for the Union head to provide a perspective
different from that of his political posture. While his absence undoubt-
edly leaves a void, his inability to participate may have permitted the
panelists to more candidly develop their own argumentations.
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From a different angle, the definition of critical issues for
the candidate by the panelists may engender certain differences of
opinion. It is anticipated that this presents some problems due to
the nature of the panelists and their personal involvement, not
only in New York, but in their expanding roles as consultants to urban
districts throughout the country. Thus, the skill of the candidate
and the moderator to maintain an objective pursuit of the objectives
was of paramount importance. As a result of the same factors,
the results of this study may be "suspect" by the simple composition
of the panel. However, it is the candidate's belief that there exists
no more competent group of professionals from whom information may be
collectively gathered.
A final obstacle is presented by the sheer length of the tran-
scripts of the panel sessions and the scope of the issues upon which
the participants touched. No single dissertation could hope to
adequately treat the raw data which this study has collected. Therefore
only those issues most centrally related to the objectives of this
particular dissertation have been observed, leaving the remainder for
use by others.
CHAPTER II
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Efforts to reform public education have a hazardous future, a
future created by the failure of educators to generate reform from
criticism. The glaring evidence of the ineffectiveness of a large
number of school systems mandates educational reform. The entire
educational community
- pupils, parents, educators, politicians, and
government officials - has attempted to demonstrate its dissatis-
faction with the schools. Within the context of this general
malaise, the most publicized failures of education are in the inner
cities. The attacks on public education graphically described in the
headlines of the 1950's are repeated in the 1970' s, and educators
have neither effected reforms nor unified in an effort to prevent the
protracted decline in the quality of public education. This barrage
of unanswered criticism gradually destroyed the credibility of urban
systems, showing them as instruments of socialization rather than
educational institutions. Finally, the unrest caused by school
systems led to demands for institutional reform.
The increasingly militant struggle for civil rights widened
the base of this movement, compounding the difficulties facing the
white and black bourgeois educators. In the 1960 's previously
docile people were decrying the inhumane plight of both the inner
13
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city citizen and the pupil, spawning a natural coalition between
parents and pupils to "attack" the public schools. Gradually, publ:
education and the social policy which the bureaucracy enforces, became
subjected to examination as efforts were made by individuals and
organizations to provide a more positive and productive learning
atmosphere. Educators had expounded the myth that education was the
conduit to affluence. Now those who had been denied affluence began
to attack the system which had discriminated against them, thus trans-
forming the spectrum of social problems (housing, employment, urban
renewal, and health) into the problems of the schools. As a result of
the examination, the myths which provide the ideological foundations
of American education have been challenged; they may now be destroyed.
But criticism, no matter how strident, can not bring about a
revolution, and American education looks much the same today as it
did twenty years ago. Incidents of confrontation, designed to force
educational reform, have created new issues, usually non-educational
,
that have polarized interest groups retarding attempts at change.
What is the problem, what is the direction, and what is an educational
system designed for the future? A situation which has been historicall’
troubled now appears impossible because of the complexities of bureau-
cratic standard operational procedures, public uncertainty, national
neglect, political pressures and racism. One must be careful not to
believe that one movement or one strategy is sufficient to diffuse
the educational crisis. It is a major American dilemma which must be
met with resolve and dispatch for it becomes more explosive daily.
.14
This is the context which a white liberal, such as Lyndon B.
Johnson, establishes most effectively. Writing in the foreword of
the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders,
he attempts to give clarity and direction:
The only genuine, long-range solution for what has
happened lies in an attack, mounted at every level,
upon the conditions that breed despair and violence.
All of us know what those conditions are: ignorance,
discrimination, slums, poverty, disease, not enoughjobs. We should attack these conditions not because
we are frightened by conflict but because we are fired
by conscience; we should attack them because there is
simply no other way to achieve a decent and orderly so-
ciety in America. •*-
Johnson hoped that when the members of our society recognize that
"the American dream" is in jeopardy, they would act individually and
collectively to preserve democratic ideals. Then, and only then,
could educators proceed with educational reform. For this liberal
strategy to succeed, all citizens with their varied interests, con-
cerns, talents, and resources, would have to attack this common
problem; a national coalition for survival would have to be created.
Working within this context, Charles E. Silberman emphasizes
how the pervasive crisis in education transcends racial and economic
categories
:
Because adults take schools too much for granted, they
fail to appreciate what grim, joyless places most American
schools are, how oppressive and petty are the rules by
which they are governed, how intellectually sterile and
aesthetically barren the atmosphere; what an appalling
lack of civility obtains on the part of teachers and
^Lyndon Baines Johnson, Address to the Nation, July 27, 1967,
quoted in Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
(New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1968), p. xv.
15
principals; what contempt they unconsciously displayfor children as children. 2
Student unrest, teacher militancy, parent demands are familiar terms
which indicate the severity of the problem. These conditions of the
1970 s breed despair and violence as they did in the 1950's. Echoing
Johnson, Silberman links this protracted stagnation to the structure
of society:
This mindlessness, this failure and refusal to act and
think seriously about the educational purpose, the
reluctance to question established practice is not the
monopoly of the public school. It is diffused remarkably
throughout the entire educational system, and indeed
the entire society. 2
The concern is so deep, the phrasing is so well-turned, that one has
no choice but to applaud.
But the black people in America have seen two decades of
Silberman, Holt, Kozol, Friedenberg, Kohl, Goodman, Allen, Kennedy,
Johnson, and Nixon, and education for black people remains funda-
mentally unaltered. It remains impossible to question the rhetoric,
but equally impossible to expect that education will stop destroying
the minds of black children. In attempting to explain this failure,
this study will center on three major institutions charged with
maintaining racism and class oppression: the educational bureaucracy,
the teachers union, the mass media.
Charles E. Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom, The Remaking
of American Education (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 83.
3 Ibid.
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Objective conditions in the public schools are such that con-
cern about the current educational dilemma should transcend racial and
economic categories. But the manner in which these conditions have
been publicized by the scathing institutional reports, such as the re-
port of the National Commission of Civil Disorders, the Carnegie
Commission, etc., have reduced educational issues to the concerns of
the oppressed. After expressing the need for common cause, the Kerner
report states "for the community at large, the schools have discharged
their responsibility well," thus undercutting its prior contention.
While the victimized must certainly question the effectiveness of pub-
lic education, particularly public educators and policy makers, the
failure of the schools to even minimally serve the minority community
should make it impossible to claim that schools have served well the
community. Is there no longer a common interest? As a corollary to
the above assertion, one must realize that the implications of Kerner's
claim provide the spark for racial strife centering around the schools.
The suggestion that public education has served the white community well
insures that educational issues will degenerate into racial conflicts.
Once the pervasive nature of the crisis in education has been
accepted, Kerner's statement and its assumptions must be viewed as
an establishment strategy designed to minimize the need to make
education for all children the nation's number one domestic priority.
His faulty analysis of the conditions and his piddling recommendations
for solutions beget the same, inaction. Similar studies were done
on the 1919 Chicago Riots, the 1935-36 Harlem Riots, the Watts Riots,
the Newark rebellions. Others will follow, but no plethora of studies
4DReport of the National Adviso ry Commiss ion on Civ il Disorders
,
p. 25.
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answers the problem.
But to state that American education is universally poor does
not imply that it is not particularly bad for blacks and other people
of color. Kenneth B. Clark alludes to the severity of the problem in
his report to the Board of Education of the District of Columbia:
One of the most disturbing and persistent realities in
contemporary American education is the fact that the
academic achievement of minority groups and lower-status
children in urban public education is consistently below
norm. This retardation begins in the early elementary
grades and continues at an accelerated rate through the
upper grades. Cumulative academic retardation has become
the most significant characteristic of large urban school
systems. It is probably the dominant educational problem
in the United States today. J
This attack on the minds of black children can not be seen as simply
the result of the incompetence of educators. Some schools are founded
to create the future leaders of our country," others to provide the
requisite number of garbage men, bus boys, and junkies. Schools are
used overtly to deny minorities the opportunity to participate as
equals in society. Translated, this means that the failure of the
pupil is the success of the school; that the low aspirational levels,
the negative experience, frustrations, drop-outs, push-outs, despair,
and violence is training for life.
Thus the conditions of society supply the ingredients which
create an atmosphere of violence, the undercurrent of social unrest
which results in the disruption of public education. Within the
context of this disorder, certain fundamental issues are visible,
predominantly the racial attitudes and behavior of white Americans
^Kenneth B. Clark, A Pos sibl e Reality (New York: M.A.R.C.
Publication, June 30, 1970), p. 1.
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toward black Americans. Racial strife has shaped our history;
apparently, it will now shape our future. Overt white racism must
bear the blame for the social violence which has persisted since
World War II.
Discrimination in employment, housing and education has ex-
cluded black people from the benefits of economic growth. The white
exodus from urban areas has created concentration camps which deteri-
orate at rapid rates. The living conditions in these concentration
camps, or ghettoes, insure failure, re-enforcing the self-fulfilling
prophecy that minority groups form ignorant masses from whom unaccept-
able behavior can be expected. Obviously, this breeds contempt and re-
sentment directed particularly at the institutions of white America-
the schools, the courts, the large corporations, and the police. The
frustrated hopes represent the mutation of unfulfilled expectations
resulting from gains won in the civil rights movement. The per-
sistent failure of black people to gain control of their lives
through legal means has led the community towards a more militant
posture. Overt action, boycotts, riots, etc., usually incited by
the young, have replaced the apathy born of a blind faith in the
democratic process.
Once again, a people has emerged to challenge an American
institution, not simply a black or minority institution. The objective
is not to continue a policy of putting one race above another. The
challenge mounted by the black and other minorities can, if met with
meaningful reform, provide educational opportunities for all Americans.
Repression or suppression will not create lasting answers; only a
realization of the needs for common opportunities for every individ-
ual in a single social order can lead to stability.
But, as stated above, white institutions pervert these educa-
tional concerns into racial issues in an attempt to forestall widespread
reform. This attempt to restore dignity to a people and unity to
a nation has been scarred, distorted, and oftentimes destroyed by
one of America's more powerful instituions, the media. Today, one
can read in periodicals, newspapers, or view on television, accounts
of educational disorders couched in terminology so biased that the
seriousness and persistency of the issues fail to incite people to
action
.
The racists lodged in the institutionalized media and the
educational bureaucracy define issues and disseminate information
that prevents a clear identification of the problem. The oppressor
reports that acts of violence prevented the election of new P.T.A.
officers at George Washington High School, thus placing blame upon
the "militants." No mention is made that the school lias been beset
with serious problems for almost a year! The real issue of the
rights of parents and students to control their schools is avoided by
this type of emotionalized reporting. The press reports that a small
militant group keeps New York City’s I.S. 142 shut. The minority
community can only view this as a strategy to protect the vested in-
terests of a racist establishment; hardly the accurate reporting of the
miseducation and abuse of students.
Such a strategy allows the bureaucracy of the school system to
present meaningless options as solutions. Quests for information by
citizens can be parried with such typical generalizations as,
"My God, what do they want?," and "What else do the blacks want?"
Ten or twenty years ago, headlines stating that public schools kill
dreams and mutilate minds would have been intolerable, perhaps even
leading to a congressional hearing. But the manner in which the
press portrays the crisis is designed to elicit only minimal concern
and no action. Can this not be seen as a deliberate policy designed
by white America's institutions to keep minorities off the path to
affluence by blocking the road to quality education?
Educational bureaucrats utilize techniques identical to
those of the media. A Report to the Parents of Detroit on School
Decentralization6 speaks of the protection of children and states
that the black children are among the most abused in America. Yet,
the report can be seen as a political vehicle at best. Its weakness
is its failure to adequately identify the problem in such a manner
that it will incite both black and white America to action. In other
words, it makes the issue of education clearly a "minority problem,"
a definition which begets more polarization. Further, the manner of
presentation does not differentiate between community control and
decentralization, but pretends that they are one and the same. The
report defines community control to be local governance democracy.
If taken at face value, the statements are very noble; yet, within the
next few hundred words, the report suggests that the interests of the
tax payers, the school system, the teachers union, and the voters must
^Detroit Geographical Expedition and Institute, A Repo rt to the
Paren ts of Detroi t on School Decentralization (December 1969).
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be considered, as well as the interests of the pupils. The report
assumes that all participants share in the policy and decision making,
then structures the political situations in such a fashion as to in-
sure the continued impotence of the community. This ploy can serve
two purposes: one, to confuse the issues; the other, to give the
impression that the blacks are making unreasonable demands. The ability
to define terms with the intent to confuse issues and pacify critics
characterizes much of the educational professionals. Consultants
consistently stack the deck in favor of the bureaucracy that hired
them aginst the people to whom they should be held accountable.
The third party to this deliberate attempt to accompany the
rhetoric of liberalism with acts of repression is the United Federation
of Teachers. Only a colonial ideology makes it the prerogative of the
Teachers Union president to define some demands as reasonable and
others unreasonable. His interpretation of a reasonable demand by
the client is, for instance, repair of school buildings and demands
foi security, but unreasonable demands are student decisions on
the selection of a principal, student demands for employment as security
guards, the ouster of the local superintendent, etc. A related
strategy is evident in the U.F.T. request that the George Washington
High School issues be investigated by law enforcement officials to
determine if a conspiracy exists to incite students to riot, that
known disruptive students (known by whom to be disruptive?) be removed
from school, that an injunction be issued to bar certain individuals
from the school, and that supervision laws be enforced. The U.F.T.
makes no mention of education in this law-and-order diatribe. The
suggestion that the courts be used against the community creates
more ill will and displays an insensitivity to the experience of
blacks in our judicial network. Also, in 1967, the U.F.T. persisted
in making the disruptive child issue a negotiable item in its contract.
This polarized the city along racial lines, rallying many whites to
the cause of the Union.
Obviously, the demands of parents to become partners on local
levels in the educational process are steeped in their commitment
to prevent existing school boards from dealing with the problems
through repressive acts, or by simply ignoring the problem, or by
brinkmanship which leads to meaningless compromises. While this
obfuscation might fool the white community, the people must ultimately
see through this ruse. The black community, in the absence of any real
attempt at solutions, perceives these overt manipulations as acts of
repression from the hands of the slave master. When blacks see
headlines such as Millions in Anti-Poverty Funds to Consultants,"
there exist no options for them within the given educational system.
How can they accept the fact that monies for the poor are in the
coffers of the already affluent, or how can they accept the ease with
which the oppressor retrieves monies earmarked for the indigent? Such
headlines, as well as the accompanying stories, indicate not only
powerlessness but complete rejection of the demand for community
participation. Who are these consultants? How were they selected and
by whom? These are some of the overt questions from the community
people. The real question is: how can this manipulation of funds
by the local education agency be stopped? This serious concern for
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the control or influence over the commitment of funds is a foundation
of the drive for the right of self-determination.
the urban population continues to become predominantly black
and Spanish, i.e. in Washington, D.C., New York City, Detroit, and as
these minorities continue to escalate their demand to share in the
affluence of America using as a vehicle for change the educational
institution, every institution of our society is jeopardized. The
numerous investigations and reports that reflect concern of the school
community, the social scientists and public officials have failed to
bring about any measurable and/or sustained improvement in the achieve-
ment of lower status children in the basic academic skills of reading
and arithmetic. Educators are therefore faced with a dilemma: they
must either attempt to preserve the existing public schools with repres-
sion, or redesign the educational system to meet, the needs and demands
of the people it is supposed to serve. Rhetoric, criticism, and in-
action must become phenomena of the past.
Critics of the current educational system fall into two broadly
inclusive categories. Assuming that miseducation of black and poor
white people results from the failure of the schools to meet their own
objectives, institutionalized liberals seek to reform education by in-
fusing additional sums of money into the bureaucracies, redesigning
curriculum, developing new teacher training models, in addition to
implementing the current "innovations." On the other hand, there exists
a more radical perspective which states that the failure of the schools
to educate reflects the success of the school system in introducing
social, racial, and economic distinctions.
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Not too many years ago, the critical issues broached by both
groups would have been considered revolutionary. Today, they are viable
options and among the many being implemented, some have shown evidence
of success. The issues now in conflict seem to be the most radical,
radical in the sense of going directly to the root of the problem.
They pose basic questions and the resulting alternatives reflect genuine
possibilities
.
One demand is for radical restructuring designed to eliminate
compulsory education. The ensuing debate has attracted a "host of
experts" who have created the illusion that the outmoded and academi-
cally disreputable system can survive. The educational elite markets
compensatory programs, voucher systems, guaranteed performance con-
tracts and decentralization plans, each meant to give the appearance
of reform. Yet, embodied in each of these concepts are the seeds of
the conflicts which presently plague the educational system and the
society. The so-called experts, incapable of knowing the depth of the
problem, continue to create illusory alternatives which must lead to
more conflict and violence.
Sound and tested educational alternatives that will allow
effective educational reform are not available to the educator.
There exists a serious need for a variety of options and alternatives
available to educators which they may utilize when and where there
are similar urban educational problems. In too many instances interest
groups and their ideologies cannot or have not been identified; and
in the absence of a positive course of action which effectively
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involves all of the vested Interest groups, there exists no possibility
for effective educational leadership.
Action by the legislators, city officials and politicians that
cannot be implemented, as well as actions by those opposed to ending
racial segregation continue as unrest spreads and discontent leads to
confrontation. The necessary educational reforms center on the effec-
tive resolution of such questions as:
1. How can sound educational decisions be reached in today's
world?
2. How and by whom are these decisions translated into action?
3. Who is to be accountable and for what?
A. New educational partners - a need or a fantasy?
5. What courses of action are available to educators to
provide effective education for their clients?
The problems of the educational community are: (1) to define
today's educational needs in such a way that every child in America is
considered as an individual; (2) to redefine the role of the educator
and to prescribe his function so as to maximize his effort in effecting
the individual child's development; (3) to examine in depth the various
vested interest groups and protect their needed gains, and to plan
effectively for their future growth; (4) to recognize the need for a
nationally declared and supported course of action replete with options
and alternatives for educational excellence; (5) to recognize the com-
plexities of the problem and solution not as an impediment for educational
reform, but rather as a vehicle to have every man, woman, and child
in America participate in the solutions. This will demand new concerted
actions and new coalitions to eliminate slogans, catchy phrases and
individual ideologies, to eliminate attempts by one group or one agency
to remedy this national disgrace and to make education the nation's
number one priority.
CHAPTER III.
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The open struggle which erupted in New York City around the
attempt of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville demonstration district to assert
control over the education of black, Puerto Rican, and white children
occurred within a context established by the preceding debate over the
nature and future of urban education. As this verbal and political
battle progressed through the 1960's, certain prominent issues were
defined by the various antagonists while they created certain roles
which would predetermine their future conduct. It is the contention
of this writer, a contention to be supported in this chapter, that the
definition of these roles and issues presents a distorted, biased, incom-
plete and deliberately obtuse picture of the national educational arena
in which Ocean Hill was, by necessity, forced to operate; and, that
these categories are of overwhelming importance in molding the course
of events. In other words, actual decisions stemmed from distortions
in language and thought which characterized the literature on urban
education
.
These theoretical inadequacies developed from a series of
causes. On a superficial level, the lure of authors toward sensation-
alism, an outgrowth of their natural desire to increase the circula-
tion of their writing, led to an obfuscation of the factual material.
But to focus on sensationalism would be to mistake a sympton for a
serious disease. Such sensational or distorted writing could only stem
from writers who reflected the racist assumptions and class biases of
their nation. Thus, one of the serious questions i s the perspective
of those providing the public with information. Using New York as an
example
,
of all the bocks, articles subsequently written on the crisis,
none were written by those people most involved or most affected: the
people who lived and worked in Ocean Hill-Brownsville. This omission
does not deter anyone from claiming an accurate understanding of what
must be seen as a complex series of events. It is even odder, perhaps
even hysterical, that so many people who claim to have a vested interest
m the institution of education have not yet been able to determine who,
or in fact,why education is not controlled by a visible entity. To re-
mark upon this obvious failure does not prevent anyone from trying.
This writer feels that one may divide the literature on urban
education into two basic categories, each with different subsets de-
signed for their respective audiences. The first category, usually
marked confidential, can be termed coded directional litany. This body
of material is designed for those top-line policy implementors enabling
them to make decisions facilitated by a pre-determined context. The
second such category is what I describe as pastoral reporting, a genre
which incluces Schools Against Children.^ Deatli at an Early Age ,^ The
O
T ea rners Str ike, and Crisis in the Classroom . ^ Most of this literature
^Annette T. Rubinstein (ed
. ) , Schools Against Children (New York
Monthly Review Press, 1970).
pJonathan Kozol
,
Death at an Early Age (New York: Bantam, 1967).
qMartin Mayer, The Teacher s Strike: New York, 1 968 (New York:
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968).
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simply reiterates in different language what has been obvious for years,
and then becomes required reading in the profession of education. I
wish to make it absolutely clear that these categorisations are in no
way a criticism, rather a conclusion based on the information which I
will present for documentation. In order that the explication will not
be facile, or degenerate into polemic, I will examine one or two examp-
les of writing within each category, pastoral and liturgical, rather
than attempt to cover a large number in a cursory fashion. The purpose
of the examination will be to illustrate the effect of the language used,
i.e. the categories established on the decision-making process.
The State of Illinois Commission on Urban Education held a de-
centralization hearing on September 14, 1970. The Commission, which
was staffed by five state senators, five state representatives, one
dean of a school of education, and three members of the general public
carried a mandate to formulate a decentralization plan for Chicago's
public schools. The premises from which the inquiry of the Commission
departed stated that (1) decentralization held some promise for alle-
viating many problems in urban education; (2) effective decentralization
must invoice delegation of power; and (3) some form of meaningful parti-
cipation is necessary to reduce the alienation between urban communities
and their schools. The questions which the commissioners had hoped
to face most directly were 'how community is to be defined, how revenues
Charles E. Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom (New York: Random
House, 1970).
5State of Illinois, Commission on Urban Education (unpublished
minutes), September 14, 1970, p. 1.
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are to be generated and dispersed, and how local incentive and re-
sponsibilities can be required." 6 The rhetoric is pretty, but it
disguises a code. The true intent being to secure power in the
hands of those who have traditionally held it by setting up road-
blocks, obscuring the issues, creating facades, and neutralizing
organized efforts. This writer contends that the committee hearings
were a sham, a tactic designed to legitimize an already established
strategy, a strategy easy to discern as it is the same one which
emerged from the New York crisis. 7
To support this hypothesis I wish to examine the procedures
used, the testimony given, and the potential usage of the unpublished
document. The procedures established unilaterally by the committee
dictated that:
1. no one was able to examine any plan for reform other than
decentralization
;
2. the membership of the commission excluded representatives
from the affected areas;
3. the persons summoned before the commission included only
token and ineffective representation from the community;
4. testimony was taken individually in the presence of no
State of Illinois, Commission on Urban Education, p. 1 .
7This writer’s appearance before the committee was highly pub-
licized and highly useful for the commission. Despite the fact that
most inputs were against community control, the committee could now
legitimize the pre-determined results of their "inquiry" by claiming
to have openly consulted all points of view. Chicago's black com-
munity and needless to say myself, "had been had."
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one except the members of the commission; and the
commission reserved the right to edit testimony
prior to publication.
Given such a structure, the results must be a foregone conclusion,
with each step fitting smoothly together to create the appropriate
illusions. By limiting discussion to planning for "decentralization,"
the commission literally dictated the spectrum of issues to be raised.
Instead of focusing on the desire of parents or the rights of child-
ren, the inquiry became a hymn to the woes of educational bureau-
crats, of the unionized and administrative varieties. The mandate
of the commission precluded any examination of the roots of power,
or even the origins of dissent; simply, the stooges talked about what
organization plan, given the status quo, would minimize the difficul-
ties of professionals. This iron-clad limitation on perspective was
preserved by excluding members of the community as either members of
the commission or as witnesses. No one present could lend a different
slant, and no one could attempt to disturb the categories established
by the witnesses.
The manner in which these witnesses delivered their testimony
further undermines the credibility of the commission. Given the con-
text established above, no one could challenge the misinformation
or distortions of another witness. Thus the commissioners, and the
commissioners alone could judge the relative weight of competing dis-
tortions, a judgmental process they could completely disguise by an
intelligent editing of the transcripts prior to publication.
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But the procedure was simply a means to an end; in this in-
stance facilitating the establishment of erroneous and misleading
categories by the witnesses. We shall examine the testimony of four
persons called before the commission, in each case attempting to
analyze the impact of the categories and language present on poten-
tial decision making.
This particular session opened with testimony by Miss Vivian
Gallagher, Vice-President of the Chicago Teacher’s Union. The calcu-
lated distortion of fact inherent in her initial remarks layed a
solid groundwork for the strategy to follow. For example, she assert-
ed that a curriculum responsive to the community would increase the
opportunities for vocational education, given the high number of
students who do not graduate with an academic diploma. The explicit
suggestion was that those who do not want to go to college "would pro-
fit from following a good career like carpentry or plumbing
. . .
In this attempt to demonstrate the sincerity and good will of the union
toward the community, what was she really saying? Miss Gallagher was
not a naive observer of the urban scene. She realized that (1) the
vast majority of students who graduate without academic diplomas in
the city of Chicago are black, and that (2) the unions in Chicago have
prevented all black people from pursuing a "good career like carpentry
or plumbing
. .
." Given this context, the "good will" she displayed
must be seen as a deliberate strategy to deny black people a meaningful
O
State of Illinois, Commission on Urban Education, p. 6.
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academic education by substituting useless vocational skills.
In concluding her general remarks, Miss Gallagher stated:
The Chicago Teachers Union is all for anything that is
r
S
en
n
?nH
t0 ^ instrucltlonal program for the child-
teachers?9
^ f° r ^ WOrking COnditions of our
me openly state that I believe in the unions’ right to fight for
the working conditions of their members. America’s history is a vivid
portrayal of capitalists’ continual attempts to exploit working men.
But given Miss Gallagher's remarks about vocational curriculum, the
linkage established between instructional programming and working
conditions was clearly an attempt to manipulate the black children
to allow white teachers to shirk their professional duties. The
line of the logic began with a postulate of the difficulty of teach-
ing disadvantaged children academic skills, proceeded with the
assumption that they should then go to vocational schools, and con-
cluded with the deliberate training of black children for irrelevancy,
a fiat conducted under the banner of improved curriculum and better
working conditions. The strategy was brilliant, effective, and pain-
fully obvious: obscure the grounds of debate, confuse the issues,
mandate decisions with the best of rationalization and the worst of
motives.
One could run down the same logical steps through a number of
other "issues" brought out in the initial remarks: Miss Gallagher’s
claims about the size of the system, the money which was "needed"^
^State of Illinois, Commission on Urban Education, p. 6.
10Ibid
.
,
p. 7 .
for decentralization, the necessity of tripling all administrative
positions, her desires to utilize parents in the planning of curri-
culum, etc. But to do so would unjustly portray the Union as the
devil manipulating just and concerned legislators. Rather, by look-
ing at the dialogue between Miss Gallagher and the august members
of the commission, each a political hack, one can observe the col-
lusion amongst supposedly distinct entities to operate within fal-
lacious categories m an attempt to obscure the vicious inhumanity
and racism which will characterize their eventual actions.
Cjiajn-man Peterson: Suppose there were 15 elected Boards of
Education in the city of Chicago. Would the Teachers Unionbe able to negotiate with all 15 boards or do you feel this
would be an untenable position for you to be in? I am as-
suming complete decentralization and community control of the
city of Chicago public schools.
Miss Gallagher : Where did you pick 15?
Chr. Peterson : I picked it out of the air. 40,000 is always
considered the best possible school size.
Miss Gallagher : We have to. New York is facing the same prob-
lem. They will be negotiating separate contracts for the dif-
ferent school districts unless they have separate unions in
each district. Certainly, it could not be any harder than it
is now.
Chr, Peterson : \ou don't think this would be an impossible
situation?
Miss Gallagher : I don't think it would be impossible. I don't
know about 15. There are three areas right now.
Dean Hazard: Do I understand that at the moment, C.T.U.'s
position would be supportive in general of the principle of
decentralization, with a good many unanswered questions?
Miss Gallagher : Yes.
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What is the attitude of the Teachers Union
trlcM
hl
?
neW 1
n
ea ° £ accountability or performance con-
cting I see that the Teachers Union is having some prob-lems With the concept now. Is there any attitude on thepart of the Teachers Union toward accountability or meritpay (
Miss Galla ghe^: We are definitely against merit pay but
would not be if there was some objective way you could
mark a teacher. If it were like a plant where you turn
out so many nuts and bolts, and thus could measure it
. .
.H
The fashion m which these two "antagonists" work together to
create a pre-determined impression belies the supposedly "independent"
position of their respective organizations. When "public" bodies
become perverted into the tools of special interest groups, one must
seriously question if anyone respects the needs of the people. Peter-
son opened assuming that the Union would be directly negotiating with
separate community boards. While this has never been the case in other
instances of decentralization, the propects of separate negotiations
hardly comforts an advocate of local power. Community boards, be they
black or white, cannot possess the sophistication to deal with the
strategic intelligence of the Union. The truly frightening aspect of
this interchange is the tacit cooperation in creating the facade.
Miss Gallagher’s passive acceptance of the numerical estimates offered
by Chairman Peterson, his whimsical choice of 15 for the number of dis-
tricts and 40,000 for the optimum pupil distribution, indicates the
fraud which they have decided to perpetrate. Magical as they might
be to him, such numbers cannot be justified on educational grounds, but
^State of Illinois, Commission on Urban Education, pp. 7-8.
36
then it is obvious that educational issues are not as worthy of dis-
cussion as the politics of Union power. Shifting to another focal
point, certainly no other conclusion can be drawn from the standard
recital over accountability. The attitude of students toward their
schools, and their ensuing performance, stands as living contradic-
tion to the Union litany. Those who fail to perceive this contradic
tion simply fail to consider the student when discussing educational
success
.
One of the themes which recurs throughout the testimony is
that of sympathy for the beleaguered teacher, administrator or bureau-
crat, depending upon who is speaking. This creates a context so gross
ly distorted that it hardly necessitates attack. While hundreds of
thousands of children literally have their brains eroded by the pub-
lic schools, one supposedly must sympathize with the difficulties
experienced by those perpetrating genocide. Nowhere in this hearing
was this distortion clearer than in the testimony of Mr. Thomas Burke,
President of the Chicago Principals Club:
In Chicago, at least, the principal has been the scapegoat
of the rivalry and pressures which have developed [in re-
sponse to minimal decentralization.] Unprotected by a con-
tract as are teachers, and often unsupported by the board
and the central administration, the principals have been
attacked and removed from the schools for the sake of ex-
pediency ... it produced more red tape and now people
with whom the principal has to talk. 12
The emotional connotations of the shibboleths of the statement,
"scapegoat" , "unsupported" , "attacked"
,
"expediency", "people with whom
12 State of Illinois, Commission on Urban Education, p. 13.
the principal has to talk," deliberately attempt to evoke com-
passion for the poor principals. Legitimate education grievances
presented by the community are denegrated as expedient attacks. His
visibility makes the principal the scapegoat and the victom of the
worst affront of all: now he must talk to "those people." What were
the issues which the commission was investigating? Initially, by
their own words, their purpose was to improve the education of child
ren; yet the categories established bent the investigation into an
effort to make white professionals with an income of over twenty
thousand dollas a year feel better. Instead of viewing the communi-
ty as the victim of racist educational practices, their efforts at
reform become expeditious effrontery inflicted upon good men just
trying to do a job.
Once Burke established this context, he manipulated it be-
autifully, with the cooperation of the commission, to create termino
logy surrounding "decentralization or community control" that once
invoked, mandated an increase in power by administrators at the ex-
pense of the black, Puerto Rican, and white community. Mr. Burke
cited in an almost biblical litany that decentralization should
not be disorganization, or lack of authority, failure of
decision making, ... or just plain buck passing; . . .
decentralization should be divisive of the loyalty of the
staff where you have principals and the teachers, who are
serving two masters, accountable to the central office . . .
on one hand, and accountable, as they should be, to the
community on the other; decentralization shouldn't be an
instrument for further deterioration, as we say, where
if just constantly erodes the position of the teacher and
the administrators.!^
13 State of Illinois, Commission on Urban Education, p. 11.
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In prior testimony, it became quite clear what the principals felt
about attempts by the community to influence the education of their
children. Given this underlying resentment against dignified black
people, Mr. Burke's catalogue of the "don'ts" of reform appeared not
as an objective list of possible pitfalls, but as a conscious ob-
fuscation of the legitimate issues in order to defeat meaningful
community control. When he claimed that decentralization should not
be divisive of the loyalty of the staff, no one can challenge him:
who can advocate creating a disheartened group of teachers and admini-
strators? But to focus on the morale of the professionals, without
examining the sources of that morale, was a distortion of the issue.
In this instance, morale was contingent upon the docility of the clients
being served, just as Burke's desire not to see the authority of
teachers diminish was contingent upon the continued powerlessness of
urban citizens. In other words, Mr. Burke established categories of
discussion which obscured his real motivations, and influenced the
course of discussion in such a fashion as to insure that the real
issue would be ignored as a result of this gentlemen's agreement among
thieves
.
The blatant self-interest of this superficially altruistic
testimony surfaced with the presentation of the principal's positive
program:
All principals should be given enough aid, so that their
time is free to work with parent and community groups.
Principals should make certain that they have meetings,
programs, and communications, so that parents are continually
aware of what is going on in the schools and in the classrooms.
Principals should provide for learning experiences which
will give all pupils opportunities to practice democratic
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decision making at each level of maturity.
Principals advocate employment of more paraprofessionals
community to provide needed assistance in the class-
from the
room. 14
In this evocation of the good, the true, and the beautiful, Burke attempt
ed to solidify the discretionary power of principals over what should
stem from the people rather than be condescendingly granted. One need
not belabor the implications of this slave-holding or colonial ideo-
logy, as it represented the "pure" voice amongst the cacophony of Ameri-
can history.
Those who possessed the greatest authority within this colonial
structure utilized the inherent rationale of the existing system to
protect their political goals. The central administrative staff was
represented before the commission by Mr. Manford Byrd, Jr., and by Mr.
James Moffet, both deputy superintendents operating under Dr. James
Redmond. As they represented a single interest group, I shall treat
their separate testimony as a single coherent presentation aimed at
establishing a common strategy.
Mr. Byrd opened by giving the historical background of the
Chicago decentralization plan. Omitting the violence and protest which
surrounded the departure of the previous superintendent, Ben Willis,
and the general condition of the schools themselves, the deputy super-
intendent focused on an efficiency study conducted by the business con-
sultant firm Booze, Allen, and Hamilton. This report, which found an
unfortunate discrepancy between ability, function, and responsibility
14 State of Illinois, Commission on Urban Education, p. 13.
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’ *
’f,
® b irth to what we call our decentralization plan.It talked about the Board of Education and its concern
with policy setting and the conduct of schools.
°f course, there are some things which have to remain
centralized because of the present means of support that
we have, the task that we have. Personnel functions have
not been decentralized to this point and the matter of
appointment and assignment of personnel
— I think that
there are some good reasons for this ... .15
Mr. Moffet elaborated
I think we are not to the point of having the local admini-
stration and the communities select the teaching person-
nel, but I think that we have moved with force and autho-
rity into the area of more local involvement not only in
the principalship
.
. . but in the selection of the auxi-
liary non-professional
. .
.16
The overt line of reasoning attempted to describe a central admini-
stration deeply concerned about the efficiency of a school system.
Based on the findings of a business consultants firm, they have de-
cided which decisions are best exercised by central authority, and
which decisions are best controlled by low7er echelons in the bureau-
cracy. And if one allows the debate to remain on the plane of effi-
ciency, as defined by Booze, Allen, and Hamilton, the administrative
staff undoubtedly was correct. However, with an understanding of the
risk of redundancy, let me assert that efficiency was not the issue.
Every day teachers enter the Chicago classrooms and continue to attack
the minds and spirit of the city's children. Each year the child is
in school, his I.Q. declines. Parents have the right to foster the
development of their children and, needless to say, to also prevent
•^State of Illinois, Commission on Urban Education, p. 33.
1 6 Ibid
.
,
p. 42
41
their retardation. But administrators didn’t present the issue in
this fashion. To do so would be to implicate themselves. Instead
of speaking about recognizing the authority of parents to educate
then children, deputy superintendents presented the issues in terms
of the internal efficiency of the system.
Thus involvement was possible (it is beneficial to implicate
one s opponent) but control remains in its traditional place. In fact,
decentralization Chicago style actually increases that authority, an
increase apparent in this dialogue:
—
soH.
•
First of all, a question that came up earlier
as a number of new positions that have been added because of
decentralization. I am thinking more of the administrative
or support positions—do you have any idea of the number of
new positions that have come about because of decentralization?
Hi. Byrd . It is true that as we decentralize, as we develop
these areas, we have to have persons that can help deliver
these services. But I think that there have been some
benefits in the creation of these positions. I think the
persons are getting the services to the areas and to the
schools in an innovative fashion and in an effective fashion .
^
Decentralization was first proposed, in the words of Chairman Peterson,
to eliminate the alienation existing between the schools of Chicago
and the students they desire to serve. The effect of the plan, however,
has been to increase the number of bureaucrats oppressing the community
in the name of efficiency and dispersion of responsibility. Tweedle-dee
has deferred to a score of tweedle-dums
;
and the community remained
impotent.
17 State of Illinois, Commission on Urban Education, pp. 34-35.
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Examine the following statement by Mr. Moffet, looking close-
ly at the ignorance and paternalism which pervade, and the self-serv-
ing confusion which he established:
I would say that the community can be involved in coming to
a ecision
. I do not think that the program as developed
y ooze, Allen & Hamilton
. .
.
gives the ultimate decision-
making power to the community. I don't believe that it does,
n my personal experience, I cannot recall any decision that
.
iave n
^
ede<-l to make in which the community with which I wasinteracting was not supportive. I think it can be done with-
out very strict guidelines or saying what the powers as opposed
to my having the power
.
Chr. Peterson: Would you comment, certainly in your position
as Coordinator of Decentralization, you must have studied
other programs which in your mind are some of the problems
connected with community control as opposed to administrative
decentralization which is the program that you ultimately
embarked on?
HP-*.. Moffet : You see, I don't know that there is any fine line
of demarcation ... I think they are so closely related that
I can't bring myself to this ironclad distinction that this is
participation and this is control. 18
Simply put, the above statement is a classic exposition of a racist,
colonial ideology. Moffet has no qualms about admitting that the
community has no real decision-making power under the present decen-
tralization plan. The deputy superintendent even suggested that
such a delegation of authority is unnecessary: fully aware of the
boycotts and riots which have manifested the black hatred of the Chi-
cago public schools, he has the sadism to claim that he has made
no decision that the community has not supported. As Ralph Ellison
and Richard Wright have metaphorically asserted, white Americans seem
not to believe that black people exist.
18 State of Illinois, Commission on Urban Education, p. 43.
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Racist that he is, it would be a great mistake to underesti-
mate the strategic intelligence of Mr. Moffet; this quaint scene being
portrayed is not without its usages for him. The framework estab-
lished by his response implied that here exists no essential conflict
of interests between the schools and their black clients. Anyone
claiming that this was not the case becomes branded as a militant or
a troublemaker. Thus, Booze, Allen and Hamilton can think of a reason
to create strict guidelines. Tried as he might have, Moffet could not
bring himself even to make a distinction between community control and
decentralization. Now in the utopian environment postulated above, there
must be no need to shift the power to make decisions, as all parties
were working toward identical ends. Ergo, under no system of reform
whatsoever, neither decentralization nor community control, could
the administrative staff envision any meaningful delegation of power.
This insanity neatly concludes the staged drama presented to
the commission at this particular hearing. At this juncture, hope-
fully the reader understands the assertions which opened this chapter.
I believe that the picture of the issues in urban education presented
by the four witnesses in question represented a deliberate distortion
of the issues. In the testimony given, no mention was made of the
reading skills, academic motivation, the Coleman data, or the general
rights of parents and pupils to mold a promising future. In fact,
there was no mention of the educational process at all. Rather, the
focus rested upon the difficulties of teachers and administrators in
coping with the heathen population of the urban colony. It must be
recognized that this focus is not one randomly chosen, nor the pro-
duct of excessive emotion. Actually, this alteration in perspective
represents the brilliant, and to this date an all too successful
strategy to maintain the status quo in the face of increasing mili-
tancy and violent dissent. By using the debate to pervert legiti-
mate concerns, the established powers insure that no opposition will
mount a winning assult. The appeal of their position within the cate-
gories established is too strong and draws too strongly on the racist
myths deeply imbedded in the American mind.
What I have written above is not meant to denigrate the quali-
ty of the performances given by the respective actors; each knew his
lines perfectly and the director has exercised his authority to main-
tain thematic continuity throughout. Undoubtedly the theater—goers
received this bit of action with the appropriate thanks to all in-
volved and with slightly intrepid hopes that, at long last, some pro-
gress had been made toward the ultimate pacification of the savage
beast : in this instance, their children. The questions raised about
the motives and methods in the preparation of the coded directional
litany must also implicate the audience who respectfully applaud all
performances open to the public. Why, after twenty years of serious
attacks on public education in America, are educators and mere citizens
still unable to see through this sham, this fraud, and this overt power
play? The response to this inquiry must be diffuse, drawing from the
spectrum of social and economic characteristics of our society, but so
large a constituent element must be style of analysis fostered by the
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critical" literature itself, i.e. that writing on education has it-
self set the stage for its ineffectiveness. This general category
of literature can be termed pastoral in the sense that its focus,
its form of logic and presentation, are alien to the realities of
urban education.
The most remarkable synthesis of the pastoral perspective was
presented in the introduction to Charles E. Silberman's study, Crisis
in the Classroom
,
a book which supposedly mobilized the reform wing
within the American educational establishment. I have not dismissed
Silberman's work. Its usefulness in planting seeds of doubt amongst
the faithful cannot be ignored. Yet the tone which he creates plays
upon the naivete, the conformity, and ultimately the passivity of our
people. Crisis in the Classroom wants to sustain the myths of edu-
cation through rites oi purification instead of to destroy one frame-
work in order to build from the ruins a more just and stable one.
To whom Silberman's plea is directed becomes clear after an
examination of the assumption from which he proceeds. In the pro-
cess of describing the general crisis which confronts, in his words,
"twentieth-century man,"^ he attempts to differentiate our histori-
cal situation from that of our distant predecessors:
Men inherited their occupations, their status, their reli-
gion, and their life styles . . . and their struggles to
survive gave them little time to question anything. Today,
by contrast, they are presented with a bewildering range of
options; they are forced to choose their occupations, jobs,
places to live, marital partners, number of children, religion
19 Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom
,
p. 22.
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political allegiance and affiliation friendships,
allocation of income and life style. ®
For an author who writes in ensuing chapters about the destruction of
opportunity by the public schools, this is an astounding statement.
Such myopia only stems from an ignorance of the common facts of city
liferunwanted pregnancies, forced marriage, manipulative religion,
political corruption, etc., etc.
Putting this aside for the moment, i.e. assuming that Silber-
man s concerns are white, middle-class, the fashion in which he does
address his constituency plays upon the most conventional liberal
ideology, the ideology of pastoral politics. As the appropriate myth
would have it
,
America was founded by "good" men who wished to intro-
duce moral" concerns into government. Silberman's corollary to this
premise holds that if, in fact, the government performs "immoral" acts,
the "good men" need merely be appraised of that fact and they then will
mobilize to rectify the situation. Needless to say, the racism and
violence of this nation’s history make a mockery of this belief, though
clearly not for Charles Silberman. The central concern of the book is
moral ideas and the remedy is to literally send Paul Revere through
every Middlesex village and farm:
To say that this book is about educational purpose, there-
fore, is not to say that it is an exercise in academic philo-
sophy, still less to suggest that it is concerned with ab-
stractions and exhortations. My intent, at least ... is
to discuss ’moral ideas' . . .21
^Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom, p. 22.
21lbid., p. 9.
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It [the crisis in American education] cannot be solved un-less all who have a stake in the remaking of American edu-
cation teachers and students, school board members and tax-payers, public officials and civic leaders, newspaper and
magazine editors and readers, television directors and
viewers, parents and children—are alerted to what is wrong
and what needs to be done. 22
In other words, Silberman's educational judgements are not unsound,
but his model for institutional change insipid. Once he has des-
cribed the ill of public schools, his societal analysis precludes any
effective means of dealing with that failure. School superintendents,
newspaper editors, politicians are not moral men. Their failure to
reform the present school system stems not from their ignorance but
from the vested interest they have in maintaining the public schools
as they are. The only effective method of teaching a man to accept
a job as a bell-boy, or as a street cleaner, or even as a middle-level
executive, is to convince him of his social impotence, i.e. process
him through grim, joyless, and oppressive schools.
From the perspective of the very people Silberman calls on to
change the schools, the schools have succeeded for generations. As
they see matters, what is now called for is efficient reform to faci-
litate the job of social stratification, thereby eliminating the pre-
sent "unpleasantries" surrounding the public system. On another level,
Silberman 1 s model ignores less august interest groups such as the
teacher's union, construction unions, textbook publishers, all of
whom have a vested interest in the status quo, not in moral purity.
22 Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom
,
p. vii.
By coupling his educational sophistication with such naivete, Silber-
man sets the stage for the continued failure of efforts to revolu-
tionize education.
One should not receive the impression that Silberman is an
exception, or that he is in any way a self-conscious bourgeois pro-
pagandist. He shares his weakness with the vast majority of pro-
fessionals who write about education, many of whom have less of a
firm grasp on educational issues. Two of the most intelligent and
sensitive of his precursors are Jonathan Kozol and Annie Stein. Kozol
in his often demonstrated concern for black children, and Mrs. Stein,
particularly with her dedication to organizing the Brooklyn Parent
Workshop, stand apart from any of the trite profiteering which charac-
terizes the recent flow of books on urban education. Yet each, Kozol
in his Death at an Early Age
,
and Annie Stein in her essay "Contain-
ment and Control: A Look at the Record,"^ inadvertantly help perpe-
tuate the same debilitating myths that detract from Crisis in the
Classroom
. This built-in distortion of the issues must be dealt with
regardless of the character of the authors.
Kozol, in particular, is difficult to characterize. Deep
emotional pain, both that of the author and of the black children he
observes in the process of being destroyed, permeates the book, mold-
ing the reader’s response to every segment. But it is particularly
this preeminent tone of personal anguish that erodes the political
effectiveness of Kozol ’s prose. Eight year-old Stephen is a pathetic
2^Annie Stein, "Containment and Control: A Look at the Record,
Schools Against Children
,
ed . Annette T. Rubinstein (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1970), pp. 21-49.
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case: a sensitive child, but crushed by circumstance and frozen by
his own severe mental illness. Through Kozol’s eyes, the reader sees
him wistfully staring at billboards, proudly displaying his drawings,
plaintively hoping to be readmitted to school, and being savagely
treated by "educators.” As the reader is a human being, he sympa-
thizes. As the vernacular would express it, the reader wants to
do something." Within the cliche framework he creates, Kozol has
succeeded. He has stirred the conscience of his audience.
But once this auspicious event has occurred, what is the newly
sensitized reader to do? At this point Kozol sinks back into the trap
of bourgeois ideology that held Silberman. Simple indignation is a
useless weapon; pure sympathy for the plight of black people is an
extension of the racist consciousness. Blind rage over the situation
of others leads only, at best, to cathartic rituals of protests and
concern, or leads to utter frustration. Neither option does much either
to change American education or to help black people. By creating a
purely emotional basis for action, Kozol assists in another of the
white man's strategy to maintain oppressive schools: train people not
to look at the political realities of power; train them not to analyze
the covert process by which decisions are made; and primarily train
them not to recognize the calculated benefits of what appears as an
error. It is futile to add that sustained movements for social change
have never stemmed from one race's or class' desire to aid a different
race or class. Instead of risking personal status to achieve revo-
lutionary gains, such crusades generally degenerate into cathartic
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gestures and condescending offers of assistance. As Robert Cromie
wrote in the Chicago Tribune about Kozol's book: "This book will
anger you to the boiling point and may make you want to weep." 24
Annie Stein's essay in Schools Against Children provides a
perfect description of the syndrome that can develop from the emotion-
alism of Death at an Early Age. In great detail she describes the
stiuggle of black New York parents to integrate the public schools
from the middle 1950 's to the origins of the I.S. 201 struggle. Every
conceivable method of attack was used in this struggle: they boycot-
ted, they marched, they advocated busing, they advocated educational
parks, they petitioned, and they pleaded with anyone who would listen.
While perhaps a certain segment of the city became aware of educational
issues as a result of these trials and tribulations, the gestures them-
selves were futile. One cannot help but sense that the point of it
all is simply the actions themselves, rather than any improvement in
the education of blade people.
In the instance of Annie Stein, the result can hardly be seen
as the consequence of deliberate planning, but again she writes in such
a way as to obscure the issues and minimize support. She comes tantali-
zingly close, but still, no mention is made of the hidden power brokers
of New York; no mention of the complicity of the entire economic and
political leadership of the city in the failure of her movement; no
mention of the horribly repressive nature of the schools into which
24 Quoted on back cover of Kozol, Death at an Early Age .
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she wanted to have black children bussed. White parents, reading
that blacks want to come to their schools, unfortunately assume then
that their schools are doing an adequate job, when in fact they are
simply locking children into the economic ladder at a different
though slightly higher level. But Annie Stein fails to deal with the
problem in such a fashion as to (1) incite white parents to join the
struggl e for the sake of black and white children, or to (2) provide
black people with a new sophistication with which to develop new and
more effective forms of political action around the issue of better
education for their children.
The pastoral genre though need not be so fraught with pain
nor be so involved in active resistance. Two contributions from the
25
academic community, Teachers Talk and Dynamics of School Community Re-
2 6lationshj ps
,
also fail to dissipate the fog. Anthropologist Estelle
Fuchs addresses herself to the question of how neophyte teachers picture
their role in inner city schools. Such reportage, assumedly from a
historical and academic perspective, adds new legitimacy to diversion-
ary tactics. In this case, Mrs. Fuchs expands from the undeniable fact
that new teachers have many problems to making generalizations that
cloud the issue with excessive emotionalism. The areas of her concern,
i.e. lesson plans, interaction with pupils and teacher, reactions to
regulations and the social problems presented by the "disadvantaged,"
create certain types of questions for which there are pre-determined
9 S
Estelle Fuchs, Teachers Talk: Views from Inside City Schools
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. [Anchor Books], 1969).
9 C
\
Roald F. Campbell and John A. Rainseyer, The Dynamics of School -
Communi ty Re 1 a
t
ion ships (New York: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 195 j)
.
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answers. An example of such a staged interaction follows:
Given the existence of the phenomenon of culture shock, how
can teachers be helped through this crucial period toward
a constructive functioning on their part?
. . . One, too
many new responsibilities ought not to be imposed upon the
new teacher too early. 26
The basic assumption related to this experience of teachers who are
obviously white include imputations as to the superiority of one
party and the savagery of the other; the inadequate preparation by
society of these teachers; and the necessity of the children suffer-
ing as a result of this failure. The author sets the stage once
again, and I do believe unintentionally, to confuse the issue:
Certainly greatly expanded services to deal with physical
and emotional problems are required .... it behooves ad-
ministrators to take care that the beginning teacher's class-
room does not become the dumping ground for those children
One can almost hear Representative March! calling for the power to
remove "those children", the disruptive children, from the classroom,
an increasingly fashionable cry which ignores statistics and records
indicating the racist motives behind the improvement in the working
conditions for teachers. The issues are obscured, the answers meaning-
less.
V7e know of the existence of these problems; they are persistent
and pervasive. The insensitivity of a writer who will pander to the
sensationalism of the media rather than utilize her insights for change
2
^Fuchs, Teachers Talk, pp. 22-23.
2
7
Ibid.
,
p. 72.
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cannot be forgiven. The writer is white, she moves in white set-
tings, and again she talks about the black community without bringing
attention to real issues and possible alternatives. Her audience,
obviously educational bureaucrats and teachers, can empathize with
the presentation and is provided with the conduit to avoid serious
consideration of its actions.
Another academic production within this pastoral mode which
totally fails to deal with urban settings is Campbell and Ramseyer's
collaboration to produce The Dynamics of School-Community Relation -
ships . They wrote:
Sometimes the improvement of citizen participation in educa-
tional planning and development comes as a natural conse-
quence of orderly developments in the community. In other
instances, this participation is revolutionary in character.
Unreasonable demands are made upon the school system. 28
What they mean by an "improvement," or "orderly development", or
unreasonable demands” is anybody's guess, yet the stage is already
set for any administrator to dismiss whatever community movement he
happens to dislike. But, for the purpose of argumentation, let us
assume that the terms are not quite so vacuous. To the select, there
is a process of parent participation that merely needs to be under-
stood. This is a racist assumption directed only to white middle-
class America which has always controlled its schools and, in a majori-
ty of cases, actually participated. Such casual references as
28Campbell and Ramseyer, The Dynamics of School-Community Re-
lationships
,
p. 2.
• * * any school superintendent who has helped his community pass
a bond issue or a school-tax levy knows that there are various de-
grees of support for the schools
. . .
,"-9 assume that this is a
typical situation. But historically, minorities have not been in-
volved in bond issue voting, as they are more often considered as
dependents or welfare recipients. The model is obviously one of an
affluent community where such participation is standard practice.
To presume to deal with black urban communities in such categories
is to deny their distinctive character, if not their very existence.
Please refer to Appendices A and B for a discussion of the
literature in a historical perspective and comments on confidential
literature and public naivete.
29Campbell and Ramseyer,
lat ionships
,
p . 19.
The Dynamics of Sc l iool-Communlty Re-
CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA: PANEL ONE
There exist numerous logically defensible approaches to the
analysis of the data assembled in the transcripts of Panels One through
Five. The most obvious involves the collation of the significant por-
tions of each panel into a single body which would then be subject to
scrutiny as to the prominent themes, chronology established, options
discussed, etc. The end product of such a procedure would be a synthe-
tic compilation of the highest level of thought exhibited during the
panel sessions. Yet, this methodological approach, no matter how neat,
would obfuscate, by the necessity of its procedural rules, (1) the
different conflicts between different factions at the different junc-
tures over the course of five months; and (2) the manner in which the
expressed thoughts of certain key panelists developed from session to
session. In other words, the ensuing five transcripts must be treated
not as moribund proclamations or even the products of "reasoned" thought,
but rather as the organic development of the collective intellect of
ten people operating under the pressures engendered by the peculiar
group dynamics.
To facilitate the entry of the reader into the mass of data
embodied in the transcripts, an analysis of the November panel session
will (1) establish the background of each of the panelists; (2) delin-
eate the list of issues which these panelists considered on first
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reflection to be of paramount importance to the New York City crisis;
(3) discuss crucial incidents in the chronology created to portray in
actuality the theoretical statements previously discussed; and (4) to
discern if, in fact, the chronology established lends substance to the
prior generalizations. Excluding the representatives of the School
of Education, Dean Dwight Allen, Associate Dean Robert Woodbury, and
Dr. Atron Gentry (Dr. Gentry making the only substantive contribution),
the panelists present were Dr. Marilyn Gittell, Mrs. Esther Swanker,
Mr. Fred Ferretti, Reverend Milton Galamison, and Reverend C. Herbert
Oliver. Crudely stated for the purposes of this brief introduction,
the range of issues discussed centered upon those deemed crucial by
the participants themselves in the opening remarks. These issues were
defined as:
1. The conflicts between the powerful and the powerless in Ameri-
can society.
2. The bureaucratization of institutional procedures.
3. The rights of parents to educate their children.
4. The moral integrity of Americans.
5. The racial question.
6. The usage of the schools in the process of economic discrimina-
tion in capitalist societies.
7. The usage of state laws to regulate, or in fact, promulgate
inequality.
The critical incidents in the chronological development of these issues,
their portrayal in actuality which shall be dealt with for the purposes
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of this thesis, include (1) the 1954 Supreme Court decision; (2) the New
Yoik City school boycotts; (3) the attacks on the Board of Examiners;
and (4) the transitions in the attitude of the Teacher's Union from the
drafting of the original proposal to the strike which prevented the open-
ing of the 1967 school year. An analysis of these crucial junctures is
the first step toward any discussion of the options that were available
to each faction, and, by implication, the options that remain available
at this point to their corresponding entities across the country.
The prime question that must be dealt with is the perceptions
which each participant had of the crisis, and what effect these per-
ceptions had on the participatory role, and ultimately, on the outcome
which these roles dictated. The inverse of this proposition is equally
important. What did each participant fail to see, and how did this
failure relate to the background of not only the intellectual character-
istics of the individual, but of the political experience of the social
group or class which shaped these perceptions? In other words, the
positions delineated by the panelists represent not only the thoughts
of one person, but a synthesis of the social sophistication of the move-
ments which they represented in the Ocean Hill confrontation.
Thus, one can hardly be surprised that Dr. Marilyn Gittell, a
white political scientist from Queens College and Director of the Insti-
tute for Community Studies, presents the most cogent initial statement
about the crisis. A consultant to both the drafters of the Bundy and
the Passow Reports, her multifarious dealings with members of the black
community, representatives of professional organizations, in addition
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to men of great political influence, lends a sophistication unavail-
able to isolated members of the indigenous population: those persons
whose children were the crux of the violence in 1968.
I don't think there has ever been any doubt in my mind that
the issue was fundamentally an issue of critical and social
conflict of vested interests vs. the powerless; people whohad power in the school system and controlled the decision
making in it, and those who challenged the output of edu-
cation in New York City
. . . and that confrontation be-
tween these two forces, I think, is the backdrop of the
issue in New York City, and I dare say in the cities through-
out the country.!
from the outset, Dr. Gittell conceptualized the events not in educa-
tional, but in strictly political terms, a perception that subordi-
nates the educational nature of the conflict, i.e. what is best for
children to an examination of the division of power in American
society
.
Given this context, what other actors have attempted to portray
as central concerns becomes dependent variables or sub—sets within
Dr. Gittell' s broadly analytical perspectives. For example, the bureau-
cracies empowered by institutionalized education become not, as Esther
Swanker
,
among others, would have it, independent power blocks, but
rather a set of protective devices utilized by more deeply entrenched
interstices. Continuing along this vein, Dr. Gittell perceived racism
not as the motive force, of the various antagonists, but as the cloak
under which the white power structure chose to operate. This position
does not deny the importance of white racism in the oppression of black
people; rather, it attempts to establish a desire to protect the social
iGittell, Transcript of Panel One, November 16, 1970, p. 2.
and economic benefits of racism as the motive force, instead of its
implicit or vituperative desire to deny black and Third World people
their rights.
The strategic flexibility which this perspective permits fore-
shadows the impotence of the analysis and the movement which Reverend
Oliver exemplifies. While the white trained academician attempts to
explain apparent events in terms of hidden motivations, Reverend
Oliver, by virtue of his training, and in a broad sense of the term
his congregation, must assume that his restatement of a political slogan
can suffice for an understanding of the dimensions of the problems. This
is not to imply that the Chairman of the Governing Board was not a
courageous man, a man with tremendous dedication and organizational skills.
The fervent honesty with which Reverend Oliver presented his case, and
his passionate concern for the children of his community stand as a con-
summate refutation of the persistent racist assumptions about the inability
of black people to care for and educate their children. It is easy to
feel the links between Reverend Oliver and the Ocean Hill community as
he plays for the first time the theme which literally sums up his parti-
cipation in the panels:
I would say the most basic issue is the right of parents to edu-
cate their children ... I would ask: do professionals have a
right to educate children?
. . . does a union have the right to
educate children? I think these were issues that were being
challenged ... .2
The superficial validity of these assertions cannot be questioned. Un-
doubtedly on the moral level, the foundation lies in precisely that
^Oliver, Transcript of Panel One, November 16, 1970, p. 3.
determination about who does, in fact, have the right to educate. But
the pervasive failure of Oliver's position stems not from a failure of
sentiment, rather from a failure to generate political sophistication
from that sentiment. From the Reverend’s correct moral position stems
nothing which is of political or educational use to his people.
It would be tempting not to dwell on this point; to simply
praise the man for the unquestionable genius which he possesses, if it
were not for what this position reflects in the black community, and
in turn, the effect which such a position has upon this community. Given
the sophistication of his audience, it would have been an impossibility
for Reverend Oliver to utilize any argumentative basis other than a
moral one. Regardless of the political intrigue and overt repression
which characterized the white response to Ocean Hill-Brownsville
,
Oliver’
fervent and consistent plea for the children provided the only possible
organizational continuity. Yet it was precisely the nature of this
ideological-organizational structure which betrays the unsophisticated
level of comprehension which characterized the community itself. Denied
access to any meaningful information and institutional participation by
the genocidal actions of white America, the majority of black people is
neutralized in its efforts to formulate an effective strategy to combat
the obvious oppression which dominates their lives. Thus, it was only
from the perspective of morality, from the perspective of the black com-
munity tradition of an overdependence on ministerial leadership in poli-
tical affairs that Oliver could reach and maintain a following in the
community. But once this community was mobilized around the moral issue,
the simply emotional base of the activism precluded an understanding of
the enemy's tactics, which could have generated an effective strategy.
As the panel itself stated at numerous junctures, the issue in Ocean
Hill was not a moral one but a conflict over political and social power.
It is impossible to fight such concentrations of power with moral argu-
ments, no matter how fervent the sentiment behind those arguments might
be. Further, the excessive, almost apocalyptic morality creates defeat
in the community itself. Within such a movement, the goals are not
tangible, and there exist no intermediate points which signify the types
of gains that build and sustain a movement: any achievement short of
the banishment of evil from the earth must be termed a failure. As the
struggle continues over years and decades and evil seemingly fails to
diminish, nothing is captured by the movement to prove its efficacy to
its people. This continued failure, insured by an inability to define
tactical and specific objectives, guarantees the eventual destruction of
the spirit of the community and, needless to say, its continued impotence
in the face of sophisticated political opponents.
Cast in this realistic, if not overly jaundiced light, Reverend
Oliver's contribution at the opening session of the panel and to Ocean
Hill becomes extraordinarily difficult to assess. The dedication of this
man, for whom I have only the highest respect, to his community is a tri-
bute to his morality and character. But unfortunately, the power of black
people will not be enhanced in America, nor will our children receive a
better education solely from the emotional strength of our people. Rather
the community and its indigenous leadership must begin to perceive the
vicious and sophisticated reality of urban politics before our attempt
to destroy that system of politics is successful.
I
Seemingly, no one should have had a firmer grasp of that fact
than Reverend Milton Galamison. After almost fifteen years in the
"vanguard" of the education movement in New York City and an actual one-
year term on the Board of Education, one might assume that he would have
been able to deliver a cogent disposition on the background of the Ocean
Hill confrontation. Unfortunately, one of Brooklyn's most prominent black
political leaders slipped back to vague, yet remarkably eloquent assertions
about the failure of man to meet his times, a classic exposition of poli-
tical doctrine of original sin. Reverend Galamison neatly divided his
remarks into four areas: values, ethnocentrism, anacronisms, and econo-
mics. The problem, so this theory purports, relates back to the general
failure of the philosophy of American education, namely, its excessive
preoccupation with grades and test-passing at the expense of the "humani-
zing" usages of liberal education. He stated:
So I argue: what we are dealing with basically, in one instance,
is a problem of values, because if our values were what they
ought to be we would never have these struggles in these areas.
^
It is, presumably, this lack of values which accounts for what Reverend
Galamison so obliquely termed "the problem of ethnocentrism." This inbred
cultural imperialism is compounded by the archaic structure of the white
culture itself. Echoing a recent string of bourgeois critics from Allen
Toffer and Lewis Mumford to Charles Reich, Galamison claimed that the
pace of history has overwhelmed middle-class culture, that computers,
^Galamison, Transcript of Panel One, November 16, 1971, p. 4.
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television, and airplanes have confused Americans in the maze of their
own ingenuity. Couched amidst the Reverend's pastoral eloquence, his
I
positions assume a certain aura of dignity, the variety generally
accepted in white, liberal, middle-class circles.
While this is indeed not an inherently derogatory remark, Galami-
son's remarks do little to help anyone understand and act upon the
New York crisis while they do maintain Galamison's stature as a responsible
spokesman for the national situation; i.e. for black people in the eyes
of white organizations and politicians. More to the point, the initial
three concerns of Reverned Galamison seem to preclude an adequate under-
standing of his fourth and most legitimate focus of concern, that of
economics. Galamison alone among the panelists alluded in this initial
session to the correlation between the schooling which the white bureau-
cracy is willing to provide, and the perpetual struggle for employment
in our society. In other words, he perceived the lineage between the
poor schooling afforded black people, and the relative ease with which
they are denied even minimally adequate employment - a lineage obviously
perceived by Shanker and the vast majority of the white population of the
city. In this light, it is ironic that Galamison could persist with his
cant about values, and particularly about the failure of America to gain
control over its technological environment when he so clearly under-
stands that the issue directly centers upon conscious attempts to
maintain the economic oppression of black people. The implications
of this understanding dictated an accusation against the white power
structure delineating its genocidal assaults upon the minds and bodies of
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the black community
. Galamison's failure to even approach such a posture
underscores the difficult relationship which exists between the faceless
members of New York’s black population and their "leadership" as de-
fined by the white media.
Moving the analysis to a different stage, the fascinating initial
statement of Esther Swanker must be read with great care as it provides
an excellent introduction to the perspective not only of the State De-
partment of Education for which she worked, but sensitive and liberal ob-
servers in general. The perspective which she brought to the panels was
a unique one. As Commissioner Allen's liaison to the New York Board of
Education, she had the opportunity to establish a close working relation-
ship with Superintendent of Schools Donovan while observing the machina-
tions of such organizations as the state legislature, the C.S.A., and
the Union. Needless to say, such a perspective and such sources of in-
formation were not available to anyone within the black community.
Speaking after Dr. Gittell and Reverend Galamison had usurped the
more obvious focal points for discussion, Mrs. Swanker alluded to the
utilization of the New York State Legal Code by, in her words, "these
vested interests. Given her position in Albany, her remarks validate
what others could simply assert:
I think we were shown dramatically just where the political
power lay when the decentralization bill finally came to the
floor of the legislature, and we saw the Ocean Hill-Brownsville
Board and all the people who supported it, and there were many
very powerful people, as you recall, who fought for a broad,
general decentralization plan and it went down to a tremendous
defeat, because of the power of the union, and the power of the
CSA which sat on the tailcoat of the union.
^
Swanker, Transcript of Panel One, November, 16, 1970, p.5.
^Ibid
.
,
p . 6
.
This verification of the
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power of the United Federation of Teachers is
itself a valuable addition to the recitation of areas of concern, but
the real fascination of her remarks stems from the context in which she
placed this obvious fact of political life. As a civil servant, the
failure of her bureaucracy to unilaterally dominate the situation is
baffling, and she remained unable to integrate her knowledge of the
power of the Union with her broader assertions about the legislature and
New York politics in general.
For the past twenty years, the difficulties forced upon educa-
tional bureaucracy came from "those people," a vocal but politically
impotent force of black and white liberal reformers
. Regardless of the
validity of the position advocated, the political powerlessness of the
black community implied that their opposition per se could be met from
a position of strength. Suddenly with the challenge stemming from a
union, the bureaucracy lost its power to dictate "compromise" on its
own terms and was forced to accede to the power of its lily-white oppo-
sition. Clearly, this loss of control made Mrs. Swanker, and undoubted-
ly her co-workers on Livingston Street and in Albany, understandably
anxious
.
Secondly, she failed to integrate her broad knowledge of the
power of the Union with her understanding of institutional processes in
America. Fully cognizant of the power of the U.F.T. to manipulate votes
she could still assert that "the legislature did not know how to really
face the issues that were raised in the 1967-70 controversy. . . ."^
^Swanker, Transcript of Panel One, November 16, 1970, p. 6.
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Yet the obvious deduction from her prior assertion is that the legis-
lature was fully aware of the necessity of its acting in the interests
of the Union and was not simply confused or naive. As a corollary to
this she hoped that the lesson of Ocean Hill to the people of New York
will center around the inadequacy and inequality of the law. She stated
this when her own data indicated that this issue is not the law, but the
vested interests which the law protects; that the issue is not the legis-
lature but the men and the money which control the legislature.
The reactions of a portion of the absent panelists, particularly
Mario Fantini and Bernard Donovan, to this statement by Mrs. Swanker
would have been particularly interesting. But their opening statements
were solicited in later sessions and are commented upon at the appro-
priate juncture. This analysis has not dealt with the comments made
by Mr. Fred lerretti. While his intellectual interjections were extra-
ordinarily valuable, his independent assertions generally centered sole-
ly around the role of the media in the school crisis. Because of the
unique manner of Ferretti's contribution, his remarks are dealt with
as a unit rather than under the appropriate panel.
The remarks capsulized above will hopefully provide a framework
not only for the ensuing chronology, but for the ongoing discussion which
rambles on over the full five panels. In this instance, their vague and
general nature is valuable to the structure of the study, and this
aspect also makes it extraordinarily difficult for anyone not directly
involved in New York City, particularly administrators in other cities,
to ground the remarks in particular situations indigenous of their re-
spective communities. It is far easier to perceive the similarity or
dissimilarity between specific reiterations than to attempt a comparison
of one particular circumstance to a vague generalization. Hence, the
second major endeavor for the candidate and the panel was the abstraction
of a chronology of the events in New York from the theoretical statements
above, i.e. the translation of these abstractions into a concrete reality.
It would be impossible to discuss each of the events touched on by the
panel. Thus, four critical events have been selected for the purposes
of this analysis: (1) the 1954 Supreme Court decision, (2) the school
boycotts, (3) the attempts to abolish the Board of Examiners, and (4) the
reactions of the Union to the proposal for the demonstration districts
and the relation of this reaction to the 1967 strike. It is hoped that
the nature of the events in question, in addition to what each panelist
stated about that event, will be, when adequately analyzed, a useful tool
in defining the import and the implications of the crisis in New York
City schools and the role of the demonstration districts in that ongoing
crisis
.
The decision of the Supreme Court on the Brown vs. Topeka School
Board case in 1954 is not simply important for the alteration it made in
the legal attitude of white America about the question of segregated school-
ing. Not only did the negation of the separate but equal theory initiate
a movement which began the challenge to the urban school systems which
continues today, but it more, crucially established a particular mode of
attack, a particular political posture which has had deep and lasting
effects on the Negro reform movement.
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The decision is often credited with sparking the civil rights
movements which began to materialize under Martin Luther King and the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference. The background of the deci-
sion centers upon the efforts of a black intellectual, Dr. Kenneth
Clark, to manipulate governmental institutions for the benefit of mino-
rity Americans through an integrated organization, the National Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
. Dr. Clark pro-
vided the research data which anchored the case in academically and
legally respectable terminology while the NAACP provided the financial
backing and legal expertise. In reaction to this combination a white
institution, the Supreme Court, granted the coalition the most signifi-
cant victory that the black movement had received in post-war days.
The combination was eminently successful; such success invites repeti-
tion and repetition, in this instance, was a deadly error.
To understand this assertion one must examine the characteristics
of the elements which combined to produce the victory and their relation
to the larger black community. None of these constituent elements can
be perceived in an inherently negative light. Dr. Clark is one of the
true pioneers in his field and the NAACP did much to publicize and
attack the plight of the American black population. But the positions
into which these elements were projected by the circumstances debilitated
the black community for a period that can only be seen as symbolically
ending with the Watts riots. Dr. Clark is a black man who manipulated
the style and the rhetoric of white America. In his ability to do so,
he was literally unique in 1954, and he remains a scarce commodity even
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at this time. But in capitalizing on this ability, he established
that the battle would be fought using the white man's system of judge-
ment, and on the white man's turf. In doing so he aided in the con-
tinued political castration of the black masses. By implication,
their talents and their power were deemed either useless or irrelevant.
Secondly, the NAACP relied heavily on a "white" definition of
racial problems and, significantly, on white financial backing to pur-
sue those problems. Thus, the organization was strictly limited to
what its liberal backing or its guilt money could condone; an obvious
conflict with the needs and desires of the black community. And as
in the implications drawn from Dr. Clark's key role, the conception
arose that progress was possible without the participation of the mass
of black people, that the combination of the black elite with white
money would pursue the cause of racial justice. Further, the focus of
all efforts was on justice from the same white institutions that had
been perpetuating injustice since the founding of the Republic.
In summary, the 1954 victory established a pattern in New York
and nationally. It defined the bases of black support in the narrowest
possible fashion, tied the movement to the constraints imposed by its
white financial backing, and established the precedent of fighting the
battle with a foreign system of values in frameworks constructed and
controlled by the opposition itself. It is almost a mute point to add
that such a policy helps to perpetuate the lack of political sophistica-
tion of the black masses, literally helping to confirm the original
assumptions of the victorious coalition. Thus, while the victory was a
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great one, the patterns which it established had effects which in-
fluenced the course of events, ultimately helping to establish the
context in which Ocean Hill-Brownsville functioned.
Milton Galemison stated the following about the nature of
the consistent struggle over the public schools in New York City:
It was a group of people that had no body politic in a
sense, that is, there wasn't a lot of mass organization
and what not underlying these groups. So they made their
bid and then sort of fell apart.
7
The reasons for this disintegration and the successes that were achieved
before this dissolution are best exemplified in the school boycotts
of 1964, led in part by Reverend Galamison. After a series of efforts
to integrate the New York City schools and the sit-out for open enroll-
ment in 1960, Galamison, backed by the Parent's Workshop, the NAACP,
CORE, and the Urban League led a boycott in February of 1964 in which
over 400,000 children participated. The focus of the boycott "was
to get a timetable and a plan for desegregation of the public schools." 8
After the failure of the initial effort a second boycott was called
for March. This one ultimately involved 300,000 children. Finally,
a timetable was established, though not seriously pursued by the Board
of Education. The obvious fact is that for all the organizational
effort expended, the boycotts failed to noticeably affect the
education of children in New York City. The intriguing question is why?
Among the responses which come to mind the pressing one is,
as foreshadowed above, the financial base of the organizat ions . Because
7G al amison, Transcript of Panel One, November 16, 1971, p. 8.
8 Ibid
.
, p . 14 .
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the black people lack the expendable resources to engage in philan-
thropy, the sources, when they could be found, had to be white. And,
at that time, most whites preferred to send their money south, as a
consequence of, in Milton Galamison's unique phrase, the liberal
"social presbyopia. ”9 Thus the dependable and adequate financial
base needed for a mass organizational effort was lacking. As a corol-
lary to this stance, Galamison pointed to the attrition which the
movement experienced as it persisted in its struggle:
... I think it ought to be remembered that the farther we
pressed along, the more our number dwindled, that is, every
fight involved fewer people than the fight before ... be-
tween those two boycotts in 1964, we lost the NAACP, we lost
the Urban League, and we lost the Congress of Racial Equality,
at least we lost the national office, nine of thirteen branches
participated anyway
. .
.10
Though the continued dedication of numerous parents groups can be
consoling, the defection of institutions providing financial backing
severly debilitated the boycott movement.
But the origin of the defeat must be sought not only in the
backing of the movement, but in the goal and constituency of the move-
ment itself. The entire effort was aimed at the establishment of a
timetable, a statement of future commitment to integration rather than
to immediate change. This attack at the manner in which the Board of
Education conceived of its schools certainly struck at a fundamental
principle, but timetables in their abstraction become too vague and
Galamison, Transcript of Panel One, November 16, 1970, p. 12.
^ibid.
,
p. 16.
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distant to provide the focus of a sustained movement. Even in victory
literally nothing tangible is won. Given the most sophisticated of
constituencies, this inability to deliver tangible rewards for victory
insures the eventual dissolution of the coalition. This is particu-
larly so when the community in question is subjected to the harrass-
ment and oppression of cooperating white racist institutions. A crude
example is the standard threat to withhold welfare checks from activist
parents. Under the best of circumstances, it is difficult to build
a sustained drive with people forced to undergo the daily grind of
poverty in New York City, particularly when the goals are so abstract
and non-visible.
This tacit acknowledgment of the self-defeating aspects of
the boycott movement does not lead to the implication that, perhaps,
a more intelligently directed coalition, or a coalition encompassing
a broader, more diverse spectrum of interests, would have been more
successful. Each futile movement to reform the New York City schools
has been traditionally criticized as creating its own impotence out of
9 failure to build workable and political coalitions. However, there
exists no evidence to the conclusion that such a coalition could, in
fact, be created around a substantive issue; and secondly, even if
such a coalition did miraculously appear, that it would be successful
in achieving its stated objectives. A classic example of the failure
of such coalition politics was the attempt in 1966 to abolish the
Board of Examiners
.
This legally autonomous institution for the certification and
selection of supervisory personnel had long been criticized as not only
being racist, but entirely unable to conduct an adequate process of se-
lection. With a minimum of effort, the board has long employed such racist
techniques as pronunciation tests to unilaterally exclude minority groups
for civil service eligibility for supervisory positions. Mrs. Swanker
asserted that, just prior to the establishment of the decentralization
districts, this unilaterally denounced board could have been abolished.
She argues that not only was the black community calling for such a mo\e
,
but the president of the Board of Education himself, Alfred Giardino,
backed legislation to alter the selection process. In addition, the
dean of the School of Education of the New York University, Daniel
Griffin, had issued a report, endorsed by the Public Education
Association, which recommended the abolishment of the Board of Examiners
to the Superintendent. Clearly, a wide spectrum of very powerful interest
groups were demanding action on a single, clearly defined issue. This
was not an attempt at a black or a militant coup, but a movement which
included the most established white educators in the city of New York.
The Board of Examiners continues to exist, with its legal mandate
to continue racial discrimination in the hiring practices of the public
schools unchanged. The oft sought-after coalition failed to deliver on
even so moderate an issue as the selection processes for principals, no
less on the rights of blacks to self-determination. Just as Mrs. Swanker
had so naively presented her hopes for such a coalition of white knights,
she graphically explained why such a coalition was an exercise in futility
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from start to finish. In her words, "at that time the only two groups
that were fighting for the continuation of the Board of Examiners were
the Union and the Council of Supervisory Associations
. .
,»U Such
a crude recitation of the political facts forces a reassessment of any
illusions about the process of political change in New York state. As
a result of such a reassessment two facts become startingly clear: (1)
the number of people involved in any movement or coalition is irrelevant
Only the political allegiances which those groups represent can be cal-
culated. And (2) that the efforts of black community groups to "work"
m coalitions with "white liberal support" had produced absolutely
nothing of substance to justify the continuation of such coalitions.
Such conclusions drawn from the data which Mrs. Swanker presented in
this first panel negate any naive speculation about the usefulness of
blue-ribbon coalitions in the "reasonable" and moderate path to better
schooling for all of the children of New York City.
Another series of incidents which may be lifted from the chrono-
j those relating to the origin of the proposal for the demonstration
districts, provides support to this general assertion, in addition to
more fully developing the political posture into which the Union, and
the Governing Board were placed. To outline in full this evolution
would necessitate an entire thesis of its own, due to the duplicity
and complexity which it engendered. Space does not allow, nor does
public information permit an adequate exercise of the actions and motives
^Swanker, Transcript of Panel One, November 16, 1970, p. 32.
of the Mayor’s office, the Ford Foundation, the Union, the Board of
Education, the State Commissioner’s office, the State Legislature,
and the professional staff and representatives of the community.
Given the events which ensued from the proposal it is, however, crucial
to understand the initial position of the U.F.T.; ultimately, Shanker's
actions structured the framework within which the remaining white
institutions were forced to operate. Thus, what is known about the
Union s motives will be related to the general chronology of events,
specifically the 1967 strike which shut down all the city schools just
as the demonstration districts were beginning to operate.
In response to a mandate from the legislature and the Mayor
to decentralize the administrative branches of the school system,
Superintendent Donovan stated that they submitted to the Board a state-
ment outlining twelve different types of educational innovations for
New York City, three of which dealt with the idea of demonstration
districts. More precisely, the intent was, in Mrs. Swanker ' s words,
to involve "the people of the community in some fashion not specified."
At that point discussion was initiated with Ford, specifically with
Mario Fantini, about the possibility of funding such demonstrations.
At these discussions the 201 complex and Twin Bridges were identified
as possible project locations. At a later stage in the negotiations,
Sandy Feldman, the U.F.T. representative to Ocean Hill-Brownsville,
suggested that groups of schools be submitted to Mario Fantini for
possible inclusion. She did so because of what she perceived to be the
12 Swanker, Transcript of Panel One, November 16, 1970, p. 49.
constructive relationships established between members of the Union
and elements of the local community. This action graphically poses
t
I
a question about not only the Union's, but Superintendent Donovan's
perceptions about exactly what a demonstration district was, as opposed
to the definition later provided by the parents of Ocean Hill-Browns-
ville. The panel data does not, at this point, provide substantive
data for a response, but Fred Ferretti suggests a portion of the
factors motivating the Teacher's Union:"The teacher at this point
conceived of the district as being nothing more than an enlarged
More Effective Schools program." 13 In other words, Ferretti was sug-
gesting that the union conceived of the demonstration districts in
their first stages as another opportunity to continue their expansion
from an organization legitimately determined to deal with the working
condition of its membership to the major education policy maker for the
schools of New York City.
The strike which prevented the opening of school in the fall of
1967 provides the perfect example of this usurpation of power by the Union.
The strike centered around two issues: (l)the pay raises requested, and
eventually granted; and (2) the issue of the disruptive child. The simple
fact of a strike was significant to the Governing Board, but the issue
around which the strike was based mandated that it be even more central to
the Board's concern. The desire of the Union to allow a single teacher
to unilaterally suspend a child from class had long been opposed by
even the more moderate organizations such as the NAACP
,
as a vehicle for
13Ferretti, Transcript of Panel One, November 16, 1970, p. 56.
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the implementation of racist attitudes which permeated the New York
system. In addition, the entire strike was staunchly opposed by the
newly formed Afro-American Teacher's Association. The Governing
Board perceived two central concerns about the strike: (1) they did
not want to begin their experiment in improving the education of
their children by denying those children entrance to the schools, and
(2) they wanted to join with all the black people of New York in re-
pudiating the Union s desire to build yet another instrument of
institutionalized racism into the schools. Thus, against the re-
commendation of the unit administrator, the Governing Board voted to
open all the schools in defiance of the U.F.T. strike.
Though the Union must have begun the process of altering its
original conception of the district long before the opening of school
in 1967
,
this failure to support what they considered to be a crucial
strike must have indicated to the Union that the existence of an insti-
tution which was controlled by black people could only be detrimental
to their self-declared goals. At this point the question must be raised,
and it applies with equal force to the preceding discussion of the 1954
Court decision, the boycott, and the coalition to abolish the Board of
Examiners, as to whether or not this action was a strategy, and if so,
was it the best strategy which could have been created given the cir-
cumstances? In other words, throughout the 1960's, was the black
community randomly picking at targets to siphon off its frustrations,
simply attacking the educational bureaucracy without any conception
of tactics or strategy?
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Ferretti, speaking as a white man and as a representative of
the media who observed the black insurgency throughout the 1960*8,
stated unequivocally that while blacks were becoming increasingly
aware of their increased power, the community at large was incapable
of translating that power into a sophisticated strategy. Thus he sees
the failure of the specific instances cited above to deal with the
appropriate issues in a positive fashion as being in part due to the
failure of the black community to intelligently organize the resources
available.
But what Ferretti was unable to do was to distinguish between
the absence of an effective strategy and the absence of strategy all
together. As Reverend Galamison stated it: "There was a strategy.
The strategy was just no equal to the opposition and to the circum-
stances." 1
''
1 Galamison 's statement at this point is crucial to an
understanding of the first panel. He was saying that while the black
community was aware of the need to work toward a revolution in educa-
tion, that no matter how intelligent a strategy evolved, the community
lacked the resources to translate that strategy into victory. The in-
verse of the proposition is also valid: that given the power which the
Union and the school board were able to bring to bear on the situation,
any strategy they chose would have been an effective one. In other
words, the crucial variables are not those related to tactics or goals,
but rather to the political and economic resources which the opposing
groups possessed
.
^Galamison, Transcript of Panel One, November 16, 1970, p. 24
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CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA: PANEL TWO
t
The increments provided by the second panel resulted from (1)
the presence of Superintendent Donovan, and (2) a series of confronta-
tions structured by the candidate in prior consultation with the modera-
tor, Dr. Allan Calvin. The intent of this strategy was to affirm or
negate the premise that options existed for either the community, the
school board, or the United Federation of Teachers prior to the soli-
dification of political positions which the publicity and the violence
of the conflict brought about. On another level it was and still is
the hope of the candidate that such a delineation of possible alterna-
tives of the pattern of events, which focused around Ocean Hill-Browns-
ville from 1967 to 1970, would be of assistance not only to black people
everywhere in their struggle, but to administrators and teachers in any
sincere attempt they might make to understand and assist that community
in improving the educational institutions. Naive and idealistic as this
may appear to the reader, the candidate hoped that the body of data re-
sulting from the panels would in the most elevating sense of the phrase,
"teach other administrators and communities a lesson," so that all of
America's children, white and black, need not experience another trauma
such as the one which shook New York City over the past four years.
In pursuit of this objective, Dr. Calvin approached the panel
with an assertion that alternatives to any overt confrontation had existed
in 1967. He stated that the community in Ocean Hill arbitrarily cast the
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Union and the C.S.A. into the role of being "outside devils,"
1
thus
everything they stood for was, in the eyes of the community, bad and
detrimental to the community control movement. Continuing this argu-
ment in the interest of the legitimacy of his profession, i.e. social
psychology, Calvin maintains that this initial action on the part of
the community forced the Union, in the interests of its own preserva-
tion and the protection of the rights of its members, to become an ene-
my rather than an ally, if not simply a neutral observer. As an option
to this intransigence Calvin proposed that the wisdom of hindsight indi-
cated that the Governing Board should have negotiated a series of tem-
porary alliances with the Union. The content of these hypothetical
"treaties" would be an exchange of support, each respective entity
agreeing to lend its power to the other around the issues in question.
This classic way of getting things done," would involve a series of
trade-offs. For example, the union would agree to support the appoint
ment of a specific number of black principals in exchange for support of
the 1967 strike for wage benefits. Such a policy of "horse trading"^
would have provided an option which, if pursued in good faith by both
parties, would have abrogated the need for the Union to destroy the
demonstration district.
While such a position has a great deal of appeal, it has little
or no validity. Simply, Calvin’s assertion is based on a substitution
1Calvin, Transcript of Panel Two, December 7, 1970, p. 82.
2 lb id .
3 Ibid.
^ lb id
.
,
p. 83.
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of the illusions created by political rhetoric for the necessities
dictated by political realities. These are my personal feelings which
I shall substantiate in detail later in this and subsequent chapters.
At this point the discrepancies between the rhetorical position pre-
sented by ex-Superintendent Donovan and the reality which he intentional-
ly masks provide adequate and impartial support. In other words, sup-
port for the options which Calvin asserts must have existed can be
drawn from what Donovan says, but the illusionary nature of this sub-
stantiation becomes clear when the ex-Superintendent's words are trans-
lated into the context which they are intended to describe. Further,
the existence of this discrepancy in the remarks of Dr. Donovan presents
a more serious challenge to peaceful relations between the school and
the community contained in the panels. The underlying motivation of
the parents on the Governing Board was to make the educational system
work for their children. Rather than holding to abstract revolutionary
slogans, they simply wanted, in the best American tradition, to partici-
pate in and thereby reform the institutions that affected their lives.
The duplicity on the part of those institutions in the face of this
painfully honest sentiment can only be viewed as one of the most per-
verse manifestations of the sickness which the racism of this country has
created and sustained.
The initial difficulty presented by Dr. Donovan's opening state-
ment is in defining precisely for whom he is presuming to speak. In
referring to perceptions of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville situation, he
continually uses the pronoun "we"; perhaps he means the Board of Education
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perhaps the Union and the Board, perhaps the professional staff at
headquarters, or perhaps simply himself and Esther Swanker. Placing
this initial confusion aside for utilization as background material,
Dr. Donovan, or more precisely, "we", perceived three issues as pro-
viding the foundation of the crisis: (1) the responsibility, authority,
and decision-making powers of the demonstration districts; (2) pro-
fessional rights and responsibilities; and (3) the question of the
law and its relevance to education. Let us examine the categorization
of the issues in the light of Dr. Calvin's attempt to construct options
which would have avoided the overt conflicts that emerged in the 1968-
1969 school year.
Donovan's initial phrase, "the responsibility, authority, and
decision-making power of the people," 5 establishes the confusion which
structured the eventual confrontation: while the words connote the exis-
tence of alternatives, the diverse meaning of those words to different
constituencies denies the validity of those alternatives. The initial
proposal for the three demonstration districts clearly stated that there
would be no additional funds for the operation of the schools in those
districts. The stated rationale for this curious policy was that the
essence of the "experimental design" was to determine if increased
parent involvement would make the difference in improving the quality
of the educational processes. Proceeding from such an hypothesis, the
obvious task for those involved in that "experiment" was to define the
responsibilities that the parents would possess.
5Donovan, Transcript of Panel Two, December 7, 1970, p. 73.
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Given a variety of constraints, some established by School
Board policy, some by state law, some by contractual obligations, and
some stemming simply from the ingrained habits of a thoroughly racist
system, this opportunity for the parents to exercise meaningful authori-
ty was not only a confused one, but also a deliberate or intentional
fraud and deception. Whatever motivated those who created the demon-
stration districts, they knew that state law and city law required that
only certified or licensed personnel may work with pupils within the
school system. On the other hand, the Governing Board was a group of
community residents elected by the community, and accountable to that
community for the education of 9,000 students. When this Board was
faced with vacancies in its instructional and administrative staff, it
obviously wanted to employ professionals who would be committed to the
children and accountable to the Board for their ability to implement
positive educational programming. Such a "militant position" was the
logical culmination of the unrest which motivated the initial establish-
ment of the demonstration districts. It was blatantly clear to members
of the community that the teachers provided Ocean Hill by the civil
service list had failed: the children of the district provided living
documentation. An objective consideration of the design of the demon-
stration districts indicates that an exercise of "the responsibility,
authority, and decision-making power of the people," would necessitate
a confrontation.
On a more subtle plane, it is difficult to assess in what fashion
this "authority" was to be exercised, the realm in which the participation
so crucial to the design of the experiment was to be meaningful. Most
34
school system budgets demand that seventy to eighty per cent of the
available funds goes into such fixed costs as salaries. The nominal
balance that could be used by the Board in a discretionary manner
carries such restrictions as exemplified by the approved textbook
list, so zealously guarded by the Central Board. Given the above reali-
ties, how was it possible for an untrained group of black community re-
presentatives to examine the financial allocations and thereby reorder
the educational priorities for their district? The Governing Board was
not even allowed to conduct its own monetary transactions: all transfers
of funds passed through the city comptrollers by means of an internal
voucher policy.
If the Governing Board took itself and its mandate from the
black community seriously, it seems clear that the only available
course of action was to challenge these processes by overt actions and
then establish a negotiating position within the context of the experi-
msnt. Such a structured confrontation would be volatile enough if each
faction represented white middle-class interests, accustomed to the
exercise of power and fundamentally unified by racial and economic group—
ing. In the Ocean Hill instance, however, the Governing Board was an
indigenous group of people, faceless, powerless, and unsophisticated,
assuming authority without any orientation or preparation in the opera-
tion of the public schools. Undoubtedly, the white power structure
gambled on the naivete and ignorance of the Governing Board. The rapid
and brutal refutation of this classically racist assumption unveiled the
violent confrontation which must result from people who have for so long
been denied their basic human and constitutional rights.
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When the elected Governing Board began to function as if it
actually had authority and power in assuming the responsibility of
appointing to existing vacancies men of calibre with whom they felt
secure as principals of the district's schools, the Board obviously
acted as a partner in the confrontation. Immediately, the issue was
transformed from an educational one into a series of conflicts: the
blacks vs. civil service; Ocean Hill vs. job security; the militants
vs. the Union; and the separatists vs. American society. Once this
context had been established, the Governing Board could only lose, and
its prior efforts to avoid the confrontation were either ignored or
distorted by the white press. Unfortunately, the issue was starkly
reduced to "the responsibility, authority, and decision-making power
of the people." This reduction revealed a crucial though hidden corol-
lary: that such authority could be exercised only if the black people
assumed the roles of their white oppressors, i.e. only if they used
that authority to continue the destruction of the minds of their own
children. When the Governing Board rejected this unstated assumption
lying behind the central hypothesis of the experiment, it was clear
that the Governing Board was never meant to exercise any authority at
all. Thus the only options open to the local Board were either (1) to
continue the genocidal policy of the Central Board, or (2) to provoke
a confrontation by attempting to improve the educational operation of
the district regardless of those policies. Clearly, no option existed
at all.
The second issue broached by Superintendent Donovan concerned
the rights and responsibilities of educational professionals. Any such
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discussion must be poisoned by the historically determined context in
which it occurs: New York educators overtly discuss tenure, civil ser-
vice, accountability, and related contractual items as they relate only
to the welfare of the professionals themselves. Each of the above
issues can be seen as a legitimate right of an employee's organization
to protect itself. But the underlying motivation of such protection
must be the establishment of the best possible professional staff in
order to serve the children
. In New York the above issues have been
transformed into devices utilized to perpetuate the protection of teachers
who fail to teach. In short, such advances in the educational profession,
usually stipulating an increase in salary for the professional, have been
to the advantage of the professional over the client, rather than ad-
vances of the professional in the interest of the client whom he serves.
This perversion of the definition of professional rights pre-
cludes any legitimate discussion of its meaning without engendering a
political holocaust. The Governing Board could not exercise its autho-
rity in such areas as hiring, firing, the evaluation of performance, and
tenure, nor any of the myriad of union negotiated contractual items.
Given such a position of utter powerlessness in the face of a mandate
which dictated something quite different, the parents were forced to con-
tinually examine their conscience to determine if in fact they had re-
linquished all of their rights not only as parents, but as clients of
an institution theoretically established to serve the public.
The Governing Board consistently searched for a legitimate fashion
in which to effect the issue of professional rights and responsibilities.
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Such rights are established by laws and by the contractual policies
which the local board, or even the entire black community of New York,
were unable to influence. For example, principals of schools cannot
observe teachers without notice, which is only a small portion of an
extensive and complex policy, nor can information be placed in teachers'
files without their consent. This is a result of Union negotiations.
Recognizing that there have been abuses of teachers, teachers cannot
be transferred within a given district by the superintendent without
their consent regardless of the educational soundness of such a move.
The operative principle in New York's personnel practices is "don't
rock the boat," a precept which motivated the creation of an entire
sub-strata of unwritten rules. Established transfer policies have been
evaded through the consistent efforts of principals with the tacit co-
operation of the Union. One principle suggests that rather than give
a teacher an unsatisfactory rating, the teacher should transfer; co-
incidentally, the principal knows of an existing vacancy created by the
reciprocal cooperation of those agreeing to maintain the illusion of le-
gality. In the same vein, principals for years have refused to bring
teachers up on charges of incompetency because of the difficulty of do-
cumentation and the reversal of roles from the prosecution to the defense.
The existence of this duplicity, this distinction between the
overt and the covert operation, between the legal and the actual, places
the Union and the Central Board in an almost invulnerable position on
the issue of professional rights. They established legal and public guide-
lines that were educationally impractical and then systematically, though
privately, violated them. This covert system of actual operating procedures
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allows the untenable legal procedure to exist unchallenged by those
with access to covert channels. Thus, when a group such as the Govern-
ing Board at Ocean Hill chooses to invoke such traditional courses of
action, the Board and the Union publically decry the illegality of the
action for political reasons of their own. At this point they may
take refuge in the sanctity of the laws which they publically uphold
while systematically violating them. Denied the normal routes open to
any administrator or board member within the system, what options were
there open to the Governing Board in Ocean Hill?
Dr. Donovan alluded to the professional rights, but these were
not the types of concerns which the people had about the professionals
in their employ. Their concerns focused directly upon the efficacy
of the staff in producing educational progress in their children. Their
obvious concern was based on an observable fact: the massive and unre-
lenting failure of the teachers in the district. The parents wanted
skilled, competent people who had the concern, willingness and a com-
mitment to the children rather than to the institution which paid them.
They were concerned that their teachers be leaders and innovators who
would begin to offer alternatives which would produce an atmosphere in
which learning would take place. Such a concern was an expression of
the fundamental hypothesis which Dr. Donovan created for the district:
to see if parental participation would lead to better education. Pre-
cisely how did he envision these parents relating to the teachers who
attempted to thwart this effort?
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The third issue raised by Dr. Donovan was the law and its rele-
vance to the problems under discussion. More than the previous two
categories established, this one is a pure fraud and an illusion.
Throughout the confrontation, the Board and the Union did not "obey"
the law, but continually utilized it as a vehcile to maintain the poli-
tical impotence of the black community. The first instance of this was
the voluntary transfer of U.F.T. teachers out of the district, illegally
arranged prior to the assumption of operative power by the Governing
Board. Such manipulations of the law did little but lend substance to
claims that American justice is simply one more tool which the white
man uses against the black, simply one more weapon which the school
system uses against children. In a sense Dr. Donovan is perfectly
correct: the law is an issue. But there is little substance to Dr.
Donovan's attempt to justify his actions by citing the necessity of
adhering to legally established structures; such a claim is simply a
guise for political manipulation.
The prime instance of this chicanery is the legal fiat that led
to the eventual abolition of Ocean Hill-Brownsville as an independent
educational unit as defined by the city of New York. Claiming that the
law necessitated such a move, the New York City decentralization plan
released on November 17, 1969 proposed the absorption of the demonstra-
tion districts into larger educational units. ^ But, as stated in a
memorandum by the New York Civil Liberties Union:
^New York (City) Board of Education, Proposed Plan for a Community
School District System in New York City, November 17, 1969 . (Brooklyn, 1969),
p. 5.
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When considering its decentralisation legislation, the state legislature
considered wording which would have specifically continued, and wording
which would have specifically abolished the demonstration districts.
to deceive the people about the options at its disposal. In other
words, it utilized the illusion of legal requirements to disguise its
political affiliations. Thus, Dr. Donovan's assertion that the law
was an issue in Ocean Hill simply masks his understandable desire to
perpetuate the strategies which allowed him to cooperate with the Union
in defeating the communities in 1968. The law was simply not an issue,
but a device utilized by the varying bureaucracies to frustrate in an
illegal fashion their opponents amongst the people. Operating under
such constraints, black people must always be the violators of the
law because it is our oppressors who arbitrarily define the law in
response to our efforts.
One could write endlessly about the continuous deceptions and
callous strategies employed by the professional staff of 110 Living-
ston Street. The tale would be extensive, fascinating, and of little
advantage to anyone. Instead of this grisly alternative, a reexamination
^Ira Classer, "The Demonstration School District," Memorandum
of November 24, 1969 (New York Civil Liberties Union). (Mimeographed).
Discarding both of these alternatives, the legislatur
leaving the survival of the districts at the discretion of the Board
e passed the law
of Education of New York City. For political reasons, the Board chose
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of Donovan's initial assertions in the light of the above digressions
and in view of Calvin's hypothesis of options leads to a clear under-
standing of the theoretical and political foundation of the New York
school crisis. Hopefully, such a format will provide a better under-
standing of the realities of the situation, an understanding that ad-
ministrators and communities can translate into action.
Did, as Calvin claims, either the Union, the school board, or
the community have options to their ultimate positions vis-a-vis the
rights of professionals, the power of the community, and the exigencies
of the law? While the existence of such options seemed to be implied
on the rhetorical level (who can be against either motherhood or the
^i§hts of professionals?), the realities which these phrases purport
to represent require the opposite conclusion. What the Union meant by
the rights of professionals was the power of the Union to create edu-
cational policy. What the community meant by the rights of professionals
were those items which would aid teachers in the fulfillment of their
basic responsibility to the children. Thus, the Union sought the power
to remove disruptive children from the classroom; and the community
opposed this usurpation because it was not an issue of professional
rights, but one of institutional racism. Given the necessity of re-
presenting their varying constituencies, the Union and the community had
no choice but to confront each other over the issue of professional right
Dr. Donovan was one of the most astute educational politicians
operating in New York City. A man of his stature and experience most
certainly understood the inevitability of conflict. Knowing this his
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job centered on structuring the outcome. Even if the community
possessed the sophistication to perceive, as Donovan did, the nature
of the eventual conflict, no black group possesses the resources
which would enable them to successfully program the ensuing course
of events. Thus, no matter how astute the Governing Board and the
unit administrator might have been politically, they were ultimately
at the mercy of the Union and of the school board. Thus, no option
existed for the community as their role was defined by external powers.
Those who did have the power to alter the course of events, i.e. the
Union, and the Board of Education, those who possessed the power to
create options, saw no necessity of exercising that power as the path
already chosen produced the desired results: the Board got its admini-
strative decentralization and Shanker got power. What is clear from
this discussion is that only the community needed to "seek" options,
and that only the community was powerless to create such options.
This is not to imply that Donovan and Shanker did not create
an environment in which the illusion of options existed: both the
plethora of decentralization schemes and the actual nature of the
demonstration districts purported to established options, while actually
centralizing discretionary power in the hands of the Union and the school
board. In regard to the decentralization proposals, Donovan himself
said
:
. . . neither the Bundy suggestions nor the Board's decentra-
lization plan seemed to be effective enough or deep enough in
its consequence to satisfy groups that felt this was not
meeting the need as they saw it.^
^Donovan, Transcript of Panel Two, December 7, 1970, p. 74.
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This failure was not a random happenstance. In response to the legis-
lative mandate, there was a Bundy report, a Board of Education report
on school reorganization, the Mayor’s plan, a U.F.T. plan, the Com-
missioner’s plan, perhaps a Regents’ plan, and eventually a series of
legislative plans. Donovan’s reference to the fact that not one of these
plans was far-reaching enough merits a study in itself, but it does
suggest that each was deliberately designed to offer the least it could
to the volatile black community while protecting the vested interests
of each group, thus affording the most leverage to the constituents of
the architects of the respective plans.
Further, one must place this plethora of reports in the context
of the history of discord and resistance which the areas named as demon-
stration districts had prior to their designation as demonstration dis-
^-n fac t, Ocean Hill-Brownsville came into existence following
one of the most hectic and disruptive of school years. From this chro-
nology, numerous social scientists have suggested that the demonstration
districts were created to help create a cool summer for the city of
New York. This implication is supported by the curious fact that the
Ford Foundation gave a substantial grant to three demonstration districts
for a planning period of the summer, though each of the districts was
at radically different phases of development.
Yet, the planners of the demonstration project in Ocean Hill-
Brownsville, according to Dr. Donovan, continued to act in accordance
with the Governing Board’s collective beliefs. ^ Unaware of their co-
operation with an opposition strategy, or unable to act in any different
^Donovan, Transcript of Panel Two, December 9, 1970, p. 109.
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fashion, the Governing Board continued to operate as if it had un-
questioned authority as the discussions in Albany progressed. Ob-
viously, each faction was not only busily lobbying for its bill, but
also watching the events in New York with great concern. Clearly, the
action of the community could only jeopardize the possibilities of
favorable treatment in the legislature. The representative from the
State Department of Education sums it up rather concisely:
The legislative committee that put it together just took
words and phrases out of each of the various plans and
finally came up with something that would be satisfactory,
mainly to A1 Shanker and Walter Degnan, but also to the
majority members of the legislature. 10
It is simple to demonstrate the effects of the events in Ocean Hill-
Brownsville on the evolution of the various proposals. For example,
P 1 l° r the confrontation, a local district could receive funds from
sources other than the Board of Education, State, and Federal agencies.
In the final act all monies for local committees had to pass through
the Central Board of Education; in fact, the Central Board had to re-
quest such funds. In the same vein, during the Tax Reform Hearings
it was made clear that no foundation funds could be used for political
purposes. This act curtailed the historical role of the Ford Foundation
in supporting educational experimentation. It has been alleged that the
testimony of the U.F.T. president on the use of Ford funds in Ocean Hill
was of major importance in this decision.
After the fact, the strategies employed against Ocean Hill be-
come painfully clear to anyone who examines the recitation of events.
"^Swanker, Transcript of Panel Two, December 9, 1970, p. 109.
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Different factions of the white hierarchy first published a series of
reports on decentralization; each report failing to adequately deal
with the problems at hand, yet each uncutting the validity of one
another. The large number of reports gives the illusion that the com-
munity could exercise some choice. But none of the reports originated
from the community, and the community had no substantial inputs into
the evolution of a final law. Secondly, the demonstration districts
gave the illusion that community control has been tried. But the
experiment was structured to fail by the bureaucracy, and this pre-
determined failure was used to defeat the most minimal attempts of the
black community to exercise power, i.e. the power which stemmed from
the Ford grant. Thus, the processes which were established under the
guise of dealing with the failures to educate New York City's children
W6re, in actuality, mechanisms created to protect those responsible for
the continued failure.
Historically, when the mandarins of public education address
their efforts to major policy changes, they consult with the Mayor, the
U.F.T., the C.S.A., the Public Educational Association, and sometimes,
out of kindness, with the Urban League, but never under any circumstance
with the black community. The people only enter the theater after the
script has been written and the actors cast. Dr. Donovan's suggestion
that the overt public interest of the U.F.T. with professional safeguards
built in would almost defeat the purposes of the demonstration districts,
is an honest recognition by the ex-Superintendent of the power of the
Union which, for all intents and purposes, has usurped the legitimate
powers of the school board. Thus, when Oliver stated that the rights of
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the people in a community to have a voice in the operation of insti-
tutions in their own communities is an essential demand, he oversimpli- .
'
fied by denying the havoc and turmoil that such a demand must elicit.
Any meaniiigful voice would strike at the heart of the seat of power,
demanding for a new alignment of power within New York City.
It is ironic to note that such a fundamentally revolutionary
approach was definitely not the perspective initially operative in
Ocean Hill. On its most fundamental level, the demonstration district
attempted to work within the system, to join in helping the schools
meet the needs of the pupils. The three demonstration districts were
demanding change and a reform of the system in a manner which initially
suggested that they would receive the support of all factions of the city
interested in educational improvement. In other words, for naive and
even moralistic reasons of its own, the Governing Board directed its
unit administrator to attempt to create options within the system.
While the intelligence of such a strategy was debatable, it is important
to note the basically reformist mentality on the part of the Governing
Board
.
A classic example of this attempt to work within the system, and
one which demonstrates the paucity of options, was the endeavor of the
unit administrator and the Governing Board to legitimatize the selection
of principals not on the appropriate city civil service list, though certi-
fied by the State of New York. Upon a written request by Dr. Donovan to
Commissioner Allen and after numerous dealings with both of them, the Com-
missioner informed the Board that a new category of civil service could
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be established, viz. that of Demonstration School Principal. Operating
under this edict, the Governing Board then moved to appoint those men
with whom it felt most comfortable.
This attempt by the local board to negotiate the system led to
the predictable results. The appointment of principals was immediate-
ly challenged in court. The C.S.A. claimed that it was impossible to
differentiate between a Demonstration School Principal and a regular
principal: each operated within the same structure, the same teachers,
the same local superintendents, etc. The Teacher’s Union went to court
and won. This decision was appealed in the amecus curi role with the
Board of Education. Ultimately, the appointments were upheld, a deci-
sion in no small part resulting from the threat of massive violence by
the black community.
This apparently simple desire to reform the educational bureau-
cracy encountered the opposition of not only the directly involved
unions, but all those dependent upon civil service to maintain their
power. Donovan stated the case well:
When you’re talking about the teacher’s union, you're talking
about a myth. And you talk about telling the teacher's union
that its sacred protection of civil service rights and all
that is something they ought to sit down and talk to community
people about, don't forget the firemen are in on that, the
police are in on that . . . every union man in New York is in
on that, because he thinks if it’s a threat to one union, it's
a threat to all unions . . .
H
Thus, the attempt of the Governing Board to reform the system from with-
in was met with all the crushing power which the system can generate
against its opponents.
llDonovan, Transcript of Panel Two, December 7, 1970, p.
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Given the unambiguous conclusions resulting from the analysis
of the previous data, no reason exists to belabor Calvin’s initial
postulate. Let us simply reexamine its assumptions in light of the
above. Central to Calvin's mythology of options is the belief in the
existence of goals mutually desired by the community and the Teacher’s
Union:
I think we can make it in the interest of the C.S.A. and
the union to make certain changes which will also be in
accordance with the goals of the community. And I think
that if it isn't done that way, we don't find options that
will do that, you can play 'till doomsday. 12
At this point in the panel series, it was not possible for anyone to
suggest precisely what such mutually identifiable goals might be. In
other words, the fundamental interests of the Union and the community
necessitate an ultimate confrontation of their respective forces. While
the Union and the C.S.A. might be able to engage in horse trading to
minimize their differences in pursuit of power, and while Ocean Hill
might agree to temporarily compromise with the Ford Foundation or the
Urban League to solidify the front in the face of opposition, such coali-
tions are created only in response to a partial solidarity of interests.
Obviously no such solidarity existed, or ever will exist, between the
Teacher's Union and the community. Unfortunately, the Union has in-
extricably placed itself in opposition to any meaningful progress by
the black population of New York City. Until either the black community
decides to cooperate in its own destruction, or until the Union decides
to discontinue its racist policies, continued confrontation will prevent
any restoration of harmony in the school system.
^Calvin, Transcript of Panel Two, December 7, 1970, p. 105.
CHAPTER VI
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA: PANEL THREE
The purposes which the candidate established for the third
panel session were the most ambitious of the project and the most
central to the stated goals of the dissertation. Having dismissed
the possibility of any belief in the existence of options to the
course of events which precipitated the destruction of the district,
the candidate instructed the panel moderator to focus the course of
the discussion around the elaboration of hypotheses which would
rationally or logically explain the absence of options. The modera-
tor attempted to utilize the theoretical and academic faculties of
the assembled panelists to outline a series of assertions about the
school crisis which could then be subjected to the scrutiny of the
membership of the panel, and tested against empirical data. Dr. Calvin,
acting on behalf of the candidate, tried to establish an environment
in which the emotion-laden issues created by the strike could be re-
duced by the process of intellectualizat ion to a series of working
hypotheses
.
The rationale of the candidate and the moderator in attempting
to subject the panel to this externally imposed discipline was de-
signed to abstract from the New York situation a model or theoretical
basis applicable to various cities across the country. In other words,
a compilation of the hypothetical relationships delineated by the
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panel would link together to form a model of an urban school system
under the stress of decentralization and experimentation with com-
munity control. Once this model existed, administrators in other
cities could then relate their specific circumstances back to a theo-
retical framework, hopefully deriving from this prototype information
applicable to their immediate concerns.
The moderator, the candidate, and the assembled panelists
were completely unsuccessful in this endeavor. Their ultimate con-
clusion was that the nature of the data on hand precluded the construc-
tion of a rational model. For the purposes of this analysis, this
failure is as instructive, if not more instructive, than any accomplish-
ment of the stated objectives would have been. The degeneration of
the panel into a trivial and repetitious recitation of the obvious in-
vites an examination into the inadequate theoretical orientation of the
panelists, an inadequacy which prevented them from discovering princi-
ples which could be constructed into a prototype, or at least be em-
pirically verified. Clearly, theoretical statements can be abstracted
from the events which centered around Ocean Hill-Brownsville ; and it is
just as obvious that this model or prototype can be of use to anyone
attempting to understand the process of change in urban school environ-
ments. Thus, the task of analyzing this panel is two-fold: (1) to des-
cribe the panelists' attempt to create a model, and (2) to delineate the
reasons of why the participants were unable to do so. In response to
this vacuum, the hypothetical assertions of the candidate will run through
the analyses of the fourth and fifth panels.
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Another recitation of the issues was the first step in the
process which Dr. Calvin and the candidate utilized in structuring
the panel discussion. While this new litany retraced many of the same
points made earlier in Panels One and Two, three new categories of
inquiry were established by Mr. Ferretti, Dr. Fantini, and Dr. Gittell,
respectively: (1) the accountability and responsibility of the media;
(2) the nature of the problem of the identification of the various
interest groups; and (3) the relationship of social structure to social
conflict. Because these areas warrant explication, they shall be uti-
lized as tools in the process of understanding the inadequacies of the
theoretical orientation of the panelists, inadequacies that led to the
failure to create the necessary hypotheses.
Up to this point no extended mention of the contribution of
Mr. Fred Ferretti, an education reporter for the New York Times and a
free-lance writer, has been made. This deliberate omission results
from the wide-ranging effect of the issues which he raised, an effect
so pervasive as to almost deny the validity of any discussion of the
relevant issues confronting educators, forcing the course of debate to
almost deal exclusively with the total corruption of America's urban
society.
The thrust of Ferretti' s argument brutally demolishes any neat
theorizing about "public affairs." In essence he claimed that the
actual reality of the confrontation in Ocean Hill was an irrelevancy;
that Ocean Hill can only be understood by a discussion related to what
the media transformed the demonstration districts into: "It's that point
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I wanted to make, is that all of these issues that we've been talking
about never saw the light of day." 1 Or, in Calvin's rephrasing,
. there is no Ocean Hill-Brownsville
,
there is only what the
New York Times* Ocean Hill-Brownsville is, and it was amazing that the
media would just create a whole world all of their own.
. The
issues previously discussed in this essay, those concerning the legiti-
mate rights of community boards, those dealing with the sincere attempts
of the Board of Education to pacify the system, became, when presented
to the public by the media, almost mythological struggles supported by
the pre-existent prejudices of the white population.
This phenomenon can be traced to four sources: (1) the bias of
those writing the news; (2) the sophistication of those seeking to mani-
pulate the media; (3) the media's lack of skill in conceptualizing edu-
cational issues; and (4) the bias of those controlling the news. As
the Negro press is not germaine to this discussion, one can safely state
that the "news" is created by bourgeois white interests which are, perhaps,
no more or less enlightened than those of the average white-collar pro-
fessional. However, this does imply that the majority of the reportage
will reflect the comprehensive racism of their society, a sickness which,
in this instance, can be reflected in such formative areas as those
sources which reporters choose to rely on. The labor reporter instinctive-
ly trusts his contact in the union whom he has known for fifteen years,
rather than the black militant of whom he has just recently heard.
^Ferretti, Transcript of Panel Two, December 7, 1970, p. 88.
2Calvin, op. cit.
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InitiaHy, the prism through which the news must filter distorts rather
than reflects events.
Additional factors compound this initial tendency. Those
traditional "sources" have far greater skill, a skill born of long ex-
perience in manipulating the news. Ferretti mentioned Shanker's habit
of calling a news conference at five o’clock in the evening. No tele-
vision news station could afford not to cover any such conference on
the subsequent six o’clock news telecast, though the stations obvious-
ly lacked sufficient time to verify the assertions of the president of
the U.F.T. Two or three days later, when the erroneous or distorted
nature of Shanker's statements became public knowledge, the initial
impressions made by his television appearance could not be combatted.
The black community lacks the sophistication to control public informa-
tion channels in this manner. Almost completely new to the arena of
debate, the skills needed simply were either not forthcoming or, when
present, the pressure generated by the volatility of the community pre-
vented their utilization. Thus the accuracy of news reporting was de-
termined in part by the skill of the various opponents in manipulating
the media.
Lying at the base of all of this deception was the failure of
the media to conceptualize educational issues in a legitimate fashion.
These fundamental misconceptions permeated the language used to report
even the most trivial of events. Generally, the media viewed Ocean Hill
as precipitating a crisis in the New York public schools; Martin Mayer,
for example, considered the results to be the worst disaster New York
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ever suffered. 3 On the other hand, the black community considered the
accepted and ongoing failure of the schools to educate their children
to be the actual crisis. From this perspective the demonstration
districts and the ensuing strikes were simply manifestations of this
more pressing crisis. But the media persisted in seeing the disruption
of these genocidal educational policies as the "crisis" itself, accept-
ing the destruction of black children as the "normal" state of affairs.
Given this fundamental distortion, any statement filtering through the
media must inherently reflect the racist failure of the media to accurat
ly define the nature of the educational "crisis."
The temptation exists to add a segment dealing with the politi-
cal interests of those who own the media, but in any such discussion
it would be awkward to publically document certain assertions. Let
this innuendo simply serve as a bridge between the specific comments
made by Mr. Ferretti and the more general statement made by Dr. Fantini
concerning the problem of identifying the various interest groups and
allegiances in any political conflict. This was an intriguing
position for Dr. Fantini to take, one which perhaps stemmed from his
former position at the Ford Foundation. With no socio-economic alle-
giances in either the community, the school board, or the Union prior
to the establishment of the demonstration districts, his position was
almost one of a sole spectator in a room full of participants: the only
"observer" in the inner circle of vested interests. From this half
political
,
half aesthetic vantage point he observed:
Martin Mayer, The Teachers Strike
,
p. 15.
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I think to me the key issues, one of the key issues, has to
° ^ifymg the parties, the publics, the groups thattacitly had to reach [sic] in order to support any type of
reform, and the degree of education which has to precede any
reform in order to support that 4
As his later statements reveal, Fantini' s process of identification oc-
curred on two levels: one education, the other political in the broad-
est sense of the term.
On the more overt plane, Fantini stressed the advisability of
an outright identification of those parties whose support is necessary
for conducting orderly reform. Theoretically, any innovative effort
should begin by developing support within the various factions of the
Board of Education, the staff at 110 Livingston Street, all the com-
munity organizations, the groups within the Teacher's Union, the organi-
zations which comprise the C.S.A.
,
and, significantly, the students
themselves. Once this process has been completed, group interests
should be respected in such a fashion as to avoid conflict. The candi-
date's opinion of the technique has been stated in preceding chapters.
On a more sophisticated level, Fantini explained the unfortunate
process by which these educational interest groups unite with groups
that share similar interests and which operate on a more political
level
:
Well, if I may . . . dynamics of an ever expanding cycle of
forces, that was triggered, which started out as a really an
educational issue . . . and it very, very swiftly became poli-
tical, economic, racial, religious and many others; that the
parties that converged and the manifestation of force and power
on the institutions, it just became confusing even to the most -
so-called most - sophisticated participants in the arena. J
^Fantini, Transcript of Panel Three, January 18, 1971, p. 143.
5
Ibid
.
,
pp. 152-153
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This general statement conceptualizes the process by which the Govern-
ing Board developed alliances with the various progressive black and
white organizations: the Teacher's Union received the massive support
of organized labor not only in New York City, but nationally; the
Jewish teachers developed linkages with the Jewish community organi-
zations, etc. As these alliances developed, the amount at stake in
Ocean Hill multiplied many times, while the forces mobilized to effect
the outcome developed into armies of tremendous size and consequence.
The end result of this "ever expanding cycle of forces" was that the
primacy of the original educational concerns became subjugated to a
more potent series of confrontations: black-white, black-Jew, Jew-
Protestant, Union-anti-Union. At this level, the community was
literally outgunned.
But that remark is not germaine to Fant ini's point. Rather,
he wants to say that for educational reform to be possible, an identi-
fication of interests in the political, religious, racial, and economic
sphere must occur. In support of this assertion he cited the failure
of the initiators of the demonstration districts to comprehend the rami-
fications of their actions as a major precipitator of the crisis. But
such an assertion is racist in the sense that it ignores the fact that
no matter what the "elite" does, the demands of the black community
must ultimately confront the matrix of power; but again, that is not
Fantini's concern at this point. Instead of developing a hypothesis as
he wished to, Dr. Fantini concluded with what is almost a rhetorical
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question: Is real reform possible given the configuration of relation-
ships, power ... in the United States? ... Is it possible?” 6
Additional inputs crucial to this line of inquiry came from
Dr. Clark. Dr. Clark, whose position on the New York Board of Regents
afforded him an excellent seat at the spectacle, found himself fascinated
by the speed with which the educational issues became subordinated to
the "realistic power issues”? as the struggle was transferred into one
over the control of power rather than over any particular educational
decision or technique. From this observation, Clark deduced that, in
fact, the most important forces acting in the confrontation were not
those directly involved with education:
But a very important and probably the most important resistance
to meaningful decentralization was, interestingly enough, not
coming primarily from the teachers or the . . . but from
other unions who were significantly threatened by a change in
structure which would threaten their control over the alloca-
tion of funds, and of course, the obvious power problem was
that of race and status in the institutional control.
8
Clark is referring to, among others, New York's all-white construction
unions. As Schools Against Children brilliantly documents, the con-
struction unions violently and effectively opposed community control
because of the effect of such educational reforms on the allocation of
funds. They realized that the black community, if given a choice, would
funnel construction funds to those skilled black men who were locked out
of the racist unions. To protect their own economic interests, the
construction unions, even more than the more obviously implicated
6Fantini, Transcript of Panel Three, January 18, 1971, p. 153.
?Clark, o]^_ cit
.
,
p. 146.
8lbid.
,
p. 148.
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Teacher's Union, contributed political influence and money to destroy
this attempt of the black community to begin to share in the series
of economic trade-offs existent among whites. One should be able to
derive from Clark’s comments some idea of the depth of commitment on
the part of both parties to the confrontation.
Echoing some of Fantini's more dubious sentiments, Clark then
dwells upon the correlation between the lack of sophistication in
Ocean Hill and the extent of the crisis. He claims that the community,
having been left out of power matrix, was unaware of how to deal with
this arrangement. Had the community possessed this sophistication,
Clark thought they could have "insinuated"^ to become a part of, and
to make contractual agreements with, the white consortium. Instead of
threatening from outside, the Governing Board should have subtly joined
this covert power structure. Given the evidence which Kenneth Clark
presents about the absolute exclusion of the black community, and about
the force which met the community ' s attempt to join, his hope is an
absurd one. The ever expanding cycle of forces insures that the black
people will not be peacefully allowed to share in the economic and poli-
tical power stemming from Board of Education funds. The very essence
of economic oppression and racial oppression dictates that the castle
of white, monied interests can only be attacked by force.
The best justification of Fantini's original concern for the
identification of these interest groups comes from a crucial point
raised in an almost off-hand fashion by Dr. Gittell late in the panel
^Clark, Transcript of Panel Three, January 18, 1971, p. 149.
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session. As she describes her initial reaction to the Bundy Panel,
she asserts that it represented "the whole powerhouse
.
. .the 'j
Governor, and the Mayor and Bundy ... and every, you know, power
basis .... Undoubtedly, this assumption was shared by the majori-
ty of her colleagues in this endeavor and constituted one of the Bundy
Panel's operative hypotheses. From this assumption, Dr. Gittell con-
cluded that any alteration in the fundamental power relationships of
the school system designed by the Bundy Panel could be implemented with
a minimum of social conflict: those in power would simply have made a
rational decision to distribute some of that power. As those who would
see their influence diminished by the new structure were those who had
designed the structure itself, little or no effective resistance to
implementation could be foreseen. Thus, according to this mythology,
a "revolution" would have occurred in a logical and peaceful fashion.
As the events which ensued after the issuing of the findings of
the Bundy Panel demonstrate, Dr. Gittell 's assumption that the member-
ship of the Panel represented all the powerful constituencies in New
York City was tragically flawed. Her deduction that the commission re-
presented the powerful in the act of distributing their power was fal-
lacious, as she herself later recognised. Classically elitist in nature,
the assumption stated above omitted the substantial, but as yet dormant
power of the city's middle-level professional class. In the case of the
school bureaucracy, this group was predominantly Jewish. While the
Bundy Panel did represent the white Protestant power of Ford and Rockefeller
lCGittell, Transcript of Panel Three, January 18, 1971, p. 193.
no
money coupled with the pseudo-aristocratic noblesse oblige of the
Lindsay administration, its composition omitted, or entirely dis-
counted, the interests, hence the power of the newly unionised middle-
income brackets. Such preconceptions flow easily from the minds of
WASP Americans, as documented in E. Digby Baltzell's The Protestant
Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America . 11
In reality, the restructuring recommended by the Bundy Panel
represented an attack on the power of the middle-level professional
class, rather than a distribution of the power of the constituencies
represented in the preparation of the report. By altering only the
lower levels of organization of the school system, the recommendations
left the interests of the Protestant elite literally untouched, if not
enhanced, while posing a threat to the security of the civil service
employees. This is not to imply that this threat was not a justifiable
response to the proven incompetence and entrenched racism of this stra-
tum, their failure to exercise their function as educators alone would
mandate their removal from positions of influence. But the hatred which
the black community felt for this group of paid assassins hardly con-
stituted a new threat, and the failure of the black community to for-
mulate these feelings into a serious challenge demonstrated their
irrelevance to the alignment of power within the political intricacies
of New York City.
On the other hand, the Bundy Report did represent interests
significant enough to make their attack on the bureaucracy a substantive
one. Further, they thought that instead of a confrontation, this attack
•^E. Digby Baltzell, The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy
and Caste in America (New York: Random House, 196j).
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would almost be a simple coup de grace. In the phrasing supplied
by Dr. Gittell:
. I
-
What I think was misread by people like Bundy, and Lindsay
and Rockefeller - if I may say so - was the power of the
union and that middle group of professionals. They thought
tlicit they could give ewey their power .*^2
In the ethnic terms necessitated by the composition of New York City,
the WASP elite assumed that they could dispense with the influence
assumed by the Jewish professional class of educators. Albert Shanker
has convincingly disproven the validity of this assumption.
Marilyn Gittell* s anecdote about the attitudes of the panel
she served explains far more than the ethnic attitudes of Protestant
Americans: her statement literally casts the origins of the confronta-
tion into an entirely different light. In the preceding pages the
impotence of the black community in the face of the political power
of white interests has been demonstrated time after time; thus the
community alone could obviously not seriously challenge a solidly
unified white community. This was a fact of political life accepted
by all parties prior to the New York school crisis. Thus, what estab-
lished Ocean Hill-Brownsville as a serious threat was not the attitudes
of the black community, or the sophistication of its leadership, but
the decision of elements within the white elite to make another seg-
ment of the white community vulnerable. In other words, the original
precipitation of the crisis came from the decision of New York's politi-
cal elite to permit an attack on its middle-level bureaucracy, Clearly,
-^Gittell, Transcript of Panel Three, January 18, 1971, pp. 193-194.
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the basis of this decision lay in the violent revolt of the black
community against its oppressors, but the decision itself was not
made by the black community. Simply, Ocean Hill was the manifesta-
tion of one element within the white community's attempt to placate
the black movement at the expense of another segment of the white
community. From this assertion one can deduce the hypothesis that
the black community was being used as a pawn in a political struggle
which had its origin within the white community.
I fervently believe that the perspective on the events of 1967-
1970 elaborated above is the only one which adequately explains the
complexity of the derivative issues, preeminently the charge of black
anti-Semitism by Albeit Shanker and the Union. The importance of
this spectre can not be underestimated. Many people claim that the
degeneration of the conflict in the eyes of the public into a black
vs. Jew struggle determined the course of events; hence, a thorough
understanding of this charge is essential. At this point, it would
be counter-productive to retrace all the argumentative steps: the
fact that black anti-Semitism is at a lower rate nationally than is
white anti-Semitism; the traditional role of the Jewish community in
black neighborhoods; distribution of anti-Semitic literature by the
U.F.T. itself; the vicious utilization of the charge of anti-Semitism
by Shanker and the media to create public hysteria; and the consistent
stand of the unit administrator and the Governing Board against mani-
festations of anti-Semitism within the demonstration district. At this
writing, such arguments are a matter of public record. But the
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relationship between the sociological analysis provided by Dr. Gittell
and the position taken by Albert Shanker and his faction of the United
Federation of Teachers casts an important light on these known argu-
ments.
The Bundy Panel represented the thoughts of the Protestant
political and corporate elite of New York City. The allegiances of
this group lay primarily with the national perspective of the major
financial concerns located in Manhattan. As a comprehensive Newsweek
survey graphically illustrated, the personnel practices of these
major corporations have traditionally been anti-Semitic, allowing few
Jews entrance into the operation, and always at positions salaried no
higher than twelve to fifteen thousand dollars a year. This exclusion,
Newsweek asserts, forced upwardly mobile Jews into middle—level profes-
sional or bureaucratic positions. Surely the massive entrance of Jews
into the teaching corps of New York City was not the result of a collective
choice, but a necessary response to discrimination by the corporate
sector
.
Given this perspective, the attack by the Bundy Panel on the
power of the middle-level school professional can be seen as another
extension of their traditionally anti-Semitic policies: placate the
blacks at the expense of the Jews who have been traditionally a marginal
concern. Within this context Shanker* s charge of black anti-Semitism
is a tragic confusion of the proximity of the actors with the funda-
mental power of the playwright. Discarding this metaphorical allusion,
*-3"The Jew in American Life," Newsweek
,
March 1, 1971.
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the attack on Jewish interests stems not from the black community,
but from the mutual oppressor of the black and Jewish minorities:
the Protestant corporate and financial establishment. Shanker's
anger should more properly have been directed at those who had the
power to jeopardize his position rather than against those who had
no power at all.
The explication of the preceding point of discussion amongst
the panelists has been made primarily because of the importance of the
issues in question. Fantini's, Ferretti's, and Gittell's statements
are of great use to anyone attempting to discern intelligible patterns
within the debris of Ocean Hill-Brownsville
. However, this explica-
tion has a secondary purpose. Given what has been said above, how'
does one attempt to develop such rational hypotheses, and what defini-
tion of "reason" is necessitated by such an attempt? As our society
continues to promulgate the myth of rational social behavior, the
question is centra], to any study of the school crisis. Particularly
in liberal academic circles, a particular series of subjective assump-
tions are held as dogmatic laws or theories which explain social events
in all their complexity. Academicians, politicians, and more than a
few of the assembled panelists attempted to fall back upon these "truths
when pressed by Dr. Calvin to develop hypotheses.
In one of the more intelligent comments made in any of the five
sessions, Dr. Clark tries to put an end to such self-serving specula-
tions. To adequately appreciate his ensuing series of remarks, one
must be aware of the position which he occupied during the confrontation
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As a black man with an established local and national reputation, he
held a unique perspective on the events, and the political position
to translate that perspective into constructive actions. Specifically,
as a member of the New York State Board of Regents, Dr. Clark's access
to Commissioner Allen helped to sensitize the Commissioner to the posi-
tion of the black community in the city. Being in Albany and being
familiar with white liberal circles in New York, Dr. Clark can comment
on that group with authority. The "moderate, liberal, intellectual's" 14
approach to the injustice and inequity in American society crystalized
around the violence; while there had been room for ambiguity as long
as Alabama remained the battlefield, no such lassitude existed in
Brownsville. With a certain amount of sarcasm, Clark paraphrases this
position
:
. . . if you manage it; well, you know, if you are thoughtful,
if you are reasonable and rational and sit around the table
with the parties that interest you, you will be able to come
out with a rational approach in the program for institutional
reforms and that this will make everyone happy . . ,!5
Those operating within this framework perceived the politics of the
community in Ocean Hill-Brownsville as an unnecessary violation of natural
laws, not as an affront to a particular political posture, but as a
negation of the rules of culture itself. Now, speaking in a mocking
tone of voice, Clark apes the opinion of bourgeois intellectuals:
14 Clark, Transcript of Panel Three, January 18, 1971, p. 154.
15 Ibid.
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And if only Rev. Oliver were a more reasonable personif only Rhody McCoy were a little less intransigent, if
only A1 Shanker were not given tP striking over-statements,
then Bernie Donovan, Jim Allen, Ken Clark would have the
world the way we would like it - you know, we like a manage-
able, soft-spoken world in which decisions are made intelli-gently and rationally and with some regard to equity. That's
one answer
. . .
lo
These "militant" or simply intransigent leaders, by the force of their
personalities, disrupted the logical solution of the crisis, and, in
Clark's best phrase, "they postponed the nirvana of rationalism." 17
Hopefully, the analysis of the necessity of the violent inter-
action of social classes or movements precludes the reader's acceptance
of this line of argumentation. History is not created by the persona-
lities of men, rather by the pre-determined struggle between those
who have and those who have not, between those who are in power and
those who are oppressed. Clark himself clearly stated that there is
really no evidence to support the rational, liberal casej that anyone
who asserts such a line of argumentation does so on the basis of faith
rather than on the basis of an examination of the facts in this inci-
dent, or of the historical processes in general. With the issue phrased
in such an unambiguous fashion, only Calvin seeks to debate the point.
The remainder of the panelists silently accept the verdict. In other
words, they fail to challenge a position which undermines the validity
of endeavors to which they are committed far beyond their participation
in the panel sessions.
^Clark, Transcript of Panel Three, January 18, 1971, pp. 154-155
17 Ibid
.
,
p . 155
.
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Caught in such a vicious contradiction the panelists had two
alternatives. iirst, they could begin to construct a new, or different,
series of causal assertions which would better explain the events or,
at least, a case that could be even slightly substantiated by the data.
Secondly, the panelists could continue to operate along false premises,
repressing the knowledge of the insipid theoretical foundation upon
which they were operating. Significantly, they continued in pursuit
of Calvin’s elusive hypothesis and thus became engulfed in a mass of
trivial details, none of which they could either categorize or place
in a proper analytical perspective.
It is ironic to note that Dr. Clark is among the first to
continue as if the model which political scientists created in the
1950' s actually held validity. After ridiculing the white liberal view
of the intransigence of the leadership in Ocean Hill, he assumes the
same posture when speaking on a theoretical plane:
I’d like to ... to formulate a vague hypothesis, that in
the initial stages of problems . . . maybe the decision-
makers are not responding with high focus and high clarity
to the variety of interest groups that are in some way re-
lated to the eventual decision . . . .1®
This is a pretty statement. It implies that by sensitizing the leader-
ship to the complexity of the situation they command, the overt actions
which polarize social movements will be prevented. A mere ten minutes
later, Clark has adopted the academic guise and proclaims the uses
of reason. In reality, groups are polarized by their economic status,
l^Clark, Transcript of Panel Three, January 18, 1971, p. 165.
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and by the conflicting goals which germinate from that economic
status. The actions of their leadership hardly create antagonism;
they merely translate the predetermined conflict into political
strategies. But none of the panelists can see this. Even though
they have stated that no evidence can be found to support the "rational,
liberal case, they continue to analyze the confrontation as if that
model was an accepted fact. This continued denial of the obvious forces
the panel to descend into trivia. Because they lack the proper theore-
tical orientation to establish hypothetical relationships, they must
degenerate into pointless discussions of political behavior.
I do not wish to become mired in this rhetoric, but one example
might help to clarify the situation. Dr. Gittell, Dr. Clark, and
Reverend Galamison become involved in a simply marvelous discussion
about what determined the outcome of the vote in Albany on the de-
centralization bill. Someone suggests that Ocean Hill was voted out
of existence because the largest number of voters in New York state
was against the continuation of the experiment. As a counter to this
pure model of representative democracy, it is suggested that the side
that tried hardest to influence the legislature won; that the intensity
of the lobbying determined the outcome. Dr. Clark counters with the
claim that the amount of money at the disposal of the United Federation
of Teachers proved the crucial difference; that financial leverage
applied by organized labor allowed the passage of the Marchi bill.
Milton Galamison supplies an apt conclusion by verbalizing his hope
that in the future victorious coalitions will be founded upon a common
adoption of correct moral principles.
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While the above summary may be rather glib, it accurately
conveys the level of discussion which characterized the remainder of
Panel Three. While certain side comments were of inherent value, the
systematic attempt to formulate hypotheses was a failure, if not an
outright mockery. Their logical systems, or academic models, applied
only to books, being of little value in attempting to explain the
realities of a black-white confrontation in an urban area. Because of
this failure to develop rational principles, no adequate hypothetical
statements could be made about the issues and implications of the New
York school crisis. From this fact the candidate does not draw the
implication that no theoretical assertions can be made with reference
to Ocean Hill-Brownsville
; rather, the prevailing myths passively
accepted by the panelists limited the scope of their imagination, render
ing them incapable of rationally organizing the data which they them-
selves presented. It is the intent of the candidate to develop in the
ensuing chapters a model which will not only place Ocean Hill-Browns-
ville in its appropriate social context, but will act as a predictive
device, or analytical tool for the understanding of the conflicts
which characterize urban school systems in general.
CHAPTER VII
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA: PANEL FOUR
In Panels Two and Three it was the intent of the candidate to
pursue a course designed to elicit from the panelists (1) possible
options which would have either mitigated or avoided the confrontation
at Ocean Hill-Brownsville
,
or (2) hypothetical assertions necessary
for the construction of a theoretical model abstracted from the New York
situation and applicable to urban school districts nationally. At the
direction of the candidate, Dr. Calvin repeatedly attempted to channel
the course of the discussion to achieve the above goals. As a perusal
of the actual transcripts and an examination of the corresponding ana-
lyses of the data demonstrates, the panelists at that time were unable
to address themselves realistically to the creation of either alterna-
tives or hypothetical relationships. It is within this context that the
fourth panel began its unrelenting dissection of public education in
America, declaring that the schools were, in fact, predetermined failures
and that no options existed to this genocidal assault upon the black
community. After it became apparent that the amorphous and academic
discussions of hypothetical models had terminated, the panelists began
to discuss education and the implications of the politics of education
with an almost unbelievable change in attitude and direction. The pane-
lists began to allude to the realities and to tell the stark truth about
the present state of public education and the implications that can be
legitimately drawn from this condition.
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The structure of this discussion was provided by the ongoing
events stemming from the Newark, New Jersey, teachers' strike. It was
fortunate that the educational eruption in Newark occurred simultaneous-
ly with the retrieval of data by the candidate, for it provided an
illuminating effect on the issues of New York City and offered many
peripheral issues and possibilities of options for discussion and com-
parison. In the original design of the study, no mention was made of
using another city as a comparative model. The candidate did, never-
theless, view the original design of the study, the proposal itself,
as the guideline for a flexible endeavor, one which would actively
en8a Se the participants in a fashion best suited to the expression of
their views. This flexibility allowed the candidate to utilize the
Newark strike as a device pursuant to the objectives of the study. The
example of Newark proved valuable for a series of interlocking reasons:
(1) Newark is now generally assumed to be a black controlled city. The
election of Kenneth Gibson as Newark's Mayor signified to the nation a
racial transfer of power to a far greater extent than did the elections
of Hatcher or Stokes in Gary, Indiana and Cleveland, Ohio, respectively.
As the Mayor, the president of the school board, and the head of the
teacher's union are all black people, Newark set the stage for an exami-
nation of the meaning of "black" leadership both locally and nationally;
and (3) more than any other subsequent event, the Newark strike parallels
the strike which threatened Ocean Hill, allowing the candidate and the
panelists to use two situations to develop theoretical statements about
urban education. The practical application of this methdological approach
means that while the objective of the discussion centered on an understanding
122
of the New York situation, the issues in question were structured
along the lines suggested by the example of Newark.
As the Newark strike has failed to draw the national atten-
tion which focused in Ocean Hill, an omission due in part to the
absence of whites as visible actors, background information must be
provided if the educational issues are to be understood. Newark has
a black mayor who inherited a bankrupt city. Many observers suggest
that a causal linkage exists between those two facts: that only be-
cause the city was bankrupt could a black man have inherited it. The
president of the Newark Teachers' Association is a black woman de-
spite the fact that the larger percentage of the membership is white.
It has been suggested that her election to the presidency was only-
a
tactic used to give the illusion of the sensitivity, merit, and libera-
lism of the Teachers' Association. It was viewed that having a black
woman rather than an Albert Shanker would thwart charges of racial pre-
judice levelled against the Union, regardless of the actions of the
Union. On the other hand, the Union hoped that installing a black per-
son as its president would placate the militancy of the black community.
The Teachers' Association introduced the black brainchild of the New York
United Federation of Teachers, Bayard Rustin, to preach the virtues of
unions, and to "explain" what unions have done for minorities, especial-
ly for black people. His role was to create the illusion that the black
militants are hell-bent on taking over the schools for political rea-
sons and, out of a malicious desire, to break the Union. He is not
to discuss the power play and the financial demands of the Union.
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This unpleasant picture of blacks attacking other blacks gives
white America its opportunity to reinforce its belief that blacks are
irresponsible children, continually acting in an unreasonable fashion.
There are two more actors involved. The school board is predominantly
black and its leading spokesman is a black man. Unsophisticated, but
out of necessity learning quickly, he echoes the popular rhetoric of
wanting to make public education accountable to the people. Any such
melodrama, created and sustained by the white interests in cooperation
with the white media, needs its "bad nigger": Ocean Hill had its Les
Campbell, Newark, as always, has LeRoi Jones, "the separatist who has
made Gibson his flunky. The legitimacy of Jones’ spoken word is
obscured by the media s attempt to keep the issues obscured and the
races polarized.
The only white actor on this stage represented the Central
Labor Council. This "leader of men" valiantly states that no matter
what the children of Newark have to suffer (these children, incidental-
ly,are black) the "black militants" will not crush or destroy the Union.
The vested interests of the Labor Council must be supported; this sup-
port allowing the Teachers’ Association to transform the danger of a
strike into an opportunity to gain power. Somehow the educational
issues supposedly central to an educational institution are no longer
visible. Instead of children, the wheels revolve around money, power,
and the combination of those two which we call politics.
Commonly used phrase used for LeRoi Jones' relationship to
Kenneth Gibson.
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Given this complex background, facts must be separated from
fiction, and mere opinion from deliberate falsification. Ideally, in
other words, if it were not for politics, this would be the function
of journalism. Such a public service is contingent upon an awareness
of the motives of those who provide information, their methods, and
the audience they reach. The timing with which the news, or what actual-
ly is public relations, reaches the public is equally important. Thus,
the writer cannot but feel that the series of columns entitled "Where
we Stand in the Sunday New York Times represents a deliberate strategy
and one which is a disservice to education. Aside from the dubious vali-
dity of an organization which has a regular newsletter published perio-
dically on the education page, a "freedom" bought with incredible sums
of money, the propaganda disseminated is indicative of tremendous organi-
zational skill and power. In this sense, Shanker ' s column on Newark
2is a classic.
Ironically opening with an attack on the media, the article stated
that the public has been told little or nothing about the realities of
Newark. Shanker claimed that the black mayor was attempting to make the
teachers the scapegoat for the economic plight of the city. Curiously
enough, there was no mention of the children. Either Shanker was deliberate-
ly lying, or his memory was short. Gibson inherited a corrupt and bank-
rupt system; in listing his priorities, education was at the top, as was
his commitment to a unified city. He asked for federal and state aid to
achieve these ends. After this innuendo at the Mayor, the article ex-
plicitly evoked the pro forma spectre of "black jnilitancy." Knowing how
2Albert Shanker , "Where We Stand: The Real Issues in the Newark
Teacher Strike," ( A Weekly Column of Comment on Public Education [Adver-
tisement] ), in The New York Time s (February 14, 1971), p. E7
.
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to capture liberal sentiments, he attacked the black community for
its failure to limit itself to pastorial language and academic dis-
cussion, specifying the militants' virulence and stridency. Certain-
ly, this was an odd posture for Mr. Shanker. In completing this beauti-
fully structured introduction, he linked Gibson to the militants by
falsely charging the Mayor with failure to decry violence against
teachers. Once such a presentation has dissipated the slightest inter-
est to investigate the facts of the situation, Shanker dispensed his
version of the truth.
In dealing with the actual transcription of the panel session,
a discussion of the contributions of individual participants will be
followed by a structural review of the key issues embodied in these
remarks. Initially, Dr. Mario Fantini acknowledged a basic similarity
in pattern between the two cities, though he prefaced his remarks by
stating that New York City was farther along its path of deterioration
than Newark. If, then, this is the future of all systems of public
education in America, the concentration of forces that shape our society
must create the resources to deal with the disaster much in the same man-
ner as the President designates certain state disaster areas after floods
or earthquakes. But Fantini's assertion itself demonstrates the paucity
of options, not only for Ocean Hill, but also for Newark. Because these
actions must be taken by those in power
,
the positions of the participants
in Newark are of no consequence; their actions a macabre dance of the
powerless. Further, these powers are embodied in institutions with a
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structural interest in self preservation. Any attempt to create a
counter force capable of destroying these institutions, or even neutra- ’
lizmg them (a reformist option) is politically an impossibility. The
origins of the crisis exist in every major American city; the fact that
the forces of the oppositions are impregnable make it inevitable that
there will be other Ocean Hill-Brownsvilles
,
perhaps in different forms,
but with the same characteristics. The only tangible result of anyone
attempting to break out of this pattern will be violent political re-
pression, an indication that change cannot be expected in the near future.
The country was aware of Newark's financial bankruptcy; many were
cognizant of the fiscal impossibility of the city meeting the teachers'
contract demands; thus, the events of those weeks must be part of a pre-
determined script with a particular cast of characters. It is the posi-
tion of the candidate that all school systems in the process of reform
can predict the behavior of its indigenous set of actors by reference
to this script .
Dr. Fanitini simply suggested the defeat was inevitable in
Newark and in Ocean Hill-Brownsville once the black community altered
its role from that of the docile victims to an active force in the shaping
of its own destiny. Speaking as one who precipitated the original pro-
posal for the demonstration districts, Dr. Fantini clearly asserted that
Ocean Hill-Brownsville was never meant to take itself seriously, never
meant to assume that the slave owners of New York City had partially
given freedom to their colony. Once the educational establishment became
aware that the blacks had gotten presumptuous enough to act as if they
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were equals, it moved expeditiously to reestablish the status quo,
attempting to protect all of the vested interest groups by deni-
grating the legitimate actions of black people as the insane acts
of savages gone crazy in the jungle.
Dr. Clark viewed the situation in Newark as stemming more
directly from economic causes and labor interests than the Ocean
Hill confrontation. The power of these interests, from this perspec-
tive, over-rode strictly racial considerations. Thus, Dr. Clark felt
that Bayard Rustin' s role was to convince the black teachers to sup-
port the Union despite his apparent failure to convince himself of
that fact. Supposedly, poor whites and poor blacks should join to-
gether in the labor movement for the mutual benefit of everyone in-
volved. Rustin s hope was to force middle—class aspirations onto
black people in an effort to dilute their militancy. This attempt at
co-option parallels the attempt in 1967 by the U.F.T. to obtain the
support of the community for its exclusionary policies. The purpose
of striving for such support, essentially useless to the Union, was
only to remove a slight irritant that could inconveniently dissipate
some energies.
But Clark's objective at this point is broader than a de-
lineation of the Union's manipulation of one man in an attempt to con-
trol the black community. The core of his remarks impute that the edu-
cational process has been contaminated by a power group that has no
interest in the process of education, only in the power which stems from
the fiscal allocations to education. Historically, American liberals
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have mobilized to isolate, in their terminology, educational insti-
tutions from political or ideological hacks attempting to rape the
educational process. In actuality, this attempt has been a guise to
6nforcs in a totalitarian fashion the instruction of liberal, racist
dogma. But Newark signals the emergence of a new kind of pariah, a
new kind of power seeking to contaminate the educational process.
This new danger was not so apparent because at its source allegedly
were people within the educational schematism. This illusion will
take a long time to dissolve because these unionists cannot be cate-
gorized as hack politicians or reactionaries, an exemption that en-
ables them to mobilize the liberal sector of our intelligencia to
their defense. Education then becomes a form of the labor movement:
the subjugation of the school system by the teacher unions with the
support of organized labor as a whole. The role of the educator will
become that of an agent by which the union contract will be negotiated,
the stipulations of that contract dictating educational policy for the
contract period. Thus the right to structure the educational environ-
ment will have passed from the hack administrators to the hacks of
the labor movement; the community, particularly the black community,
is considered, as usual, to be irrelevant to this neat sharing of
power
.
Even though the pronouncements which characterized the fourth
panel were remarkably realistic, two options or methods to break this
stranglehold were proposed: Fantini looked to the corporate sector for
relief generated by economic self-interest; and Ferretti imagined that
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a political power base could be constructed. Both options are traps
which fail to recognize either the essential motivation of the cor-
porate structure, or the sickness of the political structure which
these corporate interests control.
The cost of education has dramatically risen in the last ten
years. The vast majority of these increases has been in response to
(1) higher teacher salaries; (2) larger teacher benefit packages; and
(3) the need to hire an increased number of teachers to maintain class
sizes due to the reduction in the classroom load dictated by the Union
contract. As the cost of education rises, society continues to pay
for the peripheral costs stemming from the inadequacy of public edu-
cation, i.e. welfare, etc. As Fantini recognized that community groups
have, in the past, lacked the organizational resources to mount an
effective assault, he looked for the corporate structure, out of pure
self-interest, to seek to redesign public education. Not only do the
corpoiations feel the societal effects of a rotten educational system,
but they are forced to expend millions of dollars to retrain employees
and prospective employees in basic skills that should be learned in the
schools. This combination of expenses, Fantini hoped, would convince
the corporate sector that it would be much more economical to educate
children properly. In other words, operating from the perspective dic-
tated by the profit motive, corporations themselves would lead the re-
form movement.
This position has two inherent flaws. One, as the analysis
stemming from Marilyn Gittell’s statement in the last panel indicates,
130
the corporate sectors lack this autonomous control. Any educational
movement led by the financial elite that would threaten middle income
jobs would be viciously fought and ultimately defeated by those tragi-
cally caught in the squeeze between the power of the oppressors and the
demands for liberation by the oppressed. Secondly, the purpose of
American business is financial exploitation, particularly of minority
groups. The skill of a businessman, i.e. his ability to realize a pro-
fit, demands this ability to exploit. Thus any educational opportuni-
ties offered could only be in one of two roles: training to be a parti-
cipant in the exploitation of our brothers, or training to be a flunky,
i.e. to be exploited as a worker. Oddly enough, these two fundamental
propositions adequately explain the existing school system
,
one that
serves the function of dividing the exploitors from the exploited. Such
schools are the perfect tool of capitalist oppression and must ul timate-
ly be destroyed by the white and black people of our cities. Thus,
what Dr. Fantini in his naivete proposed as an option actually serves
as an explanatory tool in the understanding of the lack of options with-
in the existing political and economic system of oppression in America.
Mr. Ferretti from the Mew York Times seemed to feel that the
reform of education can come from the political apparatus of the nation.
The claim is suspect on grounds inherent in its operational procedure,
i.e. those grounds which are built upon the subservience of that appa-
ratus to the economic concerns of capital and co-opted labor. Leaving
this theoretical mode of attack, the best refutation of Ferretti 's
hopes comes from later statements made by Ferretti himself. He explains
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how South Jamaica, a black area represented by one state assembly-
man and one city councilman, was neutralized as a base for black in-
fluence in the educational areas by the guidelines allegedly drawn
by the U.F.I. charter heads for the decentralization boundaries:
South Jamaica was split in thirds, each segment being subsumed with-
in a larger white voting block. Given the housing patterns and the
corresponding gerrymandering, faith in the electoral system at best
represents a compromise with one's oppressors. When Ferretti utilizes
electoral terminology and speaks of the necessity of making a coali-
tion to obtain political clout, lie can only mean that the black com-
munity should endorse gradualism and paternalism. For to be an equal
partner in such a coalition, one must have something of value to trade,
ihe only power of the poor in America is the power to destroy; the
power of violent and suicidal assault upon the white man. Since Watts
the threat of murder has held a certain political advantage. But given
the failure of black people to, as yet, mount a truly revolutionary
army, such violence only leads to the ruthless repression of the people;
hopefully, such repression will ultimately turn the tables, moving in
such forces as to create a true army which will liberate black, white,
and Third World people. Waiting for this auspicious event, educators
cannot rely on the slow process of legislative action; it is not our
function to stand idly by and watch the destruction of children.
One might assume from the virulence which has characterized the
preceding discussion that the unions, the teacher's union in particu-
lar, has been cast as the "bad guys" because of their economic power.
These powers, when translated into the political arena, have allowed
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the unions to take control over educational institutions. But I wish
to reiterate a position often stated above: that this characterization
is far too simplistic an analysis of America’s economic structure.
Inherently, unions attempt to counterbalance the exploitive force of
capital with the collective strength of workingman organizations. Capi-
tal forces them to become strong in order that labor might minimally
protect itself. Thus, one may have no doubt about the necessity for
the political strength of the union movement. However, when this strength
originally garnered to protect the working man from the exploitation
of his labor becomes a tool in the exploitation of others, the union
movement becomes a tragic perversion of its original inception, trans-
forming an enemy of inequality to a perpetrator of racial and economic
discrimination. But, it must be remembered that this reactionary trend
is a response to the initial exploitation of the labor force. Thus,
the real villain must be the monied interests which originally forced
labor to organize in order to protect its right to exist on a human level.
It is only the perversion and sickness of the labor movement that has
deflected their attack against those in power to those who are utterly
powerless. In practical terms, the Union should attack those who
originally plundered Newark, those who originally raped Ocean Hill-
Brownsville, instead of fighting with black people for the meagre re-
mains of the financial carcass.
What I have attempted to describe above is the ability of monied
interests to turn the various subservient groups against each other,
debilitating any revolutionary movement and obscuring the true enemy.
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Simply, the rich may observe the battle while their underlings
attack each other, then enter to collect the spoils. This policy
stems from conscious strategic decisions which those in power have
the money to implement. Needless to say, it is an unbelievable tra-
gedy to observe this phenomenon existing within the black community:
black men serving the oppressors' function against black people.
The decision of black men to become pimps against their own people
represents the most ominous portent for the future of black and
Third World leadership. For the purposes of this analysis, the
discussion will draw data from three sources: Kenneth Clark's ex-
perience in Washington, D.C., the absorption of paraprof ressionals
into the United Federation of Teachers in New York City, and the career
of Assemblyman Sam Wright, including the future of District 17 under
his leadership.
In many respects Washington appears to be similar to Newark:
the majority of the voters are black, the majority of the school child-
ren are black, the head of the school board is black, and the head of
the teachers' union is black. Washington does differ in two important
respects: one, the Superintendent of Schools is also black, and the
white power structure has enough invested in the prestige of Washing-
ton and in the pretty white marble edifices in Washington not to
abandon the city after the plunder as they did in Newark. Admitting
the naivete of his prior conceptions, Dr. Clark assumed that this
apparent racial solidarity would open the door to a realistic attempt
to improve the academic achievement of black children. In the absence
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of the white man, black people would be able to come together and
literally begin to teach black children how to read and write. In-
stead of this coalition, Clark net intransigent opposition and his
alternatives suffered a complete defeat. This defeat, as opposed to
that dealt Ocean Hill, was done in a more polite fashion; meaning
that the white power did not have to surface as they had the blacks
tearing each other apart. In place of Bernard Donovan and A1 Shanker,
the Washington stage featured a black superintendent and a black union
leader who explained that one really cannot just come into a school
system and teach black children how to read.
The script literally is a rewrite of the one used for Ocean Hill
and Newark. The only alteration made involved a simple substitution of
black actors into the roles created by white men. These "pimps" simply
assume the role vacated and take on the job of continuing the genocidal
treatment of their own people. The system is so lucrative that it can,
just as it perverted the labor movement, pervert black man into the
protectors of the elite. Clark's concluding phrase in this discussion,
"
... so you’re asking me for alternatives? See me tomorrow!"^ is a
glib one. He masks a tragic reality: simply putting black faces in white
roles does not change the script. Co-opted by the affluence offered
like water to a thirsty man, black people will aid in the oppression of
their brothers.
It would be an error to assume that this co-option of black
people occurs only on the higher levels of the bureaucracy. Black
^Clarlc, Transcript of Panel Four, February 17, 1971, p. 234.
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people have been enslaved in such a marginal economic position that
an offer of very little has the potential of purchasing a great deal.
The relationship between the paraprofessionals and the U.F.T. in
New York City provides a classic example of this pathetic inability
to maintain the dignity of one's allegiances. The majority of these
paraprof essionals had developed a long standing hatred of Shanker and
all his union represented to the black community: racism, the disrup-
tive child issue, the Ocean Hill strikes, and the simple failure of
the membership to educate the children of the paraprof essionals
. These
people gained entrance to the system under the Career Opportunities
concept, a method of involving indigenous community people strongly
identified with the cultural tradition of the neighborhood in the class-
room.
Unfortunately, once in the system, certain paraprofessionals
sought to rise to middle-class professional status at the expense of
their allegiances to their roots and, in fact, to the purposes of their
involvement. This drive for money led them to seek out and ultimately
accept the "protection" of the Union, or simply to receive the benefits
of unionization without publically supporting the Union. Inevitably,
they will enter the programmed cycles, assuming the roles created by
the whites whose dirty work they perform. From another perspective
one is forced to ask what they have received for their sellout. Shanker
was able to absorb them, then literally attack rather than defend their
interests. They have no representation on the Governing Council and
above all, the Union hardly noticed the fact that fifty per cent of them
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lost their jobs last year. As Dr. Clark suggests, they are not members
of the Union, but colonial subjects open to exploitation by the Union.
All they received in return is the opportunity gladly given by Shanker
to, in turn, exploit their own people.
Many people directly involved in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville
struggle have perceived from the newspapers that Sam Wright is the
master of such exploitative techniques. They claim that Wright, in
building his political empire, has managed to mortgage the future of
the black people in his district to buy personal political power, an
achievement that can only benefit white people. In the face of this
assertion, Dr. Clark said that Mr. Wright may, in reality, represent
a brilliant and covert strategy being executed for the benefit of all
his constituency. Though it is difficult to tell how serious an intel-
lectual attempt this discussion represents, Clark postulated that Wright
is aware of the fact that control will never be achieved in the fashion
outlined by McCoy, Oliver and company. Profiting from their "mistakes,"
the good assemblyman has decided to pretend to be the enemy of the
"militants," thereby giving the illusion that he is supportive of the
establishment while building a political climate acceptable to white,
middle-class America. The covert strategy which rationalizes these
actions is supposedly the ultimate goal of assuming power under the
guise of moderation, then turning this newly won right to control
over to the community.
Such a position contradicts the facts of the style in which
Wright runs his district, the political sohpistication of the white
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community
,
and the effect which Wright’s dictatorship has had on the
school community relationships in Ocean Hill. Wright, perhaps in co-
operation with the Brooklyn democratic machine, runs the district for
the sole purpose of the aggrandizements of his power. The use of
physical force and financial exploitation has been charged to him and
his organization. As a result of this mode of procedure, the black
community learns to be treated as colonial subjects of a black man.
The lesidents are not worthy of consultation, or dignity; their only
value lies in what they have that can be taken away. No matter what
Cla? k asserted about a hidden agenda,"^ such a style can only lead
to the continued destruction of the political sophistication of the
black masses . the white man s game played by a black machine.
Secondly, as Reverend Oliver astutely points out, no white
man is about to give Sam Wright power that he might even possibly use
to benefit black people: the power to destroy, perhaps, but never the
power to create. Oliver says it very clearly:
I don't think the establishment for a moment would allow him
to gain that kind of power if he is going to use it for the
benefit of the black people; and I think that the only reason
that he can do what he is doing is so that he can hold the lid
on and keep the natives happy.
^
In other words, Wright's job is to placate the masses. In return, the
white powers allow this hack to nibble a small corner of their pies.
Again, it is pitiful to watch black people turned into the enemy of the
people by those who are in reality the common enemy.
^Clark, Transcript of Panel Four, February 17, 1971, p. 231.
^Oliver, op. cit
.
,
p. 232.
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The final refutation of Clark's position comes directly from
the chaos in the district which has resulted from Sam Wright's rule.
Instead of building the faith of the white establishment in the self-
governing powers of black people, Wright has staged a protracted de-
monstration of his inability to pacify people who seriously want their
children to be educated. The sequence of protests, boycotts, confronta-
tions
,
transfer of teachers, charges of fiscal mismanagement, culmina-
ting in the removal of the district superintendent, illustrates that
the local community never accepted either the new Governing Board or the
new administrative staff. The new local board is viewed not as a
force for liberation, but as a tool in the hands of the Central Board;
and the district superintendent is perceived just as a stand-in for
the old city superintendent, Bernard Donovan. Even the New York Times
continues to delight in the spectacle of black people ripping each
other apart.
These case studies illustrate the failure of black "leadership"
in Washington, New York City, and Newark. The mere introduction of
black faces into the various levels of the educational bureaucracy, even
at the top of the bureaucracy, does not affect the quality of education
offered to black children. No matter how painful this failure is for
the black community to confront, anyone seeking the revolution within
the school system must consider that in addition to race prejudice,
the factors of economic class dividing the black community Itself
threatens to continue the style of the white man's rule in black hands.
Just as the white community destroys its own in the interest of status
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and money, certain black leaders seem willing to place personal
powers above the welfare of the people.
The conclusions which one is forced to derive from the example
of Newark, the experience of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, and the co-option
of black leadership are not pleasant ones; their essence attacks the
foundation of American capitalistic society. Yet once comprehended,
the ramifications of the conclusions allow for the construction of a
model capable of explaining the varied crises in urban education. In
other words
,
once the theoretical basis is sound, the rational state-
ments which stem from these premises have predictive value. At this
point, we shall deal with three conclusions drawn directly from the trans
cription of the panel.
Mario Fantini is a man with a great deal of faith in American
mythologies. Thus, his complete rejection of the myths of American
education indicates a profound effort to confront illusion with reality.
Towards the end of Panel Four, Fantini simply states that education is
important to Americans only as means to achieve socio-economic power.
Not only do various community groups and union organizations see the
educational structures as providing a vehicle for their organization
aggrandizement, races and social classes in America utilize education
as a means of either perpetuating or combatting oppression. The per-
spective of the Teacher’s Union towards educational policy stems not
from their concern, even their minimal acknowledgment of children, but
from their desire to protect their economic position. In a broader con-
text, all of white, middle-class America must view the education of
black children in the same fashion: they must be kept servile by de-
stroying their minds and bodies with bad food, bad housing, and bad
schools. For this sector the schools are not failures, but triumphant
successes in training the black masses for a life of oppression.
Schools in this sense do not educate but socialize.
The black community, particularly in Ocean Hill, perceived this
correlation. Our people are aware that the failure to be educated leads
to the impossibility of competing on the social and economic fronts.
Thus the black communities' fight for education can be reduced to a
basic revolutionary struggle of black people in America. In the broadest
sense of the term, the battle over education is a battle for power in
American society. Those who profit from the degradation of black people
cannot afford an educated black public. Watching the destruction of
our children, the black community can no longer tolerate schools which
are instrumental in genocidal policy.
This background gives some meaning to a series of assertions by
Dr. Clark:
. . . what I have really learned during these last three years
with disturbingly stark clarity was that the resistance educating
our kids under any conditions is greater than the resistance to
desegregation, now that is an appallingly disturbing lesson.
6
Clark speaks of the efforts to integrate ghetto schools and then, in his
words, "confesses" that:
... I didn't realize that that was almost child's play com-
pared to the resistance against any way of increaing the qua-
lity of education for our children. That any serious proposal
to have our kids academically competitive ... is going to meet
a furious resistance initially disguised under all kinds of
^Clark, Transcript of -Panel Four, February 17, 1971, p. 258.
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procedural matter, due process, sometimes even humanistic
concerns
.
. but if you keep pushing, you aren't going
o get but hard, sparse, bludgeoningly
,
God damn it no
Once the desegration issue slips into the background, the racial moti-
vation for the miseducation of blacks becomes less valid as an explana-
tory hypothesis. White Americans not only refuse to have their child-
ren educated with black children, but they refuse to have black child-
ren educated at all. The real reason is not an inbred repugnance to
associations with educated Negroes, but a very complex understanding
that educated Negroes make poor bus boys. Because, as Fantini com-
prehended, education can be translated into socio-economic power, no
white community is about to educate its black population. To thwart
any community controlled attempt the oppressors will use any gimmick
at their disposal: due processes, unions, procedural questions, laws,
etc. The particular strategy is actuatly irrelevant; the device is a
vehicle which the white community has the power to arbitrarily enforce.
The white community understands the necessity of controlling black
children, and possesses the power to implement that conscious decision.
How they do it really matters very little once it is done.
The understanding which one draws from these conclusions is
brutally simpie: until a violent revolution occurs, school systems will
continue to perpetrate genocidal practices against black children; that
for political, social and economic reasons, the white community cannot
tolerate the existence of a trained black mass; that the battle over
educational issues is simply a front from the vicious struggle for
^Clark, Transcript of Panel Four, February 17, 1971, p. 258.
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social power in America; and that in the short run, Newark, Ocean
HU1, Chicago, Detroit, and Washington are hopeless battles, fought
"O' f°r the Pr“ervatl°“ ° f than with the expectation of
y. There exists no softer language to accurately describe the
context of the educational struggle.
CHAPTER VIII
ANALYSIS OF THE PANEL: PANEL FIVE
In the preceding four analytical chapters attempts were made to
deal with the specific incidents which comprised the confrontation over
Ocean Hill-Brownsville
,
and the issues raised by the participants in con-
nection with these events. This procedure has resulted in a series of
lengthy arguments, factual presentations, polemical assertions, and
moral statements. The purpose of the discourse was to provide the
reader with an adequate understanding of the events which took place in
Ocean Hill-Brownsville from 1967 to 1970, while debunking several sup-
posedly valid explanations of urban education in general. The fifth
panel added little to this effort. As in the previous session, the
panelists realistically and perceptively commented upon the activity in
question, and although certain points were clarified or underscored, no
significant new information emerged. Thus, while the rhetoric necessi-
tates perusal of the final session, its clarity negates the necessity of
an expanded analysis. Instead, this chapter will use the data of the
fifth panel to synthesize and summarize the analyses of the previous
four sessions in an attempt to develop (1) a model of the political
structure which affects urban education, and (2) a series of conclusions
and observations about the effect which that political structure has on
urban education. As has been the practice of this dissertation, the
terminology of the model and the conclusions will have that of New York
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City idiom, though the assertions themselves have descriptive and
predictive value nationally.
Any understanding of the political substructure affecting the
institution of public education must originate from a comprehension of
the linkage between education and the struggle for economic status in
American society. As was documented in previous chapters, the under-
lying motives of the black community and our black and white antago-
nists originate in economic concerns. Public education is perceived
by both groups not simply as an "instructional process", but as a deter-
roiricint of future socio-economic status. Thus, any fight over educa-
tion is, at its foundation, a fight for money. This antagonism stems
from two sources: one direct, the other indirect. The former stems
from the money allocated to education. Not only are teacher’s unions
viciously destroying any efforts toward the reform of education in
order to preserve control over their increasingly large share of the
budget, but other peripherally involved interests make their influence
felt. For example, the analysis of Panel Three mentions the overriding
importance of the intervention of the construction unions in the New
York crisis. The sums of money currently available to labor unions
and textbook publishers are so vast as to compel those interest groups
to preserve the status quo. Obviously, any significant alteration in
the power structure of education would seriously threaten their econo-
mic well-being. Thus, for reasons that have nothing to do with the
development of children, educational policy is controlled by interest
groups dependent upon the allocations to public education for their
survival
.
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But, as stated in previous chapters, these interest groups are
not totally independent entities; they are pawns who enact the deci-
sions made, consciously or unconsciously, by larger political and
economic entities. They simply represent the vehicle through which
American education practices its policy of socialization. Those who
control this process of socialization have a major effect on the future
of the nation: by controlling the quality of education which the various
socio-economic groups receive, they in part dictate the future options
open to each group. For example, nice, upper middle-class kids are
trained by their elite schools to respect themselves as they are pre-
pared for future leadership within the general confines of our society.
Black children are beaten, ignored, degraded so that they, too, will
learn to accept their future role in society as bell-boys, garbage men,
postal carriers, and dishwashers. It truly is a marvelous school system
that can teach a dignified human being how to live in a state of sub-
servience.
From this perspective
,
the schools are an unqualified success .
Those who have an interest in maintaining the economic oppression of
black people have an obvious interest in continuing their sub-education :
one is a necessary precursor of the other, a necessary training for life
as a slave. While education is not solely responsible for the predeter-
mined fate of black people, the system of public education serves as a
primary vehicle for the perpetuation of racial and class struggle in
America.
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The political structure, America's term for elected officials
and the bureaucracies that they nurture, provides the power to enforce
this policy of educational genocide. While the rationale for this
phenomenon is rather simple, the manner in which this control is exer-
cised is rather complex. Dealing with the former, these representa-
tives of the people are dependent upon the financial power of the groups
from whom they draw support. As was brought out in the fourth panel,
politicians in New York need neither a large number of followers nor
moral arguments to foster their bid or reelection: only the money
supplied by organizations and wealthy donors can do that. Thus it is
hardly surprising that politicians would pursue the interests of those
racist groups upon which they depend for support. Needless to say, as
the majority of these hacks comes from the socio-economic class which
they serve, oftentimes they need little or no prompting as the attitude
and economic perspective of their class form the core of their operative
value system. For a more detailed development of this phenomenon, refer
to C. Wright Mills' The Power Elite . ^ Crudely stated, the political
structure is charged with enforcing the genocidal educational practices
necessitated by the economic structure of the nation.
Essentially, the preceding four panel analyses have been an ex-
tended documentary focusing on the manner in which this enforcement
occurred from 1967 to 1970 in Ocean Hill—Brownsville. Ocean Hill i e-
presents the best vehicle available to understand these fascist policies
because when the black community in Brooklyn attempted to break out of
this cycle, the oppressors were forced to publically demonstrate the
Iq. Wright Mills, The Powe r Elite (Oxford: Oxford University
Press
,
1956) .
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manner in which they ruled to an extent unprecedented in American edu-
cation. The primary instruments in this conscious policy of oppression
were (1) the law; (2) the media; and (3) the various bureaucracies, i.e.
110 Livingston Street, the State Department of Education, the Ford
Foundation, the Mayor’s office, etc. As this formulation implies, each
of these entities did not represent independent variables; rather, they
acted to enforce a policy formulated by the considerations named above.
Representing one of the major victories of political indoctrina-
tion, the legal system in America is viewed as the impartial admini-
stration of justice and not as a biased tool manipulated to perpetuate
the political and economic status quo. Unfortunately, to equate law
with justice in America negates any distinction between fascism and
democracy. Take for example the conventional legal definition of vio-
lence. If a man strikes another person with the intent to take his
money, the law defines that as "armed robbery," a felony punishable with
extended imprisonment. However, if a slumlord allows his property to
deteriorate, killing children with lead poisoning and freezing tempera-
tures, in his pursuit of an income, that is the legitimate operation of
the capitalist system. There is no justice incorporated in such laws;
they are simply functional guidelines established to facilitate the
political-economic system.
Just as these laws condone the murder of children in the pursuit
of profit, the law protects those who slowly destroy children in their
classrooms while debilitating any attempt to reform the structure of
public education. Numerous examples of this wanton perversion - the
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most fundamental principles upon which America, not to say American
education was formed - permeate the preceding chapters. The law allows
the school system to harbor racists and incompetents; the legislature
to manipulate voting districts to negate the power of the black vote;
and the State Department of Education to rule Ocean Hill-Brownsville
as a colony. As a sub-set of its duty to preserve the powerful, the
law provides an active tool for the suppression of those who try to
assert their rights and preserve their dignity. In America it is legal
to surround I.S. 271 with thousands of armed policemen, to bar parents
from the schools which their children attend, to expel students who
seek to maintain pride in themselves and in their race. Bluntly, the
American law has degenerated from its ideal position as the impartial
administraiton of justice into an instrument utilized to perpetuate
repression and class strife.
The various media, i.e. the newspapers, the television networks
etc.
,
emerged as the second major societal institution charged with
preserving the poor quality of American education. Unable to accurately
conceptualize the issues, representatives of the media, either out of
their own ignorance or in response to specific instructions from their
superiors, continually distorted the grounds of the debate. These un-
ending series of subtle distortions, gross misunderstandings and out-
right lies prevented the public from ever obtaining either an under-
standing of the basis of the struggle or the manner in which the struggl
was conducted. Ideally, journalism, like the law, exists as an independ
ent entity functioning in the public interest. The actions of the media
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during the confrontation at Ocean Hill indicate that the television
networks and the newspapers are, like the law, weapons in the arsenal
of those who have vested interests in the perpetuation of the present
I
educational bureaucracy. From the perspective of the media, the sub-
education of black children was the normal state of affairs, and any
attempt to educate them became a "crisis." In the summer of 1967 the
media portrayed the forthcoming Union strike as one stemming from econo-
mic grievances rather than as an attempt by the Union to gain control
over educational policy and implement racist disciplinary procedures;
and white spokesmen were "responsible leaders" of the community, while
the black leadership was portrayed as raving militants and revolutionaries
bent on destroying the schools, the children, the church, and the nation,
lew reporters found it relevant to discuss the educational innovations
implemented at Ocean Hill, the unprecedented involvement of parents both
in policy-making and instructional capacities, and the seriousness of
our purpose. The media failed to provide information; rather, the media
disseminated propaganda useful to the purposes of the white middle-class
politicians who were compelled to destroy the demonstration districts.
The giant bureaucracy, which harbored these white middle-class
folk, comprised the heart of this strategy of oppression. Certain insti-
tutions, such as the Ford Foundation and 110 Livingston Street, initial-
ly appeared to be publically supportive. However, their inability or un-
willingness to sever past allegiances led to the transformation of this
support into opposition and/or withdrawal as the political ramifications
of their actions became clearer. The rules, the regulations, the raw
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power amassed by the gnomes at 110 Livingston Street, the city agencies,
and the State Department of Education proved capable of smothering some
attempts at educational change; and, when those covert efforts failed,
publically destroying others, such as the one which the community estab-
lished in Ocean Hill. By perpetuating the rationale which supported
the old system, they effectively established the stage for the destruc-
tion of anything new. In order to "test" the concept of community in-
volvement, 110 Livingston could create demonstration districts, then
structure the guidelines of the experiment in such a fashion as to in-
sure their eventual failure, thus blocking another vehicle for reform.
In addition to such examples of agencies acting unilaterally to preserve
the status quo, two or three bureaucracies neatly worked together to
protect those interests which they had in common. When the Board of
Education was caught off-guard or in an embarrassing position, either
the Mayor or the State Board of Education calmly stepped in to effective-
ly prevent any black group from benefitting from this situation. This
cross-fertilization of bureaucratic omnipotence gave the unions and their
racist, political supporters a guise in which to cloak their fascist
policies in the name of "operational procedures." Rather than openly
advocating the sub-education of black children, the institution merely
has to "defend its legitimate right to conform to established procedures
for the hiring of instructional personnel." In other words, the public
bureaucracy of this country, along with its legal system and informa-
tional channels, have been perverted from institutions which serve the
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people into bastardized servants of the power elite.
Standing m the face of these grim realities, black people con-
cerned with the education of their children, and particularly black
educators, have few acceptable alternatives. Black people are also
aware of the correlation between education and the dignity which stems
from economic security. The fight for a decent education is a micro-
cosm of the fight for a just place in American society. Yet, though
we fight in the same arena as our white oppressors, the black masses
lack the tools and the power with which the white man perpetuates his
power. One could intelligently speak of a white strategy to defeat
the black man in terms of the institutions which the white power was
capable of manipulating. For the black man no such alternative
exists. The political powerlessness of our people in this society re-
duces the arsenal of the combatant to that which he was born with:
his mind and his body. Unfortunately, much of the preceding chapter
has been a description of the lack of political sophistication of black
leadership and of the black masses. This inability to devise tactics
reflect more than a simple lack of a power base to work with; it indi-
cates that black people, regardless of their sophistication, lack the
political and economic resources to effectively challenge American
education . It is my fervent conviction that the community in Ocean Hill
desired to reform the existing institution of public education, not
destroy it. But, the intransigence of the white bureaucracy and the
fascism of the white community forced the community to engage in what
the media characterized as disruptive activities. Lacking an economic
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and political power base to bargain from, the community is forced not
to bargain at all; forced out of the system, the community must choose
to either allow that system to perpetuate genocide against its children,
or to exercise the only power it has: that of violence and disrup-
tion, or abandonment which invites further repression supported by the
laws and the courts. Black people are not permitted to operate the
system, but they can, for short periods of time, prevent the system from
operating. Essentially, the community must use that futile and self-
defeating weaponry against the arsenals of legalism, bureaucratic hog-
wash and political power that the white community has at its disposal.
To recapitulate, the struggle for economic position, which
American capitalism creates, inevitably leads to the present conflict
which characterizes urban education. The political structure which
fights this battle for the interests which it represents, has at its
disposal such tools of oppression as the law, the media, and the
bureaucracy. Existing in a state of colonial subservience, the black
community is forced to choose between accepting the continued destruc-
tion of future generations, or attacking the system with those means
at its disposal.
The preceding analysis of the economic and political foundation
of the struggle over the schools leads to the following descriptive and
predictive hypotheses about public education:
1. Education is a process designed to perpetuate the attitudes
of the ruling class; consequently, education for the poor and
the minorities is practically impossible.
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2. Education is never the issue; rather economic, political,
and institutional reform.
3. The actions of the various parties were of no consequence
after the actions of the community were interpreted as con-
frontation.
^ * All overt attempts at resolution are designed for compromise
which means the assurance of the powerlessness and oppression
of the poor people.
5. Looking at similar school crises in urban settings across the
nation, the behavior of the same entities is predictable, the
results of the crises are also predictable.
6. The bahavior of the various parties or entities was the only
option available to them, i.e. there were no other options
than those they employed.
7. Given the present political and economic system, there exists
no viable alternative to the present conduct of public educa-
tion.
8. The perpetuation of this system will breed more rebellions
which will in turn bring about more repression.
The above eight statements represent a harsh verdict, including a rather
protracted death sentence. After reviewing the preceding five transcripts
and the supplemental analyses, it is impossible to refrain from these
assertions. If, in fact, options do exist, they can develop only from
a realistic appraisal of the facts at hand. The panelists, as recorded,
reached the same conclusions, but presented them in much softer tones in
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an attempt to elicit and perpetuate a continued hope and struggle
on the part of the oppressed to remedy the faults of the institution
which knowingly and unrelentlessly practices genocide against one
segment of the society it sllegedly serves*
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS AND OVERVIEW
This study has attempted to determine the relationships between
the practices of public education and the political and economic structure
of urban society. Believing that from the perspective of the dominant
classes the school system successfully functions as an instrument of
socialization, the analysis has focused on the educational myths which
disguise this destructive process, and on the benefits which the bour-
geoisie reaps from their assault. In this study the goals of this cal-
culated policy have often been termed genocidal. The usage of a term
which links white America with Nazi Germany is neither a hyperbole nor
a vacuous political slogan. Though the characteristics of our schools
result partially from the economic structure of our society, the parti-
cular aggression of these institutions toward black children transcends
simple class antagonism to reflect the desire of white America to con-
tain or destroy the black and brown population. In order to force black
and Third World people into a slavery without visible chains, a slavery
imposed by economic laws, the school system willingly destroys their
intellectual and cultural heritage. The effect of school policies and
practices implemented by teachers and bureaucrats is to force black
people into jobs that do not pay, houses that have no heat, and cities
that can support no life. This can only be seen as the result of a com-
prehensive strategy initiated by the elite of America and designed to
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control black and brown people. The nature of this strategic action
can only be termed genocidal: institutions of repression destroy Americans
who seek liberation in the same fashion as they destroy those men and
women in Viet Nam who desire their freedom from colonial domination.
The manner in which the strategic assault occurs and its re-
lation to the movement of community control of the schools is made clear by
a document taken directly from the Congressional Record entitled Urban
America, Goals and Problems
,
prepared for the Subcommittee of Urban
Affairs of the Joint Committee of the Congress of the United States.
The study, reproduced in its entirety as Appendix C, was submitted by the
noted anthropologist Edward T. Hall to a body the membership of which
included some of the most distinguished liberals in the Senate: Charles
Percy, Abraham Ribicoff, Jacob Javits, and William Proxmire. This asso-
ciation does not implicate these legislators in the production of the
idea contained in the body of the report. However, it does confirm
one's paranoia to read a document bearing the names of such men which
presents a blueprint for the fascist government that presently rules
America's cities.
Stripped of the shibboleths and illusions which normally cloud
liberal rhetoric, the document delineates the methods used by the United
States Government to manipulate the minds and to control the bodies of
"lower class Negroes." Approaching the substantive issues raised by
the ghetto rebellions solely with an interest in social control, the
author asserts that lower class Negroes present "very special problems"
resulting from the character alterations necessitated by the adjustment
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to ghetto living. Both the passive and armed resistance of black and
Third World peoples to their imprisonment presents a serious problem
to an economic structure requiring domestic peace and a docile labour
force. Those most directly charged with maintaining totalitarian con-
trol, i.e. the police, have not found their resources adequate in scope
or comprehensive enough in nature. Thus, the document seeks assistance
from other sources:
Our studies show the relationship of men to the city is the
need for enforced laws to replace tribal custom. Laws and
Law Enforcement Agencies are presently in cities all over the
world, but a times they find it difficult to cope with prob-
lems facing them and need help [ sic ]
.
As aid to law and order
that has not been used to the fullest extent possible, is the
power to custom public opinion in the ethnic "Enclaves." Co-
operating preachers, politicians, teachers, etc..
White Americans cannot control the unfettered mind of lower-class Negroes
who live in the "jungle," thus the liberals must provide educational and
social services adequate to train these beasts in the fundamentals of
subservient behavior. The document proposes to aid the police with the
subtle, more manipulative skills of ministers and teachers. In other
words, the dangerous potential of millions of black people jammed in a
single "sink" must be neutralized by means of police violence coopera-
ting with the pacification program launched by liberal welfare institutions
such as the schools. It is crucial to note that the behavioral objectives
of the police and the liberals are identical.
The study claims that the fulfillment of these objectives is
threatened by massive overpopulation. This danger manifests itself in
two ways: (1) the possible territorial growth of the ghetto which could
not only destroy the established culture of the sink, but threaten
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surrounding white residents and businesses; or (2) the overcrowding of
the ghetto itself which could lead to intolerable conditions and pos-
sible revolutionary violence. As expanding the size of the sink is
really not a socially permissible option, the report focuses on how to
maintain social control given conditions of severe overcrowding.
Because "letting the 'sinks’ run their course" would ruin the
white sections of the city, those who hold power have developed an
alternative solution: Prepack or introduce design features that will
counteract the undesired affects of the sink. But most important not
destroy the enclave in the process [ sic ] " According to the document,
implementation of this notion requires the secret cooperation of a
"coterie of experts: City Planners, Architects,
. . . Economists, . . .
Educators, Lawyers, Social Workers, . . . Ethologists and Preachers."
It is further recommended that one consult with, though not empower,
".
. . Negro enclave specialists .... Remember it is important to
learn about them in order to forward the desired effects." The product
of this impressive combination of academic talent should be an Urban Re-
newal Program in the broadest sense that utilizes experiments on mice to
understand how to effectually rule human beings.
Dr. Hall notes that these experiments show that caged animals,
when improperly housed, become stupid and confused. Because such character
traits contribute to movements towards social revolution, they should be
avoided. Thus, an excess of sensory deprivation resulting from public
housing projects creates a threatening situation. Therefore, a crucial
need is to design spaces that will allow for a healthy rate of interaction
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as defined by the "proper amount of involvement, museums, jobs, games,
swimming pools, movies, etc. And a continuing sense of ethnic identi-
fication." Once this "proper" amount has been defined, the totalitarian '
control over the black population will be forced to depend less on the
overt violence of police methods than on the covert violence perpe-
trated by just the right amount of swimming pools, jobs, and other ines-
sential items. The sophistication of the document is such that its
authors even understand the use of a sense of ethnicity to control black
people. The operative principle is to allow them enough pride to avoid
the dangers of what bourgeois psychotherapy terms pathological insanity,
i.e. revolutionary violence, etc., without transforming the docile folk
into militants. The secret cooperation of all the social scientists
should produce a design that creates enough self-respect to avoid mass
suicidal actions like ghetto rebellions, though not enough self-respect
to develop a people’s army capable of confronting the police. The
phrasing provided by the document offers a perfect summary of this
social policy:
Through a process of taming, most higher organisms, including
Negro men can be squeezed into a given area, provided that they
constantly have a minimum amount of food provided for them,
that they are made to feel safe, and their aggressions are under
control
.
Brilliantly perceptive, the author of the report understands that while a
minimum of food might be provided by welfare, the feeling of security
necessary to control aggressions is lacking in the black community. Men
made fearful of each other possess an explosive awareness of their need
of more land and better living conditions. As the fundamental premise of
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the document is that America will allow its poor neither additional
land nor additional income, an alternative must be developed to diffuse
this potentially revolutionary development.
The author of the report states that "our policy must be to
entertain compromise, maximum community control and financing in their
sinks, but not awareness or awakening to the true values ." (Emphasis
mine.) He then outlines a social policy that would utilize the black
movement for self-determination as a vehicle to maintain the genocidal
oppression of the United States Government. Black and brown people must
be given the illusion that they may exercise some meaningful direction
in their lives in order to forestall any real attempt to seize power.
The institutional reform which will create this illusion is community
control, the self-enslavement of a people in behalf of the totalitarian
state and its police force.
The involvement of the "Negro leadership" is central to this
strategy, and the document is very explicit on this point. While it
remains difficult to determine "who is a Negro leader," the study asserts
that careful scrutiny can identify the persons necessary for a successful
implementation of the strategy. The document cautions white people
about assuming airs of superiority or authority when approaching Negro
leaders. Oppressors are supposed to show exceptional concern, respect,
and act in an unsuspecting fashion. The possibility that community leaders
may represent interests inimical to that of the government hardly disturb
the logic of the policy. More maleable leadership may simply be "created
with the cooperation of those dispensers of project money, the media,
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and the delegation of some institutional authority. After "these
potent movers of the community" have been identified,
our wisest and most urgent move now should be to put them
in New Towns in Town* and let them have ’community control’
so they will have a feeling of security. Thus creating self-
containment [ sic ]
.
Beautifully simple, the government will handpick the leadership for the
black community, delegate to them a token amount of authority in order to
prevent more radical demands, then benignly neglect the blacks as they
perpetrate the totalitarian policies of the government upon their own
people.
This report to the Subcommittee on Urban Affairs of the Congress
places the actions of the government into a proper perspective and is
of tremendous value in understanding the events which centered around
the demonstration district in Ocean Hill-Brownsville from 1967 to 1970.
Above all, the document confirms the perception by black people that the
government of the United States will stop at no measure to enforce its
fascist control over black people. While the government would prefer to
have the work of the police and the army done by the schools and other
welfare institutions of the bureaucratic state, genocidal violence would
serve the same policy equally well.
Standing between the peoples and this overt violence are the new
myths used by both liberal whites and hopeful blacks to mask the reality
of powerlessness: self-determination and black capitalism. Just as the
pacification program in Southeast Asia is a front for imperialism, the
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social welfare institutions of liberal society, whether they are
controlled by blacks or whites, are a front for the totalitarian
powers of the government. In this vein, the rise of black capitalism
only indicates that the black bourgeoisie has been given a license
to exploit their own people. The document demonstrates that no thought
is given to self-determination for black people as a people, and no
thought to upgrading the standard of living of black people as a people.
Rather, those policies which appear to attack these ills are simply
more subtle methods of maintaining social control.
The preceding statements leave little dignity in the liberal
position. While the data presented in the body of the dissertation sup-
ports such condemnation, one should not surmise that the generals of
the welfare state are lacking in good will" or are even consciously
aware of the effect of their actions. Most men and women who work in
our schools, universities, and government are devoted to what they per-
ceive as their task. They have no visions of perpetrating genocide or
exercising totalitarian control. As products of white America's ideo-
logical brainwashing, such liberals honestly desire to help "those
poor people in our cities." While they may reveal their true nature
in the pro forma rejection of "militancy," "communist ideas," "anarchism,"
and "preachers of racial hatred," educators generally claim the sanctity
of Christian idealism. But the rationalizations provided for their
actions do little to alter the realities of the effect of their actions
as outlined in the document quoted above. The report graphically illustrates
the usage of social welfare institutions designed by the liberals for the
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totalitarian goals of the state. Such institutions will never offer
the services to those who staff and envision them: the schools will
not provide education, the welfare department will not provide ade-
quate food, the housing department will never construct decent housing,
etc. These bureaucracies will just continue to provide the "proper"
amount of the item in question; properly defined as the amount required
to keep the blacks docile in their concentration camps.
While none of these motives can be attributed to the educators
we have discussed in this dissertation, their complicity in this policy
is unquestionable. New York City's experiment with community control
was an experiment with self-containment. The three demonstration dis-
tricts established were designed to provide the people with the sense
of security necessary to forestall any more militant action against the
schools. When the people of Ocean Hill-Brownsville overstepped the
boundaries of the experiment
,
when they developed more pride than was
permissible, when they began to mount a challenge to the foundations of
the government itself, the experiment had to be crushed. Having ceased to
be useful, the government was forced to pay the cost of removing it.
Though Clark, Fantini, and Gittell make brilliant reference
in elitist language to this concept in this document, their message is
clear: yes, there is an alternative and an option. For those who believe
that peaceful change is possible and who have the commitment to muster
energies and resources to deliver reform, the denouncement of such a
document would obviously be to eradicate this plight from the annals
of our history. This can only be possible when programs designed to
eliminate the conditions become operative, functional, and successful.
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Finally, the document speaks directly to those people within
the state, those people who choose to function within the domain of
the educational institutions. Since the perversion of the community
control movement has become so obvious, one must construct a rationale
that combines a commitment to the revolution of black and poor white
people with the reality of one's role in the social structure. Mao
^ se~'^ unS once quoted an old Chinese proverb. He wrote about how once
one has learned to walk a straight line under all conditions, one can
walk a crooked one. In other words, if one understands how to contri-
bute to the ongoing movement of oppressed peoples, one can translate
this knowledge into action under any circumstances.
Iappendices
APPENDIX A
THE LITERATURE IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
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For a black man, or any man, cognizant of the history of black
people in America it is indeed difficult to view the current litera-
ture on education in an unbiased fashion. The persistent recurrence
of white strategies to prevent the education of Negroes lends an al-
most dreamlike quality to any comparison, a quality which cannot, how-
»
mute the frustrations and anger that such an inquiry creates.
For one hundred years the students and teachers in Negro
colleges have been anomalies in the system of American higher educa-
tion, excluded from the security, financial protection, and sense of
intellectual community which characterized many of their white counter-
parts. In fact the estrangement of blacks from white universities has
been so great as to make it impossible to speak of Negro colleges as
members of the American academic world. Rather, they have been as
parishes to the community, or relegated to the status of the unacknow-
ledged bastard child of a righteous household. And today, just as in
1880, southern Negro colleges stand in the same derivative condition
as northern urban ghettoes stand within our thriving metropolitan areas;
in Sekora's words: " . . . white institutions created them, white in-
stitutions controlled them, white institutions maintained them, and
white institutions degraded them."'*'
Educators and political scientists, and almost anybody else
who wants to profit by publication, speaks about the condition of pub-
lic education in inner cities with such terms as "decentralization,
Ijohn Sekora, "Murder Relentless and Impassive: The American
Academic Community and the Negro College," in Sound ings , Vol. 51, No. 3
(Fall, 1968), p. 252.
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parent participation, local control, militancy, etc." The history
of black colleges provides one more reason for viewing this debate
as subterfuge and deliberate obscurantism. We have run through this
gauntlet before. James M. McPherson writes that "
. . .home rule
for our colored students had become a powerful slogan by 1895.
"
2
At that time a large movement of blacks demanded the authority to
appoint teachers and an involvement in local management. And even
eighty years ago, black demands were countered by white financial
control. Playing upon countless myths of black incompetence, the
white community countered these demands by refusing to "risk" money
on the "experiment;" then, just as they will not now, relinquish
their grasp on an institution they founded.
Decentralization in 1895 was supported by white America only
when blacks could make financial inputs into the institution without
corresponding decision-making authority, regardless of the amount of
participation in the institution. Thus, fiscal control was the lever-
age used to play blacks against blacks to neutralize the efforts of
so-called "militants" to achieve self-governance. This overt rejec-
tion of black people as capable, intelligent, and mature individuals
capable of controlling their own lives was based on two corresponding
racist assumptions: the superiority of whites and that fiscal control
or management was too sophisticated for blacks.
Pitifully then as now, Negroes, stripped of meaningful control
over their lives, fought each other in a degrading spectable of seeking
^James M. McPherson , "White Liberals and Black Power in Negro
Education, 1865-1915," in American Historical Review, Vol. LXXV , No. 5
(June, 1970), p. 1369.
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self-aggrandizement through subservience to the man. In 1912 each
faction of the black community backed one of the three deans of
Howard University in a bid for the then vacant presidency. Yet only
two of the eight black trustees supported any of the black candidates,
while a majority of the white trustees desired the election of a
Negro president. Given the circumstances, if any of two of the three
deans had withdrawn from the context in favor of the third, Howard
would not have waited another fourteen years for a black president.
But each of them preferred a white man to a black comrade in a superior
position, and a white president was elected.
APPENDIX B
CONFIDENTIAL LITERATURE AND PUBLIC NAIVETE
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Let me make a very personal statement. It is unbelievably
frustrating to be aware of large-scale corruption and fraud within
the practice of education, yet be unable to prove or publically
validate what is common knowledge. There exists a whole corpus of
documents, strictly secret, hence available only to high level policy
makers. One can be only vaguely aware of their existence, and com-
pletely unable to act on this awareness in a fashion which would bene-
fit the general public. Lacking this crucial information, critics
remain either childishly naive, or impotent to crack the edifice.
The real conduct of business in education is performed so that the
people never even see a glimpse of a shadow to reflect the actuality.
For example, those involved in the movement in New York have
long been aware of a state document dealing with the city’s handling
of federal funds. The review of the various programs included in the
report disclosed weaknesses in administration and internal controls
which permitted fraud on the largest scale. Large sums of money were
advanced to the Local Education Agencies on a percentage of approved
budget, yet unrelated to actual cash need. Thus, the state asserts
large amounts of cash were on hand for unnecessarily lengthy periods
of time, permitting the city to invest for income between ten and
twenty million dollars. This was feasible because of the exclusion
of New York State’s three largest cities from the requirement which
provides for annual financial reports submitted by the Local Education
Agencies to the State Department of Audit and Control. Funds earmarked
for Title I, Title II and the Appalachia Regional Development Act are
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thus being used to provide unrecorded income on a mammoth scale for
the city of New York, rather than providing educational opportunities
for the city's children.
But this is an instance of a scandal that will never surface,
because one cannot base a case, or even make an unqualified public
assertion, on the basis of common knowledge." And mention was made
a t this point not to stir puriant interest, but to indicate the neces-
sary shallowness of the literature of urban education, a shallowness
which precludes inciting large numbers of citizens to attack the pre-
sent educational bureaucracy in an effective manner. First of all,
the vagueness of the "information," or actually the rumor, prevents
its utilization in any strategy. But that is only the most superfi-
cial damage. Far worse, the inability of critics to present such
documents creates a naive community. Literally no one outside of the
profession, and few within it, can understand the nature of the edu-
cational crisis given the available information. This ignorance of
the true sources of power precludes the creation of a movement that
would crush the powerful.
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National Priority
THE HIDDEN DIMENSION
By EDWARD T. HALL
Professor of Anthropology
Tin.^n. wtitiitn of Technology, 31st and State Streets,
Evolution By Extension
Cities and Culture
' If what is known about animals when they are crowded
or moved to an unfamiliar biotope is at all relevant to man-
kind, v. o lire now facing some terrible consecjuences in our
\jrban “sinks” (“Jungles”), (“Ghettos”).
The adjustment of these people (Negroes) is not just
economic, but involves an entire way of life.
’ The lower class of Negro in the United States poses
very special problems in their adjustments to “Sink” living,
which if those problems are not solved may well destroy us
by making our cities uninhabitable.
An often overlooked fact is that lower class Negroes
and middle class whites are culturally distinct from each
other.
,
Some Negro spokesmen have gone so far to say that no
white man could possibly understand the Negro.
They are right if they are referring to the lower class
Negro. Only those we have trained do .ve understand.
The Need For Controls
Our studies show the relationship of men to the city is
the need for enforced laws to replace tribal custom. Laws
and Law Enforcement Agencies are presently in cities all
over the world, but at times they find it difficult to cope
with problems facing them and need help. An aid to law
and order that has not been used to the fullest extent pos-
sible, is the power of custom public opinion in the ethnic
“Enclaves.” Cooperating preachers, politicians, teachers, etc.
These “Enclaves” perform many useful purposes, one
of the most important is that the “enclaves” act as lifetime
reception areas in which the second generation can learn
to make the transition to the “sink” (jungle) (ghetto) life.
The main problem for us with the “enclaves” as it is
now placed in the “Sinks” is that its size is limited. When
the Negro population increases at a late the enclaves is
unable to convert them — only two choices remain: 1. Ter-
ritorial growth, (more land), or 2. overcrowding.
If the enclave cannot expand and fails to maintain a
healthy “density,” (overcrowding) a sink develops.
The normal capacities of law and order enforcement
agencies are not able to deal with “sinks.”
Apart from letting “sinks” run its course “more land”
and destroy the city, there is an alternative solution:
^ Prepack or introduce design features that will counter-
act our undesired affects of the sink. But most important not
destroy the enclave in the process.
- A study by Pathologist Charles Southwick discovered
the peromyscus mice could tolerate high cage densities.
In animal populations, the solution is simple enough and
frighlenly like what we see in our Urban Renewal Programs
or sinks.
io increase density in a rat population) and maintain
healthy specimens, (a) Put them in boxes so they ean’t see
each, (b) Clean their cages. (C) and give them enough to cat.
Then you can pile them in boxes up as many stories as
you wish.
Note: Caged Animals become stupid, from states of flux
boredom; confusion, which is a risky price to pay for our
super filing system of these people.
The question we must ask ourselves is, how far can we
afford to travel down the road of sensory deprivation in order
to file these people away in these public housing projects?
Our most critical needs at this time therefore is for
ideas, principles for designing spaces that will maintain a
healthy density. A healthy interaction rate, a proper amount
of involvement, museums, jobs, games, swimming pools,
movies, etc. And a continuing sense of ethnic identification.
The creation of such ideas; principles will require the
combined efforts of many diverse specialists all working
ci-elly, closely together on a
massive scale. ''Coterie of
xperts- City Planners, Architects,
Engineers of all 1>F
’conom'ists, Lw Enforcement Specialists, Traffic, Transput-
ation Experts, Educators, Lawyers,
Social Workers, Politic
Scientists Psychologists,
Anthropologists, Ethologis s an
^eachei As we know, “some of the most
capable help is
yerro enclave specialists, hire
as many as you can and k p
contact In their presence don’t
talk, listen and let them
talk. Remember it is important to learn
about them m order
to forward the desired effects..
•
-•
.
It is absolutely essential to
ns that we learn more about
how to compute the maximum, the
minimum, and the
sity of the Negro enclaves that
make up our citi ..
•
y
Through a process of taming, most
higher organisms,
including Negro men can be
squeezed into a given area, pro-
vided that they constantly have
a minimum.--nt or food
provided for them, that they are
made to feel safe, and
aeoressions are under control. .
However if men are made fearful of
each other, fear
resurrc'ctT the fright reaction,
fear, plus overcrowd,re-
duces panic, thus creating an
explosive awareness o. uheir
neGC
\Ve
I
can 'no^allow this to happen.
Land will not be al-
lowed them, that as we all
know is the most precious ol
W.——EC"
community conti ol and hnanc &
aware or awakening to the
true values.
Conclusion 2
they are miiicul, 1 ’ ' •* ’
.-...nni,, cannot act 01
176
medium of culture.
Negro Lenders
Politic,-, 1 interests of Negro community power are bestmcucatcd m the talk and actions of Negro leaders
Of course it is not always easy to know who i-
,leader and Who is not, for rarely do leaders leadVveryd-L01 as rarely as community itself
'-.uyu„ng,
direction.
6 luU;r,y m “ singular
However
" ud th^ 1
^ S may not bc toda y’s leader.
ieHiv?
C 0S0 observalion and sympathetic ob-
munitv
y
,
y°U Can
!
drify PleSem N*S"> Baders with ccm-} power or influence or respect of the people.
ie only major precaution which must be taben i c m
sri fri™tmness 10 '*rz
,vll
°" enc,a
^
or those in tire Negro community withwhom we would prefer to deal, and whose influence is -d
le
G
aly“ed Wit1’ °“ r P°Wer S;ructure ' not. be
.
,
An
,
d if
,
they are lc!,ders
.
th™ they may be leaders ofinterests other than that of the community' interests Thkis why they must bc watched very close and deep thru curenclaves as well as the many laws which we have at our
,.
A
^ m
r
°,
Ie
,
ader ’ S °'le who movcs ,lis community, ratherthan establish legal authority in the country
The popular leadership of the Negro community is al-most unknown to those m authority outside the community.
Without the involvement of legitimate office the trueNegro leaders are unnoticed by the media and by public
When in danger from us they are carefullv ouarded byhe Negro community itself. The undisputable feet remains
that there are thousands of such leaders, each one moving
the local community with a powerful potent force.
Our wisest and most urgent move now should be to putthem in “New Towns in Town” and let them have “Com-
munity Control” so they will have a feeling of security. Thus
creating self containment.
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THEMATIC INDEX TO TRANSCRIPTS
Listing of Panelists' Views on the Critical Issues
and Incidents in the New York City School
Crisis - 1967 through 1970
The attached listing of comments by panelists about the role
played by each of several of the groups and forces involved in the
New York City School crisis of 1967 - 1970 is taken from the trans-
cripts of the five panel meetings, November 16, 1970 - March 1, 1971.
It should be considered as an index to the transcripts rather than as
an independent document.
Below is a listing of what the panelists said about each of
the following entities:
I. The United Federation of Teachers, Albert Shanker and
other Union spokesmen and teachers; other unions.
II. The Board of Education, Dr. Bernard Donovan and Board
members
.
III. The City education bureaucracy at 110 Livingston Street.
IV. The State Education Department, James Allen, his staff and
that bureaucracy.
V. Mayor Lindsay and the Mayor's office.
VI
.
The media
.
VII. The Ford Foundation, Dr. Mario Fantini, and Mr. McGeorge Bundy.
VIII. Black militants.
184
IX. The establishment and liberal groups: the power structure
in general, including the liberal establishment - black and
white, excluding groups that are included in a separate
listing
.
Within each of these groupings the listing is complete, at least complete
enough to be representative of each panelist's contributions, in spite
of the redundancy that entails. Where a remark refers to two or more of
these groups, it is listed under each. Within each grouping the material
is presented as it appears in the transcripts: from the beginning of the
first panel to the end of the last. This method was chosen in the hope
that it w7ould be helpful in showing the panelists' views and the change
in attitude or interpretation that took place as the meetings progressed.
Individual panelist's remarks can be followed through any of these list-
ings, with reference to the transcripts themselves for context. This
method also highlights the amount of attention given by the panel to
each of these groups in comparison to the others.
The themes that developed through the course of the meetings
were the historical, political, and social setting of the school crisis,
including racism, the civil rights movement, and the "democratic" structure
the resistance to the redistribution of power, especially racial redistri-
bution, and the resistance to the education of black children; the in-
evitability of events, the evidence that participants are acting out
preordained scripts; the results, good and bad, of the demonstration dis-
tricts; what might have been, or what might have happened if one group
had acted otherwise than it did; and what might be tried in the future.
I* THE UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, ALBERT SHANKER, AND OTHER OTHER
UNION SPOKESMEN AND TEACHERS; OTHER UNIONS
Panel Panelist Page Statement
I Swanker
I Swanker
I Galamison
I Galamison
6 When the decentralization bill came to
the floor of the legislature, the CSA
and UFT defeated all the groups which
wanted a broad, general decentraliza-
tion plan.
26 The Giardino Board’s decentralization
plan was defeated by the unions.
28 Board of Education and school system
are captive to the CSA, UFT, and other
unions as well as to professional staff
and other groups represented on the board
34 UFT and other unions are a formidable
voting block. Joined forces to defeat
the 1966 decentralization legislation.
Far stronger than other groups or
coalitions
.
I Ferretti
I Swanker
I Galamison
36 New York is such a union city that the
whole labor force can be galvanized be-
hind an issue, whether it is a labor
issue or not, as happened in Ocean Hill-
Brownsville
.
36 New York is a union city.
43 Shanker says the UFT helped with the
first 1964 boycott. The whole city was
behind that boycott, so UFT may have
given token support, although Galamison
does not remember it. Shanker would
not permit the Board of Education to
penalize the teachers for taking the
day off.
UFT did not support any boycotts after
the first one.
Theme'
Power
redis-
tribu-
tion
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I. THE UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS
. (continued)
Gittell 46 Union agreed on Ocean Hill-Browns-
ville as a demonstration district be-
cause they had been working with a
parent group there: Shanker suggested
Ocean Hill-Brownsville because Sandy
Feldman had been working with a local
board there.
McCoy 54 In June 1967 the UFT was supposed to
inform the teachers in the Ocean Hill-
Brownsville district, but gave con-
flicting information. In one place,
teachers were elected to serve on the
steering committee over the summer, and
in another place they were appointed.
There was confusion about the union's
role in planning or implementation.
There was talk about a strike from the
beginning
.
Swanker 54 The union pulled out of the planning
when the teachers were on vacation.
Swanker 55 The talk about the teachers strike in
June had nothing to do with the demon-
stration districts.
I Ferretti
I McCoy
I Ferretti
56 Didn't the teachers, specifically Sandy
Feldman, think of the demonstration
districts as enlarged More Effective
Schools (MES) program?
56 There was a lot of discussion about the
district being an enlarged MES program,
but there were a lot of mystiques sur-
rounding it. There wasn't any real in-
dication, at least not overt, that MES
was the union's hope.
60 The union's demands on the disruptive
child issue was an attempt to get part
of school supervision and to implement
an anti-black policy. It was not a dis-
pute over wages as the media presented
it
.
Ferretti 60 MES is a union pet.I
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I. THE UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS
.
.
. (continued)
I Galamison
I Gittell
I Swanker
I McCoy
60 MES was a very serious issue because
it gave some schools very special pri-
vileges
.
60 MES was an important issue because it
meant a major educational policy issue
sewn in the contract.
60 1967 was the first year the MES program
was going to be put in the contract.
63 During the summer of 1967, there was
controversy over whether teachers were
going to be on the Governing Board,
which had already been decided, and
what their voting rights were. The
Governing Board (?-We...) exposed their
fraud - they voted on everything except
principals and only wanted to vote to
see that the five community representa- •
tives were not militant. Sandy Feldman
was programming them.
I Oliver
I Swanker
Because of the way the union played its
role that summer, the original propo-
sal was modified so that the 5 communi-
ty representatives had to have 200 signa-
tures and were then elected by the 7
parent representatives.
66 Union wanted to have a voice in choosing
the 5 community representatives to the
Governing Board
,
though they already had
teachers to counterbalance the votes
of the parents, and 2 supervisory per-
sonnel, which gave them the edge.
66 One of the goals of the union for its
next contract may be that teachers will
elect principals - a popularity contest.
Not surprising that teachers wanted a
stronger voice in Ocean Hill-Brownsville.
They had a stronger voice in Two Bridges,
almost the controlling group.
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I. THE UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS
.
.
.
(continued)
I Oliver
I Oliver
I McCoy
I Oliver
I Oliver
II Donovan
68 Teachers were present and voting
when the Governing Board elected
Rhody McCoy instead of Jack Bloom-
field as unit administrator.
Voting went by almost a racial
breakdown
.
69 Teachers who were serving with the
steering committee and then the
Governing Board proposed that the
Board support the strike. The
Board refused, and shortly after
the teachers dropped out.
69 Some teachers had been elected in
June and others had been selected,
but suddenly on the Friday before
school opened they had all been
just serving, though there are re-
cords showing that three of them
had been elected.
69 UFT struck on the day school opened
.
Teachers wouldn't listen to Rev.
Oliver and Father Powis and accused
them of trying to mastermind a
black takeover
.
70 Not a single school chose a teacher to
serve on the Governing Board for three
months. When McCoy issued a directive
urging teachers to elect representa-
tives, a minority in four schools final-
ly sent representatives to the Gover-
ning Board.
76 Initially, both UFT and CSA publicly
professed support for decentralization,
surrounded with safeguards for profes-
sional personnel which would almost de-
feat the purposes of decentralization.
Union members participated in first
organizational meetings in Ocean Hill-
Brownsville and Two Bridges, not at
IS 201.
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I. THE UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS
. .
. (continued)
II Swanker 79 Union support for demonstration dis-
tricts was for MES, giving the union
more control, not for community con-
trol. Perhaps administrative de-
centralization or an elected ad-
visory board, but not community con-
trol .
II Ferretti 79 UFT publications from the start were
against community control, but in
favor of the demonstration districts.
II Donovan
II Oliver
II McCoy
80 Union in favor of the demonstration
districts at the start.
77 The Governing Board's refusal to sup-
port the strike was the end of union
support for demonstration districts.
When they could not control it, they
tried to destroy it.
84-85 Union refused to take the disruptive
child demand out of the contract ne-
gotiations in spite of attempts by
NAACP and other groups to urge them
to take it out.
II Donovan 95 The teachers have the right to orga-
nize to protect their economic inter-
ests, and the parents have the right
to organize to protect their interests.
The line between union control of edu-
cation and union protection of working
conditions is hard to draw.
II Donovan
II Donovan
100 UFT and CSA were opposed to the ap-
pointment of principals from outside
the examination list, and took the
Board of Education to court over it,
summer of 1967.
123 Unions pressured Donovan to cut off
McCoy's salary and were critical of
him for not doing it.
HI Shanker and Degnan regarded each de-
centralization plan as an erosion of
their power and were against it.
II Ferretti
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I. THE
III
III
III
III
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS
. .
. (continued)
Git tell
Fantini
146 The union's role in the contro-
versy over the demonstration
districts was a national poli-
tical issue with implications
for white-collar unions and for
Shanker ' s national union leader-
ship .
166 The union did participate with
IS 201 groups and the Ocean Hill
group and might have continued if
their interests had been taken into
account. UFT expected in return
for their early alliance a MES
program. The Governing Board lost
their support when this was taken
out. Union leadership had a hard
time showing what was in it for the
teachers without the MES program.
The UFT asked Donovan and Fantini
whether they would support the MES
program. When they said they could
not, the uneasy alliance deteriorated.
Clark 173-174 Legislators' decision on the decentra-
lization bill was not made on the
basis of numbers of votes but on much
more mundane grounds. No other ex-
planation for the 24-hour shifts of
opinion and refusal to consider prior
discussions. After that union vic-
tory, Shanker was asked how much was
spent on this in Albany. Answer -
between $200,000 and $500,000. Nobody
asked for a more specific accounting.
Clark suggested to some dissident
UFT members that this might be an
issue on which to challenge Shanker,
but they didn't make the challenge.
Gittell 182 People misuse concepts for own ends.
The union challenged the validity
of the election of the Ocean Hill-
Brownsville Governing Board be-
cause only 25 per cent of the eli-
gible voters voted; but no one is
challenging the recent school board
elections in which fewer voted.
Resistance
to redistri-
bution of
power
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I. THE UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS
. .
. (continued)
III Swanker
III Gittell
195 The demonstration districts threat-
ened UFT and CSA power, but they
gained power through this contro-
versy. They were unpopular at the
beginning because of the previous
year's unpopular strike; gained
power and public opinion through
this.
194 The blue-ribbon panel approach won't
work in New York because labor unions
run this city and they do not support
the redistribution of power.
Galamison 198-199 Teachers felt as though their jobs
were threatened when the Governing
Board transferred teachers out of
the district, and would have felt
so regardless of race. No teachers
actually lost their jobs in the
transfer, but newspapers kept say-
ing that they were and people be-
gan to believe it.
Oliver 211 New York City children are now the
captives of the UFT, and there is
no way to make the teachers produce
what they are paid for. If the
Newark Union, with its support
from other unions, is successful,
it will be another defeat for
community involvement in educa-
tion.
IV Clark 213 Newark and Ocean Hill-Brownsville
are examples of a contemporary
threat to education by a power group
that is not interested in education
but in using education as an instru-
ment of power. Previously, the threat
was from politicians, and liberals
mobilized to protect education from
political influences. Then threats
from right-wing ideologists, and again
liberal mobilization in defense. Now,
a new kind of power seeks to contami-
nate the educational process, but this
Results
Future
;
power redis-
tribution
Black edu-
cation
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I. THE UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS
.
.
. (Continued)
IV Clark 214
(cont inued)
danger is less apparent because
these are allegedly educators. If
they succeed, not only will local
community people not have control
over education in Ocean Hill, but
no one will have control including
mayors and middle-class boards of
education. If teacher's unions con-
tinue to grow in power and to be
supported by labor movements in gene-
ral, then education will become a
form of labor movement.
Clark 219 In the Ocean Hill and decentraliza-
tion conflict, political power was
very much involved, but the con-
trol of the political apparatus
was in the hands of the UFT and
Central Labor Council.
IV Fantini 224 Paraprofessionals are now members
of the UFT, being protected, and
have entered the middle-class cycle.
IV Clark 225 Paraprof essionals are not In the UFT;
they are the colonial subjects to
the UFT. They have no voice, no re-
presentation on the UFT governing
council. 50 per cent of them have
lost their jobs since they joined
the UFT - and without a strike.
IV Ferretti 225 At a junior high school in Queens, in
a black neighborhood, 60 per cent of
the teachers are white, parents seek-
ing control of some aspects of the
educational process, rebelled against
the local elected board, and 22 tea-
chers were transferred involuntarily
and a principal fired. 17 of the
teachers and the principal are black.
They appealed to the UFT and were
told that the UFT would support them
if they won in court.
Power
Power re
distribu
tion
Power re
distribu
tion
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. .
. (continued)
IV Clark
Ferretti
IV Clark
IV McCoy
IV Oliver
IV Clark
IV Oliver
IV Clark
IV Ferretti
V Ferretti
242
The union won't win in Newark
because there is no money.
242 The more the UFT and other unions
become identified with the Newark
case, the better it may be because
it is a "no win" case. If they
do find the money, the unions will
be that much stronger.
243 The unions must know there is no
money in Newark - they're not
crazy.
244 The union may know exactly what it
is doing, the union president may
be being used without knowing it
.
245 The resolution in Newark will be a
union defeat packaged to look like
a victory. Looking behind the
package one could see a severe
blow to the union movement.
247 Education has always been the key
part of the black struggle, and
there is always some obstacle -
now the Boards of Education are
yielding that role to the unions.
247 The union has emerged as the con-
temporary chief opposition to
the legitimate educational aspi-
rations of American minority
people, particularly colored
minority.
249 The UFT chapter chairmen drew
the boundary lines of the local
school districts, which the
Board of Education promulgated
as theirs.
273 The UFT could predict the Gover-
ning Board's reactions and in
that sense could almost program
the Board's actions.
Context
Black education
Power redistri-
bution
Context
Black education
Power redistri-
bution
Power redistri
bution
Black education
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. .
. (continued)
V Oliver
V Ferretti
V Oliver
V Ferretti
V Clark
V Fantini
273 Union didn't know enough about
the Governing Board and communi-
ty to predict their reactions.
They expected the Board to accept
binding arbitration, which would
end the experiment.
274 UFT did expect the Governing
Board to refuse binding arbi-
tration
.
283 Union and media used anti-Semi-
tism gimmick to pressure Ford
Foundation out of the experiment
and to defeat the Governing Board.
It was a powerful gimmick.
284 Yes, it was an important gimmick.
285 Shanker's charges of anti-Semi-
tism changed public opinion of
the reformers to that of a group
of barbaric anti-Semites.
288 The original coalition between the
UFT and the community was for MES
and when the community wouldn't
buy that, the union pulled out.
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II. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, DR. BERNARD DONOVAN AND BOARD MEMBERS
Panel Panelist Page Statement Theme
I Galamison
I Gittell
14 In 1967 the Board of Education
15 approved an open enrollment plan
for integration including redis-
tribution of teachers. Did not
carry out the plan.
I Galamison 14 Board of Education made a series
of unkept promises leading to the
1964 boycotts.
I Galamison 14-15 Theobald, Board of Education, pro-
mised a timetable for integration,
but never produced it.
I Gittell 18 In consultations in 1966 between
the Board of Education, Donovan,
and the IS 201 community about
integration , the Board of Education
was talking about integration of
black and Puerto Rican; the communi-
ty was talking about integration
of white, black and Puerto Rican.
I Swanker 26 The Giardino Board, the last Wagner
Board, wanted to abolish the Board
of Examiners, but their decentra-
lization plan was defeated by the
unions
.
I Ferretti 28 The Board of Education has always
been a dumping ground for politi-
cal appointees.
I Galamison 28 The Board of Education and school
system are captive to the CSA,
UFT, other unions, and the groups
that are represented on the board.
Minority people are not represented.
The Board is captive to the pro-
fessionals because even working
full-time its members cannot keep
up.
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II. the board of education (continued)
Swanker 29
Gittell 35
Galamison 35-36
The Board is captive to the pro-
fessional staff, but its information
comes from several members of the
110 Livingston Street staff, not
just the Superintendent. The inter-
ests of the Board pretty much come
from 110 Livingston, there is real-
ly no question about that, unless a
member makes a determined effort to
go to the field.
The People's Board of Education
sued the City Board of Education on
the basis that they were not doing
their job.
The People's Board has won only one
case against the City Board of Edu-
cation, with Commissioner Allen's
help: a lawsuit arguing that the
Board of Ed was spending money in a
manner that perpetuated segregation
and that it should spend this parti-
cular money in Brownsville and East
New York for a school structure that
would lend itself to integration.
The money is still being held up,
about $40 million dollars. Staff
won't begin a plan to un-court that
money.
Gittell 45 Donovan and Fantini consulted with
Shanker about the demonstration
districts and he suggested Ocean
Hill-Brownsville.
Swanker 48 Donovan and Swanker had been speaking
to Fantini about funding the demon-
stration districts - during the time
when the districts were being decided
upon.
Swanker 47-48 In February or March 1967, Donovan and
Swanker drafted a proposal to the
Board of Ed for 12 different educa-
tional innovations including 3 demon-
stration districts, location not
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. .
.
(continued)
I Swanker specified, and involving the
(continued) people of the community in some
fashion, not specified. In
April, the proposal was submit-
ted to the Board and they adopted
it in theory.
I Swanker 48 Donovan, not the Board, was involved
in the discussions and decision
about demonstration districts and
selection of Ocean Hill-Brownsville
.
I Gittell 49 Board of Ed approved the proposal
including the demonstration dis-
tricts without knowing what they
were doing.
I Swanker 49 Board adopted the recommendation
without giving it much thought, with
the exception of Giardino. Didn’t
connect it with the then current
controversy at IS 201 (in answer
to Gittell’ s question).
I Swanker 51 Board of Ed had decided that there
would be three demonstration dis-
tricts and when Joan of Arc was
ruled out, Fantini suggested Ocean
Hill-Brownsville
.
I McCoy 55 The first meeting that steering
committee had with Donovan made it
clear that there would be no addi-
tional funds, that it would be blood,
sweat, and drudge and in spite of
all the rules and regulations that
were applied.
I McCoy 56 Steering committee met with Donovan
in July 1967 to find out what the
personnel status was in the dis-
trict. Vacancies weren't declared
until September.
I McCoy 57 When principalships were declared
vacant and Governing Board asserted
itself to appoint them, Donovan agreed
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. .
. (continued)
I Swanker 63 Re whether the Board of Ed accept-
ted the notion, in June, that a
Unit Administrator or someone with
administrative pay would be appointed
(Gittell question p. 57 ), the Board
sort of closed their eyes in the
hope that the whole thing would go
away
.
I McCoy 63 Donovan had to avoid giving a civil
service title to the unit admini-
strator because of civil service re-
gulations
.
I Oliver 65 When Oliver wrote to the Board of Ed
in the spring of 1967, as chairman of
a local board in the district, asking
about plans for the demonstration dis-
trict, he got a letter from Robinson
saying that nothing would be happen-
ing in September.
II Donovan 75 Choice of the demonstration districts,
spring 1967: Donovan and Board were
looking for districts. In addition
to the districts that were organized,
quite militant and ready to go, the
Board wanted some that were not so
organized
.
II Donovan 75 Swanker and Donovan had recommended
the idea of demonstration districts
to the Board because they thought
there should be some trial (of de-
centralization) . Board was not re-
ceptive but finally agreed that there
should be a trial.
II Donovan 76 Board of Ed’s 1967 decentralization
proposal was for administrative , not
policy decentralization. Their legis-
lative proposal, not passed, was far
short of what the Ocean Hill and 201
community groups wanted. Board was
concerned about guidelines.
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. .
. (continued)
II Donovan 81 Re local steering committee's
plan that was supposed to have
been agreed to by union, Board,
local district, and Ford: Board
of Ed did not formally adopt it,
they said 'fill it out and we'll
consider it at the end of the
summer .
'
II Donovan 81 Board of Ed had rejected the Bundy
panel proposal, and its own legis-
lation had not been passed, so the
decentralization as it worked out
was not really connected with the
Bundy or Board plans.
II Donovan 98 Board of Ed did not cooperate or
acquiesce in the June elections
held by the steering committee or
planning for school opening.
II Donovan 98 One impediment to steering commit-
tee's and then Governing Board's
proceeding with the experiment was that
the plan had been agreed to by union,
Ford, steering committee, but not the
Board of Ed. Board had wanted to
see fuller plan at end of summer. Later,
they called in Jack Neimeier and con-
sultants who advised the Board to ac-
cept election results. Board reluctant-
ly and not formally decided to work with
the Governing Board. Board resented
steering committee's proceeding without
the Board's formal approval.
II Swanker 99 April 1967 Board recognized, without
formally adopting, Swanker-Donovan pro-
posal, without really understanding
what they were recognizing. No enthu-
siasm, but no great reluctance: took
the Superintendent's word for it.
Giardino may have been the only Board
member who was knowledgeable about it.
Later, September, October 1967, felt
that they had been dragged into it
that the Superintendent had put one
over on them.
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. .
. (continued)
II Donovan 100 Board of Ed, summer 1967, did not
want to give official public re-
cognition to the Governing Board
until there was a total plan for
the operation of the district.
II Donovan 100 The Board did cooperate with the
Governing Board: got permission
from Commissioner of Education to
appoint principals from outside
the examination list. And made
those appointments, including
appointing McCoy.
II Donovan 100 Board of Ed cooperated with State
Education Department to establish
a plan, with Ford funding, to train
Negro and Puerto Rican educators,
and three of them are now district
superintendents and many are princi-
pals .
II Donovan 108 Donovan and others thought of the
decentralization districts as pro-
jects to find out how to decentra-
lize, what the problems were, before
adopting city-wide decentralization.
II Swanker 113 July 1968 was the first time the
Board had a majority of Lindsay ap-
pointees and they did some things
that were important as far as de-
centralization is concerned.
II Donovan 117 Governing Board did not accept guide-
lines offered by the Board of Ed,
and Board of Ed did not accept the
guidelines, list of responsibilities,
that three local boards and an attorney
had drawn up (Oliver, p.117)
,
so there
were no guidelines, no definition of
authority, and the two Boards disagreed
about what rights the Governing Board
had, and that's what created the hang-
ups.
II. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION
.
. (continued)
II Donovan 118 Board of Ed might have worked with
the demonstration district in the
summer 1967 on the plan, but felt
that community boards should be
allowed to do it themselves, so did
not participate.
II Swanker 119 Since the 110 Livingston staff was
against the demonstration, and Robin-
son and Branbecker who had been ap-
pointed by Donovan as liaison had not
helped but had done everything from
foot-dragging to sabotage, even if the
Superintendent had authorized help to
the local boards, they would probably
not have gotten much help.
II Donovan 123 Donovan could have but did not cut
off McCoy’s salary in spite of UFT
and CSA pressure - because it wouldn't
have achieved anything.
II McCoy 129 Donovan provided substantial support.
The only real support the Governing
Board had, though at times his hands
were tied.
II Donovan 139 Board of Ed and Governing Board had
agreed before the demonstration pro-
ject began that teachers could trans-
fer out of the district if they didn't
want to stay. Some did then and some
did later. But there was no discus-
sion or agreement that the district
could transfer teachers out. Per-
haps there should have been, but there
wasn't. The transfer started the
controversy.
III Donovan 158 Speaking in retrospect, the Board of
Ed and Superintendent looked on it
as an educational manifestation of a
political problem, but no one had
time to sit down and try to predict
the consequences (in answer to Gittell
question
,
p . 150)
.
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(continued)
III Swanker 162 Swanker didn’t think the Board of
Ed would pass the demonstration
proposal of Swanker and Donovan.
Probably only Giardino knew what
recommendation they were accepting.
Didn’t think they would because of
the political backgrounds of the
Board members. Race and power
issues may have been in the backs
of their minds.
III Donovan 163 Didn’t expect the Board of Ed to
accept the Swanker-Donovan proposal
because the Board was concerned with
the formalities and the law. Law
didn’t permit them to hand away their
responsibilities - they said. The
plan included principals from out-
side the list and a lot of flexibili-
ty for the local board. Some provi-
sions needed extra-leagl approval
from the Commissioner, e.g. the princi-
palships. Board had asked Donovan to
draw up recommendations and he put the
demonstration districts in, which was
not what the Board had asked for.
Board was concerned with legal responsi-
bilities for funds, etc.
III Donovan 164 Donovan put the demonstration dis-
tricts in the proposal to the Board
of Ed to have a model for decentrali-
zation. Did not foresee the kind of
furor that developed in Ocean Hill-
Brownsville . Expected the community
to want more.
III Clark 164 Asks whether Board of Ed’s resistance
to the proposal for demonstration
districts came from sensitivity to
CSA and UFT.
III Donovan 164 Board was not concerned with CSA be-
cause at that time CSA was new and
had little or no authority. UFT may
have had some effect but the Board
was thinking about legalities.
II. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION
.
. (continued)
Ill Gittell 167 Some Board of Ed members were
very sensitive to Superinten-
dents at 110 Livingston.
-
III Donovan 168 At that time Superintendents at
110 had nothing to do with CSA,
they had power in Albany but not
as much in New York City as UFT.
III Donovan 165 As soon as the Board passed the
recommendation for demonstration
districts, Ocean Hill-Brownsville
went to Ford for funding and Dono-
van suggested districts. This
actuality frightened the Board about
the proposal.
III McCoy 169 The Lindsay Board of Ed was sup-
posed to represent a different
constituency, but they found it
was practically impossible to do
anything even at that point.
IV Clark 170 Donovan had said that the estab-
lishment (specifically the Board
of Ed) did not intend for the
black community to exert real
power
.
Power redis-
tribution
IV Clark
Fantini
230 Rose Shapiro was protecting Rev.
Oliver from his own ignorance.
IV Clark 248 In the first decentralization pro-
posal in Albany, the positions
of the Board of Ed, CSA, UFT
were identical. No one repre-
sented the people.
Power redis-
tribution
IV Ferretti 249 The districts promulgated by the
Board of Ed for the new decentra-
lization law were drawn by UFT
Power redis-
tribution
chapter chairmen.
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III. THE CITY EDUCATIONAL BUREAUCRACY AT 110 LIVINGSTON STREET
Panel Panelist Page Statement
I Galamison
I Swanker
I Gittell
I Ferretti
I Galamison
28 Board of Ed is captive to the pro-
fessional staff because even work-
ing full-time its members cannot
keep up.
29 The Superintendent presents the
agenda for the Board of Ed, and
to that extent the Board is captive
to the professional staff, but each
Board member has a contact on the
staff, so there is not just a sing-
le professional staff man control-
ling information to the board. The
interests of the Board pretty much
come from 110 Livingston Street,
there is really no question about
that, unless a Board member makes
a determined effort to go to the
field
.
31 Groups who wanted decentralization,
parents schools, open enrollment,
bussing - on every issue they were
defeated either by the union or by
headquarters staff at 110 Living-
ston Street.
33 There was a strategy at 110 Living-
ston to defeat everything with ad-
ministrative detail.
36 Re the one court case the People's
Board won against the Board of Edu-
cation, a ruling that a particular
sum of money should be spent in
Brownsville and East New York for
a school structure that would lend
itself to integration: the money
is still being held up, about $40
million. When Galamison was on the
Board of Ed he could not get the
staff to begin a plan to un-court
that money.
Theme
III. THE CITY EDUCATIONAL BUREAUCRACY
. .
. (continued)
II Ferretti
III Donovan
130 Did not support the experiment
and did not take action to fur-
ther it, which hindered it.
Left things in in-baskets.
168 April 1967, Superintendents at
110 Livingston had nothing to do
with the CSA.
167 Some Board members were very sens
tive to superintendents at 110
Livingston.
Ill Gittell
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IV. THE STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, JAMES ALLEN, HIS STAFF AND THAT
BUREAUCRACY
Panel Panelist Page Statement Theme
II Donovan
II Donovan
II Donovan
II McCoy
II Swanker
II Swanker
100 James Allen, Commissioner of Edu-
cation
,
summer 1967, ruled that the
Governing Board could appoint prin-
cipals from outside the list, pre-
sumably at the recommendation of
the unit administrator.
100 Initiated plan, with cooperation of
Board of Education and funding from
Ford, for training program for
black and Puerto Rican educators.
109 Thought of demonstration districts
as trials of the plan, before adop-
ting decentralization city-wide.
119 Gave ambiguous answer to question
of whether demonstration districts
could be defined as state training
schools which would have been a le-
gal way to appoint principals
without examination.
120 State Education Department, Bob Stone
in chief counsel's office, saw to
it that the demonstration districts
were given every legal break possib-
le - with regard to appointing prin-
cipals as for state training
schools
.
121 Policy heads - Commissioner Allen
and staff were sympathetic to the
demonstration districts, had faith
in the theory, and this is part of
what kept the districts going in
spite of opposition.
State Education Department used
Urban Education Act, saying Ocean
Hill-Brownsville was to have a
community education center and
presenting it to the Board of Edu-
cation as a fait accompli.
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. .
. (continued)
Swanker 121 The bureaucracy, analogous to
110 Livingston, did not support
the demonstration districts and
took no action in its support.
Only the policy heads were dedi-
cated to its success.
McCoy 132 Allen told McCoy, in the presence
of Stone from the chief counsel's
office, that there was nothing in
the law to prevent Ocean Hill from
becoming a state training setting
and suggested that he would be wil-
ling to go to court about it. But
he did not act to obtain this ruling
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V. MAYOR LINDSAY AND THE MAYOR'S OFFICE
Panel Panelist Page Statement Theme
I Gittell
I Oliver
I Gittell
II Swanker
III Galamison
III Ferretti
47 Lindsay's people pushed through
legislation requiring the Mayor
to propose a decentralization
plan including community control,
thinking that educational reform
would be a good political issue
for Lindsay.
33 Where 110 Livingston is weak, the
Mayor supports them, and where
those two are weak, the CSA and
UFT support them.
45 Then the IS 201 community groups
rejected Kenneth Clark's proposal,
Lindsay recommended a task force as
an alternative, discussions with
Mayor's office, Sverdoff; Ford,
Fantini, Bundy; community groups.
These discussions led to proposal
of demonstration districts and
Ford funding
121 There was a time when Lindsay would
have shut down the demonstration
districts if he had had the autho-
rity - when the law and order issue
was high and 3,000 policemen were
in Ocean Hill-Brownsville.
152 Neither community people nor others -
Mayor's office, Ford, etc., were pre-
pared to deal with the political con-
sequences. Committed themselves ver-
bally to decentralization and com-
munity control but were not prepared
to deal with the repercussions and
did not maintain their support.
152 When the crunch came, Lindsay was
absent. The entire episode created
a great many political cowards. People
who might have been expected to fore-
see the political repercussions evi-
dently did not.
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V. MAYOR LINDSAY AND THE MAYOR'S OFFICE (continued)
III Galamison 169 The Mayor and his appointees
did not produce the kind of plan
Galamison thought they had said
they would. Mayor did not fully
support the demonstration dis-
tricts.
III Clark 179 Dean Flaco
,
in Lindsay's office,
was sent to organize the communi-
ty to get concensus before moving
on housing programs. Flaco used
community organization approach
to create confusion whereby non-
movement can be justified on the
grounds that the people are divided.
V Fantini 283 The Mayor's appearance and economic
boycotts showed the effectiveness
of the anti-Semitism gimmick.
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VI. THE MEDIA
Panel Panelist Page Statement Theme
I Galamison
I Galamison
I Ferretti
II Ferretti
II Ferretti
II Ferretti
II Donovan
II Ferretti
17 During the 1965 demonstrations at
the 600 schools, media talked about
letting insane children into the
street, though in fact those chil-
dren functioned very well on the
picket line.
19 During the IS 201 controversy, the
media gave more attention to Stokely
Carmichael than to the moderate and
integration forces.
60 Summer 1967
,
media presented union
strike threats as a union dispute
over wages, which it was not. The
disruptive child issue was an attempt
to get part of school supervision
and an anti-black thing.
88 From mid-1967 on, the reporting on
education was poor and misinformed,
e.g., the disruptive child-control
of the school issue never saw the
light of day.
88 Media gave the impression that the
Bundy plan was important, although
in fact it was not seriously con-
sidered
.
88 Sophisticated groups, e.g. the UFT,
have greater access to the media
than others. A result is misin-
formation.
89 Media treated the Ocean Hill-
Brownsville controversy as a con-
troversy only, asking for answers
to other people's statements, not
about substantive issues.
89 That is because equal time laws re-
quire giving the opposition the op-
portunity to answer.
THE MEDIA (continued)
Oliver
McCoy
Oliver
Ferretti
Galamison
Oliver
McCoy
Ferretti
89 Media did not adhere to the equal
time rule: did not provide op-
portunity for Oliver to correct
slanders against Governing Board
by the UFT and some media.
125 At the early stages, there was an
effort on the part of some media
people to mediate the strike. Turn-
ing point was a press conference at
144, when media people stayed to
see the reading program being ini-
tiated there.
189 Opinion makers who influence the
decision makers are as important
as the decision makers.
190 Media includes those who report
and those who attempt to influence
opinion - honest and dishonest re-
porting. An example of a dishonest
piece of reporting.
190 Even honest reporters reflect their
own biases. Newspapers help by
airing the issues, but coverage re-
flected reporters' views and was
detrimental
.
190 Examples of roles assigned to various
people by the media.
206 Questions asked by reporters in
Newark are political: education
issues not discussed.
225 In covering the involuntary transfer
of teachers from Shanger Junior
High School in Queens, Times does
not cover the UFT aspects of it,
which is really all of it (union
said they would support the teachers,
who have the support of the local
black community, if they won in
court)
.
Power red is
tribution
Black educa
tion
THE MEDIA (continued)
Oliver
Clark
McCoy
McCoy
Oliver
At a recent public meeting of
the new local board in Ocean Hill,
there was a violent attack against
the chairman. The T imes covered
the meeting with no mention of it.
Power redis
tribution'
Black educa
tion
Media coverage made the conflict
over the demonstration districts
look like a pervasive community
issue whereas people other than
those directly involved were apa-
thetic or did not understand.
236 An example of a meeting that was
packed, but with no one in the
first row. Pictures in the papers
showed the first rows only, giving
the impression that there was less
community interest than there was.
241 Media is overplaying the role of
the militants even more in Newark
than in Ocean Hill-Brownsville.
283 Media and UFT used anti-Semitism
as a gimmick to destroy the experi-
ment. A powerful gimmick. Used
it to pressure Ford out of the ex-
periment and to defeat the Gover-
ning Board.
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VII.
Panel
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
THE FORD FOUNDATION, DR. MARIO FANTINI AND MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
Panelist Page Statement Theme
Swanker
Swanker
Gittell
Git tell
Swanker
Gittell
Swanker
18 The Ford Foundation first became
interested during the IS 201 con-
troversy in 1966.
23 Ford Foundation established a
training program for black and
Puerto Rican administrators in
1965. A three-year program -
trained 60 administrators.
45 Discussions winter 1966-67, when
Lindsay proposed a task force to
deal with problems such as those
at IS 201. Included Mayor’s office,
Sverdoff; community; Ford, Fantini.
Bundy did not head task force be-
cause community was opposed to it.
Proposal of demonstration districts
grew out of negotiations for task
force, which also led to Ford's
funding the project.
46 Re selection of the districts. Fanti-
ni and Donovan consulted with Shan-
ker who suggested Ocean Hill-Browns-
ville
.
49 Swanker and Donovan had been talk-
ing to Fantini about funding the
demonstration districts. Communi-
ties approached Fantini about the
proj ect
.
48 Only Fantini at Ford really under-
stood the idea of the demonstration
districts
.
49 Fantini suggested Ocean Hill-Browns-
ville as the third demonstration
district
.
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. .
. (continued)
I Gittell
I Swanker
I Gittell
II Donovan
III Fantini
III Gittell
52 Letter from Sandy Feldman to
Fantini recommending Ocean Hill-
Brownsville because the union was
working with them. Fantini had
requested the letter.
52 Two Bridges had a poverty group
and a reading program and were
pressing for more control of the
schools. Had an active, working
group and asked Ford for funding,
which is how they were selected as
a demonstration district.
53 Gittell heard that the Two Bridges
group, with an active program, had
asked Ford for money for baseball
fields and got hooked into the de-
monstration project.
100 Ford provided funding for the
training program for black and
Puerto Rican administrators ini-
tiated by the state education de-
partment .
166 UFT asked Donovan and Fantini to
support the MES program for the
demonstration districts. When
they said they could not, the un-
easy alliance deteriorated.
193 When Gittell first started to work
with the Bundy panel she thought
that even though it represented
powerful people it wouldn't work.
This kind of institutional change
has never happened without revolu-
tion. Bundy agreed. The panel was
giving up not the power of the
groups they represented but the
power of middle-class professionals.
They misread the union and that pro-
fessional group. That power wasn't
the Bundy panel's to give away.
THE FORD FOUNDATION
.
. (continued)
Oliver 283 Media and UFT could use the
anti-Semitism gimmick to pres
sure Ford out of the experi-
ment by accusing them of anti
Semitism.
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VIII. BLACK MILITANTS
1
Panel Panelist Pa8 e Statement Theme
I Gittell 18 The IS 201 confrontation was the
last time integration was an issue
and the first time community con-
trol was an issue.
I Galamison 19 The IS 201 confrontation was the
last time any formidably sized
group demanded integration. This
betrayal was a pivotal point. The
picket lines included moderate and
integration people but it was
Stokely Carmichael who got the
attention
.
I Gittell 19 If Carmichael and the Black Power
movement had not appeared in 1964,
the 201 people wouldn't have switched
from integration to community con-
trol .
IV McCoy 241 The media are overplaying the role of
the militants in Newark even more
than in New York
IV Ferretti 241 LeRoi Jones is a powerful man -
based on interviewing Ferretti did
for the Hughes riot commission -
Jones does have a lot to say about
what goes on in Newark today, as he
did three years ago.
IV Clark 246 Newark community people are not
active participants except the mili-
tants.
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IX. THE ESTABLISHMENT AND LIBERAL GROUPS
Panelist Page Statement Theme
Ferretti 11 Northern white liberals who
fought for integration in the
south opposed it in the north.
Context
;
Power redistri-
bution
Galamison 14 School boycott 1964 had as its
objective a timetable for inte-
gration, not instant integra-
tion. Largest civil rights
demonstration yet. Had the sup-
port of everyone - 400,000 chil-
dren, NAACP
,
CORE, Urban League,
UFT, rainstorm.
Galamison 16 Each fight involved fewer people
than the one before. After the
first 1964 boycott, NAACP, Urban
League and CORE National Office
pulled out. Nine of 13 CORE
branches stayed.
McCoy 22 What kind of strategies were be-
ing created in 1965 and 1966 by
white America to neutralize the
ghetto? The war on poverty may
be such a strategy.
Power redistri-
bution
Black education
McCoy 24 Strategy in the white establish-
ment: the examination system is a
fraud. Special preparation for
it after the 600 school demonstra-
tions were because the examina-
tion system was under attack.
Galamison 25 NAACP, Urban League, CORE, pulled
out before the 600 school strike.
Not gracefully, but with a front
page attack.
Oliver 33 Where 110 Livingston is weak, the
Mayor supports them, and where
those two are weak, the UFT and
CSA support them.
the establishment and LIBERAL GROUPS (continued)
McCoy 55 NAACP
,
Manhattan Branch and
others had advised Shanker not
to include the disruptive child
demands in the contract because
it would polarize the city.
McCoy ]03 The Board of Examiners, the pro-
cess of examination, is a discri-
minating practice. Workshops and
training programs are a way of per-
petuating the Board of Examiners —
as astute politicians recognize.
Swanker 110 Opposition to the several decentra-
lization plans because of differen-
ces over how many districts there
should be. Opposition because of
administrative reasons ostensibly,
but the hidden reasons were power.
A major obstacle was amount of
power to be retained centrally or
to go to the districts.
Oliver 116 The Governing Board concentrated
on education, not political pro-
cesses. Didn't know then whether
a volunteer board could even func-
tion, and it couldn't be expected
to match the political power and
sophistication of established for-
ces
.
McCoy 125 As support for the Governing Board
grew, and threat to the establish-
ment increased, the establishment
moved to counteract the threat.
McCoy 130 Mythical supporters of education
didn't support local appointment
of principals without examination
when that was in court, and didn't
support Donovan in other cases when
he was out on a limb in support
of the experiment.
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IX. THE ESTABLISHMENT AND LIBERAL GROUPS (continued)
III Galamison 144 Entrenched interests did not per-
mit the demonstration districts to
be an experiment but continually
put obstacles in its way. En-
suing problems resulted from this
frustration
.
A current example of a demonstration
project funded to provide innovacive
program in narcotics. HEW, State,
and City Departments of Social Ser-
vice rules and guidelines don't per-
mit the kind of program that was
funded
.
Ill Galamison
III Ferretti
III Donovan
152 Neither the community nor others -
Mayor, Ford, etc. - were prepared
to deal with the political conse-
quences of the demonstration pro-
ject. Committed themselves verbal-
ly to decentralization and communi-
ty control but were not prepared to
deal with the repercussions and
did not maintain their support.
152 When the crunch came, Lindsay was
absent. The entire episode created
a great many political corwards. Re
people who might be expected to have
foreseen the political repercussions
but did not, in reading the Bundy
report, Ferretti saw the political
aspects
.
158 There wasn't total political aware-
ness on anyone's part, not even
those theoretically sophisticated
enough to think about those things
ahead of time because there was not
the ability to talk about it. It
was not that clear-cut.
Ill Clark 165 Decision makers may not be responding
to the various interest groups with
high clarity in initial stages. Im-
portance of decision makers may be
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IX. THE ESTABLISHMENT AND LIBERAL GROUPS (continued)
III
III
Clark
(continued
)
Clark
determined in initial stages on the
basis of their sensitivity to the
various interest groups, expecially
those with which they identify.
200 Strategy of power structure to neu-
tralize or evade attempts at re-
distribution of power. Initial con-
frontations are with fairly good
people, initial resistance quite
reasonable: we agree with your ob-
jectives but we don't like your
methods. If you don't learn the
convenient methods but pursue your
goal, next step is to impugn the
reformer's intelligence and per-
sonal stability - and this applies
to white reformers as well as black.
Where the reformers are black and
the establishment is pushed to the
wall as Shanlcer was, pressure and
resistance may cross the threshold
of social irresponsibility so that
all issues are subordinated to emo-
tional issues of racism, black anti-
Semitism.
IV McCoy 205 Newark has the same relationships
of people around an educational
issue as Ocean Hill-Brownsville.
Education is not discussed; the
issues are of political power. Re-
presentatives of the several con-
stituencies had to protect their
constituencies and couldn't talk
about education.
IV Oliver 211 Bayard Rustin took a position against
the Governing Board and in favor of
the union without ever going to Ocean
Hill-Brownsville or asking anyone
there about the issues, and is pro-
bably not in contact with the people
in Newark either.
Power re-
distribution
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IX. THE ESTABLISHMENT AND LIBERAL GROUPS (continued)
IV Fantini 212 Ocean Hill-Brownsville triggered
an awareness coast to coast. But
a negative, not a positive thing
as it was communicated
. Made
people with vested interests aware
that they must pay more attention
to the educational consumer, so
they devise mechanisms that appear
to satisfy this but are controlled
by those in power. One result is
the issue of accountability.
IV Clark 214-215 Newark and Ocean Hill-Brownsville
are examples of a contemporary
threat to education by a power
group not interested in education
but in using the educational pro-
cess as an instrument of power.
Previously, threat was from poli-
ticians, and liberals mobilized to
protect education from political in-
fluence. Some reforms that have
since become abuses were attempts
to protect schools against this
threat. Then threats from right-
wing ideologists, and again liber-
al mobilization to protect against
that threat. Now, a new kind of
power structure seeking to contami-
nate the educational process, but
this danger is less apparent be-
cause these are allegedly educa-
tors. If they succeed, not only
will local community people not
have control over education as in
Ocean Hill-Brownsville, but no one
will have control including mayors
and middle-class people every-
where and boards of education. If
teachers unions continue to grow in
power and to be supported by labor
movements in general, then education
becomes a form of labor movement.
THE ESTABLISHMENT AND LIBERAL GROUPS (continued)
Fantini
Fan t in
i
Clark
Fantini
McCoy
McCoy
Ferretti
217 When the people in power are
affected by the deterioration
of education and of the cities,
the process will change.
228 The Ocean Hill experiment was
never meant to happen.
228 Donovan said that the establish-
ment didn’t intend for the black
community to exert real power.
229 Some so-called liberals who were
involved in Ocean Hill wanted the
experiment to show the black com-
munity that they couldn’t do it
without white liberal support.
When it began to work, support,
money, was withdrawn. Was it a
fraud throughout?
237 In Chicago, the power structure
read the signs and commissioned a
legislative body to begin hearings
on alternatives to the schools.
Structured the hearings in the
language of community control and
decentralization. Had witnesses
from teachers union, superinten-
dent, supervisors, so they had legi-
timated their position without
making full report of the testimony
they had heard.
239 If power structure can read the signs
and expect confrontation, and if
they have education as their aim,
they could have minimized the Newark
confrontation, could have taken
steps to avoid it. Since they did
not, there must be a reason - to
destroy it so that it won't happen
again.
241 Reason for establishment groups' not
taking steps to avoid Newark con-
frontation may be the racist reason
that McCoy suggested (p. 239)
THE ESTABLISHMENT AND LIBERAL GROUPS (continued)
McCoy
McCoy
Oliver
McCoy
McCoy
Clark
241 They are overplaying the role of
militants in Newark even more than
they did in New York.
242 Establishment let the Newark situa-
tion get to this point so that when
they move it will be destruction of
the concept of black people becoming
cohesive
.
251 A lesson from Ocean Hill-Brownsville
is that there has to be a more com-
prehensive effort than that, with-
out faith in the system. When black
people make some headway, the white
population destroys it, even at
their own expense, and this has to
be kept in mind. No alternative
within the system.
261 There was a predetermined script,
and regardless of who plays the
roles, they play according to the
script. They have no choice. If
education is going to change, you
have to change the script.
262 The people who have written and up-
dated the script for years are not
going to be allowed to write a new
one
.
271 Can identify inevitability in terms
of how each force had to behave in
reaction to challenge to existing
power from groups not in power. The
Ocean Hill-Brownsville community
was serious: it was a real challenge.
They made it clear that they could
not be co-opted. If they had just
gone through the forms, establishment
reaction might have been different.
If the experiment had worked, that
would have been a devastating criti-
cism of the system, so they had to
defeat the effort and had to sub-
ordinate differences among themselves
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IX. THE ESTABLISHMENT AND LIBERAL GROUPS (continued)
V Clark 272
(continued)
in order to defeat it. Their
lack of options is clearer than
the Governing Board’s.
V Clark 272 The Governing Board was serious
about educational reform and genuine-
ly believed that decentralization
would improve chances for education.
They could not be taken lightly by
the power structure.
V Oliver 273 Governing Board refused binding arbi
tration because they saw that that
would end the experiment. They re-
fused to put power back in the hands
of those who had not demonstrated
interest in the education of black
children.
V Fan t in i 276-277 Individuals were serious about edu-
cational reform, and their organi-
zation was rudimentary. Non-commit-
ted allies - Ford, Mayor’s office,
state, and at first the union. A
new kind of coalition, and for a
while it looked as though it would
work. When it began to work, the
allies realized the seriousness of
its challenge and proved remarkably
resilient in meeting the threat,
expending more energy than for edu-
cation. Individuals within the
organizations maintained their sup-
port for educational reform, but
the organizations pulled out when
the going got rough.
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PREFACE
Volume Two is comprised of the transcripts of five panel
sessions held once each month from November 1970 through March 1971.
The purpose of the panel sessions was to collect information about
the New YoVk City School Crisis of 1967 to 1970 from those who either
participated in, or observed the events in Ocean Hlll-Brownsville.
The participants were:
Dr. Dwight Allen, Dean of School of Education, University
of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Dr, Robert Woodbury, Associate Dean of School of Education,
University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Dr. Atron Gentry, Director of Center for Urban Education,
School of Education, University of Massa-
chusetts, Amherst.
Dr, Allan Calvin, President of Behavioral Research Laboratories,
Ladera Professional Center, Palo Alto, California
(serving as panel moderator)
.
Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, Director of the Metropolitan Applied Research
Center (MARC), New York City, representing the
Board of Regents of the State of New York.
Dr. Bernard E. Donovan, former Superintendent of Schools of New York
City.
Dr. Mario Fantini, former Program Officer of the Ford Foundation,
New York City, now Dean of the School of Education,
State University College, New Paltz, New York.
ill
Mr. Fred Ferretti, a reporter with the New York Times .
Reverend Milton Galamison, former member of the New York City
/
Board of Education, and a civil rights leader.
Dr. Marilyn Gittell, political scientist, consultant on urban
education, and Director of the Institute for
Community Studies at Queens College, New York
City.
Reverend C. Herbert Oliver, ex-Chairman of the Ocean Hill-Browus-
ville Governing Board.
Mrs. Esther Swanker, former representative of the New York State
Department of Schools, New York City.
Rhody A. McCoy, former Unit Administrator of the Ocean Hill-Browns-
ville School District.
The candidate is grateful that such a distinguished group of
educators found it possible to rearrange their schedules in order to
accommodate the design of the study. However, it is discouraging that
the technical sophistication of the video and audio recording was not
sufficiently refined as to capture certain crucial portions of the
dialogue. The relative Isolation of the Amherst campus of the University
of Massachusetts necessitated that three of the five panel sessions
were held in New York City, either at Automation House or In the offices
of MARC where the process of recording was jinpaired. All possible
steps were taken to insure a complete and accurate transcription of the
proceedings.
Iv
1
Finally, because of the present positions held by certain of
the panelists, it is not possible to release the transcripts for public
consumption at this time. The members of the Dissertation Committee
and the candidate are fully conscious of the time, restriction of three
years before the transcripts can be released. Thus, although both
volumes have been copyrighted in the candidate's name, only Volume One
has been submitted to the Graduate Division of the University of
Massachusetts. It is the intention of the candidate to make the trans-
cripts available to students as soon as possible in the hope that they
might excite further inquiry.
)
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TRANSCRIPT OF PANEL ONE
November 16, 1970
School of Education
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Massachusetts
Panelists
Mr. Fred Ferretti
Rev, Milton Galamison
Dr. Marilyn Gittell
Mr. Rhody A. McCoy
Rev. C. Herbert Oliver
Mrs. Esther Swanker
Dean Dwight Allen
Dr. Atron Gentry
Assistant Dean Robert Woodbury
1McCoy: I am Rhody McCoy, doctoral student at the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts, and the panel is convening
to discuss the critical issues and incidents in
the New York City School Crisis, 1967 through '70.
It is my privilege to introduce Dr. Dwight Allen,
Dean of the School of Education, who will intro-
duce the panel.
Dean Allen: Thank you, Rhody. It is a real pleasure for the
School of Education to participate in this program
which is unique in the history of our School in
attempting to relate dissertation research to a
real problem and to bring the people who have been
involved in the issues as the real world of educa-
tion is progressed into the University setting,
and to try and bring to bear the scholarly power
of the University on an issue that is too young to
have a full historical perspective. This disser-
tation program is developed under the direction of
our Assistant Dean for Special Programs, Dean
Robert Woodbury, and he will tell you more about
the program and the reason that we, at the Univer-
sity, feel that it is important to develop its use
and to offer it as a contribution to the community
at the same time as it fulfills the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Education. Bob . . .
Dean Woodbury: As a point of suggestion, what we are hoping to do
in this kind of a dissertation is to see if we can
get at some critical issues and a kind of study
that won't be something that will go on the back
shelf as soon as it is done. But we will not only
look at some of the perimeters and problems of the
school crisis of '67, '68, and so forth, but also
suggest some new directions in urban education:
what kinds of possibilities there are, some kind
of a sense of what kind of alternatives and options
there can be. So our hope here is to lay in these
sessions a data bank or a data resource base to
get a better handle on what went on in the New
York City School Crisis, but also get a better
sense of what our options are as educators and
people concerned with education, both in New York
and elsewhere in the nation. And so I would like
McCoy
:
Dr. Gittell:
2 •
to introduce to you the panel that will be today
discussing the issues and implications for the
New York School Crisis, 1967 to 1970.
I personally thank all of you for participating.
As you know there will be five panel discussions,
and I think we can start these panel sessions laying
some ground work, some ground rules, so that we
can make a productive session out of it. One of
the things that we were concerned about is attemp-
ting to list, or to set some sort of frame of
reference as to what the issues were in the New
York City crisis and the problems around those
issues, and then try to put them is some sort of
chronology. I think that will be the forerunner.
I guess the ultimate aim of this has been a very
personal hope that the kinds of experiences that
all of us have had, because we were all partici-
pants in some degree, will have some implications
for other urban administrators who are faced with
similar problems. So I guess if we can take off
and discuss the issues and problems as we see them,
and maybe the first way we'll do it is to go around
the table, because ultimately I am going to ask
very specific questions of each of you. Marilyn,
do you want to start with what you see as some of
the critical issues and problems around them?
Well, I think starting from the broader perspec-
tive, I don't think there has ever been any doubt
in my mind that the issue was fundamentally an
issue of critical and social conflict of vested
interests vs. the powerless people who had power
in the school system and controlled the decision-
making in it, and those who challenged the output
of education in New York City and want to be
feeling what was going on, and that confrontation
between these two forces, I think, is the backdrop
of the issue in New York City, and I dare say in
the cities throughout the country. The whole ques-
tion of urban education seems, to me revolves around
not to a very great degree. A part of that as
well, 1 think, is the whole question of bureaucra-
tization and professionalization of education over
the last fifty or seventy years, and what that has
meant in terms of the output of urban education
and why, at this present time in our history,
that is also being challenged. It seems to me
3Rev. Oliver:
McCoy
:
Mr. Ferretti:
that was fundamental, too; we built up a whole
set of protection devices which protect the pro-
fessional and bureaucratic structure which are
now significantly being challenged. 1 think
these are part of the broader issues of what
obviously is underlying this also is racism in
American society which is fundamental to the
whole question of wliat happened in Ocean Hill-
Brownsville and what is happening in other cities,
and the strike itself, I think, released the racist
issue to the public and the involvement of larger
numbers of people in it, no on an overt level,
where it had been covert before. So I would say,
at least in broader perspective, and I think it
would be a mistake not to consider this problem
in a broader perspective, I would say those three
issues are key.
I would say the most basic issue is the right of
parents to educate their children. I think behind
this is the problem of wlio has the right to educate.
I think the struggle of '67 to '70 brought this to.
the forefront, for when parents made an attempt to
have a deciding voice in the education of their
children, they ran into a bureaucratic structure
which said "No, you don't have this right.' I do feel
that the right to educate is a basic issue. I
would ask: 'Do professionals have a right to
educate children' or 'privilege to educate child-
ren'? 'Do educators have a right or a privilege
to educate children? Does a union have the right
to educate children? ' I think these were issues
that were being challeug.ed
,
and I think that
basically the parents must have and must exercise
the right to educate their children as well as
have a deciding vote i.n the control of institu-
tions which they are deeply involved . To me these
were the basic issues - ail else, I think, would
be side issues ....
Fred
.
Yes, in my particular - i'll call it a narrow
viewpoint for the sake of argument here, I think
the responsibility of the media in this whole
question is something we ought to discuss: a
failure of the media both in newspapers and tele-
vision to report the issues properly, the failure
of all the media to hold the accusers accountable
I4
to statements, public statements that were made;
and in many, many cases to permit themselves to*
be used as outlets for partisanship. We can get
on to that later.
McCoy
;
Milton.
Rev. Galamison; Just briefly, I think one of the serious problems
j
has been a problem of values, that is generally.
That is I have argued for a long time that when
we talk about education, we are not really talking
about education at all, because we sort of relate
education to making a living which may be voca-
tion, but it certainly isn't education which is
an enlargement of life, an enlargement of the mind
for its own sake without any relationship neces-
sarily to these other values that we attach to
education. Just by way of illustration, let me
say this is why we get such a struggle to pass
the tests by hook or crook and such a struggle
in the competitive area because very few people,
when they talk about education, are really talk-
ing about education. So I argue - what we are
dealing with basically, in one instance is a
problem of values, because if our values were
what they ought to be, we would never have these
struggles in these areas, and nobody would con-
tent himself with the kind of education and
racist division which has permeated our education
throughout. Secondly, I have argued that our
problem largely has been one of ethnocentrism
,
that the ethnocentric gap between those who
teach and control the education system and those
who learn is so immense that it has not been
bridged and very little teaching and learning
take place, as they ought to take place.
Thirdly, I have argued that our educational struc-
ture has been archaic, that we live in a period
during which people have undergone more changes
than at any other comparable time in history.
Not the changes that are forever with us; change
of course is the most constantly dependable
thing on which we live or with which we live.
But very few generations have undergone the
quantitative and qualitative change that our
generation has seen in the area of the atomic
explosion, for example, or atomic energy, atomic
competence
,
has compounded itself beyond the
5
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wildest dreams of those who first conceived it.
The computer, probably the greatest agent of
change, the greatest mechanism for change, has
expanded in its use and there are countless
other things - heart surgery, transplants, the
whole bit has been a part of an era in which
colossal changes have taken place. The schools
have not begun to move to meet this era of change
which has been a part of our own generation's
lifetime, as it were.
An then just fourthly and finally, I'd argue that
we are caught in a serious economic struggle for
jobs which in the minds of many people transcends
education, educational importance and the school
structure; that we have been caught in a kind of
economic situation where the success of one per-
son means the failure of somebody else, or for
one person to get a job means to displace another.
An this has had serious ramifications in the effort
to right what might have been the most obvious
wrong in many instances.
McCoy
:
Esther
Mrs. Swanker: It is difficult in his position he has the others .
are very, very well and I thought that Marilyn
and Dr. Oliver especially in the broader issues
covered it quite well and so I would limit my-
self to two rather narrower contexts of area
of what they have already indicated, and one
was the political power involved in invested
interests. In other words we were faced almost
immediately with the political power of the
union, the political power of the CSA , and the
lack of political power which the Ocean Hill
Board had and could muster. The second thing
which probably is much broader and of more inte-
rest, at least in my role in that particular
series of events, and that was - we were faced
immediately with a challenge to protective laws
that had been enacted by a middle-class, subur-
ban legislature and these laws became protective
of these vested interests, and the legislature,
of course, had a history, and still has in New
York state, of being white middle-class oriented
and the laws that were passed prior to the Ocean
6Hill-Brownsville controversy, of course, protec-
ted the schools like Mistiona and many up-state
white Suburban schools. The legislature did
not know, had not really faced the issues that
were raised in the 1967-70 controversy, and it
immediately made the lines very clear and made
the law clear as to just exactly what they were
set up to do and what they couldn't do. And to
me this was one of the major outcomes of this
controversy; that is to make the people, at least
the people of New York City, and out of the state,
aware of the inadequacy and inequality of those
laws, and that they were set up for a very special
group and that they did not apply equally to all
of the children and to all of the people of the
state, and I think, we were shown dramatically
just where the political power lay when the decen-
tralization bill finally came to the floor of the
legislature, and we saw the Ocean Hill-Brownsville
Board and all the people who supported it and
there were many very powerful people, as you
recall, who fought for a broad, general decen-
tralization plan and it went down to a tremen-
dous defeat
,
because of the power of the union
and the power of the CSA which rode on the coat-
tail of the union. So those are the only two that
I really could add to.
McCoy
:
I think it covers pretty much as you've alluded
to as a broad general topic, but I think that
there are some other underlying things. For
instance, if I was allowed the privilege of
translating it, it sounds like to me we are
talking about the decline of society through the
whole educational system or the society is going
down the drain using the conduit of public schools,
because you talked about all of our institutions
in a short space, except the church, but . . .
Galamison: That's because you have two clergymen, (laughter)
McCoy: I guess what I am trying to look at very basi-
cally is that these were problems that the sys-
tem, meaning the educational system, has been
facing for a long time, either subtly or covertly
or in some form. There obviously had to be some-
thing - a catalyst, if you wish, that caused
this thing to begin to spin, bringing it to the
/point where it, say, at this moment is. I think
what I am saying to you is Detroit, Chicago, St.
Louis, practically every major school system has
had a similar setting, and I use the word simi-
lar because I'd like to identify some of the
conditions that they have that have pretty much
followed in the path of New York. It may be that
you are saying that racism is patent, that's the
only way that they know how to function and res-
pond to this racism, which means that the poli-
tical enterprise comes in, and the unions come in,
and so forth and so on, to protect them. There
must be some other kinds of concerns, at least I
know there are, talking to a number of educators
recently. The conditions can be outlined, the
conditions can be seen who are the people who
play these various roles you can then predict the
kind of defeat that Ocean Hill had, although
I think it had its positive implications. So what
I guess I am trying to talk about is a chronology
as we did before, I take the liberty of just asking
one or two people and trigger.
Galamison: Are we allowed to just butt in here, Rhody?
McCoy: Absolutely, this is a democratic kind of panel -
as long as you know that it is mine.'
Galamison: Just let me take a shot at the chronology, how-
ever rough it may be. I think the current move-
ment probably started with Martin Luther King's
bus effort in Montgomery, Alabama, but then with
the Supreme Court decision in 1954, people began
to direct their attention to the schools, particu-
larly some people in the north took the position -
Dr. Kenneth Clark and some of his group - that we
have probably as much segregation in schools in the
north as you have in the south, and that we must
direct ourselves to de facto segregation. But I
want to say in spite of the other institutions that
have been criticized, liked the courts, the legis-
lature and what not, I think the schools were most
affected because the schools were in the forefront,
and the schools were in the forefront because not
only w as the pioneering done in the area of public
schools from 1954-1955 through to the present, but
it was the only consistent fight that we went
through in New York City, i/C. other battles came
and went, and in other areas of the country other
types of battles came and went.
8
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McCoy: You are talking about the boycotts?
Galamison: Yes, and - well, the whole business long even
before the boycotts - Dr. Clark's group and some
other groups- were challenging the educational
structure, challenging the defacto segregation
with their limited resources, and I'd say limited
resources
. It was a group of people that had no
body politic in a sense, that is, there weren't
a lot of mass organizations and what not under-
lying these groups. So they made their bid and
then sort of fell apart. But I just want to em-
phasize the fact that the major and consistent
struggle in NYC which was unabated for about 15,
16, 17 years, was the struggle in the area of
public schools and this is why the horrors that
are being catalogued by Ethel and some others -
I mean Esther
Swanker: You have been doing that for five years, I am
used to it. (laughter)
Galamison
:
were made first apparent, I think, to the school
struggle
.
McCoy
:
How about you, Marilyn?
Gittell: I am just sitting here thinking: Do you think
it was the schools, Milton, because the schools
were the most vulnerable, the easiest to push?
I mean, obviously, and I think we ought to recog-
nize something else that you are, I mean I think
your making the point is a good one - 1954 and
the whole movement - but then what you are really
saying is that the underlying core issue is really
racism - in American society. And out of that
grew the questioning of the whole institutional
structure not only of education but of the whole
system, because I certainly meant to indicate that
in my opening remarks that it seems apparent to
me that what we are talking about may manifest
itself in the school issue but that this is really
a questioning of the whole society.
Ferretti: But was there another added dimension in that the
focus was on the schools, however, there was a
change when you could speak of integration in the
9abstract, everybody was for it, but when it became
a concrete thing to be dealt with in the north as
well as in the south, then all sorts of walls went
up.
Swanker
:
I think that the schools were highly visible
highly vulnerable and therefore became the battle-
ground, rather than - it's pretty hard to talk
about housing, because you have to scatter your
shot, I mean you are talking about individual
landlords and smaller organizations, whereas, in
the schools, really in the State of New York - it
is pretty easy in one target, the State of New
York, because it is responsible for all education
in the State of New York and it delegates to each
local board the authority to operate the schools
within that city. So, as a result, I certainly
have a feeling that Milton's take-off point is
right and that part of the reason for the choice
of the schools is, as I said, they were so vul-
nerable and they were so open to attack.
Gittell; Ya, what is interesting is that in the profes-
sional cadres, particularly in social sciences,
when I first entered this thing which was in '62,
starting a study on the NYC school system, I was
shocked to find that almost no political scien-
tist or sociologist had studied the school sys-
tem or dealt with it. In the 1930 's there had been
one study by two political scientists out at the
University of Chicago who said, basically educa-
tion is a part of the whole governmental structure,
it's really no different than anything else and
should be part of that structure. They were
quickly chastised, their book gathered dust on
the shelf and that was the only thing I found
that dealt with education as a political set-up
or institution, which means that from - and I
doubt with a little less than the thirties - that
basically American educators were quite success-
ful in isolating and insulating education from
anybody's view. The reason I would like the '54
court position is because what that did was for
the first time, say this whole thing is really
a political issue, so we've got to deal v>?ith it
as a political issue - it hinged on integration,
but basically it opened the schools up for con-
sideration, whereas prior to that, educators
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controlled the setting and had convinced every-
body that this was so-called apolitical. I think
they did that with a lot of other things as well,
and I think it just broke on the school issue
because of the '54 court decision.
McCoy: There is something ironical here, and I don't
know if I can phrase it well, but the Martin
Luther King movement in the south, and then the
Supreme Court decision in a way - if we want to
look at it from the educational point - were
educational. They served as an educational
process for people and yet, as you said earlier,
it's never been an educational issue. I mean,
it's sort of surprising. In other words, what
happened to Martin Luther King educated a lot of
people to social conditions in the north and east
and some other sections. I guess I am trying to
ask another kind of question. I don't think that
the schools ever were an issue in the south. I
think the people had sor t of sccepted the dual
school system and here in the east and the nort
and some other sections of the far west grew opera-
ting under that mystique and facade that there was
a kind of integrated educational system. I guess
what I am asking here in another way is that itj
seems to me that the catalyst here was the plight
of the people. In other words, you are finding
minority people who find themselves unemployed,
poorly housed, powerless, not being able to func-
tion in this advanced technology, and so forth,
and then seeing their kids - that, I mean that
was the base and then these tv/o acts ^ the Martin
Luther King movement and then the Supreme Court
decision, sort of triggered it. I mean if that
is some sort of chronology.
S wanker
:
There was one thing about that movement in the
south that did have an effect in the north, and
that was, I think, that the freedome rides and the
sit-ins, and so forth, awakened the north - the
common people in the north - to the plight of . .
you know, because up to that point, up to that
time, I think that particularly the v^hites in the
north had always thought that everything was quiet
and calm and there really were no problems, and this is
is what the press, the media, had led us to
believe. An then, all of a sudden, it became
11
apparent that this wasn't the case, and that was
being dramatized by Martin Luther King and by the
freedom rides, and this kind of thing, and it made
them, especially the liberals of the north and the
white liberals of the north, aware of the problem,
so that in fact many, as you know, many of them
went south to join
. . . and so became figliters for
cause in the south, and then eventually came back
north and moved it back up here. So it really
did have, I think, have an effect in the nortli,
and in that respect, in that it enlisted a small
army, but an army of fighters.
Oliver
:
In response to that though it was good for the
south, let's say the long white south? To see
the influx of people from the north to come and
help bring about a condition that was supposed to
be mandated by the laws of our country, that we
have not had in the north, an influx of people
from the south to help and force the same thing in
the north and the assumption that it is not here
is a very tragic assumption. But when I look
back at the 1954 decision, at that time, it gave
me hope that at last equality was beginning loj
take hold in this country. As I look back now,
it seems to me now that it gave hope for equality
for children, but not for adults, and what 1 see
that children might have hope for equality but
they are moving into an adult world where they
are not going to have that equality. It just
seems to me that that whole decision side-
tracked us from the real issues and those real
issues are still here now plaguing us more than
they did in 1954.
Ferretti: I don't want to integrate the efforts of those
who went south to help in the integration fight,
but it seems to me that this goes back to v/oat
I said before - this business of in the abstract
as opposed to in the concrete. I think most of
us would agree that many of those who went south
did it - I don't know if out of altruistic motives
or not, but those many, most I might even say,
most of those who went south opposed the same
things when it came north and I v\;ant to know v;hy
.
I think that's something we ought to explore.
Galamison: Well, let me try to ans\^7er that. I have a real
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McCoy:
Gittell:
McCoy:
thing about this, because during all the struggles
of the fifties and sixties, many organizations
were sending their money south, many people were
sending their gifts south, many people were going
south and as you have indicated, most of these
people never gave a nickel for a struggle in the
north or near home, and most of these people
bitterly opposed any effort to create a better
society in their own front yard and in their own
back yard - I have a word for it. My optomologist
tells me that prespyopia is an eye disease that
enables you to see what's far away but you can't
see what's right up under your nose. So I have
always called it a kind of social prespyopia
. . .
a kind of social prespyopia not of itself when
Martin Luther King began to move north, when he
began to move into the area of the Cicero pro-
blem or what not a lot of the support in the north,
financial support was cut off, he had to go to
Sweden to raise the money and there is no question
about what you're saying but that the liberals in
the north bitterly opposed any kind of action on
their own home ground and almost used the south
as a substitute, as a place at which they could
look down their noses and say: 'you are worse
than we are',; until the battle was brought to
the north and then there was no place for black
people to go but to Canada, you know, to get
help, because there was no north for us to go to
get help as the south had gooten help from the
north. I think we are all saying the same thing.
Let me go back. You know you have a long his-
tory of fighting, leading some of the fights in
the New York City system, aside from that
Supreme Court decision and its beginning
rumblings in New York. Can we, or will you
trigger off what were some of the sequences
leading up to the major confrontation in New
York as you saw them and perhaps even then some
of the people who were involved in some of these
scenes and how long they sustained it?
Are we allowed to talk about ourselves?
No. (laughter and mumblings)
Well, I'll try to be brief about it. As IGalamison
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remember it chronologically in New York City, the
first real effort was waged by Kenneth Clark, Dr.
Kenneth Clark and Judge Hubert Delaney and their
committee - I don't remember the name of their
committee - but it was composed of a number of
echelon organizations. They, back as early as
1954, and maybe a little prior to that in 1953,
were arguing that education in the north was
unequal and that the de facto situation was not
a reasonable excuse for not integrating the
schools and that something ought to be done about
it. They ran their course, but then when they
had sort of run out of steam, and as I said before,
they had no forces, no grassroots forces to mobi-
lize to battle for them, they sort of died for a
while. And then there came along a number of
unsung parents' groups, in Harlem, some in Brook-
lyn, which made little efforts here and little
efforts there which came to not too much. Then
about 1956, I think it was, or '57, we started
parent workships in Brooklyn with Mrs. Annie
Stein and parent workshops got a great deal done
in the way of mobilizing opinion and what not, and
we had so much trouble with the NAACP - and I
could go into real detail about this - the NAACP
gave us a very difficult time, the Brooklyn branch
of the NAACP. So in order to facilitate things,
I ran for president in the NAACP branch and won.
So for three years, the worshop worked within the
framework of the Brooklyn NAACP, but this became
increasingly difficult, because there was too much
opposition, there were too many distractions. And
I remember in '60, I pulled out. The workshop
people disagreed with me - Annie Stein and Claire
Cumberbatch - but somehow Annie Stein was not re-
elected - i'll never believe it was an accurate
count. And V\?e mobilized the parents' workshop
again, and in 1960, we threatened the first sit-
out of parents. It was called a sit-out in Brook-
lyn, and the effort was in order to get an open
enrollment policy, or at least we got the open
enrollment policy as a result of it. In fact
we had a thousand parents pledged to sit out,
now that seems like very little, very few people
today, but it was a big number of people in 1960,
and, of course, it rained - it was a hurricane
the first day school opened, and we claimed
credit for everybody who was out there (laughter)
.
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Anyway, as a result of this effort, and by this
time the NAACP and the Urban League and some
other groups had sort of joined forces v/ith us,
at least in consultation with the Board of Educa-
tion, we did an open enrollment policy in NYC
for September of 1960, and the open enrollment
policy simply indicated that if there were all-
white schools in all-white communities which
had available space, that block children in over-
crowded schools in the ghetto community could be
transported to occupy that space. And the funny
thing was that Dr, Jansen had almost offered the
same thing two or three years ago, it was very
strange yeah, and we didn't, you know, we some-
how V\?ouldn't buy it and we didn't buy this, really,
but it was the best that we could get at that
particular point of development. And what happ-
ened, too, I think, it ought to be remembered,
the Board of Education never put out any infor-
mation on open enrollment, really, so that
parents could tell one school from another i that
is, if you had ten schools, you didn't know which
school to send your kid to. The Board of Educa-
tion, in fact, discouraged it by giving children
notes to take home to get signed during the
Christmas holidays when nobody was thinking about
a thing like this, and the. Urban League dissemi-
nated some information, but I think the parents'
workshop disseminated more information than any-
body else. Now the next thing I remember, we got
into another effort to integrate the schools, in
other v7ords
,
we continued it, and because the
Board of Education had made a series of promises
which it never kept
,
there was a boycott in 1964
in which, over 400,000 children participated,
almost half a million children, and it was really
the biggest civil rights demonstration in terms
of numbers in the country. Was that in '64 or '63?
Panelists
:
'64.
Galamison: That was in February of '64, but then in March
of 1964, there was another one, and there were
little over 300,000 youngsters participating
in this one. Now the effort of both those
boycotts V7as to get a plan and time-table for
the desegregation of the public schools. Now
the fact that those v;ho participated, and many
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organizations participated in the first boycott,
asked for a plan and time-table indicates that
nobody said you have to do it tomorrow, but people
were saying 'for heaven's sake, give us a time-
table and let us know when you intend to do it.'
We never got the time-table even though we were
promised it by Theobold
,
we were promised it by
the guy who succeeded Theobold, whose name 1
can't recall. Anyway
. . .
Gittell
;
But, Milton, in '57, I think, the Board did approve
an integration plan for the city's school system
which included bussing, which included open enroll-
ment, which included redistributing teachers
around the city according to experience. I forgot
there is a name for it, but I want to get this on
the record because I think this is important as well
as the alignment of forces on the integration, as
you do establish, that the politics of this is
terribly important in terms of the alignment that
takes place later on in the strike, and issues
that were raised then, because all these things
had been approved in the Board of Education plan
of '57, which is why Jim Allen, I think, was able
to come in the early sixties and say "you haven't
got a darn thing. Wliat's more, you're more segre-
gated than you ever were before and you haven't
followed through on your own plan.' And the
reason I am interested in this, since you were
so directly involved in that integration struggle ,
where was the CSA on each of these things? Had
you any contact or were you aware of what they
were manipulating and the same thing with the UFT
.
Now the union is not recognized officially until
1960, but there were several other groups and
you have gone past I960 . . .
Swanker
:
. . .
organizations prior to the UFT . . .
Gittel 1: Right, they are the teachers' union and the
Guild. Were you, I mean, was there the feeling
at that time that the school professionals were
with you or against you or what? Because, you
know, the point is, that the question of integra-
tion has been raised in the community control
issue and politics of it, I think in particular
are significant.
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McCoy
:
Galamison:
Oliver
:
Somebody;
McCoy
:
Galamison:
Look, before you answer this - hold that ns a
point. Don't let it go. But we've gone from
'53 to '64, and I think maybe what we could do
is to bring it up to '70 and then go back and take
a look at the various things, because this thing
opens up a whole Pandora's box of questions.
After 1964, then what?
Well, Marilyn Gittel s point is well taken and
many promises were made like teacher assignment
and nothing ever came to fruition. This is why
our efforts were redoubled and redoubJed, but
the thing is that I think ought to be remembered
,
is that the farther we pressed along, the more
our numbers dwindled; that is, every fight invol-
ves fewer people than the fight before. But I
think this also ought to be said that in attemp-
ting to recapitulate in any way, any of these
incidents, one is bound to forget and everybody
ought to remember that there were dozens of
little parents' organizations, and a mother here
and a mother there - people were making great
sacrifices and struggling and pushing the strug-
gle along all the time; people who had no orga-
nization, no - you know - claim to anything, but
who viere just out there fighting for (heir child-
ren. Well, I think we ought to say that between
those two boycotts in 1964, we lost the NAACP
,
we
lost the Urban League, and we lost the Congress
of Racial Equality, at least we lost the national
office, nine of the thirteen branches participa-
ted, anyway.
What does this have to say about the supporters
of those organizations? (Laughter)
Don't mean that's and or but . .
Everybody focus on the game . . , but let's
take it from '64 to '70. There has to be some
sequence in there which you probably . . .
Well, the next effort came about a year later,
now in '65, and it was an effort with 600 schools
and high schools, and again the effort \^;as for
a plan and timetable for the desegregation of
the public schools, but we just focused on the
600 schools because, well, for two reasons;
number one, because they were most vulnerable,
they were the most neglected, you know - middle
prisons, you know, in which children - our child-
ren - were housed. And secondly, because Rhody
was working in the 600 schools at that time - he
was. And I think Rhody came to me with the idea,
because I didn't know where to go next, and I
would say on Tuesday, we are going to boycott and
empty such and such a school c£ . . . everybody
would wonder how I did it, I'd get on the phone
and call Rhody. Rhody would call the teachers in
that school and they would turn their school
(laughter and mumblings)
. .
well, anyway they
really made a scandal of this, in spite of the
fact that the 600 school kids functioned much
better on the picket line and what not, than the
junior high or high school youngsters did, you
know they said letting insane children into the
street
.
McCoy: That was the medial
Galamison: Yeah, the media, and this and tiwat and the other
thing and that we were terrorizing people. Any-
way, that was our last major struggle in '65 as
a mass organization effort that we had in terms
of trying to involve people on a city-wide level
pretty much. The next thing I remember after
that, Rhody, was the creation of the people's
board at the Board of Education in Uecember of
1965, ah, 1966, I'm sorry, thank you, when spon-
taneously a group of parents sat in and stayed for
about a day-and -a-Vialf to two days, two-and-a-
half days, 1 don't remember, we wore all ultima-
tely arrested. And out of that came the people's
board, and the people's board never really got
anything done within itself, except give inspi-
ration to community. And then, 1 think, just
beyond this and simultaneously, there was the
creation or simultaneously was the creation of
the demonstration projects, IE 201, Ocean Hill,
and a third one. Two Bridges, and of course, this
carried us into the beginning of another period.
Gittell: But I think . . . (rest drov.'ncd in voices; every-
body speaking at the same time.)
McCoy
:
. .
.
the 201 complications.
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Gi ttell:
Swanker
;
Cittell:
Gai ainison
:
Cittell:
Yeah, which is was on
. . .
. . . feeling the most, actually that was really
the most direct line to the confrontation, I mean
that you can follow the chronology directly from
that; I mean, these others are all important,
they all provide a history everything that Milton
said up to this point, but I think starting with
that '66 confrontation at 201, it moved, it just
snowballed right from that point, because this
was when the Ford Foundation became interested
in . . .
Well, it dates back on the consultations with
the Board and with the Bernie Donovan on 201
being an integrated school, and when all the dust
settled, what the Board seemed to be talking
about was integrated Puerto Rican and black, but
what the community leadership was talking about
was integrated white and black and Puerto Rican,
and I think the original group that fought that
issue at the 201 and met regularly with Donovan.
It interested me, because that's the first time
I saw the word 'community control' used in the
NYC school setting, that in the .... reports
that Preston Wilcox had on those daily meetings
and where the community group, Dave Spencer,
Babbit, Edward Preston, Hanna Barkington . . .
Your parents' workshop, was that it? . . not the
parent's v^7orkshop
,
Marilyn, was it the Harlem
parent's committee?
Right, v>?ell . . . (mumblings, everybody talking
at the same time) and some of the people were
connected with the Haryou were negotiated for
control of that school and what they were asking
for was to choose the principal. This was in
the negotiations . And also to develop a parent
involvement, direct involvement, even decisions
as to how money would be spent on curriculum,
which - I think is important - because it's a
prerequisite silhouette to what happened later
on and I think the whole sequence of events
around 201, I would agree with Esther, are a
setting for the three demonstration districts,
at least. I want to add another dimension here,
Rhody
,
as representative of the white establish-
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ment. During this period, I tliink, another thing
you 11 have to help Milton th the whole recogni-
tion of the overcentralizatioii of the NYC school
system, that starting in *53 with the Strayer
Yarbner report and up to several other reports,
there was a recognition on the part of various
study groups that Llie system was overcentralized,
it was not responsive to needs, it had to be
broken down; the Board of Examiners was recom-
mended they'd be abolished at least five studies
that I could think of starting with Strayer Yarb-
ner and the Shinnerer report and what have you,
so that I think you have two things developing;
certainly the integration struggle was the major
thing
.
Galamison: But, may I say this, that from ray own point of
view, the 201 situation which 1 had gofed over
was the pivotal point; it was where the corner
really turned, because it really turned the cor-
ner, because it was the last time any formidably
sized group of people ever demanded integration
again. I think it ought to be pointed out that
the 201 people actually wanted that school placed
near the Triborough Bridge wlic-re white children
could be brought from the neighboring communi-
ties in Queens to integrate it, and every concei-
vable deception was heaped on tliem in terms of
frustrating and preventing this, and then the
picket lines formed with some moderate people
and integrationist people, like the Harlem parents
committee, but we didn't read about them in the
press, because Stokely Carmichael was on the line
and, you know, a number of oth.er people who were
taking a much different position than had been
taken previously. So I think this was the 201
frustration; the 201 betrayal v^?as the real
turning point from a movement in the direction of
integration to an emphasis on community control.
Gittell: But what you say, and I vi?3S going to raise this
before, that the Carmichael position in '64 was
the basis on which that turning of the corner was
made, that if Carmichael and ll.e whole Black
Power Movement thing hadn't arrived at Llie point
that it did, that tlie 201 pcoi)Le wouldn't have used
this issue of community control, wouldn't have
made the switch.
20
Galamison: Well, true, a number of things - I am sorry.
Gentry: Now, excuse me
,
I am sort of out of it in the
historical event. I hear everybody talking
about the Board in the abstract. Wlio is the
Board?
Swanker
:
Board of Education.
Gentry
:
Yeah, you are talking about politics. I have
some idea what the Board is, in terms of reading
and what have you. I wonder who appoints the
Board? Is it elected?
Gittell: We had three different boards during this time..
Gentry: Way back up here in 1957, when we start talking
about . .
.
(talking by everyone) . . there was
some process the board had promised. Now these
people turn over and . . . Are there six people
one the board now? And how are these people . .
Gittell : No, five people.
Gentry
:
What I am talking about, I guess has to v^ait.
To talk about how . . . responsibilities.
Gittell
:
What was it, was it nine originally?
Everybody
:
Yeah, nine.
Swanker
:
.... a 13 -member board . . .
Galamison: Well, the point you are making, I think, though
is a partial answer to your question, and that
is, that over this period of time, there were
three different boards of education; there
were three different superintendents of schools;
and there were three different presidents of the
Board of Education.
McCoy: . . . and three different processes.
Gittell
:
Starting with the original process was really
the Mayor appointments; then a selection panel
was interposed with the notion that various civic
groups in the city would recommend to the mayor
a procedure for appointment, and that process
was in effect at the time of the 201 thing.
Swanker
:
Gentry
:
Swanker
:
Gittell:
Ferretti:
Everybody
:
McCoy
:
And prior - now there is something else that has
to be considered, too. Prior to the 201, in
fact, when the first 201 competition took place,
there was a Wagner-appointed Board. Lindsay
didn't come to office until when? '66, so he did
not appoint a Board until the Doar Board, that was
the first Board that he appointed, and I think
this is important.
Did he appoint any members of the previous Board?
He did because there were retirements and
. . .
Lloyd Garrison was chairman of this Board.
I don't think you can call it the Lindsay Board.
No, it was not the Lindsay Board.
I think what the point is that Atron is making is
a very significant one. Let me just back up and
see if T can put .some
. . .put another dimension
to it. Starting with 1953 and 1954, you begin to
see some movement around schools in this chrono-
logy, by "key figures" who had some concerns about
it, and the question I am raising right through
here is about a dual set of strategies which may
answer your question. What I am saying, is, many
people have asked the question; 'Was the 'black
minority communities' sophisticated enough to
begin to develop strategies?' So, what I am
saying is, I see a strategy developing. The
question is how the people, a coalition of people,
were formed and hoi7 they spun off into these
other groups as groups, as you alluded to, dissi-
pated themselves, or for various other kinds of
reasons I think you said as you pushed on, groups
began to drop off . what those groups were , why
were they dropping off? I guess another question
that I am asking is
,
that it seems to me - and
I'll give you a classic example, Milton - you
know we. were both involved in that, when we were
fighting on the 600 school precedent issue, one
of the major issues was black principals. We
didn't ask about how to appoint them, but we
asked that there be an ethnic representation
at that level. When the 201 people finally got
their heads togetlier, they were asking for not
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Gentry
:
S wanker:
Gentry
;
McCoy
:
Gal amis on:
only black principals but for control and selec-
tion by those people. Now, what I am saying is
there seems to be "strategy" emanating out of the
minority community, powerless as it is, as against
the strategy being developed by the white commu-
nity, which we haven't alluded to, even though
the mass media played a tremendous role here. So
the question I am raising: let's assume that
these conditions were prevalent somewhere else.
That obviously, there should have been some coa-
litions formed that would have maintained not
only substantive kinds of direction, but sustained
kinds of direction, because as I have watched the
civil rights movement even in education in New
York, it goes from one point to one point, dies,
then you have to resurrect it and start again.
Could it be . . the reason I wanted to deal with
the Board and the politics . . could it be that
organizations who weren't ... in the '65 thing;
people had people organizing the people on the
street . . . could that be a fact that there . .
It played a very important role in that it, it
gave these three, I think, these three demonstra-
tion groups a nucleus of organization on which to
call. Now, they didn't, I don't think, stay
with them very long, and I just remember that
Haryou was very active originally at 201 and
then they just left.
Thank you.
But, the dimension that you are asking and I
want to follow that because I think it's key,
the dimension that Atron is alluding to is not
what happened as a result of it, but what kind
of strategies were being created by white Ame-
rica to neutralize on the ghetto and the war of
poverty may be just such a strategy.
Could we not gloss over this point that you just
made because I think it's significant, that
during the 600 school effort there was a demand
not only for the improvement of 600 schools, but
for black principals, and I think black teachers,
too, and Puerto Ricans, and what happened there
as a result of that, at least one thing that
happened was that the next time the principal's
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S wanker
:
Gittell
;
Swanker
:
Gittell
:
Ferretti
:
McCoy
:
Ferretti;
Swanker:
Ferretti
:
exam was given, we had, oh, I think - I don't
remember the exact number - but a number of
people passed
,
which was unprecedented, a num-
ber of black people passed the exam, and some
efforts were made to facilitate the exam and to
prepare people, for it. So something came out of
that in terms of what subsequently became known
more so as community control and what have you,
but . . .
I want to follow on that - just a minute - because
I think there was something important in that,
of what you say about the exam, because I think
it was mentioned. I'm not sure it is exact that
a group from tlie state wrote a proposal to the
Ford Foundation to set up the same program for
the black and Puerto Rican principals or adminis-
trators, training program, and - I may be wrong -
but it seems to me that that was the first, that
that v^as earlier when the Ford Foundation . .
It was . . . for creation . . .
Right, that this was one of the things that
helped the interest of the Ford Foundation in
this trial one, because they funded that three-
year program and eventually it trained sixty-some
black and Puerto Rican administrators.
. . .
and who are still acting principals,
(laughter, and everybody talking)
The important ihing v>?hat you ask though is the
word "strategy," and I don't think a strategy
emerged, because I . . .
I'Jliere? What side?
In the black community I am talking about.
Not on either side, really.
Well, I would question the school establishment
side! I would say that so far as the black
community went, the leadership was too diffuse.
I think the recognised organizations that people
looked to for leadership did not provide it,
and I think wiiat you had was an increasing aware-
ness of the power of blacks, but not a strategy.
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McCoy
:
Ferretti:
McCoy
;
Ferretti:
Galainison:
And I think that
. . .
Let me do an intolerable injustice at this
point. I happen to disagree with you violently.
I'll let Milton talk about that because I saw
him being triggered. You see, if I just take a
minute and go back to this examination system,
and this is why I say strategy, because that
whole examination process was a sham and a fraud.
No, we are talking about strategy as a word. It
means like
. . . because
.
. .
Because having had some inputs into it, it could
be, I mean, it couldn't be done other than having
been a strategy, and at some point, maybe in one
of these panel discussions, around the problems
in that area, we'll allude to it. But I am saying
it that the fact that the examination was announ-
ced, that they set up courses for it and they did
all the funny things that they had been doing, was
because the system itself was under attack after
the Griffith report of the examination system.
Now I see what you mean. You misunderstand me.
What I am saying is that you had a certain set
of circumstances and there arose a response to
it, here, and then you have the same thing here,
so I don't think there were some overall strate-
gies
.
Let me say, there was a strategy. The strategy
was just not equal to the opposition and to the
circumstances. Now, there are many people who
would agree with even how the strategy evolved
and dissipated and evolved again. I mean, a
fellow like Stokely Carmichael would say: 'This
is the way you fight anyway; you fight a little
while, you wait for people to catch up, you
fight again, you wait for people to catch up.'
We did this not because we agreed with it as a
philosophy - we had no alternative. Because
after a struglle, our forces were so dissipated by
the press, and the people, I mean, for example,
just in this, well prior to the thing Rhody and
I are talking about; the 600 school strike - we
lost - we had a little organization - we never
had more than $500 in the bank at one time
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Ferretti
:
Galamison
:
Ferretti:
Galataison
Ferretti;
Gentry:
Oliver
;
McCoy
;
Ferretti
:
during our whole existence. But the NAACP
,
the
Urban League, CORE with their hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars, you see, pulled out. Now, it
was, well, it wasn't an accidental pulling out,
it was a connived pulling out, because they
didn t pull out, no, they didn't pull out grace-
fully, or pull out saying 'we won't hurt the move-
ment.' Every one of them pulled out with a front
page attack, you know, on what we were doing. The
kind of thing that the black coimnunity wouldn't
even tolerate today. They did
. . .
I don't consider that strategy.
But, yeah, of course it is, but it was a strategy
to defeat
. .
.
(Everybody is talking at the same
time again.)
We were talking about the other side. That's
what I was thinking.
But there were times when we, when just - we had
all the people arrested, that we could get to go
to jail. We'd spent all the money that we had for
food to give kids lunch, and you just plain ran
out of resources, you ran out of bail money. So
the only thing to do was just to hold the hump,
so I . .
.
(everybody is talking)
. . . I don't mean to have a quarrel, but . . .
I thought he Vi7as saying that, too. I thought he
was saying something; that because of the diffe-
rent groups and their dissension, that this was
a major problem; there was no togetherness which
is no togetherness of nobody.
I think what you are saying is that there was a
strategy that was defeating you and us all the
time, and we just, our forces were depleted
because there was a counter strategy that was
there working, and it's still working.
Yeah, but Milton plays a different kind of role
in this particular session. At the time when . .
I think you have to use the word "activism"
rather than "strategy" here.
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McCoy
:
Ferretti:
McCoy:
Ferretti
:
Swanker
:
You see at that time, Milton was able to bring
together a number of coalitions of people, des-
pite the fact that at periodic times they would
do whatever they had to do politically to pull
out the question used to be as to why they were
pulling out, and so forth and so on. But you
had a continuous, shall I say, influx of new
people, so when we got to the 600 school boy-
cott right through these things, we still had,
what I think, was a strategy. We went after
the practice who provided it for the same reason
we're talking about. The other side had a better
strategy because they had all the resources.
No, the point I made v.Tas that there was a series
of strategic actions.
But not all planned
. . .
No argument with that, obviously, but no overall
strategy, like existed on the other side, and I
think I'm right.
I think we ought to define the other side because
we've all
. .
.
(rest drowned by everyone's com-
ments at this time) but I liave particular reasons
for mentioning it, (laughter) because I recall
that die Giardino Board, v/hich was the one that
was put out of office . remember, by Lindsay's
being able to appoint
,
and he could tack the
Board. But tlri Giardino Board, which was the
last real Wagner Board, wrote a decentralization
plan - proposal - and in his legislation, and
in it, they called for the abolishment of the
Board of Examiners. So, yeah, everybody had
twenty- twenty Viindsight. We can all look
back and say if wc had only done that and thus
and thus. If we bad pulled resources at that
time with what, v/ith some of the strength of
that organization, because that board was sin-
cerely - with the exception of one or two mem-
bers - wanted to abolish the Board of Examiners,
but it was the power of ihe union again, in the
eSA that beat back. However, if at that time,
when your organization was strong, and you still
had the remnants of the. Wagner Board and you had
Lindsay certainly in favor of the abolishment of
the Board of Examiners and you could have pulled
all of those factions together and just concen-
Gittel 1:
Git tel 1:
Gentry
:
Somebody
:
Gentry
Gittel J:
Gentry
:
McCoy;
trated on one target - the abolishment of the
Board of Examiners - we might have accomplished
it at that time, but nobody knew enough to play.
But that is the key issue, because I think cer-
tainly, Milton, you remember even at the time of
the creation of the people's board, there was a
great deal of conflict and disagreement in those
groups; some of the people Rhody mentioned about
that
. . .
(There was a change here in the original recor-
ding. However, the audio that we are missing will
bo on the video-tape. There will be just proba-
bly less than twenty seconds worth of talking and
then it will continue.)
. . . of education, I mean the union. The Coun-
cil Supervisory Association, but particularly the
headquarters staff at 110 Livingston Street.
That's what
. . . accountability
. . . responsi-
ble to the Board or something?
On paper.
I don't want to establish.
. . I do understand.
But I thought that was an important point, because
you know how you deal with the Board of Education,
and you can't deal with the finances. Nobody can
audit that, you know, the Board of Education, to
find out where the money is going.
Well, that isn't entirely true. I mean, the Mayor
could have if he wanted to, and Lindsay did , but .
On a political level, you can't do that unless
you have political force, but the Mayor may have
had his head cut off. I don't know. I don't
understand part.
I guess the question goes back, let's see, to
your Board. Wlio appointed that Board? \^^hat
was it appointed for?
How long did it take that board to get to such
a complex meclianism that nobody can ever audit
it - the books?
Gentry
:
Swanker
:
By that you mean bureaucracy?
Gentry
:
Yeah
.
Ferrett i
;
The Board has nothing really to do with the
bureaucracy at 110 Livingston Street. The Board
has alv\7ays been a dumping ground for political
appointees
.
Gentry
;
You are talking about accountability and who is
responsible to who and who really runs the school
system.
Cal ami son; Could I make an effort to . .
.
(everybody talking
again)
. . .
and I was going to say that some of
you have had an opportunity to observe it much
more closely over a protracted period of time
than I did, but I would say two things about the
educational structure from having been on the
Board. One is that the educational structure is
captive, and that is, the Board is captive, the
school system is captive to these organizations
that Marilyn Gittell mentioned : the CSA
,
the ’
United Federation of Teachers, and the PA - the
construction union - all these people have their
constituencies on the Board. Now, the minority
people or almost any other; any other people
would hardly have any real representation on the
Board. Now the second thing is, you see, the
Board is always - I felt - accused wrongly, becau-
se tlie Board is usually captive to the profes-
sionals and it's captive to the professionals for
the simple reason that the Board can't keep up.
You can't possibly keep up as a volunteer, even
if you are a full-time volunteer, with . . .
this was true when I was on the Board . I had
five people working in my office and we couldn't
keep up. You see, so that for every one thing
you are moving on, the professional staff got
ten things going someplace else.
McCoy
:
That's really a good case of community control,
though
.
S\^?anker
;
I want to confirm one point though, Milton,
because I sat through four Boards, four boards,
consecutive boards
,
and I went to almost every
meeting, and it's true what you say, that the
Board is presented by the superintendent and the
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deputy
. . what should be on the agenda. However,
It doesn t work cjuite that way, because there is
nothing whatever to protect individuals on the
staff from their own, you know, they each of their
own key board member or a board member each had
his key on the professional staff and leaks were
tremendous in both directions, and this is as it
probably should be; the Board shouldn't have to
rely solely on one man for information. So, when
you say that you were in the hands of the pro-
fessional staff, that's right but it was not a
single professional staff man; in other words, it
wasn't just the superintendent, because you know
yourself you had inputs on that Board from several
people on the staff, you had people walk through
110 and out; in the field that you got informa-
tion from, just as every other member of
. . .
Rose Shapiro had her cows
. .
.
you know, that
she heard from other than the superintendent and
the deputy, so while it's true that you heard
what the professional staff wanted you to know,
but it wasn't always just ore professional staff
man. The inputs of the Board pretty much came
from 110 Livingston Street. There is no question
about that. Unless you made a determined effort
to go to the field
,
your information came pretty
much from the 110 Livingston Street staff. Right?
Gal amisoii
;
True, but even so, even if you were provided all
the information in one week, it just could . . .
S wanker
:
Oh, I agree, I agree with that. You were given
a lot of garbage that you shouldn't have had.
I mean, you know it was the Board's fault; not
this Board, but somewhere V\/ay back the board
started getting into administration, and they've
alvjays been in administration, and so as a result,
rather than be accused, I think then the superin-
tendents developed a kind of a defenseless posi-
tion on the thing. They thought rather than be
accused of not giving enough information, they
overfed them. They were saturated every week;
they would come in with piles of papers that
they weren't interested in.
McCoy
:
Let me back up, because something Rev. Oliver
said in his introductional remark having to do
with the rights of people to educate, who edu-
30 '
cates, and so forth. Let me ask it in a different
kind of way. You mentioned the fact that if
- give
'X' coalition had been formed - that the strategy
to attack
. . . whether the abolition of the Board
of Examiners. Now obviously, for my benefit any-
way, you have some information that I don't have,
or some direction. What I am trying to say here
is that I don't believe that you could ever make
that kind of coalition.
Swanker
:
I don't know whether you could, but I am saying
that the climate was ripe at one time to do that,
because when Mr. Giardino was President of the
Board - and I have forgotten the year, I would
guess at about '66 - because it was when decen-
tralization had first become a key issue. Legis-
' lation was prepared and sent to Albany which
called for decentralization of the school. True,
it was the Board's plan. It was not a community
control. It was the Board's plan to decentralize
and included in that legislation was . . .
Gittell: Was it in the legislation? Because he backed
out . . .
Swanker
:
That may be, but it was in the legislation,
because I saw the legislation and included in the
legislation was the abolishment of the Board of
Examiners, and I know, because this is immedia-
tely following the Griffin report.
McCoy
:
Let's go back, and I don't want you to lose
track of it. If that was the case , Giardino was
in that position, or supporting that, and the
Board had any inclination to do it. How is it
that he couldn't muster support?
Swanker
:
Well, this is why I say everybody, you know,
had twenty- twenty hindsight, because at that
time, the demonstration groups were just becoming,
coming to the fore. 201 and the various groups
were looking for community.
Gittell: But I think Rhody is raising an important ques-
tion which is; 'Wliy do you assume that any of
these groups had any power, because the whole
sequence of events following that created a
coalition of those groups , and they couldn t
exercise . . '
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Swanker
:
Well, no, my point is this: that if those groups
had
. . .
^ ^
Gittell
:
Which groups?
Swanker: I mean, well, let's say the demonstration groups,
which were just beginning in 19
. . .
Gitte] 1: Well, they didn't exist really.
Swanker: Well, there were organizations behind them, and
they were beginning
. . .
Gittell: No, no, that plan was prior to the creation of the
operational
. . . of the demonstration districts.
Swanker: No, what I am saying is that there were groups
in each of those three areas. They were
. . .
Gittell:
. . . the people's Board of Education.
Swanker Well, no, they were before that. Down at the Two
Bridges area there was a group of
. . .
Gittell: The area of Shapiro, the NFY . . .
Swanker: There was a poverty group down there that was
working for community control. There was the
Ocean Hill group. There was the IS 201 group,
and Mend and Haryou and all that crew up in Har-
lem that were trying to do the same thing, and
they were all working eventually towards the same
thing
.
Gittell: But then, let's be realistic about it. I insist
on some kind of scientific analysis. All of these
groups worked for integration, with the help even
of additional groups. No one ever answered my
question about the union on integration. I would
like to know that for real. They were unsuccess-
ful on every issue on integration, on parents'
schools, on open enrollment, on bussing, on every
issue they were defeated. And they were defeated
either by the union - to my way of looking at it -
or by the CSA or headquarter staff at 110.
Swanker Well, at that time the only two groups, I think,
that were fighting for the continuation of the
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of the Board of Examiners - three groups - the
union, CSA, and the Board of Examiners, because
tVie State-city Board, the minority group repre-
ser atives, all the poverty groups, people's
Board
,
all these various groups were opposed to
the Board of Examiners, who were working for its
abolition. For example, the Griffin report had
just come out, and '-./en the PEA and various other
white groups were in favor of the Griffin report.
So at that time, as I said again, we are talking
about an "if" that might have been
. . .
Gittel 1: Why, I would say all the evidence because of the
fact that you haven't got a shread of evidence
to say that they had any power, because what we
were really saying is that they had no power, and
you see, the reason I think this is important is
because later on, when we get to talking about
the districts themselves and what coalitions could
have maintained the districts or what have you,
or gotten the Bundy plan through, you are going
to face up to the same fact what you are dealing
with is a whole bunch of powerless people.
Swanker
:
But, by that time, you had lost some of those
key elements now.
Gittell: No, we gained more, as a matter of fact . . .
Swanker
:
No, but we had lost the Board of Education, which
we had at that time.
Gittell; We had Giardino who later backed out and the rea-
son he backed down, from my understanding of it,
was because his board wasn't with him. He saw
the value of abolishing the Examiners.
Swanker
:
I think there were two members on the Board,
Yushevits, and I can't remember who the other
was - probably Shapiro.
McCoy
:
Yushevits was a myth. (laughter)
Oliver: We have a debate situation where we
have a chan-
cellor who in my understanding feels the same
way about the Board of Examiners, but if the
minority groups only came to his support, he is
still a dead duck just by the fact that we cove-
ted his support.
1
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Swanker
:
Well, that may be now, but you still have
Oliver
:
Giardino wouldn't have had near the chance, the
chance the chancellor now has. Sometimes, black
people supporting a thing will kill it, and they
are the only ones v/ho come out and support it.
Swanker
;
Well, we are really wasting time.
McCoy; I think there is something else here because ear-
lier you made some remarks
. . .
Ferretti
:
You said that there was a lack of strategy.
McCoy
:
Yes, and, but
. . . more here that means there
was a definitive strategy on the other side. I
guess what I am saying is rdino and the rest
of his Board may have had a position "to abolish"
the Board of Examiners. It in itself was not
complete enough, it didn't or was not responsive
to what these various entities were all concer-
ned about as a total kind of package, and I
think it was a very "definitive" strategy to see
to it that those groups couldn't come together.
Even if they did come together, they couldn't
deliver it, so it would make it much easier as a
strategy to keep them apart. I mean nobody knew
what they . . .
Ferretti: I said that there was a strategy on the other
side, and the strategy at the other side was at
110 Livingston Street which did right from - we
were talking from what . . 1955 to tomorrow . .
defeat everything simply with administrative de-
tail. It's amazing what you can do.
0 1 iver
:
It's more than just 110 Livingston Street. I
think that where 110 Livingston Street might be
weak, then the Mayor will come in and support
them, and where the 110 Livingston and the Mayor
miglit be weak, then the CSA and the UFT will come
in to support them.
Ferretti
:
When I say 110, I include the CSA and UFT in that
Galamison
:
Shouldn't we realize that we are dealing with one
of the most formidable voting powers in the state
when we deal with the construction unions and the
UFT, and if for example, as Esther was saying,
1
the legislation to abolish the Board of Examiners
could not get through, it would be because the
CSA joined league with the UFT during the strike
and supported them, and therefore, the UFT and
all the other unions related to the UFT had to
' join hands, and Mr. Rockefeller gets elected for
the fourth time in a row, because lie knm^/s how
to give deference to these tremendous voting
blocks, so that even if a subs l arilial number of
white people that you could org.uii/.c in the city,
I argue, would come out now to support the pre-
sent chancellor. Even the churches and these
groups could not begin to amass the kind of voting
strength for strength to effect llie legislature
that Van Arsdale and A1 Sliankcr and Degnin and
all these guys with the other urifons who are in
league and in partnership witli them - they pro-
tect each other - I - medical men protect each
other . . .
Swanker
:
I agree with you there. I am saying that in 1966,
that if we had been able to puli all these groups
together, because then that was prior to the mar-
riage of the CSA and the UFT, yon see, and v.e
might have had a little hope froni the UFT at that
point, because at that point, after all . . (every
body talking) . . they were beriug lield down by
the CSA at that time.
Ferretti; I think that is a speculative point. I think it
has merit. I really do.
Swanker: If we could Viave come together on triat one issue
and got rid of the Board of Examiners , we should
have, we could have.
Ferretti
:
Now, not a chance.
Swanker
:
Not a chance
.
McCoy: But you sec, you continually . . • and I agree
with what you said - the hindsight - and 1 am
looking at it obviously in this panel and sub-
sequent panels about some sort of direction,
and I just don't believe from what I am hearing,
Vi7hat my past experience has been is that those
groups can come together. You said earlier that,
and so did Milton at some point as you begin
to move to these things, fewer and fewer people
Gentry
;
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are in the forefront and nothing ever happens.
Now, I guess what I am saying here - let me
jump like just say five panels away - if I was
listening very carefully, I would say that any
urban administrator, anyone, at any level - school
level, superintendent level, headquarters level -
would obviously recognize the potency of the
local political machine, meaning the teacher's
union, labor union, and their vested interest.
He'd have to recognize that right. So then it
must be - you got to ask yourself, or I would
ask myself two questions. One is, what's the
rationale for acceptance of a job like this?
I mean if you know the potency of the political
machine, then why would you accept that job?
Number one. And what's the criteria, or what
can the people expect as a criteria, a perfor-
mance criteria, when you allude to accountability
of the guy who is going to take that and how is
he going to take education? I mean the direction
he is going to take education. The only option
that I see for him, and you know my bias, is small
or autonomous units, if you want to call it again
community control, but, obviously, from what I
am hearing is the behind-the-scenes politicking
and the vested interests that don't have to poli-
tic have preserved themselves.
You know, I guess 1 wouldn't want to give up so
easily. I always deal with the hope factor.
Anyway, there is no place, so I have to find
some kinds of things so that I can keep pushing
that we don't have a bout. At this point, can
you turn that around? Our teachers' union and
all the teachers would be happy with unions and
things these days. Are you going to deal with
your tax, you know - your limits? New York City
is going to be at that point pretty soon where you
are going to have to absorb people who are being
paid for not working . . plan to just working, and
that they have a whole . . . in New York City,
you know. There is going some in the future,
is going to be some kind of rebellion on
taxes
,
and teachers and people are going to have
to be accountable for something, and that s when
unions and things are going to have to start to
do some things, too.
Swanker
:
Ferret t i
:
Gentry:
Oliver
:
Gentry
;
Gittell
;
Galaniison
:
I think that they are going to get bailed out.
I think that the state is going to take over
more and more the cost of education, and the
cities are never going to really have to come
to grips with that issue, because New York is a
union city, and there is just ain't no way around
it. You might have a chance though, what you
arc suggesting, in another city and especially
away from the eastern seaboard, but not in New
York
.
New York City is such a union city that you could
take an issue like the Ocean Hill-Brownsville
thing, which is essentially not a union thing,
and with one statement galvanize the entire labor
force in a city in back of you . .
.
just by
simply calling iself, it became, you know, over-
night
.
If that's true . . this is I tell you . . then
you would say that I don't want to put a conclu-
sion to things right now
. . . there's no hope
for New York?
Education is union education, so who has the
right to educate?
So, the only thing people can do is try to do . .
I think we ran into something here . . somebody
is going to sue to see if school boards, and
administrators, and teachers, and things, are
supposed to be responsible for education and
responsible for children. Well, then, I think
the people ought to start to . . . people and
that they can use words as law, and with . . .
that says about a right to have equal education.
That was the basis on which the people's Board
of Education sued the city Board of Education,
that they weren't doing their job and that . . .
wa s thrown out of court
.
We have only, to my knowledge, won one court
case. Now, Esther will certainly have a better
recollection of this than I do, but we won that
one with Conunissioner Allen, and it was simply
a lav>7suit arguing that the Board of Education of
New York City is going to spend money, and that
Swanker
;
Gittell:
Galamison
:
the manner in which it spent money only perpetua-
ted segregation and that it should be made to pro-
duce a plan for the expenditure of this particu-
lar money in the Brownsville and East New York
area for a school structure which would lend it-
self to integration. So we won that adjudication.
The money is still being held up - must be about
$40 million by now - but even when I was on the
Board of Education, it multiplied, because nothing
can be spent in that area. Even when I was on
the Board of Education, I could not move that
the staff begin a plan to un-court that money.
Now, that's a fact.
I believe it. I know it.
Some people around here would take court action
on that
.
If nobody has anything on his heart he wants to
say right now, I want to speak to the question
Rhody raised. Rhody was talking about the diffi-
culty of moving things politically. First Rhody
said, well, why does a man take a job if he knows
he's caught in a structure like this. Well, I
think if you want to just put the best motive on
a man's intentions, sometimes a man takes a job
because he thinks he can do something with it,
because he has the kind of confidence in himself
and the kind of optimism which leads him to be-
lieve that even though he is in a box, he may
be able to do something with his job. I think
this is why Commissioner Allen took the job in
Washington, because he believed he could do some-
thing decent with it, don't you see? So some-
times a man is disillusioned and life is like
this, I think; sometimes, the higher the respon-
sibilities you accept, the more difficult you
find to do something with them so that, at least
this has been my experience, so that while people
sit back and say 'oh, look at Galamison, he's on
the Board of Education,' you know one of the most
wasted nine months in many ways , that I ve ever
spent in my life
,
in terms of apparent progress
,
anyway - I don't say something doesn't happen.
So I just want to point that out. But the second
thing is this; what these, all these efforts,
dramatized is the serious disadvantage at which
we are as minority people in a democratic struc-
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ture where the natiie of the game is counting num-
bers. Now Esther alluded to this when we first
started out. She talked about political mores and
what not which make it impossible for us to move
things. Well, the philosopher would have called
it class legislation. You know this nation has
a notorious history of class legislation. John
Stuart Mills called this class legislation which
is legislation pass(’d to benefit the majority
of people who happen to be voting, not the mino-
rity of the people. So that if you go up to the
state legislature in New York, you find one black
representative in the assembly and senate who
is not elected from New York City. So what does
this mean? In a state, like in states that big
cities like Albany and Schenectady, and - I think
the one guy is from Buffalo and he voted wrong
last year, by the way - but what I am trying to
point out is, while the word democracy becomes
a very glorified v?ord and most public speakers,
when they get up, because they say; *we live in
a democracy,' that they are providing people with
the answer to something. The very nature of the
democracy creates horrible problems for minority
people because democracy started out with an assump-
tion tliat the majority of people would look after
the welfare of the minority and they do not, the
whole concept grew out of a man's desire to be able
to throw off the tyrants. People got tired of
tyrants, the people said; 'well, if we elect our
peers and our friends and neighbors to public
office, when we get a tyrant in office, we can
throw him out.' And this is great, and it's
possible in many areas of life but it doesn't
happen to be possible in a democracy for, you
know, for minority people, because, you know,
you just - you don't elect these people, and
you can't vote them out, for you constantly get
class legislation v;hich does not serve your
interests at all and even though you many speak
idealistically of inoving to a kind of school struc-
ture, Oliver - you and Rhody, whereby the school
is governed by a smaller contingent, a more neigh-
borhood type of contingent, you still encounter the
serious problem of finding the kind of state legis-
lature which will legally empower you as a minority
person. You see what you notice, let me . .(laughter)
what you'll notice is that whenever black people
or minority people amass power in a local area, then
the arena of
3 $
McCoy
:
Galamison:
McCoy
:
Oliver
:
McCoy
Oliver;
political exercise is expended. Now, I mean,
like for example, yoti have now five boroughs in
New York City, each one of which can elect a mem-
ber to tile school hoard
,
and the only borough
that could manage possibly to elect a black per-
son or Puerto Rican person would be Manhattan,
you know, yon are defeated otherwise. So even
moi e so, education power is enlarged sometimes
on a state-wide basis, because even though you
may have pov;er in the city, like in Philadelphia,
v^/here maybe 10% of the people are black, then
the power is exercised on a state-wide basis, so
the political geographic arena is continually
being enlarged to deprive minority people of what-
ever power they have managed to muster in their
small groups. I didn't mean to go on so long
v;ith it, bur this is basic, this is basic to the
whole comprehension of what is happening in this
country
.
T.et's - this brings us around before I ask Rev.
Oliver for this that there are three more parts
to this real quick and tlien we. con take a break.
But, w'liat Milton is saying is - vdiat you are
hearing here about the futility of it all, the
kind of built-in protective devices that they
have
,
what l)ope is tViere for community control?
Excuse me, except 1 didn't say it was futile.
I just computed the odds.
Okay, what hope is there for community, or what's
the process for the community to achieve its hope
with these conditions as they exist presently?
With these conditions, it can't be achieved, I
don't til ink.
What's the alternative?
Well, I am sitting here thinking about it. We
say that the power less-that-be , though they voice
integration, they rock it at every turn with the
powder that th.ey have, yet they still talk about
it; i.e. to give you one example: I think in
Ocean l!.i J L-brov.msvi lie we had the nearest approach
to integration that you had anywhere in the coun-
try
,
yet we didn't talk about it, but we had the
AO
nearest approavih to that, and yet that went by
the Board. ] see now - if this isn't premature -
the structure subsidizing black people to do to
black people viheL white people had been doing
all along, to force the black confrontation in the
black community and thus destroy it. We've just
got to find ibc wisdom and the strategies to avoid
that and yet preserve ourselves and achieve what
we feel what we have to have in this country.
Swanker; To answer the question, Rhody, on a long-range
basis, I think
. .
obviously none of us has a
short-range answer. Now, on a long-range basis,
it means simply that the minority groups must
establish a political power basis. This is the
whole answer to what we have been saying that
you are powerless, because you don't have any
political spots, and as you say - now you say
that the black community is being divided against
itself and confronting itself, so the long-range
answer is, of course, to establish a power base
and just get power in the legislature, power in
the city council, power in the Board of Education.
McCoy: But, it's so Long-ranged that it's not within my
ability to sec it.
Swanker
:
I know it's a long range ... I don't think it
is that long-ranged.
McCoy: Without some sort of unusual kinds of strategies.
Gittell: Yes, but I tbiiik the - Milton has already said
it - the procedure for the legal constraints are
such that even building a basic support, the change
in the political arena dissipates that power, so
that in cities, for instance, election of city-wide
counciimen divninishes the possibility of blick power
in the city council in most large cities and simila-
rily down the line. In other words, the political
structure has constantly changed to prevent that
power base from being developed. I thiiik you mis-
quoted Rev. Oliver; he said it was the white commu-
nity which was pitting various leaders in the black
community against each ether.
Swanker:
Gittell:
No . . . happening.
helter-.ske Iter
,
because I really do think that
it does make a difference.
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McCoy
:
Git te 11;
Ferretti
:
McCoy
:
And I want to disagree with you, Milton, on some-
thing. I don't really think it's the majority
factor of so-called democratic society which is
creating problems that you were talking about.
On the contrary, while the UFT has a sizeable
voting block, I don't believe for a minute that
it s voting block is what was significant in that
particular confrontation. I think (it was) it's
hov.’ the union is organized, who its supportive
forces arc, how many people in the legislature
arc evened by unions in this state, or New York
State - I don't want to talk about Massachusetts
Iiere - owned not because of controlling voting
blocks, because they pay for their campaigns,
and political campaigns, if you recall during the
key session on the Bundy plan up in Albany, Shan-
ke.r went up there and threatened that he \>;ould
run opposition against Jerry Kretshmer. 1 remem-
ber that in particular, and did
. . .
He did, ha . . ,
Riglit, and in Coney Island V'jere a fev; guys who
voted the wrong Vvay, or he thought vrould vote the
wronp, way, and T don't think it's numbers, I
t’urai-'; it's e>;tcnt of organization and the abili-
ty to align oneself v^7ith other peripheral groups
that tiave crov^d and leadership. I really do
believe that A1 - the exercise of leadership on
Al's part in that legislature was an enormous
strategy on his part - very cleverly thought out.
Whi.at you are asking for - can I say something
bef(.)re you defend yourself? - is that what you
are. talking about, of course, is a nev^7 political
coalition. You must talk about new politics,
you must talk about blacks and Spanish-speaking
people and the poor building a constituency, and
not courting politicians, you know, who happen
to be around nov-;. You create a constituency and
you create politicians.
Let me cut off, before you do it, too, and say
to you that, oi course from another perspective
that has substantial educational merit, or if
I listen to v;hat has been said before, you are
stiJl dealing with a powerless group, trying to
perform some sort of coalition and develop a
strategy to take away the power of pov/erful men.
Swanker: Can be done. Wilson Riles just did it in Cali-
fornia.
Somebody
:
Okay, if that's what you believe.
Svjanker
:
He did. He beat the
. .
.
,
he beat the main
party. He dealt a nev.7 coalition.
Galamison: Well, I don't think Marilyn is saying anything
different from what I have been saying. She
just put an emphasis on some things different.
She is saying that it's a coalition that v;ins
the success, not the numbers, in essence - this
is what you're saying. I would agree v;ith that,
but I would argue, you knov.^, until doomsday that
numerically, we have been defeated not only because
we don't have a coalition, but because v.'o h.appen
to be a minority people in a majority country
where the majority of; people arc so tragically
insensitive to anything else, except legislation
Vi/hich favors their ov;n interests, that we have
just not been able to get our head above the
v^ater
.
McCoy
:
Let me do one more thing. We started with the
chronology from 1953 and ran througVi ' 70 . . .
Ferretti
:
Through '66.
McCoy
:
No, we Vv7ent througli . . .
Ferretti But you missed '67, which is very important.
McCoy No, we stopped with the demonstration di.strict.
We went through '66, stopped at the demonstra-
tion district - I am going to ask Marilyn to
present a chronology from the; political science
point of viev; of '66 and a lialf through '72 at
the next session - tlic chronology there, what
actually happened in the demonstration districts,
who savi7 beyond that. Let me ask you, given the
chronology, I'd like to just put this oi\ the
record so that at the subserji.iOi'it panel can look
at it, are there names of people who played roles
in this whole period of '53 tlirough 1970 that we
have not touched on? We talked about ken Clark
and Delaney starting it off, and tlie Harlem
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parent s group. And we've talked about the
Helen T.
. talked about Annie Stein, Rose
Shapiro, the whole
. .
. (everybody talking)
key people who
. . .
Ferre tti
:
George Bundy
. .
McCoy
;
What I am saying is that I think we ought to put
these people's names into the record at this
particular time.
Gal. ami son; I would say Robinson, who was head of the Harlem
parents' committee who is now on the Board of
Education j Thelma Johnson, who was very active in
the Harlem parents' committee; Thelma Hamilton,
who now is in education in Brownsville, you know,
in the area of poverty work and what not, anti-
poverty work, who was very active in the parent's
workshop, and so many parents - Preston Wilcox,
who came along late, I have to say came along a
little late.
Gitte.1 1
:
Down on the lower east side, I think you have to
say the mFY . .
.
(everybody talking)
. . trulv
was one. I think we left that out. MFY, Milton, truly
was one
. . . P.D.C.
McCoy
:
The reason I asked for names is because at some
point I think we ought to take a look at what
kind of organizations they represented at that
time, and roles of those organization, and at
what point later on did their politics change
in terms of coalition and who was sustained, and
so forth. This will give us a broader picture.
Gaiamison
:
June Shagiloff, Bayard Rustin. . . .
Gitto] 1 ; You never did answer my question. Can you answer
ray question about the union?
McCoy That's the way to close the session 1
Gaiamison: Mr. Shanker says that the union helped with the
first, that is the March or February boycott
of 1964. Now, I do not remember that they
helped, but let me say this, that my impression
of that boycott as I look back on it is that
that boycott had the blessings of the entire
city, i.e. once everybody thought they couldn't
Git tel 1;
McCoy
:
Galamison
:
McCoy
;
PART
McCoy
:
Gittell:
stop it, everybody got involved, and it was only
when we started the second boycott and they saw
that we were really serious that people began to
pull away. So it may be that the UFT did give
some token support. I do remember that Mr. Shan-
ker would not permit the Board of Education to
;)C'.nalize the teachers salary-wise by having
taV;en a day off, but 1 do not remember their
support and certainly subsequently we got no
support from them.
Did Bayard support all of the boycotts?
No.
After the first one . . . anymore.
Look, can we stick to terminate this before we
go to dinner? We need a little time to get over
to the other place so, can we take a few minutes
to see if we can't put together time, a time slot
for the next meeting, because I know at the end
of the second half after dinner, everybody is
going to be rushing.
(End of first half of session. Dinner break.)
TWO OF FIRST PANEL SESSION - November 16, 1970
AFTER DINNER
We can now convene the second part of Panel One,
and we left off v;ith agreeing that we start with
tt.e chronology beginning in '67 because we laid
the groundvi/ork for the demonstration districts,
the actual teachers' strike, and so forth. Mari-
lyn, let me ask you to kick it off again in terms
of chronology in '67.
] think the two events most important starting
in '67 were the - in the legislative session of
t’lic spring and probably that was before Easter,
which would be March '67, was the legislative act
which requested the Mayor to prepare a decentra-
lization plan for the City school system which
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would include community participation as the
major element of the plan.
McCoy
:
That was in the legislation?
Gittell; Yes. And actually, during the course of that
winter, starting with the summer before, the
summer of '66 which was the 201 circumstance
where a whole series of events occurred
,
where
the Mayor, and, I think, Mike Sverdoff as head
of HRA, were trying to negotiate some kind of
deal for setting up a task force on the problems
in 201 and anywhere else in the city where they
might arise, to kind of deal with that diffi-
culty. I would assume, and I am pretty certain,
Bernie Donovan was involved in it. Sverdoff was.
I don't think he admits to that anymore, but he
was, and the plan was to set up a task force
which George Bundy would head, and Mario Fantini
was brought in at that point that winter, too.
Swanker
:
Can we interject to add more names to that, because
I think they are important - Benita Washington
was on it, Giardino . . .
Gittell ; No, no, no; wait a minute.
Swanker I am sorry.
Gittell
:
No, this was the task force that the Mayor was
looking to create to resolve the 201 controversy.
You remember Ken Clark had made a proposal, a
plan, which was rejected by the 201 community
groups and as an alternative, the Mayor orders
was recommending a special task force headed by
Bundy to resolve the issue which was at that
point that Mario Fantini was brought in and met
with the community groups and realized that they
informed him that they had no part in the crea-
tion of that task force and would not accept it
as a task force if it were created, and they
wouldn't work with it. And I think Fantini
brought the message back to Bundy and recommended that
that Bundy not allow himself to be put in that
position of being on a task force which the
community rejected already. It was out of those
negotiations that the idea for these demonstra-
tion districts emerged. Certainly the 201 dis-
trict is clear. On the Ocean-Hill Brownsville
(somebody couglied)
. . . not actually clear,
but my understanding is that either Mario, or
Mario and Bernle Donovan tliought it might be a
good idea to hove other districts and consulted
with Al, and he mentioned that Sandy Feldman had
been working with a group in Ocean Hill-Browns-
ville, and there had been a rum board in Browns-
ville for District 17 which Father Powis at that
time vjas instrumental in creating. And the union
agreed that that might make a good demonstration
district, because the union and the parent group
were vjorking on it at that time. And the union
.
McCoy
:
Just a clarification. Is this immediately
following the legislation?
Gittell: No, vjell, I think this v^as all discussed prior
to the passage of the legislation. I don't
think anyone thought - anyone I've spoken to -
realistically thought that there would be any
kind of legislation like that. I mean, obviously
the Mayor's people up in Albany did push it
througli, but 1 don't know how seriously they '
thought they . . .
Swanker
;
I think that was a late legislative session that
year. I think that went through late in May,
as I recall, because I remember . . . usually
they were negotiating that thing up in May.
Gittell: It did come through after the districts had
been agreed on. The districts were announced
in April
.
McCoy
:
The reason why I am asking because I thought
there were three events and I am just trying to
put them, in order . One was the legislature s
directive to Lindsay to decentralize the system,
or to reshape it for financial reasons. That
was one, and that's why I asked you the ques-
tion .
Gittell: No, no, no. I . . .
McCoy: And then, two, there was the Board of Education
s
mandate about experimental ideas in education,
and then finally there was the demonstration
district
.
so v;e are talking now about 1967 in
terms of months; March, April, May.
Gittell: I wouldn't interpret the legislative action as -
for financial reasons at all. Well, the fact was
that the Mayor had - since I originated that
idea, I'll fight on this one - the Mayor had
already arranged that borough designation for the
legislature which was pretty clear cut; i.e. that
New York City would no longer get aid as one
school district, and that need had been coming
already. Now there was the notion that the City
had to make some move to actually decentralize
in order to continue that aid, but I don't think
that anybody really believed that. I am certain,
maybe Esther has a different view, that that aid
would have been continued, that it was Lindsay's
move to try to get ahold of the handle through
forming the school system as a political action
and that legislature was . . .
Swanker
:
But didn't he reshape the legislature to get . . .
Gittell: Oh, yeah, the year before, but it wasn't an ,
actual decentralization. It was saying 'yes,
there are five borough districts in New York,
therefore, we should get aid based on these
five boroughs .
'
Swanker
:
Yeah, but I think he got the bill passed that
said: 'we're continuing on this basis if the
Mayor comes up with a decentralization plan.'
I think this was . . .
Gittell Yeah, but what I am saying is that New York City
would have continued to get aid on the bas is of
the five borough districts whether he got enabling
legislation to go ahead with reform or not.
Swanker: But I think he tried it to prove that . . .
Gittell: Right, because I think for political reasons,
which I am sure he may think a different way
about it now, I think he had made the decision
and his staff had made the decision that educa-
tional reform was a good issue for him, and that
if he got a directive from the legislature - he
could control that issue, because you remember
that the first reaction to the legislation was
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McCoy
:
Swanker
;
t.be Nev; York Times and the PEA saying 'how dare
llu: iegislaturo give the Mayor the power' instead
oL the Board of Education. So there is no ques-
tion that it \<ias the Mayor's men up in Albany who
manipulated that bill through. My only point
with Rhody is that there was no real fiscal rea-
son to do it. The aid would have been continued
on the basis of the five counties if they hadn't.
Tlie real play there was a power play on Lindsay's
part to be in charge of educational reform in the
City, which he thought he could get political
leverage from. You know, he was the educational
reform mayor. He was gambling with that notion
and, therefore. I don't think there is any ques-
t ion that the. demonstration did force move on the
demonstration districts as well as the Mayor's
was made without any knowledge that the legis-
lations v;ould seriously going to be considered,
or certainly not passed, because in very many
conversations that I have been involved in, and
at Ford many people say that if that legislation
had gone through, the likelihood would have been
that the districts probably would not have been
funded, at least by Ford. They might have been
cit'ated, but that there would have been second
thoughts on that. Actually, the districts got
the go-ahead . . . annual legislation was passed
and here they were, you know, sitting with both
tliese now, and novj, I mean, then the Mayor crea-
ted the Bundy panel. It was Bundy he wanted on
that task force in the first place. Bundy had,
or Ford had already negotiated for the creation
of the districts as a result of their involvement
and refusal to serve on the task force, and here
1 v;ould say was more Mario Fantini than Bundy.
1 don't think Bundy really understood fully the
demonstration districts as an idea. In fact,
I don't think anyone at Ford did, besides Mario.
That's a fair answer.
Well, to pick up on this. In February or in
March, I worked with Bernie Donovan to draft
the proposal to the Board of Education for the
creation of twelve different types of educational
innovations in the city of New York; three of
wln’ch were to be demonstration districts - not
specified, in other words, the location or the
A9
geography was not specified, but there were to be
demonstration districts involving the people of
the community in some fashion, not specified.
This was submitted to the Board of Education in
April and adopted in theory by the Board and at
this time, I had been talking with Mario about
the possibility of Ford funding them, so he was
working with both groups - both with me and Ber-
nie Donovan and with variovis communities, and as
the communities approached him, we looked at
their potential as a demonstration and their
leverage with the Board, with the legislature,
and the City, this kind of thing. So the deci-
sion finally was made in April, I think, or in
early May, to fund the three districts, and to
be very honest. Ocean Hill-Brownsville was a
very late starter, because 201 had been decided
on right from the beginning, that was obvious,
and Two Bridges had been decided on, but there
was a third one that had been proposed up in
upper west side Manhattan, as you recall, the
Joan of Arc complex, and there was some problem
in the community there in accepting it, and so,
when this did not go througli, Mario said he had
been working v^ith a group in Ocean Hill-Browns-
ville and how would this set with Bernie Donovan,
really, because he knew tliat the Board was not
involved in this discussion at this point, thati
Bernie was making the decision. So the decision
was made to go with those three, and tl\at was
. .
Gittell
:
But then there was the .... (mumblings)
McCoy
;
Let me go back to see if I got this correct,
Marilyn. You had the legislative move engineered
between the legislation and the Mayor.
Gittell: But after the demonstration districts had already
been decided on.
McCoy
:
So then, the demonstration districts or district?
Gittell
:
It's districtsl
McCoy: Had been decided before the legislation.
Gittell Right
.
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Swanker
:
i think that legislation came in May, not March.
G ittell: Yeah, I think you are right.
McCoy
:
The Mayor's task force was instrumental in helping
to put this
. . .?
Gittel 1: There was no task force. What he thought would
be the task force, the negotiating parties, hel-
ped put together the plan for the demonstration
districts
.
McCoy
:
And then, at what point did the Board of Ed's
proposal come in? After that?
Swanker
:
Well, that was in April.
Gittel 1; Well, obviously. Bernie Donovan submitted it to
the Board of Ed
,
and they gave it approval
. I
guess you have to ask Bernie, but you worked with
him (addressing Mrs. Swanker)
. . . they realized,
they didn't know what they were doing, I am sure
of that.
Swanker It was a two to three page memorandum and there
were twelve ideas presented and, well, you've
sat through Board meeting and know how much atten-
tion is given to memorandums, and it was asked
for an opinion to vote, and it sounds like a
good idea, but to be very honest and with the
exception maybe ofGiardino, I don't really think
any of the other Board members were . . .
Yushevits might have known it.
Gittell
:
The only question I have about that is since the
201 thing was really quite controversial at that
time, what happened to the 201 thing? Did any
of the Board members associate this with . . .
Swanker I don't think so. I don't recall that there was
really much discussion about it at all, because
you remember 201 had kind of died then. There
was some legislative action going on, and the
Board had submitted some kind of legislative
plan including the abolition of the Board of
Examiners, and so they, I think were feeling
pretty confident and secure at that point, that
the tilings had kind of died down and that . . .
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McCoy
:
Swanker
:
Gittel 1
;
McCoy
:
GittcH:
McCoy
:
Swanker
:
You are talking about Donovan's new proposal?
The April
- yes, right.
I just want to add one other element here. 1
should tell about something else I was involved
in, and I was at the meeting witli the people
from the people's board at that point, who - var-
ious members of whom were involved in the nego-
tiations, and I remember specifically going to
Preston's house one night. You were not there.
No*
Various people came up and told me about the
negotiations and what was being offered, and -
that was when I didn't know Mario. You know
I didn't know anybody involved, but I have heard
about Mario, and did I think about it, and I
said: 'unless you get all of Harlem, forget it.'
And I just want to establish that I was opposed at
that point to the creation of the districts, at
least I mean I had no official capacity. I v;as
‘
an unpaid consultant to various people around,
community groups, around the city.
Can I ask you a question and go back to just
clarify? I can understand how they were dealing
with 201. I am hard pressed to understand in
this chronology here how - what you said - Two
Bridges and the Manhattan area and then Ocean
Hill came into it. I mean who did they touch
bases with?
I am not sure who the person was at Ocean Hill,
but apparently there was. Rev. Oliver would
know more about this than I, but in the propo-
sal that Bernie made to the Board, there was
mention of the Joan of Arc complex, because
there had been some discussion in that area.
That's P.S. 96th, I think. I know it's the
upper west side of Manhattan. Joan of Arc
Junior High School and its feeder schools to be-
coming a demonstration district, and Edythe Gaines
was then principal of Joan of Arc, and this was
considered to be a leading contender and was to
be one of the three. There were two tilings against
it. One was that that would have put all three
Oliver
:
Swanker
;
Cittcll :
McCoy
:
demonstration districts in Manhattan. Secondly,
there was community opposition apparently. I
don t know what all the ramifications were there,
but there was some problem about agreeing on a
Board there; it had two elections, and neither one
of them took. So, at this point, it had been
decided by the Board of Education that there were
going to be three districts, and one district was
obviously not going to make the grade, and so
Mario came forth with the Ocean Hill-Brownsville
thing, now who
. .
.
(rest was drowned out) You
would know better than I, I don't know.
I wasn't involved in that at that time, so
. . .
Well, all I know is that he was the one who pro-
posed Ocean Hill-Brownsville. He said: 'I've
been working with the group in Ocean Hill-Browns-
ville, what do you think about it?' And he men-
tioned the union.
I saw a letter from Sandy Feldman to Mario reco-
mmending the Ocean Hil 1-Brovjnsville district
because the union was working with them. Now, it
is obviously - it was a letter which was solicited.
Mario had a technique of requesting things in
writing
.
Let rie go back just once more. Then I'd like to
move this forward. 201 was involved because of
their conflicts. How did Two Bridges get invol-
ved?
Swanker and
Gittell: They had . . . Marguerite somebody . . Higgin . .
no ... I know it - Margaret Dodd, that's it.
Swanker: They had a community poverty group, reading pro-
gram funded, and they v>;ere pressing for more funds
and more control in the schools , and so they were
already an active group and a working group and
had a pretty good electorate down there, and they
had come to Ford for help. So they were already
functioning, and that's how they became involved.
Now, as I said, I am vague on the beginnings of
Ocean Hill-Brownsville, because this came to me
out of the blue from Mario.
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Gittc 11
;
Sw.anke r
:
Gittell
;
McCoy
;
S wanker
;
McCoy
;
They supported Elliot Shapiro's appointment
dovm District three - they were part of ori-
ginally
. . . MFY and had been activated to
support Elliot Shapiro's appointment in Dis-
trict three at that time and ; had this parent
training program and it was Chinese, Puerto
Rican and black with combinations. I must
say that I heard that they came to Ford from
many of the baseball fields or some kind and
got talked into
. . .
I tliink they v;anted to continue to
. . .
I think this is something you should really
ask Mario.
As far as I can remember the chronology, the
Board of Ed. passed its little resolution.
At that particular point, negotiations began
in earnest with the Ford Foundation about funding
in this model and there were some conditions, and
I think we ought to ask Mario to fill those
conditions in v^hen we get there. So the next
move was the activation of the pilot grant. I
think it was June, June 1, 1967.
And do you remember the creation of that group,
you and John Bremer - somebody from 201, I can't
remember who it was, Berlin Kelly, I think, and
Bob Bunker and I to work out the criteria fox-
selection of . . . the five of us worked through
the summer - that was the summer of '67, too.
But what I am saying is on June 1, the announce-
ment was made, a press conference was held, that
this was the grant, and, let me just try to put
some details in there. Originally, in Ocean Hill
at least, they had a proposal that had been
worked out with somebody at the Yeshiva Univer-
sity, sixteen people on the local committee that
liad been negotiating that. Their orientation at
that time again was like 201, was around IS 55,
where they had been told that they could have an
input into the selection of the principal - were
told in such a way as not to give the impression
that they could bypass civil service, that they
could if they, in fact did this. And then the
proposal itself was worked out. It had about
seven to eight pages to it, the original
proposal, talked about everything but control.
Then we moved on into trying to put that thing
together immediately after the press conference
so that we could begin to make some sense out of
what the plan was. Now, my understanding is - and
maybe at some point we need to bring in a person
like Father Powis to come in and fill that void -
but they spent an inordinate amount of time of
planning with that committee as to what in fact
they would or would not be able to do. The union
was supposed to talk to the teachers in the dis-
trict
.
Swanker
:
They pulled out in the first part of the summer
because the teachers all went on vacation.
McCoy
:
Well, no, before the school year was over, in
June, they were supposed to have informed the
teachers in the district and the task force was
basically supposed to inform the community, and
the Board of Ed. would have done its homework
by assigning a special guy. I think they assi>-
gned Robinson, if memory serves me correctly,
as special assistant before Brombackcr. Wliat I
found out on close examination was that whoever
was responsible for informing the teachers had
given them about six different dimensions to
the problem. For instance, one - and we operated
under that dual geographic location above the
hill and below the hill - but above the hill it
had already been determined that they would make
some change, and the change meant a local body
coming in. The lower hill, and I guess for a
variety of reasons
,
they were told that there would
be a planning session over the summer, and then
above the hill - shall wo play that game again? -
the teachers elected representatives to serve on
the steering committee over the summer, and the
below hill - they were appointed and so you had
all of this confusion around what the union's
role was, what it wouldn't be and whether they
were appointed to the Board or not, whether it
was a planning session or whether and implemen-
tation, and so forth and so on. The next step
was after the press conference - the actual
awarding of the check which is a sign of go
from the Ford Foundation, and quoting Mario,
S wanker
:
McCoy and
Swanker
Swanker
McCoy
:
55 -
I
referring to the gome who said: 'I met a guy who
meant action, so he handed the check and the ele-
vator stopped running, and a few other things,
and the light went on.' We began the planning
sessions and the very first thing that we were
confronted with during the planning session - I'm
trying to stay within the chronology - was the
threatened teachers' strike. At that time, it was
just talk about strike, but not - 1 mean they had
not implemented any move towards strike, they
were waiting for some negotiations with the.
. .
Let's clarify that. That was the strike over the
contract
.
It had nothing with the demonstration districts.
Tliat was the semi-annual contract.
Right. My understanding is that there had been
a number of meetings around this disruptive child
j.s.sue with local people and from all intelligent
advice Shanker has been programmed not to involve
the disruptive child as an issue in the strike
because it v;ould polarize the City, the Manhattan
]) ranch, the NAACP, and those kinds of people had
been putting inputs into it, and then over the
summer, as the negotiations approached the criti-
cal stage and no decisions had been made, then
you had the City beginning to be polarized, and
at that point the Afro-American Teachers Associa-
tion entered tlie picture and made its stand clear
lliat they were opposed to it, and tliat they were
going to svipport whatever fight there is in the
aett on the part of the union. They wanted the
schools kept open and I think they approached
Ocean Hill. Again I go back to our political
strategies. Ocean Hill was asked to support the
move because shortly after that, we'd have to
have held the election near August 4, or what-
ever it is . They were asked to basically support
the black teachers in their positions and they
wanted to use - it was suggested that they use -
Ocean Hill as the rallying point. If memory
serves me correctly, I recommended to our Board
that we only open half the schools, and the Board
voted to open all of them, and this was before
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Ferretti
;
McCoy
:
Swanker
:
the final declaration on the part of the union
to do its thing. So, when it became apparently
clear tliat the union was going to strike the
Iriday before scliool opened, if memory serves me
correctly, they came to the Governing Board, repre-
sentatives of the union. So, couched in this
planning and distortion of what planning was and
iTieant
,
they had this tremendous responsibility
to be the first decision made out in front, and
it was very obvious that they had to take on the
might of the teachers' union - which was a con-
sideration, as well as having to make a decision
on whether to support the black teachers associa-
tion, and so forth.
Wasn't there another consideration in that ini-
tial planning for the district, that the teachers,
when I say the teachers I am talking of Sandy
Feldman at this point, conceived of the district
as being nothing more than an enlarged. More
Effective Schools program?
Yeah, there v/as a great deal of discussion around
it, I don't knov; how to ansv7cr it, you see, there
arc so many - what I call mystiques here - 1 can't
cope with that because the first meeting I think
v>7C It ad vjith Dr. Donovan was a clear indication
that there be no additional funds, tliat you do
this cut of conu'ni ttment
,
blood, sweat, and guts,
despite all the other kinds of bought-in rules
and regulations that were applied, like the trans-
fers which violated the union contract - all
those kinds of things, I mean special dispensa-
tions. So it may have been one of the reasons
that the union used - to talk about More Effec-
tive Schools, but as far as I can tell and look-
ing at all the documentations, there never was
any real indication of More Effective Schools
Vv’as the union's hope, at least it never became
overt
.
Was the selection of principals an issue in that
at all because it seems to me that you had selec-
ted two or three principals in the original
suimncr . . .
McCoy
:
No. In the initial planning stage, the only pro-
blem, the only issue was IS 55, and it was even
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suggested that if they opened school in September
they'd allow them to select a principal outside
the civil service, but then the building program
bogged down because of building strikes and so
forth.
Swanker: But I thought you put
. . .
Ferretti
:
Didn't you have the Ferguson thing, too, at the
same time?
McCoy
:
Yeah, but way down on the chronology.
Swanker: But didn't you have Fuentes
. . .
McCoy Let me back that up so we get this chronology
correct
.
Swanker
:
Because I remember you wanted to grandfather
them in when we wrote that
. . .
McCoy Well, there are two things before that.
Gittell Well, let's hear about that, Rhody.
McCoy
:
In June I had done some work in looking at the
law. In July, as we began to organize, we have
had a number of meeting just before Donovan v;ent
away and we attempted to find out what the present
personnel status of the district was. There had
been some discussion by members of this task
force that there were in fact, or would be in
fact, four vacancies. Up until September, if
memory serves me correct, those vacancies had
never been declared, I mean as legitimately,
remember one of those meetings when Dr. Donovan
finally announced that there were four vacan-
cies? And so what we v;ere operating on was 55
which was not even completed yet. The possibili-
ty of 144, the possibility of 137, and I don't
remember, whatever Fuentes schools was, yes, 155,
and as late as the beginning of September we
were still operating on three vacancies. 178 was
a junior high school at that time, and at the
last moment it became a vacancy, and that's when
we appointed Mr. Harris. So what we were doing
was operating on the premise that these were
vacancies
,
because you had the absentee princi-
pal and another guy and so forth, and some
other kind of information that we had received.
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that some of tliese guys would pull out in fact.
Gittell
:
Were you assured that you would be able to appoint
these other principals outside of credential ing
procedure?
McCoy: No, at the beginning - Rev. Oliver, I think you
may fill in - there was no real discussion around
it because in fact there v;ere no vacancies. We
couldn't find where the vacancies were and if you
recall, we began to talk about ways of doing this.
One way we talked about was - as you said, the
grandfather clause - and what happened was
,
we
began to look at state certification.
Swanker
:
Right .... was the proposal for community
principals
.
McCoy: But there is a step before that, unless my chro-
nology is wrong. We also talked about it beco-
ming a state training school which led us
. , .
I guess as a result of doing the homework, but
what I am saying is it led us to the fact that
we then look outside of the list and once we
talked about that and then the late date when the
principalships were finally declared vacant and
the Board asserted itself as wanting the right
to appoint them
,
and that's when Donovan finally
agreed
.
Cittell
:
What I am curious about is, was there some kind
of feeling from the beginning that you had to
make your own appointment to those schools?
Swanker No, because Bernie asked us, and I am sure that
this was before the close of the school in 1967 ,
because that's when he said; ' you, Bremer, and
I'm pretty sure Berlin Kelly, Don . . . and I,'
we met - we must have met tv>;elve times working
out qualifications for community school princi-
pals, because I had already gone to our legal
department, state legal department, the commu-
nity or the state training school was ruled out
early in the game as far as the state was
concerned, that was a dead issue, that law should
have been off the books years ago, so you had
to find some other way, and the only other way
is to declare it a unique situation; set up
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unique qualifications, and I remember the five of
worked on what tho® qualifications were to be and
what kind of criteria would be established for
the selection of those principals.
McCoy
:
Let me back up. If memory serves me correct and I
can't spell this out, because I didn't start
in that district until July 1, and if you recall
201 didn't have a unit administrator and Berlin
Kelly was put on as a consultant - all of this,
the meeting that you were talking about - took
place after Donovan came back from vacation,
which was August - after August 4 - because we
hadn't appointed the principals at that time.
As we approached the school and the alliance
between Ocean Hill and the black teachers asso-
ciation became evident, then it was clear that
Bernie was going to support a resolution allowing
us to appoint "demonstration school principals"
using state certification.
Swanker
:
Bert Swanson, I remember now. It was before you
were appointed, Bert Sv>?anson, Norm Brombacker
,
>
somebody from 201 - I thought it was Berlin
Kelley, but it may not have been - maybe he may
have been a member of the Governing Board or a
consultant, and John Bremer, before you were
appointed
,
and then when you were appointed you
joined the group, because we started - I remember
starting in the summer on that and we never did -
we finished it and it was presented to the Board,
and, as I recall, it never was accepted. Is that
your recollection, too?
McCoy
:
Yes . Fred
,
can we talk a little bit about what
happened with the media over that summer?
Ferretti: Over that summer?
McCoy
;
Not really over the summer, but as the school
began to open and the strike became . . .
Ferretti
;
Well, as usual with Shanker, things began in
June, where there would be one statement saying
that unless VN^e had a contract, you know, over
the summer, there would be a strike, which he
always does and you knovv is continuing to do.
And then along around mid-August, v\;e used to see
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the union newspaper and he'd be on television
many times, saying the same things that were get-
ting nowhere. This time I felt that what was
presented as a union dispute was not such. I
thought the disruptive child thing was really
something that was ignored by the media, some-
thing that they did not consider, because it
became a strike of how much the teachers are
making, how much do they want, and there was no
concept of the union attempting to get part of
the school supervision, which is what this was.
Nor was there any interpretation of it as an
anti-black thing, which I think it was.
Galamison
:
This interpretation was put on it in the black
community because of the background that the
school system had with 600 schools where we had
a disproportionate number of black and Puerto
Rican children dumped in the 600 schools on the
basis of real arbitrar ianism. Obviously, pre-
judice on the part of some teachers that no
teacher should be allowed to determine who is
a disruptive child and who isn't. We took the
position that no teacher was qualified. The one
thing that has been passed over here - somebody
suggested that the MES school was an issue and
indeed it was an issue, too. It was a very
serious issue, oh yes, because many schools. . .
Ferretti
:
That's a union pet . . .
Galamison
:
Right . . . had very special privileges on the
basis of the whole MES contract and concept.
Swanker
:
But that was the first year it was going to be
put into the contract, I think.
Gittell: Which was an issue, because it meant that they
would then have in the contract sewn in a major
educational policy decision.
Gal amison
:
But these wore the two major issues that reached
the public . . the mS and the disruptive child
thing. I want to suggest that I stand to be
corrected, that you were right in saying that
they settled for money, that this was the basic
issue, one which the union ultimately settled.
Swanker
:
They had a fantastic package.
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Panelists; They sure did, they did.
Gittell;
. . . first point was that the media covered it
that way.
Panelists
:
Right . . . and not covering it appropriately.
Ferretti: Another thing that happened was that everybody
discovered Albert Van - who is this guy? All of
a sudden he came up as a guy who'd call a press
conference on his front steps. I recall a piece
of film, because I used it that night. Who the
hell was he?
Swanker
;
I know who he was
.
Ferretti: That’s right, exactly. That was the point.
McCoy: Well, that leads us further to two incidents;
the Afro-American Association, A1 Van etc.,
Ferguson, and a number of black teachers came
into Ocean Hill and collectively we worked out
the strategy for the opening of schools; work-
shops, distribution of materials, and workshops
on how to handle the kids, and everything for
the first term.
Gittell; Could you go back just a few minutes and - I'd
like to know how you and Rev. Oliver got invol-
ved in Ocean Hill camp.
Swanker; I would like to know, too, because that part is
too vague
.
McCoy: That's a rather strange story. I'll tell a ver-
sion and then you tell the better version.
Swanker: Could we back up just a minute, because your
background is in the south.
Oliver; Yes, not altogether, though.
McCoy: Don't let them put you too far south. I was
called in and I understood recommended by Edythe
Gaines to Father Powis who was searching to find
a "principal" for IS 55. And when I met, they
were having a number of interviev/s, and to make
it very sophisticated, they gave me this propo-
sal that they were operating under to sit and
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Swanker
:
McCoy
:
Gittell :
read while I was being - while I was waiting to
be interviewed for the principal of 55, and I had
been an acting principal for about six or seven
years in the 600 schools, and when I read the pro-
posal, I read between the lines almost immedia-
tely that they meant civil service, you know, and
when I met with the steering committee
- you know
it's a very warm comfortable feeling knowing that
you got all the marbles in your hand. I said to
them, 'they done snowed you, they really sat you
up for a job that you can't possibly operate
this way,' and therefore, I began to tell them
what I saw in it, that they had to go civil ser-
vice, they could select one of the first three,
I mean, that would be the game that they would
play; and the proposal was too broad and ambi-
guous and didn't address itself to the specifics,
what they needed to do is just to define control
and talk about personnel, etc. etc. etc. And we
had an interview - I thought it was a good inter-
view - we called each other a few nice things,
I mean really honest things, and there was a
great deal of apprehension about a guy who was
coming out of this system and finally somebody
suggested that I had been involved with Milton
Galamison - that was the magic word at that time -
and I had experience in the 600 schools' strike,
and so they thought that maybe I could convince
them to stand up, but I mean, at least at that
interview, and then I suggested that I wasn't
interested in 55, because 1 v-;as already an acting
principal and had a school that had gained some
national interest or reputation, and the subse-
quent was that they called me back and asked me
to serve as pro-tom "unit administrator". There
was no title at that time, because Bernie had not
made up his mind what he was going to call this
funny little people, but anyway, I was to be it
over the summer.
. . .
something that wasn't in the civil service
job application.
And, at first, as I said . . . (everybody talking)
Had the Board accepted the notion that a unit
administrator would be appointed, or someone with
administrative pay?
Swanker
;
Ferretti
;
McCoy
:
Ferretl" i
:
McCoy
Well, I think (he Board sort of just closed their
eyes in the hope the whole thing would go away for
a long, long time on this thing.
Wticn did tlicir candidate come in?
V’lio? Whose candidate?
The LIFT candidate.
I v/as trying to program this, as I say. There
v?ere no titles and Bernie had to avoid it for another
reason, because, it he gave it a civil service
title in a sense, not only would it have certain
qualifications, but it would have the implica-
tions of a law.suit, ultimate lock it in, which is
ironic, but what 1 began, essentially talking to
the teachers, they already had a program that it
was a fait a compli that Bloomfield, V'/ho was the
junion high sc!\ool principal, who had established
a reputation, would be the guy, but it took me
tiiree or four meetings with key people in the
coviimunity to show that that guy really v;asn't
doing his job, he was just used. So, as I say,
I operated on a - just on a summer program of
being the organizer for the planning part of it,
which really meant that we ran the Board, and
so forth and so on. Let me just talk about two
members on the Board and then I'll turn it over
to Rev. Oliver, and v;e'll come back.
There had been a lot of feeling in that community
about Sam Wright, arid I spent an awful lot of
tiTTO. convincing them that they needed the poli-
tical support of this guy and everybody said
he'd had such a bad record, bad experience until
thic.y didn't want any part of, but we had two
major controversies over some - what the teachers
v;cre going to do, whether they in fact were going
to be on the Board or not be on the Board, which
I think had already been determined, and what their
voting rights were, and once we had sort of
exposed them and exposed them for the fraud,
i.e. number one; they voted on everything except
thiO principals, and what they wanted to do was to
vote/ to see that the "militants" did not get on
the Board for the five community people, so they
voted liaif the time v^hen there v^ere soft issues,
and refrained from voting on hard issues, and
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Sandy Feldman used to sit right at their elbow
and program them, but she wasn't fast enough,
you know, our program was better. So, I mean,
we had this operation. Then the next move was
Rev. Oliver. It had been known that Rev. Oliver
was to serve on the local school board in the
adjacent district - is that District 17? - which
was one of their adversaries, and so somebody
suggested that we ought to talk to Rev. Oliver,
and I called him on the telephone and we talked,
and he got interested and started coming to the
meetings, and so forth, and so finally the deci-
sion was made asking would he be a candidate.
And that's interesting, because the seven commu-
nity people the seven school people were elected
in a public election and the modification of the
original proposal based on how the union had
played its role over the summer was, that they
would be nominated and each one would have to
get a minimum of two hundred signatures on a
petition.
Swanker
:
This is the school representatives?
McCoy
:
These were the five community people at large;
not the teachers. The teachers - they were still
playing their games.
Swanker
:
But you had parents, or representatives of each
of the schools that had been elected by the
parents of those schools. Right? And then you
had five community representatives.
McCoy
:
Right
.
Gittell: And they had to put names on petitions (every-
body talking) . . .
McCoy
;
No, they were basically supposed to collect two
hundred, a minimum of two hundred petitions, and
then they would be brought back in and those who
had two hundred, the seven members would vote on
the five community members
.
Oliver: We didn't go out and solicit. Others went out
and solicited for us.
McCoy: Right. People who sponsored them.
Oliver;
Gittel 1
:
Oliver:
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Well, I had been - a few months earlier in the
Spring of 1967 - appointed to the Board, local
board of our District 17, and one thing that we
were concerned with there was what will happen
to the schools in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville
area, because they were originally part of Dis-
trict 17
,
and I wrote to the Board as chairman
of one of those committees to inquire about
that and got a letter back indicating that the
effect of it was that there wouldn't be anything
starting in the demonstration districts in Sep-
tember anyway. So I got this kind of reluctant.
Who was that one?
Robinson, and yet I could see that in this
community there was distrust to get something
started in September. I was approached, Mr.
McCoy spoke to me and others requesting me to
come and serve in Ocean Hill-Brownsville and
make my name available. I did so, my church is
in the area, and being one the qualifications to
serve on the Board was that you either had to live
in the district or work in the district, and
since my work was in the district, I qualified,
and I was accepted and became involved. Soon
after I came on the Board, there was an election
for chairman of the Board, and I got elected.
At the time, I didn't know who had been serving
as chairman, I had no knowledge of how it was
functioning, but I understood later that Mr.
Wright had been serving as chairman of those
who were meeting previously. Just let me mention
here, I am not a newcomer to New York. I was
born in Birmingham, Alabama, and I grev'j up there,
got my high school training, elementary and high
school training there, I went to college in Illi-
nois and to seminary in Pliiladelphia, and for
nearly six years I served a church in northern
Maine. Then went back to Birmingham and was
there about six years and involved mainly in cases
of rights violations and circulating them through-
out the country. Then I cam back to New York,
but I had been in New York before, and I have
three children - one 22, one 18, who is here nov.’,
and one 16 - and all of them were born in Man-
hattan. So I was not a newcomer to New York
City. I'd like to throw in here also that there
was and is a concern about - in the black commu-
nity - about who is serving in the schools of
New York City. We saw almost no principals in
a system of nine hundred schools, and I tliink
as late as 1967, there was not as many as six
black principals. I couldn't accept it that I
came from an area of the country where all the
principals were black and got tlieir education
in the north, and I come to the north and find
out that there is nobody apparently qualified
right here in the north to serve as principals
of schools, and I just couldn't accept that this
was just the way it was. I suspected thatsome-
thing was wrong, and we definitely wanted, and
the people in the community wanted, to see black
men serving in some of these positions in their
own communities, and one of the difficulties with
the union was that the union v;anted to have a voice
in choosing those five community representatives.
Now they had already had the right of having a
teacher to counterbalance the vote of the parent
and two supervisory personnel. That gave tliein
the edge, but they still wanted a complete con-
trol which really would not be community control
at all, and somehow that did not work out.
Swanker
:
A1 Shanker trouble, for example, one
of the goals of the union perhaps the next
contract will be . .. the teachers v^ill elect
the principals, in other words, a popularity
contest. This is one of the It's
not surprising that they adopted this position and
they were moderately successful in achieving it
in Two Bridges
,
which was the reason that they
were pressing so hard .... they knew were
out in Harlem, because they had been just com-
pletely out in that first confrontation and they
never had a chance there, but in Two Bridges
they had become literally, practically almost
a controlling group, I think, on that governing
board. They were still . . .
McCoy
:
Let back this up and bring the chronology around
so you can move again. When we first met - the
steering committee met and we looked at the Ford
proposal, and the only - and I hate to say it
this way . . .
Gittel . . . who had written that . . .
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McCoy
:
This was about the third version of
. . . the UFT
and the guy down at the
,
but the only thing
that made any kind of sense to me was the budget
on the last page, and it called for - it had a
line-item budget and the first half of it was
election, so immediately after the press confe-
rence, we all assembled in a little room and then
we figured it out in the dark recesses of 271,
and we planned this election. And, there was*
a
very interesting remark that Dr. Gentry made
earlier about the expense for the programs and
how they came into being, but I said we are going
to have an election in a month. Now the budget
called for a planning of an election over a period
of two months, and this created all kinds of
anxieties, because it had a dollar sign attached
to it, and it was a poorly written budget, because
you take a school like 271 that had over two
thousand kids and the appropriated amount of money
was the same as 87 across the street with four
hundred kids in it
. But we ran the election in
twenty-four days, and it was on August 4th, I think,
we had the election and the next day ... no,
we had
. . .
Git tell ; Rhody McCoy on . . .
McCoy We had college students, we had New York City.
We had a beautiful election. The New York Police
Academy cadets
,
and we did a better job than any
politician ever could have done in that area.
Gittell : We should say here that Bert Swanson and the
Niemeyer commission said that it was a very odd
election. Was Wright right? Was the election
within a month? This was June now?
Swanker
:
No, that was in August.
McCoy July and August, and I think immediately after
that - I don't remember the exact date, but the
Board in total assembled and they elected you
the chairman, and then from there you proceeded
to appoint the unit administrator, so Reverand,
if you take it at that meeting and then talk
about those appointments that are now . . .
Oliver
:
Well, that meeting I remember - after I was elec-
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ted chairman, I believe, was at that - the same
day we moved to the election of the unit adminis-
trator. There were two candidates, Rhody McCoy
and Jack Bloomfield, and there was a good deal
of apprehension there, because the teachers were
present and voting at that time. This was in
August, and it was a toss-up - a very serious
toss-up - as to which way it would go. When the
ballots were counted, McCoy won; he was chosen
unit administrator, but it looked like they were
going a straight breakdown, almost a racial break-
down, but it was very close, very close, but McCoy
won. Then, either at that meeting or soon there-
after, when we discussed the matter of the strike-
or was that the same meeting - I should have
checked my records, v;as that the same meeting
where we dealt with Ferguson?
Galamison: No. Could I just suggest that if you are talking
about a strike chronologically, let us know which
strike we are talking about.
McCoy
:
the '67 strike. '
Oliver
:
The teachers who had been serving with the stee-
ring committee in the summer put a proposal to
the Governing Board, and it looks as though I
am leaving them off the Governing Board, but they
were only serving in voting at that time.
Gittell
:
How many teachers were there in August on the
Governing Board?
Oliver
:
Seven.
Gittell: And in administration?
McCoy
:
No, administrators were all on vacation.
Gittell
:
And there were eight parents in five communities?
Everybody
:
Seven parents . . . five communities
.
Oliver
;
But there were two supervisory personnel. Yes,
the gentleman there vdio was always bringing up
high-sounding words and theories.
McCoy
:
Oh, I know the guy you are talking about.
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Oliver
:
But I forget his name, but he was there and ser-
ving and there was someone else - a supervisory
personnel - Matisse, but this proposal was put
to support the strike, and we'll support you and
your efforts, and it didn't take the members of
the Board long to say: 'No, we are not bargaining
with our children. This is not a bargaining
matter. Our children need an education, and we
cannot go along with closing the schools now at
the beginning of a new thing for us. This is a
new day for our children and we simply said
No, we could not do that.' And it wasn't long
after that that the teachers who had been invol-
ved simply dropped out.
McCoy
:
That was the Friday before school opened, and
school opened on that Monday, and the strike took
place on that Monday.
Oliver
:
But on that Monday, Father Powis and 1 went to about
six of the schools in the area to address the
teachers, the entire professional staff, to try
to let them know what was going on in the commu-
nity and to urge them to vote for someone to serve
permanently on the Governing Board and that was
a very hectic day, because we got a great deal of
flack from each school that we went to - 73 in
particular, we were almost unable to speak to
them. We were charged with, accused of trying to
mastermind a black take-over, teachers said that.
'Well, this didn't work in Washington, it can't
work here, what are you trying to do? You are
under the control of block militants,' and we
couldn't convince them otherwise, and not a single
school chose a teacher to serve on the Governing
Board. They all refused to have an election.
McCoy
:
Excuse me. Although some of those members had
already been elected before school ended, and
many of them had been elected before that time
and the others had been "selected." But after
the initial presentation on Friday, it suddenly
became that they all were just serving, but
there were records indicating that the tliree of
them had been elected.
Oliver
:
Well, they claimed not to know what was going on
in the district and they just were not prepared to
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Swanker
:
Oliver
:
McCoy
:
vote because they didn't know what was happening
in the schools and on the Governing Board. From
there, well, things just went from bad to worse,
basically the people
. .
. (interrupted by several
panelists)
. . as far as cooperation with the
teachers, it was a good three months before we
were able to get any teachers on the Board, and
they were on the Board as a result of, was it a
directive that you sent to them eventually? -
requesting those who were interested to, or urging
the principals to have a meeting and urge those
who were interested in serving on the Board or
having anything to do with it to come together
and choose somebody to serve on the Board.
. Tlien
four schools and a minority in those four schools
chose someone to serve on the Governing Board, and
in that way we got four teachers to serve on the
Board. They all turned out to be black. We
tried to assure the teachers, however, we tried
to let them know that this was not an effort to
get rid of teachers, but to see that our children
get a decent education regardless of who teaches.
Ulio teaches will have to be responsible v^hethcr
they are black, white, blue, or what. They would
have to be responsible. Letters were sent to them
to urge them to stay, but this didn't seem to work
out too well, and if we are not going too fast to
back in November, when you had about seventeen
. .
Before you go to that point. Rev. Oliver, can you
put a date, do you think, on the approximate time
v^hen your negotiations v;ith the union as a group
kind of broke down, and vdien you really could
say that they no longer were officially part of
your organization? In other words . . .
Well, I do remember a meeting at the George Wash-
ington Hotel where an effort was made to try to
rectify the situation. You were there, Shanker
was there, members of the Governing Board, but
nothing came of this.
Well, Shanker said at that meeting that he would
let racists and labor watch management for a
while, if you remember, because they hadn't com-
pletely resolved the strike issues. We were . . .
Ferretti
:
Where do wo put the Ferguson thing here?
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Oliver
:
That was when teachers were still present.
They would not vote on Ferguson.
Ferretti
:
On Ferguson ... he was arrested and was out on
bail
.
McCoy
:
Yes, let's back up and look at that just quickly
before we are running out of time. Wlien Donovan
finally declared four vacancies, we began to move
because we have been interviewing people. We
appointed Fuentes and Gerber and Bill Harris,
and
. .
.
(Swanker interrupting) no, Hanes didn't
come on the scene until later, and we appointed
another guy, I forget his name now, but who'
didn't take the job, if you remember. But we
were programming Herman Ferguson because we took
him rlglit out of the Board's curriculum projects;
he was working on fifth grade curriculum projects
despite all of this fanfare, he was still at
that time a legitimate Board of Ed. member.
Gal amison
:
Well, oughtn't you also add that Herman Ferguson
had passed legitimately a principal's examination
to be a principal? (interrupted by panelists)
No, no - he had passed, you can correct me if
you found out otherwise, lie liad passed the prin-
cipal's examination to be the principal of a
special school, you know, for crippled children
or something. Anyhow, it was some special exam,
and he was always requesting that he be given a
slot because there were no vacancies in that
area in a regular school. . . they would never
transfer his license.
McCoy
:
It wasn't a pr incipalship
,
it was a supervisor,
but it Vi/as comparable in salary which was the
same thing, but incidentally, while you are
mentioning that, if you recall, there was a
(somebody interrupts) . . . yes, it was defini-
tely true, I want to get back to that. . .
(Galamison interrupting) We're being put off.
We pick it up at this point with H. Ferguson,
but what happened in his case is couched now
and that group in that district with parents,
teachers, and everybody supported him being a
principal in that district over and above,
you know, without tlie civil service, and so
forth. So that was before we got him, and just
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as we picked him up at that point, while he
was working on the Board, and he had community
support to be a principal, but
. . .
McCoy: Well, I'll make a note of this. We are going to
transcribe these tapes and get them to you real
quick. You are running against tremendous odds
of getting them to you before the seventh of
December, so what we'll do is to . . .
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Calvin: Not only to New York City now, but to urban school
systems in general. Last time there was a pro-
longed discussion, really, on some of the issues
and also some of the specific people that were
involved in the history that led up to the Ocean
Hill situation, but the Ocean Hill situation it-
self was really not discussed directly. I would
like to begin today's discussion by having Dr.
Donovan, who at that time was Superintendent of
Schools, make some remarks either about what he
saw in the situation at that time, and perhaps to
comment directly on the transcript of the last
session that we had.
Donovan
:
Rather than comment on last session's transcript,
I think maybe we ought to get to the fundamentals
of what we saw at the time from our various points
of view. Very briefly, as the Superintendent of
Schools, I saw several issues facing us. One was
the very fundamental issue, not yet resolved of
the responsibility and authority and decision-
making power of the people of a community for the
educational process in their community. Another
issue I saw at that time was the question of pro-
fessional rights and responsibilities - both sides -
involved in a stab and its relationships with the
community it served. The third, and I only men-
tion three of them at the moment, although there
may have been many others
,
but a third one that
seemed very important was the question of the
law and its relevance to these problems, that
is, the laws governing education, many of which
were passed quite some time ago, seem to be under
surveillance to find out whether those laws were
pertinent to today's problems. Those are three of the
things that I saw from the vantage point of supe-
rintendent .
McCoy
:
Allan, let me go back just briefly and bring in
for your purposes in part to sort of reconstruct
just very quickly the chronology wliich will open
up a new dimension which I think is important for
you to kick off today. We started back in '53 I
think, if memory serves me correctly, put toge-
ther people like Ken Clark and Judge Delaney who
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Donovan:
began to overtly talk about the system, whoever
was functioning in that, and then Harlem Parents,
that came on the scene, individuals and groups
talking about particular schools and school areas,
and then the Parent Workshop wliere the parents
began to get feedback and information as to why
the schools were or were not functioning and what
course is open to them, and then you began tiie
Brooklyn sit-out, ultimately two or three boycotts
in which Milton was involved, and then the 600
school boycott, which had certain kinds of speci-
fic demands, such as black supervisors, as well
as better buildings and locations of those buil-
dings, and then we moved on to the Board of Edu-
cation's plan for changing the school system,
then we moved into - for a short period of time -
the introduction of the union, union being for-
med and so forth, and ultimately .... the con-
demnation of the school system by Commissioner
Allen, its not performing, and then finally the
people's board in '66 and their sit-in, and then
finally the beginnings of the Bundy panel, the
Board's proposed educational change, etc. All
those things we felt ... in bringing up to '67
and the beginning of the demonstration districts.
So I guess what I'd like to ask you to start off
with, which would probably open the door, is just
what was happening and why the demonstration dis-
tricts were formed from your point of view.
Well, I think from my point of view, two or three
things were happening. First and probably most
fundamental was that the public schools in those
areas were not meeting the educational needs of
the children. That was basic. The second was
that despite all of the efforts that you talked
about just now in bringing this to the attention
of the public and in trying to focus attention
on it, neither the Bundy suggestion nor the
Board's decentralization plan seemed to be effec-
tive enough or deep enough in its consequences to
satisfy groups that felt this was not meeting the
need as they saw it, and I think that at that
point, certain groups having talked together,
having planned together, decided that they would
like to show what could be done in their areas
if they were given the opportunity , had been
trying in 201 and other places unsuccessfully,
i.e. they hadn't gotten approval for trying. I
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think at this point they were ready to try, but
they needed help in doing it, because you can't
operate just in a vacuum by yourself.
McCoy
:
Well, I can understand that, and I think that's
probably one of the reasons that we had such
problems in Ocean Hill, and 201, and Two Bridges,
as you referred to in the early part of the laws[
that the existing school laws and its not being
relevant to the needs and demands of the people
who had some problems, but was there any particu-
lar reason why the demonstration districts were
chosen at that particular time? My understanding
was that
. . .
Donovan
:
Why they were chosen?
McCoy Not only chosen, but that approach, because
usually the three demonstrations
. . .
Donovan Well, yes, there was a particular reason for it
at that time. At that time between Mrs. Swanker
and myself operating for the State as a liaison
in New York and as Superintendent, we felt that
there ought to be some trial, some demonstrations,
and prepared for the Board jointly a suggestion
that there be demonstration districts. As I re-
call, at the time the Board did not take very
kindly to this. The Board did not think this
demonstration idea was very good, but they finally
came around to being convinced that we should
try some, and in looking around to try some, we
found some areas that seemed to be ready to be
tried. One of them v;as Ocean Hill, one of them
was 201, one of them was Two Bridges, one of
them at that time seemed to be ready - that was
the upper west side, but did not get ready, and
then the Board insisted that in addition to these
obviously ready districts in areas that were
really quite militant and ready to go, that we
also try some districts that were not organized
to go, but could be used as a kind of other
examples, or other experiments, and so we looked
to South Jamaica, we looked to the Bronx to find
something. So really, at that time, the recommen-
dation came from the Superintendent and from Mrs.
Swanker, representing the State Education Depart-
ment, to the Board of Education to establish these
demonstration districts.
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McCoy
:
You mentioned that the Board was not so receptive
at that time. Were there any specific reasons
why they were reluctant to move?
Donovan: Well, the Board of Education, you know, at that
time was pursuing a policy of administrative de-
centralization and their legislation, that they
had sent to Albany, while it was a big step for-
ward, frankly was still far short of the kind of
decentralization that groups like Ocean Hill-
Brownsville and 201 were asking for, so the Board
was a little concerned about going way out in that
demonstration and was particularly concerned in
trying to set up some guidelines, etc. It also
was concerned that the demonstration not be limi-
ted to areas like Ocean Hill and 201 where they
had already, you know, had a little argumenta-
tion back and forth, but that it be tried in
other places that were not so organized already.
Calvin
:
Maybe we can get some comments on Bernie's initial
remarks, also maybe Bernie can say it. There
isn't somebody from the union here now, maybe we'll
wait until the next session when hopefully there
will be, maybe you can just say one thing, and then
I'd like to go around the table. Wliat was the
union's initial reaction, and also the CSA's ini-
tial reaction, to the idea of demonstration dis-
tricts?
Donovan
:
Well, it's a little hard for me to tell what
their initial reaction was four years ago.
Calvin
:
When it first came up in the Board, did anybody
testify against it? Did you get a reaction from
eSA?
Donovan: Well, the eSA and the union both professed pub-
licly an interest in decentralization, i.e. they
said this is a great idea . . . (interrupted by
Calvin) . . . surrounded, surrounded with safe-
guards for professional personnel and all that
which would almost defeat the purposes of decen-
tralization. They . . .
Calvin
:
Did they support the initial districts?
Donovan
:
Initially, there were union members on the orga-
nization board, at least at Ocean Hill-Brownsville
,
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Lliere were union members participat ing at our
first meetings. Yes. 1 do not know about the
other demonstration. Yes, I think there were
some in Two Bridges, but I don't think they par-
ticipated at 201.
Calvin
:
Kev. Oliver, perhaps you would like to comment on
what you saw; the situation at tlie time that it
was initiated at Ocean Hill, and in regard to
Bernie's comments, perhaps you'd like to comment
on those and also, how did you sec Ll>e union's
initial reaction, and the CSA's initial reaction,
and maybe, as we go along, other people will
comment on that.
Oliver: Well, I agree wholeheartedly witli Dr. Donovan that
the schools in my judgement, and in tlie judgement
of many people of the community, the schools were
not meeting the needs of tlie children, and it
was necessary that something be done and some kind
of experimentation to sec if the matter could be
improved. The rights of the people in the commu-
nity to have a voice in tlie operation of insti-
tutions in their own communities, I felt and still
feel, is very basic and as yet they liave not been
worked out. The attitude of the union - when 1
first became involved in August of 1967 - I was
not really aware of the role of the union, but I
came to feel tliat the union wanted to control the
experiment, and when tlicy were not able to con-
trol the experiment, then there were tilings that
were done to really make it unsuccessful
,
or to
destroy it. There were UFT teachers, professionals
who were serving v;ith the steering committee du-
ring the summer of '67, and I think a turning
point came when McCoy was elected as a unit ad-
ministrator rather than a member of the UFT - (McCoy: CSA)
Jack Bloomfield, who was principal of 271. I
think that was the turning point. Then there was
another turning point when members of the Gover-
ning Board wore asked to support the 1967 strike,
and the Board refused to along with that. They
wanted our support in turn for their support of
the experiment, and we did not go along with it.
Calvin: Why not?
Oliver Our reasonin[^ was that licrc was sonietliing new now
for our cliildren. We arc beginning something new.
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Calvin:
Oliver
:
Calvin
Swanker
:
There is a chance now for our children to get a
good education and to start that off with the
schools closed to us was pure folly,
I think I'd like to come back to what Rev. Oliver
has said after we hear from the other panel mem-
hers
,
because I think it is one of the crucial
issues in the Ocean Hill situation which offers
some other strategies that might be appropriate
for other school systems, because early in the
game obviously there was not, at least, overt
UFT opposition to the idea, and yet as it went
along it began to - divergent opinions came out
and then finally, or fairly early, you refused to
back the UFT, let's say in their strike, and we
might talk about what would have happened if
Ocean Hill had agreed initially if Rhody and your-
self and whoever was involved, the Board had
taken a different view. I'd like to hear may-
be some comments and come back to you then, if
we could.
Well, I would say to start something as new as
>
this with closing the schools to me - it would
have taken the heart out of me.
Okay, well, let me come back to that because
classically that's the way - well, I don't want
to take any time because I want to hear from
the other panelists, but I'd like to come back
to it because that is an alternate strategy.
Esther, do you have any comments on what Bernie
said or
. .
.
particularly, it's unfortunate, I
think, and perhaps we can remedy this next time,
that the union isn't here, because at the end
they played such an important role, but maybe
you can speak?
Well, they played an important role at the start
also in that the union saw an opportunity in at
least Ocean Hill-Brownsville and I think in Two
Bridges, to create their MES school. They saw
this as an opportunity to create seven, ten,
twelve additional MES schools which, of course as
you know, is the union idea and would mean more
jobs to union people and less work for the people
who are presently employed. So, their initial
interest, I think, was based on the concept that
these would be MES schools and they were willing.
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therefore, to support the idea of the Governing
Board, Now, 1 don't think they ever totally
accepted the idea of community control. I think
that they were willing to go along with an idea
of a, perhaps an administrative decentralization,
or an elected board which would be advisory,
perhaps, but I don't think that the union ever
went so far - and now, again with Sandy here or
if someone from the union had joined us this could
be clarified, but it's my impression that they
never went so far as to support the actual con-
cept of community control.
Calvin
:
That's interesting. Fred, as an outside obser-
ver from the media, what do you see, how do you
see this evolving from the initial start where
perhaps the professional groups were neutral,
let's use that phrase to a point where they were
the key, one of the key demands, obviously was
the abolition of the demonstration districts.
How about commenting, and also on Bernic's ope-
ning remarks.
Ferrctti
;
Well, I would comment, I would tend to disagree
with you that they were neutral and . . .
Calvin
:
Well, I am using that only because they aren't
here. I don't want to - let's say that initially,
at least, they weren't overtly . . .
Ferretti
:
Well, I would even . . .
Calvin
:
Okay, well then, maybe you want to comment on
that
.
Ferretti
:
I think there were several publications put out
by the UFT wliich said very frankly that they were
opposed to it. I think - yes, indeed - in fact,
I'm talking about the UFT publication, which
followed one put out by the League for Industrial
Democracy which was written by Sandy Feldman,
which tended to agree that the concept of decen-
tralization as it, almost as it exists now, but
not with community control, wliich are two diffe-
rent animals. So I think they were outspokenly
against it from the very start.
Calvin
:
You think they were?
80
Ferretti
:
Donovan:
Ferretti:
Donovan:
Ferretti:
Calvin:
McCoy:
Oh, sure, I would think so.
Fred, I have to disagree with you. Only at the
beginning, I have to disagree, because the union
sat at the table with us when we went to Ford to
get the money to start it, and the union sat at
the table and said: "Yes, we want to work with
it." But I must admit that I think in their minds
was a joint running of that district, rather than
a community control district.
Yes, that was their vision of it, I think.
But at the time they were damning
. . . one of
the things financed, one of the goals, you know
it didn't take long - it took a month - for
everything to go like that.
There was one added dimension to what Rev. Oliver
said. One of the reasons for not supporting the
'67 strike, one of the union demands in that thing
was that teachers be given control over so-called
disruptive children, and I think that was something
which really grated upon the communities.
Let me ask you, and Mac, maybe you want to comment
because after I'll direct this question to you,
and maybe . . .
Hold that question until I get off some solid
ground. You talked about decentralization as
a concept and let me couch that in three terms.
First, I'd like to know when the term decentra-
lization entered the picture, and how did you reach
that decision to decentralize, and then as the
demonstration districts v^ere being formulated,
what kind of relationship that had with the Bundy
panel, and finally the architects of the decentra-
lization plan and, you know, its relationship
to how it began to be implemented, for example -
and the last question - when I came on board for
an interview in the summer, as a matter of fact,
June 28 or 29, they already, the local board,
i.e. the steering committee, not the local board,
already had a plan which supposedly was tacitly
agreed by the union, school board, the. local
district and had the budget that Ford had agreed
to put the planning money up for, which - well,
let me start with those three, because then it
leads to another kind of question.
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Donovan:
McCoy
:
Donovan
:
McCoy
:
Donovan:
Swanker
:
Well, I can answer one thing for you. By the time
you came aboard at the end of June, the steering
committee in Ocean Hill-Brownsvil le had a skele-
ton plan which the Board of Education then said:
'Fill out over the summer I Fill it out, put the
bones on this skeleton over the summer. Come
back to us at the end of the summer, and we'll
oncsider it.' They didn't, in other words, they
didn't formally adopt it by the Board. The Board
said: 'Okay, it looks hopeful, work on it this
summer, fill it out, come back with the whole
thing and then by that time, we'll be able to say
that we'll adopt it, we'll have guidelines,' and
all that. That was the June situation, and Ford
had put money up by that time so that the Ocean
Hill-Brownsville could get, but between June and
September, a number of things took place that
destroyed that sequence of events.
To go back to the first question - how did we
get the term "decentralization" into the picture?
Well, I think you'd have to go with a hawk-sure
microscope to find out where that happened, it's
been talked about for years, everybody talked
about the unwieldy size of the system and some-
thing ought to be done to break it down and gra-
dually you got down the word "decentralization,"
and - I don't know just when it happened, but
it had been talked about for several years in
one way or another. I couldn't tell you.
Then the last part of it was, as the demonstra-
tion districts, the proposals, etc., were being
discussed, what was their specific relationship
with that Bundy panel or . . . project?
I don't think they had any relationship with the
Bundy panel at all. By that time, the Board of
Education had rejected the Bundy panel, had pro-
posed its ovm legislation which had not gone
through, so everything was just kind of hanging
in the air. I don't think there is any link, do
you, Esther?
I don't think so. The Bundy panel really never
got off the ground.
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McCoy
:
Well, the reason I asked is because I recall - I
wish Mario were here - but I recall that on a num-
ber of occasions as we began to implement the plan
over the summer - which is the next question I am
going to ask Bernie - there were some allusions to
it being a forerunner or prototype of what Bundy
was planning, and it was also an attempt to ask
people to take certain postures and positions so
that it wouldn't really destroy what the Bundy
plan was, or was to be, since it had basically
in its skeleton outline breaking up the schools
into some sixty-odd districts, if memory serves
me correctly.
Calvin: I want to interject here for a minute, because I
think there is a key thing in what we are trying
to do here in order to talk about options that are
open. Mac, I'd like you to react to this and also
I'd like everybody else around the table. One of
the key things that you could see in Ocean Hill
was, regardless of where the union and ^CSA stood
initially, within a relatively short period of
time they were opposed, and what I saw - as an
outside observer - was very soon, the union and
the CSA were cast in a role of being outside
devils, and everything that they - they were
basically looked down on as bad, and basically
looked down as people that were trying to inter-
fere with community control or decentralization.
Now, initially, as I understand it. Rev. Oliver,
the community group in Ocean Hill decided not to
support the strike. In effect, which from a labor
point of view, is about as - you know, if you don't
back a strike and you are scabs and so forth, that's
about as rough as you can go, 1 wonder if any
serious attempts were made to say to you see the
classic way of getting things done, as a social
psychologist would look at it, is that you trade
off, so it's in the teacher's best interest to
go along, and in the Board's best interest, and
in the CSA's best interest, if you say we'll sup-
port you in the strike if you guarantee so many
black principals and teachers, and we'll support
you in the strike provided you do such and such.
Now you may not support them next time , but a
temporary alliance . . . and it seems to me that
very early in the game that the community groups,
and maybe the union, too, maybe you were respon-
ding to a union initiative, but very early in the
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Oliver
:
Calvin:
Oliver:
Calvin:
game there was a traditional kind of horse trading -
no, saying that: ' look, if you'll give us such and
Such, we'll be willing to do
. .', in other words,
'we'll go for MES schools provided you will say
that the control of the MES schools will be joint-
ly in the hands of such and such kind of parcels,
in other words, we'll allow those because we want
to experiment to see if they are good, otherwise
we'll put them out, but we'll be willing to try
them.' In other words, what I see happening here
is an option that's open to school districts going
into reform, and it's happened almost every time
that I've been around big cities, that the commu-
nity groups and the professional groups assume
like this. It's true of Model Cities Programs,
it's true in all programs, and I wondered, maybe
you have some suggestions, Rhody, and later on
Bernie and everybody around the table. How
come this split, and was there any choice, and
was there any possibility of forming a coalition
before everybody got frozen into public positions
for their own constituencies with the union
saying basically: 'hey, these guys are no good
and they're everything from being anti-Semitic,
to being anti-v;hite, to just being bad folk who
are just trying to do terrible things,' and
the communities saying: 'here they are trying
to destroy our children.' By the time you got
that far, you obviously couldn't put a "meaning-
ful" coalition together because the constituen-
cies v^/ouldn't allow it, but was there a chance
earlier? Wliat would have happened if you had
taken any options supporting the strike? A horse
trading, let's use that. Now I'd like to hear . .
Well, one of the reasons that we did not, and I
could not even as I am looking back, I could not
have supported that strike, and one was the dis-
ruptive child. That was involved in the strike.
Did you ask them to take that out? Would you
have said: 'we'll support your strike if you'll
take that and that out?'
We didn't do that, no.
What do you think would have happened if you
would have? Do you think there is any chance
that they - I mean, I don't know, because I don't
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know the union leadership and it's easy in hind-
sight
.
Oliver
:
I don't know vdiat would have happened had we sug-
gested that, but I would like to say that the
frustrations of the people in that community v/ere
beyond that kind of trading. (Somebody interrupts)
. . .
and fix the service .... and Ocean Hill-
Brovmsville v;as burning daily 1
Calvin: And you think that any kind of accommodation to
the union was hopeless, as far as your own con-
stituency was concerned? In other words, you
don't think your constituency
. .
supposing your
constituency would have said to them: 'we'll
support your strike provided the disruptive thing
goes out and provided a certain percentage of
black administrators are increased over . .
.
,
provided you make the following demands in addi-
tion to.' I mean, that's the classical, you
know, alliance kind of politics, and then maybe
McCoy wants to . . .(mumbling) . . because that's
an option.
Oliver
:
With a brand nev; Board, with newly elected commu-
nity people, it's expecting too much for them to
go with an experienced body to bargain with them.
I think that's expecting too much.
Calvin
:
Okay. Well, Mac, maybe you v?ant to comment.
McCoy
:
I have to go back and look at it in a different
way. Obviously, the disruptive child issue from
the union's point of view was a city-wide thing.
It has nothing to do necessarily with Ocean Hill.
Calvin
:
But if you had said: ' it you drop that as a
city-wide demand, we'll support . . .'
McCoy Let me follow this. Let's say this had tremen-
dous, had created tremendous polarization throu-
ghout the City, and I know for a fact that there
were many attempts by people in much gieater
leverage positions to negotiate with the union
to take that out of the contract, and therefore,
LThnn it was sort of a fait a corapli, then you
couldn't expect this particular community to
support it, even though it may have had some
inclinations which I can't attest to. But that
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kind of situation out of this disruptive child
thing polarized the city in the black-white issue.
And secondly, you also have to understand that
the black teachers' association was involved in
that aspect of the union's negotiations around
the disruptive child, and therefore, you are
talking about getting support - the main thing
to support obviously at this particular point, this
local board v;anted to support the Afro-American
Teachers Association, and a few other things.
The second one is that, I think Rev. Oliver just
touched it briefly, is that there was such a lack
of confidence in the public schools system,
period, and most of it was addressed to poor
teachers' performance and the inability of the
central Board to get teachers to begin to per-
form like they should. A third one hod to do
with what I call the earlier relationships, that
is to say, this had all its ramifications city-
wide. The union offered no options. I know for
a fact the NAACP negotiated with the union on a
sustained basis to try to remove this disruptive
child issue, and therefore, the union wouldn't;
provide any options. The union wasn't about to
discuss it at this particular point. I think
what you are saying is right. I think they
used their leverage to get more effective schools
into the thing, but that's one of the things
which we can do. But specifically about Ocean
Hill, there were two things that I think would
have mitigated any possibility of dealing witli
the union at that time. One is the proposal it-
self. I mean the proposal had been written sup-
posedly reflecting the attitudes of the local
steering committee which the union played a major
share in drafting this proposal. It also was
alleged that the union had agreed to it and had
suggested to the members of the union in Ocean
Hill that they cooperate over the summer and
plan, as you say, and that planning was never
clearly spelled out to anybody. Then they func-
tioned behind the budget of the Ford Foundation
which had monies for elections, and so forth
and so on, which gave one indication that there
was something to be implemented, not questioned.
And then finally, which 1 think is more impor-
tant, were the teacher attitudes that prevailed
through tlie months of July and August, who were
there. For instance, just to give you an illus-
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tration, at the first assemblage of the alleged
teachers who were involved in the planning stage,
some were elected, some were selected, and some
were appointed
,
all of vjhich is saying that it
was their understanding that they would do what
they were specifically elected to. In other words,
those who were elected were elected to cooperate
and work with the Board, those who were appointed
were appointed just to spend time, over the summer
to see what was happening, and the ones who were
selected were designed, as far as the communities
were concerned, were put in there to destroy the
whole project. So you had those three kinds of
concerns
.
Calvin: Not only in Ocean Hill-Brownsville
,
but the issue
that's now involved in Model Cities and wherever
you see a decentralization, or wherever you see
an attempt to involve people in control. I think
the key to issues are beginning to come out now,
and maybe some people have some ideas about some
alternate strategies, because I feel that the
strategy that was employed at Ocean Hill-Brovvns-
ville and is now being employed by numerous - I
use the words "by people's groups" around the coun-
try has been defeated every time and will con-
tinue to be defeated, because the power really
belongs in our constituted lives, lies in the
hands - lies elsewhere, and I think maybe v^7e
could look to some other options which might prove
more effective within the present structure, or
maybe the present structure just has to be alte-
red, I don't know. Bernie, maybe you want to
comment?
Donovan: I'd rather have some others comment before . ..
Swanker
:
In our first session, we mentioned that there was
a possibility, as you hinted, there was a possi-
bility earlier, early in 1967, that there were a
number of groups that, had anybody known that had
taken the reins, might have possibly formed a
coalition, if they had been able to form their
one point only, and that the abolition of the
Board of Examiners. Marilyn disagrees with me
heartily on that point. She feels there is no
evidence to support that contention. I say the
evidence is in the legislation which the Board
of Education drew up, is in the public statements
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of the coinmunity groups, poverty agencies, and
various public group sections, such as public
education associations, parent associations and
various groups of that sort. That, to me, of
course, is a tremendous classical case of everybody
having twenty- twenty hindsight, and that, you
know, it's water over the dam.
Calvin: Well, let me ask you a specific question. Do you
think that at any time, including right now,
right today, that it would be possible to bring
together in a big urban area, let's say New York
City, but not focusing, are there areas cf agree-
ment, where the - I won't use the word "the people,'
but let's say the community, could be brought to-
gether with the professional groups so that the
professional groups would gain by this bringing
together, so that the people would gain - where the
community would gain some of its objectives. Is
there a possibility even now to reassemble so that
we don't keep going in this direction? Or maybe
there never was such a possibility.
Swanker
;
Yes, I think there is a possibility. I don't
think there is a possibility in New York. I think
the positions are too polarized at this point,
the hostilities too great, and I think it will
take a number of years before those positions
soften. However, I think in other major cities,
and we've seen evidence of it this summer, where
we have seen representatives of the union and
the professional teachers' association, the ad-
ministrators, the Board of Education, and the
community groups sit down at the table and talk
out plans for possibly experimenting and perfor-
mance contracting - in Rochester there was some-
thing of that sort. It is possible. It has to
be done delicately, obviously, so that each side
feels that their own needs and wishes are being
met. It can be done. I think so, yes.
Calvin: Fred?
Ferretti: I would agree with that. I would like to just
go back and discuss my narrow frame of reference
here from the media. I think that . . .
Calvin: Not narrow at all, because you guys - you know,
it was always interesting to me, there is no
88 '
•
Ocean Mill-Brownsville
,
there is only what the
New York Times' Ocean Hill-Brownsvi 1 1 r> nr«a
it was amazing that the media would just create
a whole world all of their own because
(interrupted by ferretti)
. . . now you have a
very important role to play.
Ferretti
;
It's that point I wanted to make, is that all of
these issues that we've been talking about, never
saw the light of day.
Calvin
:
I understand that.
Ferretti
:
I thought that the reporting on education gene-
rally throughout this period, let's say, let's
pick a point - mid-1967 until today - has been
so poor and so misinformed, and what happens is
that the groups which have sophistication, like
the union, like Shanker
. . .
Calvin
;
. . . reach the public.
Ferretti:
. . . like Shanker, knows precisely what to do ’
to reach the public with his message. For
example, during
. . .
Calvin: But that's your fault, then, isn't it?
Ferretti: To an extent it is, yes, of course. But on the
other hand, there is a tendency when the presi-
dent of a union, which is one of the protagonists
in a dispute, calls a nev^s conference at five
o'clock in the afternoon. You do not out of
hand reject it.
Calvin
:
No, you'd have to attend it.
Ferretti
:
You go. And unfortunately, you put it on, and
if three days later what he has said is not fac-
tual, well, that's tough. This happened over
and over again during the course of that dispute.
Donovan: You know, there is a - I have to put in a little
snmpfln'ng here about the media, not the Times
now, but the media in general.
Ferretti: I wouldn't . . . the Times, go ahead.
Donovan
:
T am not afraid of the Times either, but I don't
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want to level with it at this time. It had to do
with all the media. One of the difficulties
throughout that whole period, which you described
as mid- '67 even up to now, was the idea of the
media that the only thing in the educational matter
was a fight, and that therefore any time Rhody
said anything, before they printed it, they would
call me and say: "what do you answer to it?"
Well, if I said something, they'd call in "what
is your answer to it?" So you are answering each
other in the media rather than attending to the
substance of the problem, and that I found very
trying.
Ferretti
:
One of the causes for that, unfortunately, is
an FCC regulation on equal time, but this is
. . .
Calvin
:
Equal?
. .
.
yes, in a newspaper? Come onl
Ferretti
:
I am talking about media. I am talking about
television and radio.
Calvin
:
I hope so.
Ferretti At this point; and to an extent even newspapers
and magazines, if he calls him something, then
you call him to say 'he called you that, what do
you say? ' I think there is a tendency to do
this in every media, I really do. There is ano-
ther point I'd like to make to follow this up,
that in any dispute vdiich involves a city or
any, you know, large group of people, most of
the people depend upon the information they get
in newspapers to make decisions, and I would sug-
gest that, even before I became involved in this,
that I really thought that the Bundy plan was a
great, big, seriously considered thing. It was
not at all, but if you read the papers and if you
saw the magazines, and if you watched television,
the Bundy Report was everything.
Calvin
:
Reverend Oliver, maybe you have a comment to make
to that?
Oliver Well, I was about to say that tlie
did not adhere to that rule of equal time, because
there were times v^;hen I tried to get something
to the news to correct slanders that were laid
against us by the UFT and by some news media.
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but they never gave me a chance.
Calvin: I would say that it's honored more in the
well, let's just put it this way; I think that
perhaps television is pretty careful during elec-
tion campaigns and other things, but it is more
lib-dy that - and if I sound like Spiro Agnew, I
can t help that - certain kinds of people tend to
sell newspapers and tell them to make interesting
television viewing and I think they tend to per-
haps be able to get their message on the media a
little bit more easily than people who are trying
to do solid and substantive things that involve
education
.
Ferretti: Well, that's true, but there again, you have the-
what kind of medium we are talking about. For
example, if I go out and speak to McCoy and get
an interview and print it, and I spend three or
four hours with him and come up with something, I
can still call Donovan on the phone and in the
papers there will be a back and forth kind of
thing. On the other hand, if I go out with a
television camera and do an interview and he is
on the screen, and he faces saying something for
a minute-fifteen, and I have a script ansvjer
said, you know, in response to that, 'Mr. Donovan
said
.
.,' well, then you just don't remember
Mr. Donovan.
Calvin
:
It's a good point.
Donovan
:
Or if you interview for three minutes and then
put twenty seconds in that interview, your pic-
ture . . .
McCoy
:
I want to backtrack this quickly. If memory ser-
ves me correct, when you asked about a coalition .
Calvin
:
Yes, that's what I v^/ant to come back to.
McCoy Actually, as far as I recall the history, there was
some sort of a coalition between the steering
committee or people in Ocean Hill and the union.
That's how one of the proposals got together,
got written. The question that I raise is that
the issue that they were around - and I don't
identify each single issue - the issue that they
were around was either not a major priority one
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Calvin:
or not severe. In other words, you - they could
coalesce around improving the schools in that
sense, but when you asked tliem to coalesce around
"racism" or the disruptive child, to be specific,
then obviously you couldn't get them with that.
A second aspect of it is - what you're saying
before - about the unsophistication and tlie people
to deal with tliese various things, because the
union obviously had some hidden agendas wliich,
you know
. . .
Let me tell you an assumption that's made which
seems to determine the options, and then I could
get people's reaction to that. The assumption is
that the union somehow is monolithic, the commu-
nity is monolithic, people have fixed positions,
they don't bend, and it's difficult to make a
coalition on the major issues, such as racism.
I am of the opinion that even today that, if
Rev. Oliver and Rev. Galamison, Rhody, and four
or five or six other leaders of the community -
Puerto Rican leaders and white leaders, too -
would ask for a meeting with four or five leaders’
of the union, and were to sit down just like any
other kind of bargaining session or discussion,
and that at the end of four or five days, parti-
cularly if it v^ere so that they couldn't be in-
terrupted, they could discuss, that the ability
to reacli agreement, particularly because there
are things tliat tlie union needs from the commu-
nity, and it will be difficult for the community
to move without cooperation from - so there is
a symbiotic relationship between . .
.
,
in other
words, I don't think we can afford to wait ten
or fifteen years for this polarization to dimi-
nish on its own, and I am not willing to say at
the present time that, as a matter of fact I
think the union would welcome an initiative from
the leaders of the community, and now I may be
endov^ing them with certain Christian characteris-
tics that they don't have, but I think \<io tend
to somehow get to fix positions that these are
bad guys, and maybe they are bad guys, but I
guess what I am saying is, couldn't we look at
the option of eveii at this late date, say an
initiative where you'd say 'look, there are
problems in tlie schools, we care about kids, we
got different ways of doing it, we want to have
sometliing to say, you want to have something to
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say, let's get it together.' Wliat do you think of
that?
Ferretti
;
I applaud your optimisml
Swanker
:
What bargaining powers do these people have?
Calvin
:
They have one hundred per cent bargaining power,
because without their support, let me tell you
what's happening, because v<?e move, you know,
Esther, by this time, that we are able to make
certain changes in structures and one of the
things that we try to see at the beginning is that
the other side isn't one hundred per cent, even
CM and the UAW get together, you know. I guess
what I am saying is you have more power than you
think, well, because - Rev. Oliver, do you want
to add?
Oliver: Let me respond to this. Let me say that the
Governing Board sat down at different times with
teachers and we discussed
. . .
Calvin
:
But that's different. Reverent Oliver, than
sitting down with union leaders, because you
don't have much
. . .
Oliver We did that, too. I mean, we were working
together with UFT personnel.
Calvin But did you ever initiate a meeting, you, your-
self initiate a meeting with Shanker?
Oliver Hold it - let me finishi The vice-chairman of
the Governing Board was a UFT representative,
Natalie Melkins. She never served, but she v;as
,
the people of that community thought enough of
her to elect her, that is the Governing Board,
elected her as a vice chairman. That to me is
an indication that we were anxious and willing
to v>/ork, and we - Father Povjis and I - on the
opening day of school in '67 went around to six
of the schools to urge the teachers to cooperate
and v^7ork with us. Not a single school sent any-
one to serve on the Governing Board.
Calvin
:
But thath different. Let me show you why I think
that's different and let me get your reaction to
this. That's like - the union always says: 'but
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look, we have this black representative here and
we've got this black vice-president here, and in
the observers we sent black.' That's not the
same. I am saying you, Rhody, Galamison, who-
ever, Ken Clark, whoever you think is appropriate-
by the way, I am leaving out another group, and
I d like Bernie's comment about, you know, there
is a board group, there are all kinds of groups
that have to get together - I am saying tliat the
five or six of you as spokesmen for a particular
point of view sat down with Shanker, Selvin, who-
ever else to the name you want to name, and said
as equals, 'how can we get together and accom-
plish our goals, ' instead of saying 'these are
the adversary.' An adversary position very sel-
dom makes for - I am just trying to lay out a
possible alternative strategy.
Oliver
:
Do you know Sandy Feldman's involvement in Ocean
Hi 11 -Brownsville?
Calvin: A little bit.
Oliver Well, this was done through Sandy Feldman.
Calvin But not, but you see Sandy - that's like saying -
they will always counter: 'we talked to this per-
son in Ocean Hill-Brownsville
,
and we talked -
we got this black representative,' but that isn't
really talking to you.
Donovan
:
Yeah, but I think you have to realize, Allen,
that when the Reverend talked with Sandy, he felt,
he felt he was talking with Shanker. Shanker
wouldn't come. He sent Sandy. She was his spe-
cial representative in Ocean Hill; so when they
talked to her, they felt . . .
Calvin
:
Maybe somebody else has some comments?
Donovan: They may have felt wrong, but that's what they
thought they were doing with good reason.
Calvin Well, let me ask you a question. Did Shanker
send a letter to say that 'Gee, I am sorry I
can't come, but I'll have Sandy go as my perso-
nal representative.' Was there any such thing?
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McCoy
:
I think that was handled in a different way, not
through a letter, but I think everybody understood
that to be
. . .
Calvin; But I think one of the problems
. .
.
(everybody
talking)
Ferretti
:
. . .
understood today 1
Calvin
:
Oh, yes. Well-, I would say . . .
Ferretti
:
Sandy Feldman represents the Teachers' Union.
Calvin: We found a very helpful thing, and that is that
if people would get a little more formal. You
see, one of the things that there always seems
to be communication problems . . . from whose
point of view, but what I am trying to do is ex-
plore, and maybe we want to go on to something
else because this is just an alternative, but
it's a basic alternative, and maybe we want to
move to another point, which is this. What
would happen . . .
Oliver
;
Before you go on to another point . . .
Calvin
:
Okay, because we can move on to something else.
Oliver; I feel there is something basic right here.
Calvin: Okay, so do I because I think it's a key.
Oliver: And that is, the right of the union to educate
children. I think this is something that is
not clear, and I do not feel that a union has an
inherent right to educate children. Parents have
that inherent right to educate children, and we . .
Calvin
:
In order to change, not yet, to . . . here s the
key, I think. You have a structure with a set
of rules, and laws, and power bases, and lega-
lisms, that are set up with bargaining and con-
tracts, and things going on. If you want to
work within that structure, which is not the
only alternative, then the only way you can do
it is by changing the laws, or getting the courts,
or something, because as long as tliey are held
to be bargaining agents, they'll send the police
in and enforce the rights which you may not believe
rn
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Oliver
:
Calvin;
Oliver
:
Calvin
Donovan
:
We know that already.
They got, they got
. . . that's one approach.
The other approach is to say: 'look, the whole
system is no good, we are going to pull it dov/n.'
But as long as you are going to work within it,
you may say: 'I don't believe in a union,' - by
the way, as the chairman of the board of a com-
pany
,
I may not believe in a union, either, but
they have the NLRB and they have all kinds of -
we deal with the Teamsters Union; now we may not
believe they have a right to do certain things,
but nonetheless that's written into our structure.
So we have two choices; we can either work hard
to change the structure
. . .
I believe in unions, but I don't believe in unions
having an inherent right to educate children,
and that's
. . .
Well, but in order, that, how would you, how
would you go about, but it's a fact that a con-
tract was negotiated bctv^een Superintendent Dono-
van of the Board and the Union, and so you can
either say
. . . Bernie, maybe you want to comment
on that, or somebody else?
I think we have to be careful how we speak these
things. I don't think a union should have, or
has an inherent right to educate children. I
would agree that the education of children should
not be either the responsibility or the right of
a union. Teachers have a right to be organized
to protect their economic and personal interests,
as anybody does; just as the people of Ocean HiLl-
Brownsville had a right to get together and elect
the Board to protect their rights as parents in
the matter. And so this, this very shadowline
between a union protecting the salary, the fringe
benefits, and all that kind of business, and the
union dominating the school system to the extent
where it tries to dominate the instruction is a
critical one and very hard to separate where
working conditions end and education begins.
It's very hard, it's probably harder in education
than anything I know of, unless you talk maybe
to the police or firemen. There, too, it's a
very critical shadowline as where a union is.
But I wonder whether we are not trying today to
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seek the answers which may not come until we are
all through with the panel, after several more
sessions, because we are really trying to get
the answers to everything that happened in Ocean
Hill -Brownsville
.
Swanker
:
Right, we are only at the beginning of
. . .
Calvin
:
Yeah, the only point that I was going to make - I
didn't mean to stay so long at - is that you have
to view this in context and two things were appa-
rent, and you, all of you around this table are
so close to it, maybe, that there is a slight
advantage in being slightly detached, and that is
this. At the beginning, it is at least possible
with the professional organizations granted here
objection, that v;ere at least neutral, let's at
least say that this was possible. As it went
along, the professional organization very rapid-
ly made it into a fight. Now I think we have to
view everything within that context, because the
overwhelming forces, or one of the biggest for-
ces operating were the union and the CSA
,
because,
I think - I am sure - we'd have an Ocean Hill-
Brownsville going today, and I'm sure, if it
weren't for the professional organization, let's
say interest, if not active attempt to oppose.
And so I think if we view the happenings in the
light of that change, because a strategy was
adopted in 1967 during the first months of the
existence of Ocean Hill-Brownsvil le which said:
'we won't back the union in its strike,' and
from thereon in certain other consequences, I
believe, were absolutely determined by their ini-
tial actions. In other words, that the initial
strategy on the part of Ocean Hill-Brownsville , I
think, allows us to usurp other things v^;ithin
that context. That's all. Maybe now we can move
to some other . . .
Ferretti
:
Well, you are taking that as an initial strategy.
I wouldn't agree with that at all.
Swanker
:
I wouldn't agree with that, either. I think the
choice of Rhody McCoy over Jack Bloomfield was
much more important.
Calvin; Okay, that's first.
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. . as far as the union is concerned
,
the
(everybody talking)
Donovan: a second thing ... the second thing, it came
at the same time - our agreement to appoint prin-
cipals who were not on the list.
Calvin: Nonetheless, that's another
. . .
Donovan: That complicated it, you know. It wasn't just
the disruptive child.
Calvin: Yes, but that's CSA rather than a union.
Donovan
:
They are both
. . .
Calvin
:
Okay, what point would you like to move on to
now?
McCoy
:
Let's get specific and go into the Ocean Hill-
Brownsville situation. Let me set some stages
and then hopefully get some response to it.
There was a proposal written - the original pro-
posal had about four or five pages that called
for a lot of things, and so forth, and again I
am saying on the back page of the last page was
the budget by the Ford Foundation, which called
for an election of the Governing Board by a mere
line-item budget. One is so much money for elec-
tion years, so much money for publicity for elec-
tion, etc. etc. The Governing Board - the steering
committee in the community proceeded at this
point to hold such an election and then moved -
which brought us to this point where we had to
deal with the union - tov;ards the opening of
school, which obviously had some inputs from
the teachers' strike, teacb.ers' negotiations
for their contract. Now the question I am rai-
sing is, they had tViis proposal, they proceeded
to have the election, and they prepared for tlie
opening of school. The question I am raising
here is specific: why, and if so why were the
various impediments from that period, from the
time the proposal was initiated to the time of
the opening of the school? I mean, I think
that's a . . .
Donovan
:
I can tell you one of them. One of them was
that this was an agreement between the Ocean
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Hill-Brownsville steering committee, which included
the union, and the Ford Foundation, but not with
the Board of Education. And the Board of Educa-
tion as such did not approve this agreement, mere-
ly said, as I described before, 'all right, this
looks like a good outline, work over the summer
and come back and see if you can give us a full-
blown proposal.' But in the meantime, the elec-
tion took place without the Board's participation
or acquiescence. And then after the election
took place. Ocean Hill-Brownsville wished to be
represented by that elected board and the Board
of Education kind of had sixes and sevens because
you had a board which you hadn't approved, but
you had a board, called in Jack Niemeyer and a
group of men at our request to look at that elec-
tion and see if it was a reasonably conducted one,
so that maybe they could give a kind of de facto
approval. They looked at that election, and they
found that despite many things that they would
have done in a different way if they had conduc-
ted it, that in essence it ought to be accepted.
And so the Board kind of reluctantly, I don't
think ever by any formal vote or resolution or
anything like that, said: 'well, okay, we might
as well deal with that board.' I mean, that's
what happened over the summer, so one of the
impediments that came up out of the whole thing
was the board got its back up - I mean the Board
of Education - got its back up over the quick
election without the Board ever having said; 'go
ahead and have an election.'
Could I just back up one second, Bernie, because you
were not here last time when we discussed this,
and I t>iink it's kind of important for you to
either agree with us or change the record. And
that is, when the original proposal, which you
and I made to the Board of Education, was adop-
ted or recognized, let's say, by the Board of
Education - I don't recall that they ever adop-
ted it formally, but was recognized by the Board,
it was my contention at the last session that of
the Board members present, perhaps one, at the
most two, really understood what thej* were recog-
nizing, that the rest of them kind of said: 'well,
if the Superintendent recommends it, I guess it
won't hurt.' In other words, that most of them
really didn't know what they were getting into.
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Donovan
:
There wasn't any great enthusiasm.
Swanker No, there was no enthusiasm, but I really didn't
get the sense that there was any great reluctance,
I just felt that they really weren't aware what the
ramifications of such a thing could be, and so as
a result, with the exception of Mr.Giardino, v;ho,
I think, really was knowledgeable and was aware
of what was going on, the rest of the Board, I
think, felt - along about September and October
in '67, that they kind of have been dragged into
this without knovjing what it - what was going on.
Donovan: Right, I agree with you.
Swanker
:
To be very blunt about it, I think that many mem-
bers of the Board felt that you had put one over
on them, that you'd really run one, and I guess,
really, in a sense we had.
Donovan
:
Well, I remember one Board member who particular-
ly said: 'I'm not going to approve this, if these
demonstrations are just going to be in 201 and
Ocean Hill - no, 201 and Ocean Hill would give
us trouble
,
' so . . .
Swanker
:
Are you sort of using that with the community
education centers? Because that was an issue.
Donovan
:
No, that was back when we started the other.
The same thing happened again, same thing, same
number
.
McCoy
:
Bernie
,
you said that after the election and the
Board brought the - got Niemeyer and his staff
in to take a good look at it - I don't know what
the date was, but the next move behind that was -
and I am trying to follow your sequence because
it may be important to highlight some other things
the Board said; 'well, it wasn't such a bad thing,
vje'll begin to deal with this newly elected board.
The next time we had a meeting, an issue at that
time was the appointment of principals. So if,
in fact, the Board had said; 'okay, it's not
such a bad idea,' and then we began to deal with
them around them around the issue of principals.
And the next issue was the opening of school.
Then why did the Board get its back up again?
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Donovan
:
Calvin:
Donovan:
The Board didn't get its back up again! The
Board went to the Commissioner of Education and
got permission to appoint principals in this
demonstration without taking them from the exa-
mination list. They did that over the opposi-
tion of both the UFT and the CSA
,
and they got
Jim Allen to rule that for a period of time,
they could appoint people at the recommendation
of the unit administrator, presumably with the
approval of his board, and we did appoint such
people to those positions, including yourself.
And then the CSA took us to court. So they didn't
balk on that, what they balked on was giving
official public resolution recognition to the
Board until the Board - your board- came up with
a total plan for the operation of the district.
Let me stop here, because we have to go to lunch.
Before we leave, could I get comments from people
around the table'2 We are no\<i talking about the
initiation of the plan and we are talking about
going outside the list, which is happening in
every city. Now, from your vantage point, Bernie,
in particular, and Esther also, and then every-
body, what - that strategy didn't work, and by
didn't work I mean the fight is still going on,
as I understand it - I am not that familiar with
the internal workings, but from the newspapers,
Scribner is saying 'hey,' and everybody is still
saying 'hey,' and that's maybe five years later.
Now what other options or strategies were open
in order to increase the number of black and
Puerto Rican principals? Is there another op-
tion that could have been taken at that time?
There were a couple of options, and they were
both taken at that time, and I think last time
you met in the session, if I read the notes
right, Esther reminded the group here that under
her initiation from the State Department and my
cooperation from the Board, through Ford Founda-
tion, we did establish a plan, first for the
training of Negro and Puerto Rican educators,
which has gone through three years and three of
them now happen to be district superintendents
three of those people. And many of them are now
principals, but it took a long time. The second
thing was that we did appoint the number of men
not on the list under this Allen approval of the
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demonstration, and just before I left the Superin-
tendency, I nominated ten people - Negroes and
Puerto Ricans - to be specially examined by them-
selves to be principals of junior and senior high
schools, which the Superintendent has a right to
do under the law, but, when you say "cities all
over the country are going outside lists," cities
all over the country don't have lists'.
Newark had the problem.
Newark had never had a Board of Examiners by state
law.
No, I mean what the problem seems to be - Newark
is objecting to the fact that, for example, prin-
cipals were appointed more rapidly, went to court
over it, similar problems I can't name the city.
But the problem in this city, by that I mean New
York, has always been unique, because of a state
law which many times has been attacked, but never
has been able to be beaten, and therefore, the pro-
blem is still the state law which governs the
appointment of principals in this city, and all
the little ways around it, like training blacks
and Puerto Ricans to become principals and doing
demonstration work, doesn't answer the whole
problem. And therefore the present position of
the Chancellor is: 'I appointed a man to a high
school, I am going to keep him there even tliough
he is not on the list.' Now he is going to fight
that in the courts to see if he is right? He can
appoint a man and send him down for examination,
and if the man passes the exam, he can put him
on; he doesn't have to wait for a list, but he
must pass the exam. The law is still there bin-
ding the City.
Well, what is the strategy? Maybe we will ask
Rev. Oliver. What would you suggest for New York
or for some other city, and then Mac and every-
body, what options are available? Let's deal
with New York then, saying that its situation is
unique as a state, but also I think theie are
ramifications in Newark, because the issue - and
for other cities - is at least related.
The issues are related, but not as in New York.Donovan
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But not as legal. What strategy can you see,
Rev. Oliver, and Mac and others, on how you
attack this problem?
Well, right now the utmost thing in my mind is
the aspirations of people to that of their
education. Winy is it that the UFT has got to
raise a fuss with Scribner when he appoints
somebody that the community wants? Wliy can't
the UFT find some way of relating
. .(Voices lost.)
So the district superintendent says: 'hey, I
want to appoint a bunch of principals. Commi-
ssioner Scribner, isn't there a turn' - 'they
haven't passed the exam,' or whatever he'd say.
What should be done now?
I think, i'll have to relate to the actual si-
tuation there. I think Scribner did a wise
thing, although it's going to be a big fight,
it might cost him his job, but I think he did
the viise thing. In the long run he may have
to go, maybe someone else who comes in and does
the same thing, has to go. But the time is
going to come when the union has got to recog-
nize that people have rights and they must re-
cognize those rights.
Do you still view this basically as a union,
let's say CSA-Union confrontation with the commu-
nity, and you don't see any, until that's resol-
ved . .
.
you see I can't such feel that that's
the frame that you get into.
Rhody, you have probably more experience than
anybody around the table with this particular
issue directly. What would you say should be
done?
Well, I think Bernie hit on it "that New York
is unique."
You know, if people in Buffalo say "Buffalo is
unique."
Buffalo operates under the same law as New York
City.
No, but I mean by the people in Toronto or by the
people somewhere else. I think it is unique,
but I think the problem
, . .
Donovan: ... by unique, - legally, that's always so
. .
Calvin: Right
.
Donovan: Legally, we're unique, but we look like all other
people, generally speaking, although that may be
fair to the other people, but legally, we're unique
McCoy
:
Well, my concern is, again you are talking about
the superficial aspect of an issue, and basically,
I think that there are two or three major con-
cerns. Number one is that there have been a num-
ber of people who fought the Board of Examiners
for "its discriminatory practices," or the mere
fact that by using this process the minority peo-
ple had not, in fact, been through that. Mario
alluded to the fact that they prepared, set up some
workshops and a training program for blacks and
other minorities, it had a stigma whether we
want to recognize it or not, and it was sort of
like the hope factor that Dr. Gentry talks about
all the time that blacks and Puerto Ricans hope
that this will be a conduit through which they
can get into the system. But I guess the more
astute politicians, the educational politicians,
recognize that rowing this way perpetuated the
Board of Examiners, so therefore, that was one
issue. The second issue was that vjliat the hope
was that by appointing the wrong principals that
you would then begin to structure a different
kind of accountability of people who had "rela-
tionship to the community" and that they could
hold these people accountable for their perfor-
mances in the fcommunity. It brings to mind a
little funny thing that you hear all over the
country novi/ when people ask you the question
"we had the right to hire and fire.' If a per-
son accepts an appointment on those conditions,
then obviously he had a right to hire and fire.
A person who doesn't want to accept those con-
ditions, then you don't. But the third fact
that I am saying is, it's just public opinion
that blacks and minority, Mexicans, Chinese, etc.
in the City would then begin to take jobs that
were formerly held by one particular group.
Those are the three issues, never mind the mere
fact that you got blacks into the system.
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Ferretti
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I agree, and I think you state it very well. My
question is - today, let's suppose that you were
the head of a board, or that you were a superin-
tendent, or that you were just a consultant, what
strategy would you recommend to a school system
on the basis of your Ocean Hill experience to
increase the number of minority administrators,
assuming that most school systems in the - Cali-
fornia has a different kind of problem, legally,
but basically the problems are the same; there
is kind of waiting list of, regardless of how
it is structured, and generally speaking there
haven't been many blacks and browns and other
minority groups who've gone aliead. So here are
these people who've been waiting for eighty years -
they've been waiting for eighty years to be principal,
and I am white, and now you are saying to me 'hey,
we need more blacks
,
so you are going to jump
somebody ahead of me.' Now, what I am saying to
you is, Mac, what strategy, concrete strategy?
Well, two things. First of all, I would insist
_
on local community people being involved in the
selection of the administrative leadership.
That's part of it, and I think accompanying that
has to be an educational process of letting peo-
ple understand that it's important both academi-
cally as well as psychologically that the ethnic
representations effect the clientele that you
serve. So I guess basically, I am not talking
about an option as much as the process of allo-
wing local people and the clientele to be invol-
ved in the selection of those people who both
teach and administer their schools
.
Fred
,
you are the one who creates the educatio-
nal client.
Well, you are talking about options here.
That's right. What could be . . .
I really think that you are talking about a
dream vwrld, to an extent. I think there are
options in certain communities, but there is no
option in New York. There is no option at all,
because as Bernie pointed out, there is a law
in the books.
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Calvin: We ve changed laws in three legislatures.
Ferretti: What I am saying is that you have a situation
where legalisms are being used to combat a social
movement, and, you know, you just can't talk
about Vi?hat options are there, you have to talk
about pressure
,
continued pressure to got laws
changed
.
Calvin: What strategy
. , .
Ferretti: There are no options, really.
Calvin
:
Oh, gee whiz, that's an awfully interesting
comment. What kind of pressures? How could you
create these pressures? In other words, what
would you ask - it's not fair to ask people to
wait ten or twenty years, that would seem to me,
hov7 would you create these pressures?
Ferretti: Well, I think Rev. Oliver could answer that ques-
tion .
S wanker
:
Well, the only answer, obviously, is to mount
enough of a lobby to beat the union.
Calvin
:
Now supposing that the union had, now, you see,
now we get back again to what I think is the one
thing that's missing that I see in every other
discussion, and Esther always come closest to it,
as a matter of fact, after when I have read the
transcript - maybe we'll talk about it after
lunch. I think we can make it in the interest
of the CSA and the union to make certain changes
which will also be in accordance to goals of the
community. And I think if it isn't done that
way, we don't find options that will do that,
you can play 'til doomsday. Nov7 maybe you can
destroy the union, maybe it can be done. A lot
of big corporations, including plumbing, manu-
facturing, and clothing in Wisconsin tried for
a number of years. It's a very difficult thing
to do. I don't think there have been many no-
table successes in this country with the labor
laws as they are now written.
Oliver
:
Do you feel that we tried that?
Calvin: I don't know. I'd like to hear from you more.
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We did not.
Well, but then what alternative do you have? You
see if you say: 'well, we don't want to destroy
them' there they are. They do exist.
You try to make them see that there is a law in
the books that ought to be changed.
Well, psychologists in general feel that people
only do what's in their best interest to do.
Of course I
And so what I am saying to you is, has anybody
tried to work out ... Is there an option that
would involve v;orking out programs that would
benefit the CSA to make a change?
I would like educators to see some of these things,
some of these social problems, otherwise, they
have no right to be teaching our children.
You see, there is the crux of it.
I think that's true.
I think that that's, I think it has been enuncia-
ted very well. If you expect it, you see, I
think, educators are no different than life insu-
rance salesmen, really, honest to Gosh, or minis-
ters, or psychologists.
They are human, of course.
That's right, and I think they have their . . .
well, come on you guys .
.
(laughter) .
.
you get
the same spectrum.
Now, I think, what you have to see is something
else here. I don't think it is quite that simple.
When you are talking about the right of the union,
you are talking about a myth. And )^ou talk about
telling the teacher's union that its sacred pro-
tection of civil service rights and all that is
something they ought to sit down and talk to the
community about. Don't forget the firement are in
on that, the police are in on that . . .
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I understand that.
Every union man in New York is in on that because
he thinks if it's a threat to one union, it's a
threat to all unions, so that two things have
to be done. One of them, despite the improbabi-
lity of success there is still a possibility, is
the attempt to sit down high level to hash these
things out. I don't think anybody disagrees that
an attempt ought to be made. What we may disagree
about is a possibility of a success. But it ought
to be tried. I wouldn't leave any stone unturned,
seriously. And the other is the mounting of this
pressure on tVic legislature to remove one of the
big barriers and the people in areas are hard to
organize. The union is organized. They've got
a legion to send out pamphlets and get other
unions in, and they go there in court and the
legislators know it. But the people come in
dribs and drabs. Some of the people that come
don't put their cases forcefully as the union
does. So that's a great, big job to try to or-
ganize a community to stand up for its rights.
Well, Mac, if you'd like to adjourn for luncheon,
we'll
. . .
Let me just put a footnote on that because it
isn't just the community as we've been using it -
that term - what I am saying is that you need
more than the community. You need all of the
pressure you can bring to bear to force the
State which is opposed to the Board of Examiners
for years. The various groups in the City, par-
ticularly who have in the past stated their
opposition to the Board of Examiners, I am refer-
ring here to Parents Association, the Public
Education Association, the various educational
groups - whatever they may be . . . You know
the names of them far better than I - that they
are not powerful. None of them, in themselves,
have the power of the union. And all I am saying
is that in order to effect this change, it can't
be just the community , although that's the biggest
group, and obviously should, and it should be
made to organize them and to mount this pressure,
but ally with them, along with them all of these
various other groups, because alone, I don't
think the community controls enough votes to do it
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LUNCH BREAK
This afternoon, although we may refer back to the
general context, 1 thought we'd spend our time
on some specific things that happened at Ocean
Hill-Brownsville
. Without initiating a specific
topic, maybe, Mac, you'd like to begin by talk-
ing about some key things
,
key programs
,
key
issues
.
I am going to take a certain kind of privilege
and I talked earlier at lunchtime with Dr. Dono-
van, and I think that some of the inputs that
he would make at this point are crucial before
we get into the very specifics. Bernie, would
you try to put together for us something, some
of the progression around the Bundy report, the
Mayor's report on decentralization, the Board
of Education's report on decentralization, the
Markey bill, and ultimately the legislation,
and probably towards the tail end of it, sum it
up how it affected Ocean Hill or how Ocean Hill
played a part in it.
Well, it's a little hard to tie all these things
together, but let's start with the Bundy plan
which was a big plan worked out to create an
entirely decentralized system in the city of
Nev\7 York. It was kind of the father of all
plans. After it was promulgated, there was a
long period of argument back and forth, and just
very briefly, the Bundy plan kind of faded out
of existence, practically, as a Board plan
came into being which was a modification of the
Bundy plan, because the Board president was a
minority member of the Bundy Commission, and he
voted against the Bundy plan. And then, with
Mr.Giardino, he drew the Board's plan, which is
a modification of the Bundy. The Mayor drew
his own plan. None of these plans achieved any
legislative success. But while this was all
going on, tlie Ocean Hill demonstration project
was moving ahead. We thought - v^hen I say we,
I am talking about myself, and I think I can
say Mrs. Swanker thought, many of us thought
-
that the Ocean Hill, 201, and Tv\;o Bridges pro-
jects were demonstration areas to find out how
you could decentralize, what the problems were.
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and whether any changes were needed before adop-
ting decentralization as a whole city-wide pro-
cess. We looked upon it as a real demonstration
area. I am not sure whether anybody else did
except maybe the people in Ocean Hill and 201 and
Two Bridges may have, too, from their point of
view, and the State did
,
I know. I am not sure
whether anybody else did, but in the midst of it.
Ocean Hill kept moving ahead, but I think it kept
moving ahead on its own axis, kind of apart from
the Bundy report, apart from the Board's report,
apart from the Mayor's report. It was proceeding
the way its people in its community felt it ought
to move, and the Board was reacting to it - and I
was reacting to it as Superintendent. In a way
we felt we had to react regardless of Bundy, or
Lindsay, or anybody else's plan. Here was a fact
here rather than a lot of theories going on.
I don't know how else to tell you, but it's
kind of general. Esther?
Well, I'd like to amend that because there were
a couple of major things that (he said) were left
out. It's hard to remember. Well, it was four
years ago, it's hard to remember the exact seque-
nce, but as I recall the Mayor took the Bundy
plan and adopted it, modified it considerably
and adopted it as his proposal, his legislative
proposal. But there was another major input, I
feel, in that decentralization legislation, and
that was the Regents' plans which were quite dif-
ferent from any of the forementioned plans. And
as you may recall in the legislative history,
the Regents plan won, I think, the greatest sup-
port from the community districts, from practi-
cally all of the groups except the union, which
didn't support any of the plans. And when the
final bill came out, as someone said -as Murray
Burtrom said - it was put together with a paste
crack on the night before adjournment, and it's
very obvious that that's what it was. And I
think that the legislative committee that put
it together just took words and phrases out of
each of the various plans and finally came up
with something that would be satisfactory, main-
ly to A1 Shanker and Walter Dcgnan, but to the
majority members of the legislature.
I have two questions to ask both of them similarMcCoy
:
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to that. As each one of these plans came about
for whatever their reasons, basically can we - all
the panelists could be able to react to it, why
was there so much opposition to each one of the
plans? Or was there something that was continu-
ous through each one, or was the opposition sort
of . . .?
Swanker
:
Well, as I recall, and again I should go back in
review, but everybody had their own particular
hang-up on how many districts there should be,
for instance. This was a big issue. I recall
that the final bill which was enacted was kind
of a compromise - some of the plans called for
seven districts, some called for thirteen dis-
tricts, some called for sixty-six districts, and
everybody had their own hang-up about how many
districts there should be.
McCoy
:
Why?
Swanker
:
Why? Well, the given reasons were the adminis-
trative. The hidden reasons, I think, were the
power breakdown. But, in addition to the number
of districts, of course, another big stumbling
block was the amount of power to be given, or if
it v;as to be decentralized what should be retai-
ned centrally and what should be given to the
districts, to the local community districts.
And that varied all the way from complete control
of the programs - kindergarten through grade
twelve - with absolute control in the districts
to limited, well, almost, the bill that we have
now, very limited decentralization, very limited
power given to the districts.
McCoy
:
I don't want to sort of hold this, but I mean we
keep touching some points which, I think, leaves
us open. EacVi one of these proposals on decen-
tralization, at some point . . are they, I think
you said the public had the impression that the
Bundy report was the thing, and yet you allude
to the fact that it wasn't. And I am saying each
one of these decentralization plans had some
"visibility and support" and yet, in substance,
they were not going to be accepted . Besides just
the power breakdown, there must be some other . . .
Ferretti; I think the opposition from Shanker and
Degnan came
Ill
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because, I think as I said this morning, that
they regarded each program or each decentrali-
zation plan as an erosion of their power to some
extent, and I think they would be against it as
a general principle, and then let's talk about
it against, but let's talk. And they proceeded
from that point of view, I think.
Donovan
:
Well, there is another element to this besides
Shanker and Dcgnan. They were a very critical
force. But there was also the force of the
people in the City of New York who didn't all
agree on whose district they wanted it to be
in. This little group didn't want to be in that
district and that little group didn't want to
be in this district, and so the matter of six
districts or sixty-six districts was a critical
matter with people who said: 'I don't want to
be with them and I, we've always been here and
this is our traditional center,' you know all
that kind of stuff that came into it. Some of
it, I think, was racially motivated. Some white
people didn't want to get mixed in with some
black districts, and so forth, you know. So it
wasn't just Shanker and Degnan, although they
had the big public force, but the people them-
selves. Everytime you go to a PTA meeting, or
a local board meeting, there would be a big
fight about where the district was to be and
who is to be there and how many there would be
in it
.
McCoy
:
Was integration a part of that?
Donovan: Yes, I think it was a - well, I wouldn't say
integration. I would say a part of it was the
desire by a number of people not to be integrated,
Ferretti
:
Bernie, I think you are right, because - as we've
seen with the new bill - the so-called - I would
really put quotes around these - the so-called
"neighborhood school districts" that have been
created, you know, are argued. For example.
Flushing is as much a part of Amherst, Massachu-
setts, as some of those are. Incredible, incre-
dible things that they coll neighborhoods. For
example, they took - out vdiere I live - in Queens
County, South Jamaica which is a black community
and which over the years has been thought of as
a community in so far as
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council manic districts, state senate, state
assembly. It is now broken into three districts.
South Jamaica is now part of three different
school districts, so that there is no power what-
ever, no power whatever.
Calvin
:
You know, I think one of the things being over-
looked, and I think it's an important thing,
I'd like your reaction to it. Fee lingj were run-
ning so high at that time, for example, we talked
to a lot of people - cab drivers, and people
like that - and of course they wouldn't drive
us out to Ocean Hill-Brownsville
,
but there was
a lot of feeling against the Ocean llill-Browns-
ville as the focal point, but also 201, and one
thing that you got from a lot of people - like
I used cab drivers as an illustration - was those
"people" are doing all kinds of bad things. "What
we should do is to get them all together and
shoot them." I mean there was a really strong
clement. And 1 am not talking about the sophis-
ticated opposition of Shanker, 1 am not talking
about the sophisticated opposition of some other
legislators, or even the power brokers; I am
saying the man in the street had been by the media
so stirred up that I genuinely believe an elec-
tion would have - I don't know what would have
happened to New York City - but I think you
VTOuld have gotten a very repressive kind of move-
ment at that time. Now, you were all . . .
Ferretti
:
But you almost did. The last mayoral election
proved that.
Calvin
:
Okay, but I am leaving that aside. 1 am just
saying that the scliool issue at that time had
been so polarized by the media that it wasn't
simply a matter of sophisticated people carving
up districts. There was a general feeling that
in Ocean Hill -Brownsville , hate, revolution,
terrible things were being taught by terrible
people, and
,
' by golly, we can't let our scViools
fall into the hands of the . and then you can
fill in whatever word you think is most appro-
priate .
Donovan
:
1 tell you one thing. That particular time had
a lot to do with changing John Lindsay into the
law- and -order man at tliat point.
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Well, there was another significant event of that
spring, too. You recall that following, or part
of that legislation that finally became a decentra-
lization bill, created what was called the Lind-
say Board. The first Lindsay Board. Because prior
to that time, the board had been a carryover from
Wagner days, although Lindsay had appointed a few
members. He did not have a majority until July
of 1968, and so that Board did what you, Allan,
would call some funny things, too. Some of them
probably were very good and others certainly were
very bad as far as their public image and as
far as furthering decentralization is concerned.
That, I think, was a key element of that year, too.
McCoy
:
I still am hung up on a couple of concerns. Let
me try it in a different way. The Board had a
report, the Regents had a report, the Mayor had
a report, Marchy had a report, and finally there
was a legislative act. Now, I am going to pre-
face the question we remarked. It would appear
to me that the Board of Ed.'s plan would have the
greatest educational report - should have tVie
greatest educational report, theoretically, as
well as the Regents' plan, and yet basically .
.,
but theoretically, for some reasons - and I has-
ten to add this - for some reasons, none of
these reports were, ah, received sufficient sup-
port that they could stand . I mean even the
Mayor's report. And then the other part of that
question has to do with the odd situation with
how the community people never really understood
and were able to rally around any one of those
reports
.
Donovan
:
Well, Rhody, I think there are a couple of things
in them. One is that each one of the reports
approached it from a different angle, provided
different things for decentralization. No one
of those reports by itself satisfied everybody,
no one of them. And in the meantime, while those
reports were being conserved, all the turmoil
in Ocean Hill and 201 was going on saying to a
lot of people in the City; 'well, if this is de-
centralization, we don't want this. People
didn't really look at the issues at all, but just
saw a lot of turmoil. And so nobody rallied
around decentralization at a time when the only
decentralization demonstrations v^/ere in turmoil.
IIA -
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:
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So maybe it blocked some people from getting at
it. All I know is that there was no consensus.
I want to come back to that point, Bernie, on
turmoil
.
Yes, I was just going to say, Rhody, you may also
recall that it v:as in May of that year that Ocean
Hill contributed their bit to the decentralization
bill by transferring nineteen teachers and super-
visors. You remember, that was what eventually
precipitated the strike.
She said transfer.
Donovan:
Calvin
:
Oliver
:
McCoy
:
Oliver
:
She said transfer. (laughter by panelists.)
Rev. Oliver, you haven't had a chance to comment
on this so far. Maybe from your point of view,
what did the Board
,
what did you and Rhody do to
try and communicate? Any word I choose here is
hard - I'll just say the cominunities . What did
you try to do to get your ideas across to tVie
people who made the decision; i.e. did you ever
meet with them, maybe you can't comment on this,
maybe tliis is still too recent history. Did you
ever try to meet vjith Rockefeller , was there ever
an attempt - that's assuming tliat he was a cha-
nnel - or did you use any other channels? RTaat
did you do and why didn't any work, and what
maybe could be done differently? I think Rhody
has opened up a very good point. What did you
try to do?
An effort was made eventually to meet v^/ith Gover-
nor Rockefeller, but nothing came of that.
During this period
,
we were able . . .
A slight correction. We met him down in the St.
George Hotel. He promised an audience, you
remember that?
But, we did meet with the Central Board of Edu-
cation many tim.es - the Governing Board. And
looking back over that, I can say that we, that
now was a pleasantthing , because now, we never
did meet with the new five -man Board. We've
never, we've requested it, but we've never had
a chance to meet with them. But we did meet
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with the old Board, with Dr. Donovan, several
times. We had our hot times, but at least there
was an open door and we did meet. The community,
I think, very quickly analized each of the various
proposals, very quickly. I think - I give credit
to the people
,
many of the people who had not even
been to college, but they were involved with
their own children and they could read these do-
cuments and see what was in them. Their reaction
to the Bundy panel, or the Bundy report rather,
was that basically it shifted power at the top,
giving the Mayor a little more power and letting
the communities have a small voice in the selec-
tion of district superintendents, but everything
else remained pretty much the same. And they
rejected that as not allowing the people to have
a sufficient voice in the operation of the schools.
There were good elements to that bill, but there
was one thing, I think, that frightened many
people, and that was if there had been as many
as sixty local boards, there would have been
over a hundred people that the Mayor himself
would appoint to those boards
,
so that would give
tremendous power to the Mayor. The Board of
Education plan, we felt, was much weaker than
the Bundy plan, and the community didn't go for
that at all. The Regents' plan was analized as
soon as we got copies of that and there were many
good features about it. We liked their stand
with reference to the Board of Examiners, but in
the fine print it appeared that after a few years
you go right on back to the same old thing. And
I don't have the w'ording here, but I think if you
were reading it, that after a few years, things
would go back, and it seemed as though somebody
with a good sociological mind was saying: 'well,
here is something happening, we'll roll with the
punch, we'll give in now, but vi/e'll make sure
that we write into it that we go back.'
But vjhat did you do then? I guess what I am
saying is in the way of options, let s look at
some options that some other people have emplo-
yed. For example, Charles Edwards or Medger
Evers, used economic boy. . . , and Martin Luther
King used economic boycotts, and supposing you
would Viave said; 'look, if we don't get the kind
of decentralization bill that we want, we will
ask the black and brown people - the Puerto Ricans
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and black people in this area - not to buy from
any downtown New York City stores, we will with-
draw our patronage,' and the New York City.
. .
I mean, I am not saying a type could have used;
what techniques did you utilize of the options
that were available, by that, I think the econo-
mic leverage is by far the most powerful. That's
the one thing that has worked every single time
I know of, from the bus boycott on, to be effec-
tive. Was ever anything like this utilized?
Have you thought about
. . .
Oliver
:
Here again, you had a new Board, a community
board, going into an issue that was very diffi-
cult and new to many of them, and people were
putting their minds to education.
Calvin
:
And not to the political processes.
Oliver Not to the political process. We couldn't,
these were volunteers, all volunteers, and it
would remain yet to be seen whether a volunteer
board could even function. We didn't have a
chance to discover that. I think that a volun-
teer board, really, just can't do it. You can't
take volunteer people to do a job to keep up
with people who are making $35,000.
McCoy
:
The question I am directing to Rev. Oliver is
his reaction to whether or not the people saw
each one of the proposed bills of having some
direct relationship to Ocean Hill-Brownsville
.
Oliver
:
Very definitely, yes, because it appeared as
though each one of them reduced, or cut out,
from under Ocean Hill-Brownsville the things
that we wore struggling for, and that is a good
education for the children, period. If it can
be done through the union - beautiful; through
the Board of Education - beautiful; but a good
education
.
McCoy
:
Well, that leads me to my next concern, and
Bernie, I said I would come back to it. You
translated the things that were going on in
Ocean Hill, and some of that I can understand,
in terms of turmoil. And early in the session,
we've talked about the Board sort of accepting
tacitly the fact that Ocean Hill was an elected
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body and they would deal with them. And then
further we discussed that Ocean Hill was, in
fact, and historically it has been proven, we were
continuing to go through the educational process.
We were actually running, and given the reaction
to these various pieces of the proposed legisla-
tion, how is it that Ocean Hill was sustained, I
mean allowed to continue, you know, its programs,
etc., even though you translate it as turmoil,
the people saw it as moves which ^^;ere necessary
in order to continue educating the kids.
Well, I am not arguing whether the moves were
necessary or not, it still created turmoil, whe-
ther they were necessary or not, that he'll call
three thousand police in a place of turmoil, and I don't
know what you'd call it. There was a turmoil,
whether it was good or bad, is not - I am not
putting blames on anybody in the turmoil. Tur-
moil was when the union pulled out, too. That
was part of the turmoil. But nobody can deny
that as far as anybody in the City of New York
was concerned or any place in the nation, there
was turmoil in Ocean Hill for a long time. But,
you may not recall, Rhody, but some time back in
around October, or maybe November of '67, after
you became the unit administrator, and after the
Board had tacitly agreed to deal with the Ocean
Hill Board, the Ocean Hill Board was asked to
accept a set of guidelines for how it should
operate
,
so was 201
,
so was Two Bridges . Nobody
accepted them. Ocean Hill didn't, 201 didn't,
Two Bridges didn't. But guidelines were offered.
They didn't go as far as Ocean Hill wanted to go,
and so Ocean Hill said 'no,' and from that time
on, no guidelines were drawn. You know, there
was no real definition of authority. But Ocean
Hill went ahead on what it assumed v^as its right
to do for its children. And the Board never re-
cognized some of those rights and that s what
created the hang-ups.
Well, there was a strategy at that point. Ocean
Hill-Brownsville
,
201, and Two Bridges got toge-
ther and had several meetings together with an
attorney, and they drew up in legal terminology
the types of things that we felt we should have.
That was never accepted. It wasn't accepted.Donovan
:
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So the Board's guidelines were not accepted by
Ocean Hill, and Ocean Hill's guidelines were not
accepted by the Board.
Bernie
,
would time have been a fact? In other
words, at the beginning you said that the Board's
assumption was that over the summer they would put
together, or put the meat on a framework.
That the Ocean Hill-Brownsville steering committee
would do that.
McCoy
S wanker
;
McCoy
Donovan and
Swanker
:
McCoy
Donovan
:
Well, you had the other two districts
. . well,
you had
. .
.
(mumbling by other panelists.)
No, because the others v^eren't that far along,
but they didn't have their elections that early.
Well, the Board assumed - what the Board assumed
that over the summer all three of those using the
Ford planning grant would put them
. . .
Yes
,
right
. . .
Now, what I am saying is, if - in fact, or could
they have been processed, or would it have been
effective if they had a process Vv/here during that
summer period the Board of Education through some
of its representatives, primarily you, I suspect,
or an appointee, could have devised a program at
that point that would have not created this con-
flict of accepting the Board's plan, or the Board
accepting Ocean Hill's plan.
It is possible, but I think the Reverend put it
very clearly before. The Ocean Hill-Brownsville
community had so little regard for the Board and
the public establishment of the Board that it
frankly did not want the interference of the
Board in preparing its plan for its own commu-
nity. It wanted to make its plan itself. Not
that they might not have - yes, maybe they might
have accepted some help - but the Board felt
that the community was going to set up a commu-
nity board it ought to be allowed to set it up
itself, which it did, but the Board never parti-
cipated in the main operation.
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Swanker
:
There is another point here, too, Rhody. i am
not sure that your suggestion that if it had been
followed would have been very meaningful, because
you recall in the relationships you've had with
the liaison people that the Superintendent appoin-
ted, there was Dr. Robinson and Mr. Brambecker,
you got the very definite feeling that there was -
if not outright sabotage, certainly foot-dragging -
that there was no real help offered to you, and
so even if the Board or the Superintendent had
authorized personnel from 110 to help you deve-
lop an education plan, I don't know that you
would have gotten anything more than you got any-
way. So, I mean, because this was the attitude
at 110 with the exception, I would say, of the
Superintendent of Schools. The whole hierarchy
there v;as very definitely - and this is no sec-
ret to any of you - very definitely opposed to
the demonstration districts and they were not
about to go out of their way to help you move
them forward
.
McCoy; But, you see, I am coming around about, before
we get back at it. Part of the question that you
raised before, Allan, v;as that the community,
as Rev. Oliver very specifically stated, was really
addressing itself to education, had put all of
its efforts into education and as a result of that
kind of effort they were literally dissipated in
terms of dealing with other kinds of "strategies"
or political leverage. We did have at some point
some suggestions that helped to do some boycotting
and so forth and so on, but we were not - I am
saying we were so dissipated. The reason I use
that is because I recall using Hovjard Kalodner -
we tried every approach in the books to deal
through the law, and that brings me back to tliis
key point, and Esther, I'd like to direct it
specifically to you at this point. At the time
that Dr. Donovan wrote to the State Department,
Commissioner Allen specifically, about the prin-
cipalships - I may be a little bit off in terms
of dates, but I think I am pretty accurate - that
we also were petitioning the Commissioner to crea-
te "training schools" situations, and even though -
if memory serves me correct - the law did not spe-
cifically define training schools at that time,
and I think he was ambiguous in his answer , but
it left the door open as a possible choice between
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either using demonstration school principals as
against creating training school setting which
were sort of giving us a sort of isolation from
the existing laws. Now is there any particular
rationale behind why the other option couldn't
have been tried?
Very definitely. "That law was established back
in the normal school days when teacher training
was a kind of a haphazard thing, and it was esta-
blished so that various schools could become
campus schools if you will, or demonstration pro-
ject schools for teacher training institutions.
Well, it was on the books, and I want tO) assure
you that with Bob Stone in the chief council's
office. Ocean Hill and the demonstration dis-
tricts were given every single legal break that
there was possible to give, because this was
not true in Charlie Brin's day. Charlie Brin
was a strict instructionist and he was never
going to give anybody a break as far as this
kind of thing was concerned, but if there had
been a loophole; Bob Stone was the kind of guy
who would have found it and would have worked
to your advantage. Ho\\’cver, if you could have
demonstrated a tie-in with a teacher training
institution where you would literally have used
all of your schools as demonstration schools in
that your primary, your primary purpose was to
train teachers, then I think they would have
allowed that loophole. But, you see, it was
obvious that it was not your primary purpose.
Your primary purpose was to educate the child-
ren of Ocean Hill-Brownsville , and you were using
this - hoping to use this loophole to get around
another law, and so even the most sympathetic
people in our department, and incidentally I
think you also realized that most of our depart-
ment - I am not talking about individuals now,
and I am not talking about the people who came
down as policemen during the occupation, but I
am talking about the real policy-making heads
of the department - were very sympathetic to
the Ocean Hill, well, to the demonstration dis-
tricts, and really this will answer part of an
earlier question of Dr. Donovan, is what kept^
you going. Part of it was the faith of Commi-
ssioner Allen and members of his staff had in
the theory of the demonstration districts. I
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can remember Dr. Donovan and Dr. Allen talking
many times about this should be tried, we realize
that there are headaches, there are problems.
Commissioner Allen, meeting with the New York
City Board, saying: 'have faith, it'll work out,
it's trying, but . . .' A lot of things were
done, kind of behind the scenes, to keep you
going even to "finagling" - if I may use the
term - of funds from the State - and I don't
mean that in any way dishonest or illegal - but
when the Urban Education Act was passed
,
we went
to the Board of Education in New York City with
a fait a compli and said: 'Ocean Hill-Brownsville
is going to have a cormunity education center.'
And don't think there wasn't some objection on
the part of the Board at that time, because that
was still the Giardino Board at that time. There
were a lot of people - and I am talking here about
Commissioner Allen, Bob Stone, Dr. Donovan -
people who were in decision-making positions, who
had the feeling and who had the faith that this
was a thing that needed to be done. They some-
times regretted some of the methods, but that -
I think this can answer your question as to what
kept you going - and I think it v-7as the faith of
people like that that kept you going, because I
have a feeling that there was a point when Mayor
Lindsay would have shut you dovTO if he had had
the authority to do so, because as Bernie said,
he became very law and order at one point, when
three thousand policemen were out there. So I
tried to answer two questions here at once, and
the first was on your question about the trai-
ning schools and the second on what kept you
going.
I want to bring this back into one focus. Maybe
Fred can comment on it and then have the others
,
because I think we've got some very useful data
here. As far as drawing conclusions from this
that could be very useful to other school sys-
tems in New York and other places, would you say
that the thing that kept it going - let's see
if we can get a little consensus - v^?as the sup-
port and belief of a large number of officials
in the State, and maybe the Superintendent of
Schools of New York, and the State Superinten-
dent and others, that they should be given a
chance that'll allow it to run for a while, but
Ferret ti;
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Ferretti:
the failure, the ultimate failure was because the
laws and the legislature and other people are used
to people dealing in fairly political ways, and
that the Board and the community of Ocean Hill-
Brownsville and its allies - using that term in
a loose way - lacked the political sophistication,
know-how, muscle and money to organize, and that
therefore, is it a fair statement to say that if
it were to be done over again, maybe more atten-
tion should be paid to the political process as
well as the education process? Arc we fore-doomed
to all these unless v?e realize that education is
fundamentally a political issue? Maybe the Board
should initially appoint a director of public
relations, or - I guess what I am saying to you
is maybe for other school systems who are about
to go through this and for particularly the commu-
nity people in it, maybe they should be aware
of the fact that it's basically political.
Well, I think in these days everything is poli-
tical. I don't think there is anything you can
do in any urban situation whicli is not political.
Then, Fred, what kind of advice would you give
from what you saw in Ocean Hill and then I'd
like other people to comment on it. Wliat could
have Ocean Hill done with all these bills coming
out and all these other things? Rhody and Rev.
Oliver have pointed out the political problems
that they had encountered.
I think you answered it in part in what you said
before. It's not what they could have done with
all these bills coming out. I think it's what
they could have done is back be.fore there were
any bills is to get political.
In other words ...
I remember Rhody saying to me about one morning
in his office - like two months after this had
begun - when he had gotten to the point where he
was calling and he was speaking off the record
and speaking to people with whom he had not spo-
ken before. Rhody spoke of sophistication, and
it came late.
Let me care to look at it in another way. WhenDonovan
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you say what could Ocean Hill have done - Ocean
Hill was really the first community in the whole
nation that tried to crack the big city, and,
you know, they had to throw the tea in the har-
bor in Boston once, too - and that was illegal -
but if they hadn't thrown the tea into the har-
bor, maybe things wouldn't have come out the way
they did. So Ocean Hill had to do some things,
I assume, that v;ere more illegal - I'll put it
that way - in terms of the civil war, the educa-
tion war, and more distasteful to some people
because of what they did, than you would have to
do perhaps in the future, because they did it
first. And all the other cities have a lot to
go by and a lot to learn, and have learned a
lot, and may be able to put it to use in sitting
down and talking long ahead and building up poli-
tical pressure. I don't think they had the time
to do it because as they read their reading
scores - if they were going to sit around for a
decade and build up political - a whole genera-
tion of kids would have gotten by, well, - they
did that, so 1 am not condoning some of the
things they did . I think some of the things they
didn't do properly, but I see their reason for
it, so what we can do out of this is not so
much go back and look at what could Ocean Hill
have done, because Ocean Hill is unique in a sense
that it was Number One. We might look back at
what other people can do as a result of the
experience of this which is an entirely different
matter. A lot of forces kept this thing alive.
There was constant pressure to cut Rhody's salary
off, you know - 'he defies you, he is insubor-
dinate, come on, throw him out of the office, cut
off his salary.' I could have done it, like that.
What would it have achieved? A momentary vic-
tory I Hurrah, the Superintendent shows his force.
There wasn't much point to it, so the union and
the CSA were critical of that. Anybody was cri-
tical of it - we were all in something for the
first time. None of us had ever been in this
before. Commissioner Allen had never been in it.
Three of his minions from the State that came
down had never been in it to try to do what the
Superintendent couldn't do, and the three of them
failed. So that, you know, it was new to every-
body. I think we ought to continue to get the
facts of what we did and when we are through.
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let's see what we can say to other people.
Swanker
:
I want to take issue with one thing you said
,
Allen, and - because I don't like to have the
record show tlie the Ocean Hill demonstration was
a failure, and you mentioned that word - that
it was a failure.
Calvin
:
That should be wiped out. Let's say lost in the
legislature's mill. It was dismantled, elimi-
nated, or . . .
Swanker
:
All right, as a political entity, it no longer
exists. But I certainly don't think that we can
term the entire effort a failure, because as Dr.
Donovan indicated, it opened the door, it showed
other cities and others in New York City that it
can be done, that there is a way; may not, maybe
not all, everybody would agree with the way Ocean
Hill did it, but at least, that the bureaucracy
of the school system and the education laws are
not sacred, that they can be challenged, and that
it takes a lot of gut.
Calvin
:
Do you agree v\'ith that. Rev. Oliver? I'd like
to hear because I am not - I think tliat's a
very important point. Do you think that the
outcome for Ocean Hill showed that the lav;s
could be changed, that the educational establish-
ment would bend, and you look on Ocean Hill as
a success or a failure. How do you look on it
from your point of view, and Rhody
,
too? What
way, do you think, was accomplished? Do you
agree with what Esther said?
Oliver Well, I agree that it showed that lav^s can be
challenged and that the central Board can be
challenged, but I don't think we were trying to
prove that. What has ultimately happened to Ocean
Hill-Brownsville
,
I think, brings out something
in that, and that is that the law in this coun-
try is such that when black people try to take
the law as it is and get ahead with it, they get
slapped down illegally, or legally, or in some
way, and if they try to get it around the law,
then they become illegal bad guys, so you are
locked in. And this is not going to stay this
way. There might have to be some tosses and
tea in the harbor again, or something equivalent
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to that which would challenge the whole law.
Would you characterize Ocean Hill, and now I
want to ask Rhody the same question, would you
characterize it as a victory for community par-
ticipation, community control, decentralization?
IIow do you see it in the general concept?
A victory for community participation as long as
it lasted. It was a victory because people were
involved
,
even people could come to the Gover-
ning Board and demand the kind of principal that
they wanted and get it, even over Mr. McCoy and
over the Governing Board; they wanted a certain
principal and the Governing Board would say this
is who you want, all right, you may have him.
I think this was a victory for the people.
It wasn't easy.
Rhody, do you want to speak on that point, because
I think it's an important
. .
No, I don't know how to speak to that point, Allan,
because - 1 guess v;hat I am saying is, that it
appeared to me even though the people were sort
of reflecting almost a national concern about
the quality of education and the determination on
the part of people, parents, to rectify that con-
dition, it became a morality versus a political
fight. In other words, the education of kids,
the future of kids was the moral issue and its
opposition was political. What 1 saw developing
was as each day the district stayed on, and,
Fred, I am going to touch just the key point
here, we began to get more support, but more
support from a moral point of view, from the
powerless people, and I saw that as suddenly a
threat to the establishment who moved expedi-
tiously and this sort of led to the kind of con-
flict. For instance, and I am jumping way ahead,
if you recall at one point there was a great
deal of, I think, bias on the part of the mass
media in the early stages around the effort to
resolve the strike, if you recall, a number of
the mass media guys got together and v\;anted to
set up a proposal to come in and mediate the
strike, because their whole attitude changed.
I think the turning point was in 144; that press
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conference when they came to see Johnson vs. McCoy
at that particular fight. You remember that,
Allen?
Calvin: Yes, I do.
McCoy
:
And they stayed for over an hour and a half
looking at the reading program that we were
initiating in the school even though we were
"under trusteeship," and so forth. So I am
saying, if you can couch it in that kind of
terms, I think it was undoubtedly a victory
and still is.
Ferretti
:
May I - I'd like to even take it further.
Never mind the education. I think you had
an issue here in which a community which here-
tofore had not even been regarded as anything -
either as a political entity, or as a group of
people with any power at all, who suddenly found
themselves able to work together for something,
and I think on that basis it v?as certainly a
success
.
Donovan: I think, to me the big element in it is not
whether it introduced the reading program,
because the same reading program was introduced
in two other districts in the Ctiy that were not
in Ocean Hill-Brownsville
,
and not whether the
union was made to learn a small lesson, it didn't
learn much but a little bit, but this demonstra-
tion district got people in the City thinking
more about education for children who have never
had good education
,
and it got them to thinking
more about communities having some control. We
now have a bill which while it doesn't give commu-
nities control, at least it's some movement for-
ward to let people elect local boards. I don't
know how, I don't say this is a very great piece
of legislation, but it is a movement. You know
it was about four hundred years ago that Martin
Luther nailed a thesis on the door and some of
what he nailed at the door is just starting to
come around now. It doesn't happen that quickly,
and I think that thrust that it gave, the opening
up of people's thinking about this whole tiling
is a victory in itself.
Swanker
:
Well, . . .
Calvin
:
Oliver
:
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:
S wanker
:
127
You know, Rev. Oliver is . . . Let me just ask
one question, because
. .
.
you didn't partici-
pate in tlie election and I think that a lot of
people have asked why Ocean Hill - why your Board
refused to run and why you refused to participate
and why you refused
. . . ah, if what Dr, Dono-
van says is true, and I think most people believe
what he says is true, because it certainly makes
sense, why wouldn't you particpate in the process
and run and try to get your own programs continued?
Well, as soon as the bill came out and we made a
study of it, we felt that it, there was a design
here to get rid of Ocean Hill-Brovmsville
,
and
later on we could see when the central Board at
that time, the new interim board drew the lines
of the new district that would involve Ocean Hill-
Brownsville, they almost made it coterminous v;ith
the boundaries of the assembly-man of the district
a lone foe of Ocean Hill-Brownsville where his
political strength was. So the decentralization
bill set up the structure for it, the interim
Board of Education drew up the boundaries to give
Ocean Hill-Brownsville to Sam Wright, and that's
exactly what happened, and that's why we did not
participate, because we would become a party
to giving it over to someone who would have des-
troyed it, and it has actually been destroyed by
that politician.
Esther, maybe you want to comment on that?
Well, I'd like to. There was a point prior to
that when Dr. Donovan mentioned that it made the
people of the City aware of the educational
issue as far as minority children are concerned.
I think it was an even broader thing than that.
I think it's made the people of the country avjare
and wherever you go in the country now, you know,
you are used to get around a fair amount and still
do, you never used to hear about community con-
trol involving parents or local boards . These
things were just never mentioned, never discussed
prior to 1967 you never heard about it anywhere.
Oh, we had a little thing going up in the corner
of Detroit
,
maybe New York or there was some-
thing dov^7n in Philadelphia, but nothing major,
there was never any major thrust at involving
the parents of children, particularly minority
128
Calvin
:
Oliver
Swanker
;
01 iver
;
Donovan
:
Oliver
:
Donovan
:
Oliver
:
group children, in the educational process, and
particularly in a policy-making, decision-making
role. And now, you go around the country and
there are very, very few large cities that do
not have a plan, a legislative action, a some-
thing in the works that will at least make a
start toward what you were trying to do in Ocean
Hill. So I certainly think it would be a great
mistake to call your effort a failure, because
while you didn't accomplish in your own little
eight schools what you wanted to do for those
particular children on a broader scale, you did
open the door.
I think that's well put.
Again, let me react to that and perhaps, no doubt,
you must have more experience than I in that, but
if community control now should be used as a
gimmick to still control black people by the use
of community control, that is a failure.
I didn't think I used the term community control
over ... I didn't intend to. I meant to use . .
It isn't, but I am afraid that this is w’hat it's
going to be. The establishment and say, the
white establishment in this country can very well
take community control and control black people
with it.
But you take your present district, that's hard-
ly true.
It is - it's happening now.
In your own district?
Exactly'. That's exactly what's happening.
You've got now’ black people doing in the commu-
nity - killing our kids. There has not been a
full day of school at 271 this year, and nobody
is saying anything about turmoil. There are not
five hundred out of seventeen hundred; nobody
is saying anything about turmoil, but the kids
are not being educated.
I wasn't referring to that. I was referring to
the fact that I agree with you thoroughly; that
Donovan
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if conununity control is a gimmick to do the black
people out of their rights to
. . . the education
of their children, then it's a farce. It's worse
than not having
. .
.
(mumbled) But, when commu-
nity control is turned over to a district which
is all white, and your district is black, parti-
cularly, or very close to it, then you begin to
fight with yourselves.
Oliver
:
That's part of the disability to
. . .
Calvin: You think that s a plan you got to ... the plan.
Donovan
:
Well, if that s a plan, I don't like any part
of it, that's all. (Several panelists talking
at once.)
Oliver:
. . . already chose a man who already was oppo-
sed to everything that we were trying to do,
for political purposes.
Donovan: They elected him, didn't they?
Oliver No. The establishment put him in.
McCoy
:
V.^ell, let me go back. Let me touch it from
another point of view. And this is in its gene-
ral context. If in fact what happened in Ocean
Hill began to coalesce people all over the coun-
try to look at education - that's one dimension -
the second dimension is - and I say this, and I
say it over and over again - and I believe the
only real support that we had, I mean, can I
say substantial support, v;as through Bernie, even
though I know that there were times v>7hen his hand
was tied, and I'd say this because . . .
Swanker You had the Board with you
,
too, for a short time
You had the Doar Board - I neglected to mention
that when you asked who kept you going, but . .
McCoy I don't put those in the same vein with what
I am talking about primarily.
Swanker Well, at least they gave lip service to . . .
McCoy Well, let me get back to what I was specifically
saying given tlie kind of support that we were
supposed to have had and the kinds of concerns
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about people for education, I am going to ask this
kind of question. I knov; that the first thing
that we did which ended up in the court, was the
appointment of the principals. If, in fact,
people were saying that we were looking at options
or we were looking at improvement of education,
then those people, whoever they are, mythical
as they are
,
should have begun to support that
concept. I know for a fact, in one instance
Bernie was out on limb, period. The second thing
had to do with the transfer of teachers
. . .
(End of second side of tape.)
Ferretti
:
It was in the in basket and it stays in the in
basket until that guy who's been there for twenty-
five years decides to take it out, and it goes
dov;n three more levels
,
and it never reaches the
schools
.
McCoy
;
Fred, the difference is, the point
. I am making
here, and maybe I didn't allude to it, the
difference was that Ocean Hill out of committment
to the people, persisted in staying alive, I mean
despite all of the overwhelming odds, and I am
saying . . .
Ferretti
:
But what you're saying is that if there had been
indeed this broad basis of support
,
why did it
not succeed further? And I think that, I just . .
McCoy
:
But I am also saying it in another way, because
maybe Bernie wants to allude to it. I know for
a fact that if he ever set a taboo on the dis-
tricts, the life of that district, or part of it,
is shorter, and I know lie fought that over some
tremendous odds. The point that I am saying is
that as Ocean Hill mustered support, it preser-
ved itself, v\?e went out and actively enlisted
support. We tried the law, court cases, tried
all the organizations, w’e got the support of the
powerless people. I am questioning whether in
fact when Bernie made those stands which were
way out on the limb, so to speak, why those
people who basically had said that they suppor-
ted some sort of change in education, didn t
rally to Bernie 's support.
Calvin: Why should they?
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McCoy
:
I in not talking about the union now.
Calvin
:
But, but, Mac
. . .
Ferretti
:
But, I think, the analogy 1 gave, I think, holds
true. I think it holds true for Allen, holds
true for Bundy, I think it holds true for the
Mayor, you knov>;.
McCoy You are saying Allen backed off?
Ferretti John Lindsay can say something on television, and
then he gives four pages to Lou Fieldstein, and
in three weeks, you know, where are you?
Swanker
:
No, what he was saying on that, you said about
Allen, because, well, I know that Commissioner
Allen was committed to the concept and dedicated
to it and he worked hard at it, and so was Bob
Stone, his legal counsel, so was Niquest, and so
was 1, and I was a minor functionary, so that
didn't mean anything. But, you get below the
level of Commissioner Allen, and the deputy
commissioner, and then you get people, and I
am not going to mention names, but you get old
school men who are just the exact counterpart to
the people at 110 Livingston Street.
Donovan
. . . and who never saw New York City.
Swanker And who never came into Nev^ York City except to
stay at the Waldorf and go to a parking place.
What I am saying is that Commissioner Allen could
do so much and Bob Stone did all he could, and
the people like myself and Commissioner Niquest
were directly involved and had something to do
with it, did try to help, but . . .
Ferretti Can I make a point? The best analogy I can think
of if, we were talking about New York City, let's
stay there. John Lindsay creates the Enviornmen-
tal Protection Agency to encompass about five
different city departments, and he appoints an
administrator, and there are four or five commi-
ssioners, but all the civil servants stay there,
the guy who'd been there for tv^7enty years, and so
what happens? He talks about plans for a pollu-
tion-free city, and he talks about overall plans
for green belts and all these things, but what
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happens is that the garbage doesn't get picked up,
because it goes from here to here to here to here
to here, and it's in somebody's in basket for two,
or two-to-three months.
No, I guess my perspective is a little different.
What I am saying is the people in Ocean Hill spe-
cifically, despite - we read implications in the
various proposals for decentralization, we read
hidden agendas in the "overt" positions of people,
and so forth, and I am saying that there were cer-
tain people who had demonstrated orally, mostly,
a kind of support. For instance I am saying, let
me use this very specific, in the original dis-
cussion we had with Commissioner Allen about
training schools versus the other way of appoin-
ting principals, he had suggested that there was
nothing, in the presence of Stone - I am challen-
ging indirectly the kind of support that you say
they are giving - but he had said that there was
nothing in the legislature that denied Ocean Hill
becoming a training school setting. He would have
to look at it and "it would then be subject to
interpretation," and he even suggested that if he
went that way, he may be prepared to go to court
about it. Now the question I am saying is after
a certain period of conflict, and we appealed
to the Commissioner on more than one occasion,
knowing Bernie's role in this, that these two
power brokers, so to speak, could then change
direction as an option or an alternative to say:
'okay, rather than have all the conflict,' because
I suspect that a large percentage of what happe-
ned in the City was out of "fear" that this
community would erupt into violence. What I am
saying is that Commissioner Allen could have then
in his office, or I think it should have respon-
sibility to run a move to the training school
level. I am not picking that as a specific, but
an option to . . .
Do you think the outcome would have been any
different? The CSA would have challenged that
just as they challenged the others.
He was prepared for that, but it was an option.
You know, I think, we are getting into specifics,
here, and I think there is a central phenomenon
Calvin
:
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which I have noted again and again in the American
education and particularly among black educators,
and I want to comment on. I'd like to get some
reactions, because I think it'll have real impli-
cations. There seems to be a belief that education
is different than washing windows or delivering
eggs or picking up garbage, or anything else, that
the people in that are different and that they
don't operate with the same needs and goals and
incentives that people do in every other area of
American life. And those areas - the reason people
do what they do is because there is something in
it for them. Otherwise they wouldn't survive -
it's enviornmental ly buili; in and to say people
should do this or should do that or shouldn't, I
don't mean this in a narrow sense of a payoff,
I mean in the sense of the survival of certain
institutions. No\7 you can't get - it seems to me
what I heard Rhody saying was: 'why shouldn't
they because it was right, it was fair, it was
just, it was reasonable,' and vdiat I am saying is
that nobody says: 'what could we, could we have
gone to Nyquist, or whoever you were going to talk
about, Jim Allen, or whoever you were going to talk
about; do we ever give any support, do we ever
give any help, do we ever take a public position,
did we ever find out what it was that the State
Department wanted that we could have felt with?
'
I guess what I am saying is what would I hear
out of this - still what 1 read in the first
transcript - was the feeling that somehow or other
people should do things because it's right? And
I don't think that we should expect educators
to do things that are right any more than we
expect any another group. I think it's unfair
and unreasonable, and as long as we have that con-
flict, then the remark that you make - it's like
listening to two different people talk. You are
saying one thing, Fred, and you are trying to
address yourself to one problem, and Rhody is
addressing himself to another.
I don't think so.
Well, I do. I don't think I . . .(Ferretti in-
terrupting) . . two people not hearing each other.
They would be in the same room and saying things.
I would disagree v^ith one of the things you saidFerretti:
13'4
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right at the beginning that people should not
look upon educators any differently from window
washers. I would say to that that I think people
ought to look at educators differently because
you give your kids to them for six hours a day.
Well, if you do, if you think they are any diffe-
rent from window washers, or doctors, or law-
yers, or psychologists, or dentists, that you
also give your kids to, you are in trouble. And
if you do, you will constantly find yourself
running against basic facts of human behavior,
and that's what we are doing. Teachers are the
same as the people who run the television cameras,
and of those - ah, they are basically people.
I couldn't disagree with that.
Okay, that's a basic disagreement and that's why
education is in the state it's in, I think.
I disagree with you very violently, violently.
Because if a garbage collector refuses to pick
up a garbage can and then dump the garbage out,
the garbage won't cry, it won't long for its
mother. But it's different when a teacher walks
out on a child. You are not dealing with things,
but with people.
As long as you want to take this position, you
will try and figure out how to make changes in
education and the changes won't come about,
because you have to appeal to the same interest
of the teacher has as you do to the interest of
the garbage collector. As long as you say: 'but
the teacher should be dedicated,' the teacher
should. People don't behave . . .
If children were garbage, I would agree with you.
On the contrary, the reason why so many children
are in the garbage is because Vv'e don't understand
that teachers are human, that educators arc
human, and because tlicy are people, just like
firemen, and policemen, as long as we say they
are different, and teachers should behave diffe-
rently, have different goals and needs, then - if
you are like garbage collectors, then we will
turn children into garbage which is what we are
135
McCoy
:
Donovan
:
systemically doing.
Allan, I think I'd just like to redirect that.
What I am saying is what we tried in Ocean Hill
was everything. Every option that we
possibly could to remedy the inequities of edu-
cation. Now, as I said, we resorted to the court,
we used consultants, we went to appeal to pressure
groups, and so forth. The mere fact that you
have a Commissioner of Education, he has an obli-
gation to see that certain kinds of things are
done - the Superintendent of Schools, the local
School Board, and such and sucli. What I am saying
is these people have certain kinds of obligations
by virtue of the positions wliich they hold. Now,
what I am saying is, if we found that important,
remember, Esther, we called and asked, and I
think it was, I don't remember how we got to Ka-
lodner, but we ended up getting Kalodner to try
to put this thing together; if we felt that that
was a responsibility, then obviously by the mere
position that the other people held that tlicy had
a responsibility likev/ise to look at their
options. And I don't think that has anything to
do with their vested interests other than to look
at the options.
Well, I think there are a few things that I'd
like to comment on. One is on Rhody's and one
is on yours. There is no question on what the
people in responsible positions should look at
all the options, but they don't have to accept
them. Just because you say: 'look at the option;
you should have given us this training school,'
maybe the people looked at it and said that it
is not the thing to do and turned it down. That
doesn't say that you didn't look at it, just
because you don't agree about everything; other-
wise this would be a fine world. The man in au-
thority wouldn't have any authority at all, be-
cause you'd just go the way he was told. And
sometimes those chores are difficult. You made
a statement, Allan, a minute ago - I know you
didn't mean it quite the way you said it, and
that is that people lead people into things
because it's right to do them. And I know you
were saying that we - well, we are not all an-
gels, we ai*e human beings and teachers aic as
well as everybody else. But, I am very sorry
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that, even tliough it sounds like a Sunday sermon,
I hope we don't get away from the fact that peo-
ple ought to do things because they are right,
and the more v.’e get av;ay from it and begin to
say: 'well, everybody is a human being, they are
all good, bad, and indifferent,' which they are.
If we don't keep hammering away at what's doing
then we are just going to get further and
further into the vicious cycle of the policeman
who got his $800 raise, the fireman got to get
$800, the next one got only a $25 weekly in twenty-
five years; in other words, you have to keep craw-
ling up the line; everybody is mechanical. 1
know that's tlie way v;e live, but I hope tliat we
try to get - not only from teachers, doctors,
dentists, and others who deal with human beings,
not with panes of glass and garbage cans, with
people who deal with human beings. I hope v/e
continue to hammer the fact that something is
right, whether you like it or not.
Listen, now, for a second. There arc ten thou-
sand studies, there are hundreds of pieces of
information that show why people behave as they
do. It's because impulses go. to the ceptral area
of the medial part of the cortex. Now, if you
want to start talking about rights and wrongs, if
we wanted to say: 'he's bad, the union is bad,
black people are bad, there is bad, there is good
there is right, there is wrong, there is . . .
'
As long as you get it on a moralistic plane, we'll
never be able to help the kids because we won't
set up an incentive system so that teachers and
educators will do what's best for children. No-
body is accountable. Tliere are no incentives
because we keep saying 'it's right.' Now when
you say, Rhody
,
that, a superintendent of schools,
or that a commissioner ought, or should, or must,
or has the responsibility to, you could change
superintendents in the State of New York for one
hundred years, it wouldn't make any difference.
And you could change superintendents of schools
in New York City for as long, because the delivery
system is the teacher and as long as that tea-
cher has no incentive to do wliat you want her or
him to do, you'll have a situation like the Post
Office. You must have accountability, and you
must have incentives because that's why people
behave in the v^ay thi:y do. And I think that s a
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fundamental assumption about behavior which we
can document, and I feel strongly, really strong-
ly about it, because I think that we neglect that
issue. Teachers are people. They will do what's
appropriate if they are reinforced to doing it.
And to keep saying they should. Rev. Oliver, is
making an unreasonable assumption about their
goodness. I don't assume that they are any bet-
ter and that we can, there are some teachers
that will, but not most.
I don't think that has to do with Ocean Hill, and
I hate to bring it in, but will you tell me,
please, what incentive the teacher is going to
have besides a $17,000 maximum salary, nine months
of work, every medical, dental and health plan,
and all the protection of the law that you prac-
tically
. . .
Boy, am I glad you came to that because that's
the key to Ocean Hill. I'll tell you that's the
key to Ocean Hill because they get that whether
tliey teach or notl So that's not an incentive,
and that's their attitude and that's why you
see: 'you ought or you should' is what's wrong.
And that's why as soon as you look at that you
say: 'hey, that's right; they get all those things
whether those kids learn or not,' then you get
v/hat you and I went to the Field Foundation for,
what they are beginning to do in the US Office
of Education and that, and that is as you say,
that you'll get more v^7hen the kids learn more;
you'll get less if they learn less, and you will
get fired, if they don't learn at all, and that's
the real message of Ocean Hill-Brownsville
.
That's all very well and good, but it's impossible
in New York City. You can't tell a teacher in
New York City he'll be fired if he doesn't . . .
You know, they told us the same thing about the
State of Louisiana and the State of Indiana, but
it didn't turn out to be impossible and . . .
(everybody talking again) . . I hope we don't
have to come to it either
.
Read what your contract says.
But what I am saying to you is that . . •Calvin:
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:
You are talking about unreal things, you really
are
.
Cal vin
:
Reality lies in the eyes of the perceiverl You
can't say
. .
.
(laughter) That's right! You
can't say that it's unreal until you want to
try it. And what I am saying to you is if you
tinker with these other little things, tinker,
tinker, tinker, you'll never get it until the
teacher is reinforced and rewarded and gets an
incentive when they do a decent job, and when
they don't . . .
Donovan
:
. . . a lot of tinkers.
McCoy
:
Let me just touch basis and back to specifics
within this panel discussion for today. I asked
that specific question about the principals and
the teachers, the transfer of teachers, because
I guess what I am saying is that if there had
been some other kinds of inputs into that situa-
tion, perhaps then it would have become an obli-
gatory responsibility of those people who were
making the decisions. What I am saying is that
whoever drev/, the architect who drafted the con-
cept of teachers because it was a demonstration
district, had a right to transfer out; recogni-
zing what the problem in the inner city is in
terms of teachers. Anyway, in other words, the
large turnover of teachers, the inexperience of
teachers and so forth, if they had in fact con-
ferred with community people on that issue before
it took place, then perhaps you wouldn't reach
the point of (1) being a conflict situation, and
(2) putting a person out on a limb to have to
defend a particular position which would fall
in the realm of the "responsibility of the per-
sons who make those decisions" in terms of
providing options. In other words, I guess what
I am saying is, how did the central Board, or you,
Bernie, reach the kind of act, starting with the
principals, the transfer of teachers, and other
similar kinds of acts that were passed on to the
community Board which elected principals?
Donovan
:
Well, I'll try to answer briefly since this is
the last question, but it is a series of questions
One is that you know we had an agreement with you
and your Board when the demonstrations first star-
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ted, that teachers who did not wish to participate
in them, could get out. That was an agreement we
had. That any teacher who didn't want to work
under those circumstances had a right to transfer.
Some did, some waited a length of time, which was
wrong, then they decided they wanted to leave.
You know, they didn't make up their minds. The
issue was never raised, nor agreed to, that the
district could transfer out people it didn't want
to stay. Now maybe it should have been raised,
but it wasn't. That issue wasn't raised. It came
up, you know, on May the nineteenth. On the prin-
cipals, the Board of Education and I went with you,
and allowed you to select principals. I even had
to go to court and testify against the CSA and
UFT about it to uphold that. So that there are
three different acts there. One, the Board went
along with you and said: 'all right, we'll let
you pick your principals,' and we did, you nomi-
nated them, we appointed them, maybe it took a
month, you know, these big institutions are
slow. But as far as the teachers getting out,
it was agreed that in all three districts that
any teacher who didn't want' to serve there could
leave. But it was never agreed that any teacher
wlio wanted to stay there, could be put out by
the district. Now maybe that was bad. Because
after all, when the time came and you saw some
people you didn't think were functioning, maybe
you should have had the right to move them. But
you didn't at the time, so you took the step -
you and the Board, whoever did - you thought you
had to take. You want these people out. But that
was never agreed on. That started the whole she-
bang .
Well, Calvin, I think that our time has run out
for today. I know you are going to thank the
panel, and I'd like to thank the panel personally
and would suggest that we are going to send corres-
pondence to you within the next two or three days
about the next panel, and if there are any feed-
back or inputs you want to put in, I would appre-
ciate it.
I think one thing that we might try to do before
the next meeting or even on the basis of this
meeting is, maybe as we go along, we kind of
keep in our own heads ways that we can see that
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the Ocean Hill experience can be useful to other
school systems. I think that's really the key
because, as Esther and Bernic pointed out, there
are acts and bills and plans, that would work in
all kinds of districts. I don't know how it is
going to work and I don't know how many are going
to make real changes
,
and maybe if we can give
some ideas to people we can be of real service.
And I think that that's one of the key things to
come out of here is to see if v;e can formulate
some kind of plan, not a definitive plan, but
rather some sort of options that we con use from
the basis of v>;hat you gentlemen have experienced
before
.
It may be premature. Cal, but I look forward to
this panel being superimposed on niajor school
systems. I think we'd have all the answers.
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This is the third pranel on critical issues and
incidents in the New York City school crisis.
I might set the stage a little bit for today's
format by saying that it's going to be a bit
different than what we've done to date. So far
we've established a chronology of events. Now,
we are going to really try and look at those events
and see wliat the critical issues were and get sug-
gestions from each ol you as to what alternatives
could have been advanced at that time that might
have led to different outcomes. We will want you
to state these in hypothesis form, and then we're
going to try and see if we can deduce data that
v;ill tend to support or contradict this hypothe-
sis. Now this is going to be a really unusual
thing in American education. I think everybody
is aware of how many words have been written and
how many things have been said about what happe-
ned at Ocean Hill-Brownsville
,
but we have in
this room some of tlie outstanding educators in the
country, and more tlian that, we have people who
directly participated in the activities that went
on in Ocean Hill. All around tlie country in the
large urban school districts people are faced with
the problems that were in microcosm in Ocean Hill,
and what we want to look at today, and hope we
can get from the assembled people around these
two tables, is ideas, ways, means of making rele-
vant change. What did we learn from Ocean Hill-
Brov7BSvillc? Did v/e learn anything at all?
Arc there different things that could have been
done in different junctures which we can now
apply to the similar situations in Chicago, Los
Angeles, San Francisco, Detroit, Gary - all kinds
of school systems around the country. In other
words, today, we are going to kind of ask you,
each of you, to select one critical issue that
you think was really important in the Ocean Hill-
Brownsville situatiorx, and tlien v.^e would like you
to put forth a hypothesis about an alternative,
i.e. here is what did happen, if vje vwuld have
done something else, namely this, something diffe-
rent would liavc happened
,
and then from around
the table we'd like some evidence brought in,
from Dr. Clarl', from Dr. Donovan, from Rev. Oliver,
and from everybody else about what they think of
the hypothesis as put forward, because the whole
purpose of this get-together is to see if we can
find an example, a model, a prototype which will
Donovan
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be useful to all of the other school systems
around the country who are strugglin;' with
related problems
. Do you have any fjuestions
about - this is by the way, iny one speech for
today. Today 1 am just going to listen and see
if I can elicit the kind of hypothe.ses and the
kind of data that will be useful. Tlii.s format
make sense? Okay, let me just begin then by
asking you, Dr. Donovan, what you Lliink was the
critical issue in the v/hole Ocean Hill situation,
and then - after you pit the issue itself, and
I 've got some notes here lliat have been made
about the conflict, participation, covert or overt
issues, but really basically, what we're saying
is what could have been done differently, and
then later on we'll ask other people about wliat
they think about what would have happened if it
had been done differently.
Well, I think one of the most important - in fact
I think the most important issue at stake was,
to put it in today's terms, accountability, by
that I mean who is it that sets the policy for
a school district and then determines whether
that policy has been carried out. That's what
I mean by accountability. And I think in the
Ocean Hill matter, there was a fundamental issue
of how close to the community should tliat res-
ponsibility lie; what measure, what tt'.rms
,
wliat
degree. That to me was the prime consideration.
There are several others, but that stood out v;ith
me .
I think what we'll do, and I think that's a very
good way to begin, is take the issue.^i first and
then go around and ask for people's hypotheses
about how it v^;as actually set up, wh.nt could v;o
have done differently in tlie accountability thing.
And so, I think - does that make sense to you,
Rhody, to first state the issues? That's a very
good beginning. Dr. Donovan has suggested that
the major issue, or one of tlie major issues, is
accountability. Who should he accountable for
educational control? I am going to skip Rhody
at this point, because I think we really wani
to get everybody else's opi.ni.ons callout the issvics
ratlier than his and then he'll comaienL on them
later on. Dr. Fantini, perhaps you would like to
select and issue that you think is exliomely im-
porfaut in this kind of situation.
Fantini
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As I uudersLand it, wc. are not going to respond
to tills.
No, we'll conic back to liis with hypotheses about
specific tilings. Perhaps accountability was set
up ill such aiKl such a way. You might have a sug-
gest ion later on about Dr. Donovan's issue , saying:
'nov;, ii accountability would have been set up,
tlicMi we would have gotten different results,'
and then pi-oplc will respond to that. I think
first of all we'll just get one key issue from
each person. And if you'll agree that his is the
key issue and really don't want to add anything
else, wo can just say: 'I feel as Dr. Donovan does
that that's the key issue.'
J think to mo the key issue, one of the key Issues
has to do with identifying the parties, the publics,
the groups that tacitly lind to reach in order to
supfiort any type of reform, and the degree of cdu-
oation which has to pro.cede any reform in order to
su[)port that. And one of the major problems here
was lliat: there was a loose alliance of, in terms
oi the pari Les of interest, it was limited and
that Ihvougli real participation to be realized
much more had Lo take place in terms of a process
for informing, for involving greater numbers in
Ihc major parties, and the major parties there
had Lo 1)0. the teachers, tlic parents, the students
thomselvcs and otlier community residents. Not
enough may have been done.
The issue, then, and that's nnotlier interesting
one and obviously very different from the first
is, who wei'C. the people and who were their con-
fit ituencics iiiul what W’ore their particular inte-
rests, and they weren't really identified clearly
enough and so certain things were obscured because
nobody knew what people were looking for in the
particular situation. Okay, I think I liave that
pretty clear. 1 can't see down to the end, but
1 iliink Mr. I’erretti is next.
Well, I would like to expand a bit on Dr. Dono-
van's . . . in my narrow frame of reference of
roiTuimnic at Ions . I tliink that an issue, perhaps
the. most important issue, because so mucli had to
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be communicated to the public in looking at this
thing over a long period of time, was the respon-
for v>(’ords and actions. For example,
who spoke for whom? Was lie responsible? Did
he indeed, - now let me be more specific. Let me
say, did Albert Shanker, for example, speak for
all the teachers in the City? Was he held accoun-
table for what he said? And who were the spokes-
men for the community? Were they indeed spokes-
men for the community? Were they accessible? I
think that's an issue.
I think what - to restate that, that's another
interesting point - is from the media's point of
view, various people spoke for various groups. Did
they really speak for them? How can the media
decide to deii.aeate who speaks for whom- and per-
haps the issues were clouded by spokesmen appea-
ring to really represent groups of people and in
fact they didn't. We might talk about ways of
clarifying that later on. I think the next gen-
tleman is kcv. Galamison. Perhaps you would now •
like to give us what you think was one of the
key issues.
Weil, I wo'.ilcl suggest that one of the key issues
was that Ocean Hill was a demonstration project
that was never permitted to be a demonstration
project. That is, in its effort to pioneer and
demonstrate, Ocean Hill ran head-long into struc-
tures, and obstacles, and guidelines, and entren-
ched interests which would not permit the kinds
of adventure that Ocean Hill was designed to
make, and that many of the ensuing problems were
a result of this kind of frustration.
In other words what we are saying, and certainly
v.’e can see this all over the country, is that, peo-
ple who are going in to do innovative things very
often find that the very nature of the structure
of the organizations in which they are trying to
innovate make these innovative attempts impossi-
ble to actually bring about.
May I cite a case in point, which is worth tel-
ling. We've been funded, for example, to do a
demonstration project by the Health, Education,
and Welfare Department in narcotics working with
Galamison
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teenage girls. But already we have run headlong
into the Department of Social Servies, the State
Department's Social Services, and the City Depart-
ment of Social Services whose guidelines are so
rigid and so restrictive that if we adhere to
their guidelines it will be impossible to carry
out the kind of innovative project that we were
initially funded for.
Calvin
:
It will be very interesting to see Dr. Donovan's
reaction to this point and some other people's
later on, because this is a very difficult point
and obviously one which should bring about some
very interesting discussion about what can be done
by the people in control of the structure to make
such things possible, or perhaps they really were
done. I think the next gentleman is Rev. Oliver.
What issue do you see as a primary one?
Oliver
:
One issue that I feel is very important is how
can people exercise a meaningful role in the life
of institutions around them, institutions that
influence their lives, their future, their des-
tiny. I do believe that what's happened in Ocean
Hil 1 -Brownsvil le was basically an attempt of peo-
ple to get into the system, so to speak, and at
least have a meaningful say in the schools; if
not, at least the power to exercise a meaningful
role, how can people at least be made to feel
that they have a meaningful role and they really
don't have it. But that's a positive thing.
Calvin
:
I think that that's a point that is easily recog-
nizable not only in Ocean Hill but in all the
other programs, such as Model Cities, that have
been set up and I think that should bring around
some very interesting commentary also. Dr. Gittel,
what do you think from your vantage point is the
key issue?
Gittell; Well, it kind of disturbs me to talk about key
issues, frankly, because I don't know whether we
are talking about individual strategies, or tal-
king about the fundamental questions. So I am
going to go to them. I think one of the real
problems in this whole controversy was the lack
of recognition or acceptance of the fact that
you were not only dealing with an educational
1A6
reform or a change, but that what you were dea-
ling with was a fundamental political question,
and, of course, there is the distribution of
power within the system. And I think that's -
I have to go to where Mario was in terms of the
lack of recognition on the part of both parties
and their actions or strategies coming out of a
non-political awareness or a lack of acceptance
of the fact that they wore dealing with a lunda-
mentally political question; so that on the part
of some of the people in Brownsville or the so-
called movement for community control, 1 think
there was a lack of perception about the reali-
ties of the political structure in New York City
and in New York State and a failure to use that
structure to their o^>m advantage, presuming they
could. I have serious questions as to whetlier or
not in the long run that could be done, but it
certainly was not used, or they did not try to
use it. It vias more a question of kind of rejec-
ting the political system entirely. I think tiiere
were individual participants who may have touched
certain levers or played with certain handles,
,
but never really fully effectively. I can recall,
even in terms of the legislative action that
there was almost no participation on the part, of
people in New York City who purportedly suppor-
ted community control or decentralization up in
Albany. I mean there was complete disavowal of
the whole Albany political arena vjhich I happen
to think was instrumental in all of this, and
that certain coalitions might have been made.
I think up until the time - well, maybe three
months after the implementation of the experi-
ment, there v;ere many people on the Board, or at
Livingston Street who themselves did not per-
ceive this as fundamentally political. That the
union was playing on a political issue nation-
wide with certain implications for white-collar
unions, for A1 Shanker's leadership in the natio-
nal union picture; all of these were parts of
the game. As social scientists like to think
that the way to make decisions is to lay dov;n all
of the evidence and the consequences of your
actions and then move on them. That s, you i.nov.
,
a little optimistic, ho\:ever , I don't think th.at
was done almost at all on either side. So every-
body was operating out of a kind of ad-hoc situa-
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tion and without full recognition of the total
picture, I am not sure, however, even in recog-
nition of all this evidence and the attempts to
use strategies which fit into t’ne evidence, that
the results v7ould Imve been majorily different,
frankly. And I think we were dealing with such
fundamental social forces, and 1 think the evi-
dence is clear that in cities like Detroit, Los
Angeles, and even Portland the same kinds of con-
flicts, basic conllicts of social forces, are
occurring. The kind Rev. Oliver is talking about
in terms of if people challenge the system, which
is really v;liat you're saying so that they can get
a piece of the action, isn't tlie roof going to
cave in no matter wliat happens? I think we have
to deal with that fundamentally.
Calvin: I think if nothing else comes out, if we can - in
all of these, and then I'll got to Dr. Clark's
comments, if we can begin to formulate something
so that at the beginning, citizen's groups or
educational groups, or political groups can be
aware of these prob'ems - and tliis is certainly
a vital one whicli was absolutely overlooked,
having been involved 1 would certainly agree v.’ith
that - and then v/e ' 1 1 call their attention to the
need to focus on ibis initially, and I am not
quite as pessimistic as Dr. Git tell is, I think
that perliaps if that's done, maybe it would make
a difference. Dr. Clark, wliat do you see from
your vantage point as one of the key issues?
Clark: I think one of the ley issues is the extent to
v;hich the Ocean Hlli-Brownsville situation demon-
strated that one carnot understand such an im-
portant social problem in terms of isolated issues
The key issue to rue is the interrelatedness of a
variety of issues which did not become clear until
the problems and co.iflicts em.crgcd. One started
out with the proble;;', the situation as if one were
dealing vjlth an educational problem. And it soon
became clear that one cannot deal with an educa-
tional problem in oui complex society as if one
could deal with an educational problem in isola-
tion, that the attempt to deal with educational
reforms soon elicited a variety of conflict power
of problems w'nicli vere not primarily issues con-
cerned with education. In fact, what soon emer-
1A8
ged was tliat despiLe. t.he fact tliat we thought we
were talking about schools - Bcrnie mentioned the
schools - it became clear that we were involved
immediately in an awareness which came to vary-
ing individuals, tlie different individuals in
various ranges of time v.’hich may have been said
earlier, but the aw'arencss that reform of any
institution in our society brings with it conflict.
I mean the essence of a conflict is that you can-
not have reforms wittiout, again, I'm rather ser-
ious, genuine reform, without redistribution of
power. And you are not going to get redistribu-
tion of power witliout conflict because the conflict
reflects the attempi. and the understandable
attempt on the parts of those with the power
without regard to hov; they use the power. Whether
they were using the power to educate children or
not, that became clearly secondary; that people
with power do not respond positively to their
power being challenged, and tliey tend to resist
challenges to their power and to use whatever
methods are available to resist povv’cr challenges.
And the tiling that Lascinated ino about Ocean
,
llill-Bro'wnsville was the quicitness with which the
educational issues bccamo subordinated to sucli
realistic powder issues as the desire on the part
of individuals in the educational system to main-
tain tVieir control over a deeper following; the
area of their exprinditure of energy, bow much
energy they were going to expend for a return
of this, their protect Lon of a representing pro-
cess which had been b’.ilt into educational sys-
tems under a variety of bearings or assumptions,
the extent to which o':her groups involved in this
institution and in other institutions in our
society maintain control over money, funds. This
is a very importcniL issue by tin; v^ay , but it
never really emerged except in Alliany - behind
the scenes. But a very important and probably
the most important resistance to meaningful de-
centralization v;as
,
Interestingly enough, not
coming primarily from tlie teachers or the . . .
but from otiier unions wlio were significantly
threatened by any change in structure which would
tlireaten tlicir cont rc)i over the allocation of
funds, and or course, the obvious power problem
was that of race ami status in the institutional
control. As I've looked back, on this issue, I
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Calvin
:
thought It was the issue that was used most effec-
tively, and disguised even more powerful issues
in the area of the interrelatedness of power
problems when any threats for its existing power
relationships of arrangements were made. And,
by the way
,
I think this would be true no matter
where the threats come from - whether they came
from the community or whether it comes from the
State Education Department because they are more
sophisticated in the unstated awareness that you
don't really shake off a power arrangement with-
out inducing or eliciting inevitable conflict and
tension. So they are more sophisticated dimen-
sions of our society, such as legislators or offi-
cials and what not, seek to insinuate themselves
into the power arrangement rather than to con-
front it. And to me, the issue with Ocean Hill-
Brownsville was the extent to which a community
group, not being previously a part of a power
structure, sought redistribution in the power
arrangement in ways that could only lead to con-
flict because they were not sophisticated enough
to seek to insinuate and to become a part of and
to make contractual agreements in this way which
I . . . operate.
I think that the key issue here which I'll try
and sum up although they are interrelated is that
in a school situation like Ocean Hill-Brownsville
,
this is a dynamic process
,
and that very often
the parents or the people who speak for the parents
or purport to, are not aware of all of the subtle
of financial and other tilings of the problems
that interact. Perhaps if they were made aware
of them, they would take this into account instead
of focusing just on educational problems, and
there might be then other strategies and options
that would make possible educational change. And
I think we can see this thread running through
all of the comments that were made. Esther, you
came in a little bit late. What we are trying to
do is elicit from everybody a prime issue that
people around the two tables think was really
important in Ocean Hill-Brovi;nsville , and then
we're just going to take an issue and see if some-
body has a particular strategy that they think
would help other communities going through this
problem and offer that as a hypothesis. And then
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Calvin
:
Donovan
Calvin
:
various other people will, we hope, comment and
bring data to bear on whether this indeed would
have been a meaningful option and had it been
taken, would things have changed? In other words,
we are trying to learn from the Ocean Hill-Browns-
ville and make things
. . . and so, if you have a
particular issue - maybe it was covered .already
,
or maybe you just want to advance one as every-
body else did .
I'd like to follow through on something. I am
not, really, I'm too unstructured, but I think we
need a little bit of flexibility and in following
through on, I think, a number of us have indicated
that we think there wasn't a political awareness.
I think what Ken said relates to that as well; that
it immediately became a political issue yet, I am
certainly interested and I think it's relevant to
this, as to whether the people who created this
district in the first place from above, maybe
Bernie
,
maybe Mario, and Rhody, and Rev. Oliver
can talk to this point, whether they - when they
worked out the details of this arrangement, or
from their immediate role in it, sense that this
was going to be a very political issue as well as
educational issue, that it would be as volatile
as it became. Perhaps you couldn't predict that,
but to what degree was there an awareness that
this really dealt with a question of redistribu-
tion of power?
What I'd like to do is, if you could state that
in the form of an alternative, or testable hypo-
thesis .
What difference does it make how it's stated?
Well, it makes a difference, it does make a diffe-
rence in the following words. Yeah, let me see if
I can tell you why. One of the things that we
hope will evolve from this is not simply an histo-
rical review of what occurred, but rather hypothe-
ses that can actually be extrapolated to other si-
tuations. If we don't get it into that format,
then people who don't have the background and expe
rience and insight that people on this table have,
will not find it useful. And I think that, at
least, if Rhody wants to change the ground rules,
that's fine, but he asked me at the beginning if
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we could keep it in this kind of structure, and I
guess I have to look to him for guidance rather
than make any kind of judgement myself. Do you
want to just go . . .
Cittel 1
:
I don't think there is a ... I mean, I think if
we can deal with this question now and then at the
end of the discussion of it; it seems to me I
don't form hypotheses until I know a little more
information. Then we can say, based on the dis-
cussion that one can hypothesize that had people
been more aware of the political circumstances,
X, Y, and Z might happen. But I do mean until we
talk about this a little bit, it's kind of crazy.
I am not willing, I mean it's not going to make
any difference to me if you want to say: 'the
hypothesis is that presuming there was greater
awareness and sensitivity to the political issues,
other strategies might have been used or might
not have been used and the end result would have
been different,' except I think there's a lot more
that goes into that. The union was to me as a
hypothesis at this point.
Clark: I question this, because I just didn't feel there
is anything to be gained by framing this into a
particular thing, even if the richness or whatever
we have to say, because . . .
McCoy
:
All I suggest is, let's don't lose sight of what
we are trying to accomplish, and I think we do
need a background for any kind of response , but
couched in that understanding of different kinds
of alternatives. Let me follow your question,
Marilyn, just a simple statement to that. I think
that tliere were some political awareness from our
end. Let's put it that way . .
Gittell: How early?
McCoy
:
I am trying to say it this way. The problem I see
is it could only be to the extent that we had been
involved, or - I don't mean just involved in edu-
cation, but the extent in which we have been invol-
ved in education, period. In other words, at the
very beginning, I think we were cognizant of the
fact that there were rules and regulations related
to - let's say the assignment of principals - civil
service, the City examination, and so forth. And
152
Galamison
:
Ferretti:
we were conscious of that, we were conscious of
the political overtones of it, but only to the
extent that we had had exposure and experience to
it
.
May I throw something in here because Ken's remarks
stimulated a conunent here that I think ought to
be made and I would put it this way for future
gcneiations. lhat one of the serious problems in
this whole adventure was that the people who osten-
sibly supported it and under Rhody v^;ere not pre-
pared to deal with the political consequences
apparently. That if Ocean Hill were not prepared
to deal with wliat ensued politically, certainly
other people were not, too. It's like the "mission
impossible" thing, you know where they send the
guy off to do something and then they say if you
get into trouble, we'll disown you. And I think
that beginning with the Mayor, who supported decen-
tralization and the whole - the Bundy Committee,
the Ford Foundation, and all manner of other peo-
ple who committed themselves verbally to decentra-
lization or community control were not prepared
for the kind of repercussions v^7hich ensued, and
did not give the proper support nor did they deal
Vvj.th it in various ways and areas where it ought
to have been done forthrightly. Let me cite one
other and current illustration which is not quite
the same, but vv’hich indicates how blindly we loose
som.etlm.es. I just cite the off-track betting adven-
ture, vdiicli can't get off the ground because appa-
rently the people who designed the off-track betting
adventure didn't reckon with the union people at
Yonkers race track or other race tracks, who will
novj not let it move. And it just seems to me that
somebody in political life particularly, or people
who V\>ant to Corm somebody ought to be sagacious
enough and astute enough to foresee some of these
tilings, because it happens in every instance where
we try to move something.
If I can make one comment. I thought that the
Bundy report, I thought, as I read it, took note
of all these political things. However, when the
crunch came. Mayor Lindsay was absent. I think
tlie entire episode created a great many political
coward s
.
Fantini: Wei]
,
if I may . . . dynamics of an ever expanding
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cycle offerees, that was triggered, which started
out as a really an educational issue
. . .(mumbled)
... and it very, very swiftly became political,
economic, racial, religious and many other; that
the parties that converged and the manifestation
of force and power on the institutions, it just
became confusing even to the most - so-called
most - sophisticated participants in the arena.
They said, well, you know, this is all we expec-
ted out it was really an educational effort, recog-
nized that there were problems in urban education
and this was going to be one of the alternatives.
But as soon as it broke open, then I think that
the people just backed away. And this gets back
and I think there is a fundamental irony in what
both Dr. Gittel and Dr. Clark were saying, if I
understood them, because this is all related, that
is, if intensive series were formed, are almost
always, if not always accompanied by a major
conflict because of redistribution of power and
the responsibility of authority . . . then the
notion here was that what is it if power and the
redistribution is essential to reform, and if
'
>
those in control will negotiate only to the extent
that they'd only like to state control, then we
have a situation in which real reform is never
possible without conflict of major proportions,
and if Ocean Hill were a microcosm which it I
think made us all aware of, convergently speaking,
v;hat difference now would it make if communities
have vjed time, that is, take another district,
that is, did Ocean Hill occur at a time of cri-
sis in the development of New York City? In other
words
,
you have to view it in terms of fact that
they were. The front page of the New York Times
carried 201 and all of the symptoms of a stage
of decline which hadn't, which I think had to
receive a response from local people, and espe-
cially politicians were aware they had to do some-
think in order to maintain, even if they main-
tained their own power, they had to at least commu-
nicate, or given the indication of certain types
of reforms were taking place. That s not what
happened and we saw very quickly on the floor before
us what will happen novi/. Is real reform possible
given the configuration of relationsliips , power in
at this time in the United States, especially
as far as education is concerned. Is it possible?
Because if you look at the history of reformists.
154
Clark
:
it s systematically one by one they have been
defeated and dissipated in such a way that they
liave been rendered ineffective. And the only one
that I can count on os saying this is reform is
still convenient is one who is not challenging the
power but rather - adding on to power, such as
compensatory education. So that the real question
I am raising is thus, that the Ocean Hill fellows
that you really can't achieve reform in a kind of
transitional smootli v;ay at a time wlien in education
is already for many of the children at least the
stage v.’hcre it is life and death.
I think, Mario, that you certainly have focused our
questions and I don't think there is a simple ans-
v^7er to that
. I think that one of the things that
we ouglit to look at in terms of trying to under-
stand more clearly what happened in Ocean llill-
Brownsville as to the important issues, is that
the answers to the questions you were focusing on
vary according to who is trying to give those
answers. For example, if one looks at the kinds
of answers that the moderate, liberal, intellectual
sought to give during the Ocean Hill-Brownsville
. .
.
,
you see tliat their answers were similar in
this particular instance that they give for the
whole approach to the problems of injustice and
inequity in American society, mainly that if you
manage it; well, you know, if you are thoughtful,
if you are reasonable and rational and sit around
the table with the parties that interest you, you
will be able to come out with a rational approach
in the program for institutional reforms and that
this will make everyone happy and convenient, that
there is such a thing as, I mean that there is
(such a thing as) the educated, liberal, moderate,
continues to believe that there is such a thing
as reform and modestation from inequity to equity
that can be powerful and convenient to all of the
parties involved. And those individuals looked
upon Ocean Hill-Brounisville as a disturbing, unnece
ssary violation of this which could happen. And
if only Rev. Oliver were a more reasonable person,
if only Rhody McCoy were a little less intransigent
if only Ai Shanker were not given to striking over-
statements, then Bcrnie Donovan, Jim Allen, Ken
Clark would have tlie world tl'.e way we would like
it - you know, we like a manageable, soft-spoken
world in v-;hich decisions are made intelligently
and rationally and with some regard to equity.
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That's one answer, and those of us who took that
answer didn't want to have anything to do with
Rhody McCoy, or Oliver, or Shanker, as long as
they were shocking. You know, they said they made
our job difficult, if not impossible; they post-
phoned the nirvana of rationalism of social pro-
blems
. Another answer can be given by revolutio-
naries who unfortunately have become more popular
since the heyday of Ocean Hill-Brownsville
,
and
they say: 'the hell witli the system if you can't
get any reform in the system' and certainly the
least likely way to get it is by irrational negotia-
tions, problem-solving approach. They say .'break
it up,' but they tempt us, but they scare us.
The thing that scares me most about them is that
they might be right. Then there are some of us
who try to combine these two by being psycholo-
gists or systems analysts, or something. You say:
'all right, v.'liat is the optimum balance between
disruption, confrontation, non-rational ways of
seeking equity on one hand and the rational?
'
How can we really academically portray . . . or . .
My problem is that I don't know. I don't know and
if we went to get the evidence - I don't know
that there ru-ally is any evidence to support the
rational, liberal case in the use of reason approach.
And people wlu) believe this have to believe it.
I don't knov.’, and technically, there is no evi-
dence for the romantic revolutionary approach
because nobody has yet succeeded in destroying
the establishment. Nor do I know of anyone who
has really succeeded in destroying an institution,
including colleges which everybody said that it's
going to be destroyed; they haven't been destroyed,
they are probably stronger now. And I don't knovN?
that we have any evidence to support or even point
to the optimum balance between these two seemingly
conflicting positions. What we do know is that
whenever anyone gets really serious about bringing
an institution or any important operation in our
society closer to justice, they've never got there
with everybody being comfortable, and even if he
makes people \mcomfor table , that doesn't necessarily
mean that he is going to do it. And I don't know
whether this is a hypothesis or . . .
I tell you what it is. What happened is when you
take, let me say sometliing from an outsider s
standpoint, because I am an outsider. I don't
Calvin
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Gittell;
Calvin
:
Clark:
Calvin
:
come from the same enviornment
,
the sani union,
the same kinds of problems involved, same approach.
But i'll be blessed if I can see tViis group of
people today before Ocean Hil 1-brownsvil Le commu-
nity sitting around the table and having this
conversation and not having one iota oi effect on
the events that took place. And I tell you v.'hy:
Because they are not couched and that's
-.hy I want
to see vdiat happened, and that's v;hy I v^ouldn't
accept these things in terms of liypotheses that
our attempts do make a difference. That's why
we insist on this and other kinds of situations
I don't see that these are couched in . . . terms.
I don't see that they have antecedents iu conse-
quences, I don't see that they have probabilistic
features involved in them, and therefore, I think
that there is an exchange of information and that
really doesn't read. Around this table v.c've got
some of the best minds in the country. People
who have had more experience in urban education
and got more than almost anybody else. Now, if
we can get out of that six, eiglit, ten things,
concrete things that can be done, then T think
that we'll really have accomplished something,
because you people know more than anybody. But,
what I am afraid of, is that instead \;e are
going to have basically general statements and
that really doesn't add much to the cori'munity
leaders in Portland, or the Superintendent in L.A.,
or the union leader in Washington, D.C.
,
and I
guess that might.
I think v;e don't want to accept what we hear,
frankly ... I mean, 1 think - you want us to
say how it can be done, in what Ken has said
and what the rest of us are saying that without
conflict, V\?ithout maybe revolution, it's not
going to happen. Now that is a
,
I think, a
very substantial hypothesis.
Stating a hypothesis that without revolution,
you cannot have change in a structure, and tlien
you can have the evidence both for and against
that, v;e can put it in some terms, get some
data that would support . , .
I must confess, I really don't understand you.
The reason, I tliink, that you don't understand
me and Vi/e might talk about that, and tlien I 11 ji'st
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get back and maybe people can give it a thought,
is that I am trying to couch this in terms that’
are meaningful for action in both the corporate
sense, political sense, and in the physical
-scien-
tific sense. And now that may not make sense to
the program we're having, and I am certainly
willing to back to the format that we had, and if
it's useful, let's by all means continue in the
general
. . .
Clark
:
Let me inflict a fair interpretation for reasoning
what I hear you saying. All you're saying is that
there are things which the people around these
tables can say here that will make the job of
the superintendent in L.A. easier on the basis of
what we've said here.
Calvin
:
No, rather that some ideas will be advanced that
he can test, which he can find out whether these
ideas have merit or don't have merit for community
leaders
.
Clark And having merit or not having merit in terms of
what?
Calvin In terms of the empirical consequence.
Clark: And what happens to the kids?
Calvin And what happens to the kids, or the teachers,
or the parents, or whatever that you are interes-
ted in talking about, or all three. That's
really what I am saying.
Gal amison
:
If we are trying to arrive at some clue here in
recommendation about revolution and we're going
to have to qualify revolution. For example, I
don't know whether Dr. Calvin would feel that a
revolution necessarily involves violence or not,
or whether there are other ways, non-violent ways,
to wage a revolution. But I think, Dr. Calvin,
that in theory, if some of the criticism and
observations or suggestions and some of these
hypotheses can be drawn, I would be happy to
attempt to do it later on today, or anyone at the
table would, but I think what the argument here
is for a freer discussion. Well, that just has
to be couched in some kind of . . .
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Calvin
:
Let me turn then. Rev. Galamison, to a free dis-
cussion. I just know that when there is a free
discussion that three or four people are discus-
sing, three or four people listen.
Donovan
:
No, I just want to have a chance to have something
to say, but I first wanted to listen to the philo-
sophy behind it. I'd like to go back to Dr. Gittell's
first question, and a lot of what's been said here
I don't think there is any fundamental disagreement
with that. These things are always distasteful
to the power structure, that they are going to lose
their power, that I don't know anything has been
done as a teacher's history two for years it hasn't
been done, but some form of violence, it may not
have been physical violence, but there was some
violence to it one way or the other. What I am
concerned about is your question about what
happened at the beginning of Ocean Hill. Was any-
body politically aware of the ramifications? My
answer to that will have to be limited, very limi-
ted, because I think from our side of the Board
of Education, and myself, and so forth - there
were some ways. I don't think we looked upon it
as a totally educational problem, although there
was the educational manifestation of a problem,
and yet we're almost Monday morning quarter-backing
because unfortunately in all these things there's
never the time for anybody to sit down and say:
'now, let's think through what's going to happen
out there,' we have panel sessions and then deci-
de what to things break too fast; that's unfortu-
nate, that's not an excuse, it's just a statement
of fact and they are going to break, they break
fast in Detroit, Los Angeles, every place else.
And I don't think we can sit here, and even after
the next panel discussions, set out a panacea for
the new superintendent in Los Angeles, either.
I just don't think we can. We can, though, point
out a few things. For example, in that political
structure, nobody was listening, everybody was
talking. Nobody listened - on either side - to
the ones who were talking to them. They were all
thinking either we are going to get the power in
the community or the Board^, and if we are not going
to get it we are going to hold it, or the law
doesn't permit, or I can't let this man do that
because that subordinates everything. Everybody
was thinking, but not truly listening to the other
159 '
Galamison
:
side. That, I think, stems from a long period of
the inability of any institution to get people
to know it, to understand it, to be a part of it.
I don't know any institution in this country of
which the people are a real part. I only know
them as institutions of leaders' run, and the
leaders vary from time to time. That even applies
ilself to the Church where you would think people
would be more a part than any place else, a very
personal thing. And yet, they are not all a part
of it as they should be. So that when it came to
political realities - I am not going to talk too
long or write a paper on it, but I don't think
there was a total political awareness on anybody's
part, not even on the part of the people theore-
tically sophisticated enough to think about those
things ahead of time. I say theoretically - there
wasn't, there wasn't the time, there wasn't the
ability to talk about it, and it wasn't just that
clear cut, it wasn't an issue you could put under
a microscope and pick out the three germs that
caused it, because there are more than that in it.
I would like to throv>7 out an hypothesis, ill-con-
ceived perhaps, on the basis of the discussion so
far, and it would be this. Dr. Calvin: that it
is impossible to computerize the events vvhich will
take place as the result of a reform effort. Now
this does not mean that the possibility should not
be considered. You know, don't misunderstand me.
I think people should sit around the table when it
is possible and try to speculate in every area
about what the consequences might be. But I would
argue that the forces of life was such and the
forces of society was such that it is impossible
to guideline and computerize all the consequences
of an effort at social reform. I am a believer
in the serend ipities of life. I think if we all
sat around this table and drew up the best possible
plan for the achievement of almost anything, that
almost nothing in that plan would come out as v%’e
had conceived it sitting around the table. This
is what makes social science such a difficult
discipline, because things do not work out when
we are working with people as we've preconceived
them on paper. So if I were to advise a school
superintendent in Los Angeles or anybody who was
begetting to try to do anything, I would say your
bcst bet is to assume that anything can happen,
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and nothing is going to happen the way you planned
it.
Gittell; Can I defend the social sciences?
Calvin
:
Please do. Now, I think that's - once we can
state that that way, I am interested in what Dr.
Gittel, Dr. Clark, Dr. Fantini, Dr. Donovan and
other people have to say.
Gitte] 1
:
I am going to respond to Milton, but I want to
pursue what Dr. Donovan has said because I think
there are some unanswered questions, at least
to me, on that. I am only going to argue with
Milton in terms of the fact that I think you can
go a long way to understanding who might be the
participants, for one. I mean that's clear that
there are certain people who are more interested
in educational policy and you are going to attract
certain kinds of participants, as distinguished
with, let's say, from health policy, or other
areas of public policy. And I think you can out-
line of where communities, V\/hat the lay of lands
might be. You can even go further than that. 1
think on the basis of experience that in Ocean
Hill-Brownsville and in other cities now, you can
pretty much outline what the coalitions might be.
You might not be able to predict some individual
participants, let's say Ford Foundation, for one,
which was the major participant in New York City,
but will probably not be in Los Angeles because -
just for the fact that they were in New York City,
so they are laying low. I can remember that wlien
people from Detroit called me and Mario and I
went out there, we did just this. We sat before
the Board of Education and tried to describe or
predict exactly what we thought would happen in
Detroit, and I can remember also that a lot of
them put down some of the things we said about
the union's role, about the professionals' role,
and so on, which actually we predicted quite
accurately on our part in Detroit. I just came
back myself from Los Angeles and went through
the same business with various people asking me
what could this legislative committee do to get
their legislation through this year, and they
were dealing with the new superintendent and the
Board which was going to come up with a plan, which
followed a very similar pattern, Milton, to what
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was happening in Detroit, as a matter of fact;
not so much to New York. And I think you can’set
up what the battlefield might be, and I happen to
agree with Ken that it is a battlefield. I don't
think that the compromise model which I really
think social scientists imposed upon everybody,
in that way of thinking, that you could sit down
and figure out a solution was a part of all our
thinking, and it is a part of all our thinking even
if we don't admit to it, and I think that came
from the compromise model which prevails in the
social sciences. I mean we are really beginning
to just accept somewhat more the conflict model
which brings me back to the appropriate point
for my question to Dr. Donovan, and that is: We
know historically that the 201 controversy was
at the heel for the creation for those three expe-
rimental districts. It has always appeared to me
that that was part of the compromise model that
in your thinking and anyone else who was involved
in that, the feeling was that if you gave these
people something, some kind of compromise, that
is their own local school board or whatever, that
you could put your hand on that kind of controversy
which was emerging at that time; that this would
be a kind of solution to the problem which was
developing. I am just curious to know if this was
at all thought about. What was the reasoning behind
the creation of the experimental districts on the
part of the Board of Education and the superin-
tendent at that time?
I'd like to answer part, and I'd like Mrs. Swanker
to answer part, because we happened to work toge-
ther on that at the time. 201 was a special
problem which kind of blev^/ up at one point because
the Board and I didn't agree on whether they ought
to get some of the powers they thought they should
have. But actually what took place was that the
Board of Education itself had proposed some adminis-
trative decentralization, not the kind of decentra-
lization Ocean Hill was talking about, but admi-
nistrative decentralization. And at the time,
Mrs. Swanker and I and with Mario and some of the
people who were in Ocean Hill had some meetings
and out of that came some suggestions which as
Superintendent, I took to the Board. I'd like
her to describe if she vJOu]d, how we did that,
then I think of Vv?hat happened when we got to the
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Board, because this is V7hat you are asking about.
How did they come about? VBiat was behind them?
It was not, may I say, 'here is something that if
you'll accept this as a partial plan that'll
quiet everything all around.' That was not in
my thinking, nor do I think it was in Mrs. Swanker 's.
Maybe you'd like to
. . .
Definitely not. Well
,
my role, as you know some-
what, was different in it because I was outside
the event. In other words, I was not actually
an interested party, and therefore could make
suggestions kind of as an observer, and just as
kind of see what was happening in certain things
v;ere put into position. So I think that there is
a little bit of this in my thinking, and the docu-
ment that Bernie and 1 drafted and it was, following
some discussions with Mario at the Ford Foundation,
but I am trying to recall in my own mind the exact
chronology of that. It seems to me that the ser-
ious discussions with Mario took place following
our draft of that document, and actually, Bernie
and I kind of sat dovjn v.'ith him and brainstormed
the kinds of decentralization or the kinds of
demonstration project? that we fel t should be pro-
posed . We, I personally didn't think they had a
snowball's ciiance with that Board of Education.
I really was being kind of an imp in suggesting
some because I honestly didn't think the Board
would adopt them, but that, let's just see what'll
happen if we propose these and we can do one of
two things. You can either bring them to this
Board, hoping that they'll see the light and
adopt them, or vje can run one which was actually
what we didi. We took it to the Board and said:
'here they are,' and outside of Mr. Giardino,
who I think actually did do some studying - he
knew a little bit about vjhat was going on - the
rest of the Board passed it on his recommendation
and they really didn' t 1-now until July what they
were into.
Why do you think the Board would not accept it?
Or, why do you think the Board would not accept
any?
Given the co’.v.position of that Board and their
political backgrounds . . .
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I would like to aak you, I'd like to have your
interpretation of that clearly. Because they
would lose power by it, or because they were
racist?
I don't think tliey were at that point. I don't
think tliat the I'acc issue as such, entered their
minds, I mean, I don't think they thought of it
consciously that vjay
. I think perhaps in the
back of some of their thinking was: 'we got to
keep tills a predominately white power structure.'
That may have been in back of this. I don't know
because I didn't work this closely with that
Board as I did with the subsequent Board. But
given the composition of that Board and their
political backgrounds, it was fairly clear to me
that they would never adopt willingly and knowingly
the kinds of proposals that we were putting before
them. It seemed to me that our strategy had to
be one of two things: either as I said, education
and hope that they would adopt part of it, or
just try to run it. I think our strategy kind
of evolved by accident in a v/ay which we ran it,
instead of educating . , . merely because the
events pushed uf. into that.
V/hy didn't they accept it?
I'll tell you wliy they wouldn't accept it. I
think in my - I agree with wliat Esther said -
but the Board was concerned very much with the
formalities of education, vjhich v^as obeying the
law. 'j'hete w^as nothing in the law of this state
that gav.r them tlie right to hand away their res-
ponsibilities - they said. And we were proposing
v/ith t’nc demonstration district, which would have
in it principals not taken off the list, a lot of
flexibility and they weren't sure they wanted to
go that far. They v.’ere worried about it, because
some of it had to get approval from the Commissio-
ner in extra legal kind of fashion which we got
for the principal sliips , for example. So that we
proposed this, it just happened they asked the
Superintendent to draw up some recommendations,
so wc drew them, and in there, we threw these
demonstration districts, v;hich kind of upset them,
and I recall a fev: meetings where there was quite
a lot oi furor about 'what did you put this in
tlievc for; we didn't ask you to put any demonstra-
16 A*
Clark
:
tion districts in.' Well, the answer was, 'look,
you want to try decentralization or don't you
want to try it? Do you want to have some models
for how it could operate around the city?' I don't
think at that time - I know I didn't; I don't know
what Esther did - I didn't really foresee an Ocean
Hill furor, like we had. I saw an Ocean Hill not
satisfied, v;anting more.
/
Bernie, percepting as accurately as given, Esther
says the resistance on the part of the Board. Did
you take into account that some of that resistance
might also be their sensitivity to the fact that
there was a Council of Supervisory Association,
there was the UFT
,
and that they will probably be
more responsive to these - as it turned out very
important power confrontations that they had to
be sensitive to.
Donovan: That original Board was not that concerned because
the CSA had just about started to form and had no
authority at that time at all. The UFT was there,
was in a strong bargaining position - that might
have had, the UFT might have had some effect, but
Swanker
:
. .
.
just one or two members, but I don't think
it had . . .
Donovan Garrison, for example, would be responsible . . the
rest of them weren't so bad. I really think they
were thinking about the legalities; we can't give
away, we were appointed to watch the public funds
and we're - you know, that kind of thing I am
assuming v;as what was making them buck it.
Clark: But in a sense
,
they v>/ere - if you look at that
Board and maybe justasthis Board - they were repre-
sentative, consciously or not, of particular kinds
of interest in the community, and would certainly
be more responsive to those interests, mainly to
the newly emerging . . .
S wanker
:
Except that I don't think the issues were as
clearly drawn at that stage. In other words,
there had been no legal per conflict at the time
that these proposals were presented to them,
and I don't think - with the possibility of Mr.
Yushevits - I doubt that any of them really
thought - maybe Mrs . Shapiro - in terms of a
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threat
. . . the UFT at an invitation to it. Idon't think they thought through the ramifications
of it. As I said, we almost rammed that thing
through the Board. I don't really think that
very many members of the Board gave very serious
thought to it except as a threat to their power.
I'd like to run the rest of the panel to formula-
ting a vague hypothesis, that in the initial stages
of problems of this sort, maybe the decision makers
are not responding with high focus and high clari-
ty to the variety of interest groups that are in
some way related to the eventual decisions; that
the importance of who are the decision makers may
very well be determined in these initial stages in
terms of their sublimal sensitivity to the various
interest groups and particularly their sensitivity
to those interest groups with which they are rela-
tively identifying. It is only when we get to a
really overt level of conflict, you get what has
now come to be called polarization, or you know,
high focus of the groups with which the decision
makers vjill identify and the groups with which
they v;ill not identify. But in the early stages
of this, it is normal; it's democratic, you know,
it may even be presented in terms of the highest
example of public responsibility.
I would say that that certainly doesn't happen
after an Ocean Hill-Brownsville
,
but there isn't
a city in the country in which a Board wouldn't
react that way, because they are already sensi-
tized by their experience.
The antagonism of the Board at the time continued,
even after their reluctant adoption of the demon-
strations, because it was right after they had
adopted it - and that was something like April,
or something, in the year - vjas right after that
that Ocean Hill and a few other places came to
the Ford people and said: 'we hear they got a
demonstration, v^7e've been working to get groups
together, we'd like to be the ones to try it.'
That's when we began to talk with Mario and picked
two or three places
,
went back to the Board and
said: 'here are two or three places,' and that's
when they began to get a little bit - what shall
I say - a little frightened about the proposal.
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May I just add to this because the Ford Foundation
is involved. I said that in the early days, the
whole history of Ocean Hill and the other demon-
strations might have been different if the union
had taken a different stand in these demonstrations,
and in the early days, the union did negotiate,
did participate with the IS 201 group which had
emerged, and the Ocean Hill groups, and that at a
certain time, had the interests of the UFT been
taken into account, then the whole history would
have been different. I would say that at least
from my point of view, if there had been an alliance
of sorts, there had been negotiations worked out
between the UFT as the major political and educa-
tional course and the negotiating groups to the
community; now had that preceded, I think the whole
history would have been different, but in this
case where it broke down, the issue was that the
expectation of UFT that in return for this alliance
they would receive a More Effective School program
v;hich they identified with for a variety of reasons.
So there was a dollar sign to this. And that the
negotiating group of the Governing Board that
emerged would have teacher participation in deci-
sion-making; now, so that when the . . . occurred,
the UF']'
,
the leaderships of the UFT, supported
these C'xperiments
;
they would have supported it
in a different fashion if part of this proposal
was the underwriting of a program which the UFT
thought highly of, and that's the More Effective
School, and when that part of it was taken out,
then you see the leadership had, they had to go
back to the rankarlfile to explain, had very little
in the way of what is in it for the teachers. And
1 remember the clearing a couple of meetings where
the UFT representatives asked Dr. Donovan and me
if whether there would be any -whether we'd support
the more effective school program, and we both had
to say tliat we couldn't do it, and then the interest
terir.s just began to decline and what Vv/as an uneasy
alliance to begin with, deteriorated. But the whole
history of Ocean Hill and what I think is one of
the major lessons is that you really can't bargain
any type of participation, any participation, with-
out involvement of the teachers, especially tea-
chers, but other professional groups because you
v;ould h.ave built-in conflict situations. But,
the other hypothesis, if there is a hypothesis,
gets back to Marilyn, and since we are rushed for
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timing, I ve got a package of a few things, isn't
a participatory model, which is the one we were
advocating, a compromise model by its very nature.
In other words, can you have participation of
teachers, or of administrators or of parents in
this, in whatever design, whatever form isn't
that by its very nature a compromise model?
Gittell
:
Why, I think any - I mean these two are not mutually
exclusive. You can have a conflict model out of
which comes a compromise model.
F antini
:
There was a compromise model, but that became
Gittell: I must argue with you on that, Mario. I think
201 - it's clear that the union had taken a posi-
tion on the appointment of that principal, and
may have made a break on that point when they went
against the appointment of the community appointing
principal. I don't think the union breaks on any
of that; on MES is the change point of this, because
they had already come into conflict with the commu-
nity group at 201 on the appointment of the prin-
cipal. I think that's very important and then
maybe goes back in saying to take into account the
evidence when the union had switched its position
from, let's say, abolishing the Board of Examiners
and taking no stand on what they called "management"
appointments which would be principals, too, now
being that the big defender then you can see turn
in issues starting with the 201 incident of recog-
nizaing that their lot was with the professionals in
that they had to defend the CSA and, Bernie, 1
want to go back to what you were saying that the
Board did not, the CSA wa^ the string and had
already put through the ratio formula in the State
legislature over the head of, I mean, on the objec-
tion of Robert Wagner, and of the Board of Educa-
tion, so they v^ere strong enough to act in the
legislature and I can recall when I did participate
. . .
interviewing Board members who were very
sensitive, overly sensitive, to the associate and
assistant Superintendents at 110 vdio they felt
ruled the system and that they had no leverage on
this thing. They v;ere scared to death of these
people
.
Donovan
:
We are talking about two different things, I am
sorry. The assistant super intendency and associa-
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tes at headquarters had nothing at that time to
do with the CSA, and the CSA rode their legisla-
tion through after the state principals put their
legislation through. They had power in Albany
but they didn't have any down there yet, they
were just at the beginning. The UFT was more
pov,;erful, that's all I said.
It's true, but in support of Marilyn's point and
trying to refresh your memory, do you remember
that time when Harris, who was chairman of the
Board and the few of us, including John Fisher,
and, I think, Rabbi Kahn, and I came down and
thought that v;e were going to be talking to the
Board about our ideas of how one could deal ratio-
nally with the decentralization problem. That was
before Mr. Brown, who was
. . .
.
,
it was IS 201,
really, and you remember at that time the Board,
without our knov;ledge
,
invited representatives of
the CSA and the UFT, and they took over the role
of - what 1 call - imposition. Remember, I star-
ted to walk out. I thought I was coming to talk
with the Board and didn't think I was coming to be
subjected to the degree by CSA and UFT people.
Do you remember?
I think maybe all we are talking about here is
the terminology. The Board v.’as calling in its
administrators, and the UFT was its teachers at
that time. I don't think at that time they refer-
red to them, frankly, as CSA - but they were the
same people.
It doesn't make any difference, it's the men . .
right from what happened in that meeting because
the meeting was taken over by UFT people who had
the power and they told us what was going to
happen, and that happen. The Board was sitting
behind .
Ken, let me ask you a question, and I think we
can, if v;e got the answer, we can wrap that one
up for lunch. But you made some statement about
tlie decision makers determining their constituency
who they represented. Is that correct? The ques-
tion I am raising . . .
Clark: . or with whom they identified.
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Right. The question 1 am raising is couched in
the next level v.'hen Mayor Lindsay appointed some
additional members to the Board, that was supposed
to represent a different constituency, they found
that it was practically impossible to do anything
even at that point. 1 mean, tliey had a different
constituency whiclv they had to work with. So the
question I guess I am raising is, does it really
make any difference who their constituency was?
Yes, I think it does, but again, at the risk of
philosophizing, tliat really, the constituents, or
the groups with wliich the individual decision
makers identified, cannot be understood in terms
of isolation from the status and hierarchical
structure of the large of society. Milton Galami-
son was clearly identified with the community, but
it just so happened that his job was much more
difficult than Rose Shapiro's because the community
with which Milton was Ldentifeid is a powerless
community. So all Milton can do is shout and demand
confront. V.^ell, in other groups with more power
can exercise their decision making without the
tactics aiid strategies which the powerless repre-
sentative might gjvL . . See my point, Rhody
,
that -
I guess - the good tiling that a political official
can do is to put representatives of powerless
groups in alleged de cis ion-making roles knowing
full well that the basic decisions are not going
to be made by them anyway. . . . constituents
V\’ere led to make poor decisions.
You know, inherent In Rhody 's question, though,
is an assumption that the Mayor himself who made
these appointments v;ns one hundx'ed per cent behind
v.’hat I would call a valuable or even an honest
plan. He was not. hhat I am saying, is, that the
more I moved along on the Board, the more I found
myself fighting the Mayor, because the Mayor and
the people that he controlled on the Board did
not really produce the kind of plan which I felt
had genuiness to it . But I know it s almost time
to break for lunch. I think Bernie has added
another dimens ioii to this which all ought to be
stated in some kind of hypothesis and I would put
it this way: that when one plans a reform move-
ment or an innovative movement in the area of
education or in any other area, one should do
some research on the legalities which might be
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in the way which were initially designed to pro-
tect the people who are already entrenched in
the system that you want to reform. Bernie is
saying, that's my hypothesis, Dr. Calvin, that
some people on the Board wore honestly distressed
about the legalities which bound them to certain
responsibilities in Albany so that they found it
difficult to let go in terms of power and respon-
sibility that might have been delegated to the
demonstration districts. And I think that this is
a very real consideration.
I think we can adjourn for lunch, but I think we
have some beginnings of some very interesting
hypotheses. I'd like to see some people commenting
on v/hether the legalities really do make a diffe-
rence. I think we saw that teachers' unions, poli-
cemen, and firemen, other people and the legalities
involved don't seem to be so constrained. I think
that's a question that could be answered and discussed.
I think some of the other hypotheses also can be
looked at. I think a very crucial decision is
supposing the school system - and obviously the
journalists - supposing the school system is
ready to embark on a binge of this kind now, would
that school system benefit by having a group such
as this sit down and try to make up a comprehen-
sive plan pointing out where the problems are,
what should be called in, having an advisory coun-
cil of this kind brought together to be useful?
I don't know whether that's an interesting, or
useful or valid approach. Perhaps from what Rev.
Galamison said, such kinds of planning are just
a waste of time, in which case we'd be off in the
false hope that it would be a fraudulent kind of
proposal
.
Dr. Calvin, I'd modify that. I would not say
planning is a waste of time. What I would say
is that in the drawing of professed conceivable
plans, one should be prepared for all kinds of
unexpected events that take place.
Milton, I didn't know that I'd be in a situation
in which I vrould be more extreme than you. I
think a valid hypothesis is one in which one exa-
mines the liberal traits wliich I tliink is more
tlian a trait - maybe it's necessary belief in the
myth of rational approach to problems of fund amen-
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tal justice reform.
Calvin: I think that's a key issue and maybe we can close
on that and talk about it after lunch, because
that s really to me a key issue, if that is
really - if what Dr. Clark is saying is really
the consensus
. . . or as a hypothesis.
Clark: What I am asking
. . .
Calvin
:
What he's asking, I think, it would be really a
very fundamental question.
Donovan
:
My hypothesis is that we answer that after lunch.
LUNCH BREAK
Oliver It took a little bit of time. But one of the things
that we - I don't think anyone realized and it was
spelled out here before - we didn't know, no one
saw wliat was ahead. No one saw what would even-
tually come out of this, no one knew what forces
would rise up to put an end to efforts that were
being made in Ocean llill-Brownsville
. I, for one,
didn't, v;ell, I knew that the legislature was there.
I didn't know howmuch they were involved, but as
far as the local - the community school board -
it was an appointed board, we knew that, and what
Esther said a while ago about . .
.
perhaps some
members of the Board may have thought that while
we have this power we'd better make sure that we
don't let it get away. I would say that people
in the community didn't try to arrive at that as
something to be believed, that this was deeply
imbedded and that consciousness of everybody.
This is what is is; that we did not count on the
legislature coming up with the kind of bill that
they did. Of course I don't know whether it
would have made much difference, but there was
a good deal of political sophistication in Ocean
Hill-Brownsville
,
and I think one thing that
enabled the Board to maintain itself as long as it
did was the fact that there was an election, an
election of this local board, and those who were
elected were political enough to realize that they
should represent those who elected them. And, of
course, as you know, this was one thing that we
harped on over and over again, and I think if we
had been an appointed board
,
we would have been
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easily swept aside. But the fact that we were
elected, though we claimed that we were - I see
that Dr. Donovan is frowning over there - but we
it was an elected board and to me this was the
real, this made the difference in our determination
to stay and the communities somehow hanging in
with us, until finally there was another election.
I don't feel now that we, that there should be
now elected local boards. I think that that is
really not good, but I think in our community we
had to have something like this to break out of
the cell. But now we are back in the cell; we've
got to find a way to get back out again.
May I speak on this, because you are touching here
on one of the deepseated problems in a democratic
structure, that black people happen to face. Not
only did you work in Albany, might you spend a
whole term, legislative term in Albany working up
there two or three days a week . .
Seeking to influence legislation?
Exactly so, exactly so. Now had to return to a
certain organization because I did that. I didn't
know I couldn't do that. But you did not and may-
be I ought to say v;e did not have the political
class to achieve what we wanted to achieve in the
State legislature. I don't care how hard we
might have worked, I don't care how sophisticated
we might have bfeen, we did not have the political
class, this . . .
The Board of Regents did not have the political
class .
1
Exactly so. We had more people on our side, I
say, than we have ever had on a side that was
moving toward progress. But it was not sufficient.
And wlien you look at the Albany State legislators
where you have only one black person, for example,
and this is only one example, who was not elected
from New York City, I think he was from Buffalo,
he voted wrong . . . you just didn't have the kind
of political clout over against constituted labor
unions Vi/hich commanded a tremendous amount of
votes, and unfortunately if you are caught in a
kind of system whereby the chief virtue is to get
elected, and this is what every politician con-
Clark:
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cerns himself with, aid this is Mrs. Morality and
this is Mrs. Right, the process of getting elec-
ted and you are also a minority people as black
people are in the United States, it's very diffi--
cult to get anything done, you know, on behalf of
progress or reform, or on behalf of education even
if it happens to be right in your particular
interest. So what you ran into, politically and
legally, and legislatively, was a democratic pro-
cess which everybody extols, but which is gravely
to the disadvantage of minority people and black
people, because when you begin to count numbers
and numbers become the substitute for morality
and what is decent, then you are in trouble, then
the whole society is in trouble.
Hilton, I agree with you so much that now it's
going to hurt me to show you from what you have
just said what's being made to be a disturbingly
clear example of power and naivete, because what
you said makes a great deal of sense up to the
point where you specified the area of powerless-
ness, namely numbers. I thought this, too, and
would have continued to have thought it were it
not for the disadvantage of being actually in
Albany watching the process by which the legisla-
ture arrived at its decisions on the form of the
decentralization bill. And I am not even sure
that it's wise for me to say what I am about to
say to you now, because I've never said this pub-
licly, the decision of the New York State Legis-
lature on the nature of the decentralization bill
was not made in terms of the legislative leaders'
assessment of the relative votes of the Central
Labor Council and ... in contrast to the votes
of the minorities. And this is a popular belief.
I am convinced without having the definitive data
that that decision was made on much more mundane
grounds of the kinds of lubrication which lubri-
cates the political apparatus on local and state
levels. There is no other explanation for a num-
ber of specific things which I observed in terms
of tv^enty-four hour shifts kind of thing and the
refusal to continue the process of discussion that
was going on prior to a very specific determinant
of decision making. Now, after saying that, I wil
shift categorically to another set of facts which
if anybody draws any relationship between what
I've just said and what I am about to say, tliat's
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their problem, not mine. After the victory of
the union, some dissident members of the UFT
asked: 'how much money did the Union spend in
this victory in Albany?' The head of the union
said: 'oh, somewhere between two hundred and five
hundred thousand dollars,' but nobody asked: 'how
can anybody make public statements that span that
width of expenditure from two hundred to five hun-
dred thousand dollars. You know, there's a great
difference between two hundred and five hundred
thousand dollars.' Some dissident members of
the union who wanted to, you know, had run a
black candidate, whom they romantically felt
would challenge Shanker's little presidency, came
to talk to a fcv7 of us about how could they do
this, and I was naive enough to say to them: 'well,
one way in which you could challenge the present
leadership is raise this question of the accoun-
ting of the expenditures of the UFT in this parti-
cular struggle.' Now these were revolutionary,
these were dissident, these were people who were
going to cliallenge their verdict. They looked
at me as so if I were crazy. They said: 'now,
we can't get anywliere asking for an accountant of
union expenditures,' and they never did. They
never raised that issue. As I said, anybody who'll
make any relationship between the settings, you
knov7
,
is paranoid; they've been meritaneous, they
are people who should not be considered responsi-
ble to service this social program. Milton?
Well, let me - I would like to believe that this
might be accepted as a hypothesis. Let me sound
a note of hope here. What I hear you saying - you
add another dimension to this, you probably be
numbers, they give you money. I'll agree if you
liave a minority and a lot of money, you might be
able to do w'hat a majority can do. But my argu-
ment when you said . . .
No, I was merely saying. Milt, that there is the
kind of built-in romantic naivete on the part of
do-gooders who believe that, you know, reason, or
number of votes, or justice of cause.
When a five dollar bill might do it.
1 didn't say that'. You just said that the resour-
ces would be parried differently; we thought rede-
ployment of available resources at a critical time
Clark
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might determine how many votes on republic or the
democrats in legislatures or councils do get.
Well, these then are the formidable obstacles that
minority people see in a democratic structure, but
then we have to live by a philosophy, and it doesn't
have to be a philosophy of defeat. We have to live
by a philosophy that David can really live e lie in
the long run, for example.
But David had a sling-shot.
So David had a sling-shot. But maybe that's all
we have is a sling-shot, but we have to accept
this as a practicable philosophy with which and
at which we can work. Or we have to believe it's
a Cinderalla story, you know, the whole concept
that the rejected can ultimately triumph, because
all the ostensible circumstances are
. . .
Well, I'd like you to - maybe you and Dr. Clark
and some of the others to reflect on the facts
since now this is a hypothesis that there is some
interesting data. For example, we did some work
with Wilson Riles, and Wilson Riles is a minority
member and ran into a state which has roughly
eight per cent blacks and he beat the hell out of
Rafferty, and Rafferty had lots of money and you
might want to comment on that. That Rafferty was
well organized and supported by all kinds of groups
with all kinds of money. He is now the state
superintendent of education in California. And
Wilson is black.
Dr. Calvin, there was one other element there,
that people didn't like Max Rafferty.
Well, when you say that we might . .
We are talking about people, we are not talking
about the legislature.
Well, just a second. What we are talking about
is an elective process and I am interested in the
comments that were made earlier about - you see,
I agree with you on economics . I think very often
there is some data from other areas that indicate
certain things, and what I am saying is that when
you say the people didn't like Max, the way you
176
#
find that out, I guess, is by the election. Well
that s certainly true. If the polls show twenty,’
Max ahead by twenty-five percentage points before
he began to debate Wilson, and when he began to
debate Wilson, Wilson was smarter, and made a lot
of good educational points; and I think that there
ore a number of people who still judge people on
the basis of whay they can do rather than
Swanker
:
Yes, he made a basic mistake, too. He attacked
the color of the skin.
Calvi,n
:
That's right. He ran a racial campaign. Rafferty,
no question about that.
Clark: So did Yorty, and Yorty won.
Calvin Well, that's why there are all kinds of things
that arc involved, and that's why it's interesting •
that's another piece of data.
Git tell: We are not comparing apples to pears, I mean, that
Riles came from a basis power. He had status not
only in California, but nationally, from the Riles
Commission - a report has been published in the
Congressional Record. He was an established
acceptable figure in the educational establish-
ment in the California politics; he had money
behind him; he had opposition to Rafferty which
were willing to pour resources into the Riles
campaign, and California is crazy, anyway.
Calvin That was the key point. I was waiting for . . .
I don't want to get involved in that.
Gal amison
:
Dr. Calvin, these are certainly extreme illustra-
tions that may or may not bear testimony to what
I am trying to share. And that is, if a Negro
in a population that is overwhelmingly white wins,
I don't applaud until I know what kind of Negro
he is. He may be far worse then most of the
v;hite people may have elected.
Calvin I don't know if that's fair to Riles, because he
isn't here to defend himself, but I would say
one thing. I think that most people would agree
that Riles is considerably different than Rafferty
on other vairables besides the color of the skin.
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May 1 state that - may I suggest that Riles was
not elected by the legislature, Riles was elected
by the electorate, the state-wide electorate. I
was addressing my two totally independent obser-
vations to the v;ay in which the legislature operates.
I wonder if we can return for a minute to something
bhat Dr
. Calvin asked for v.'hich I do not think we
can produce. And that is some definite guidelines
for superintendents and Boards of Education in
other cities. I don't know if we can produce defi-
nite answers
, I think we can produce some ideas
to be looked into. So I'd like for a moment to
revert to Mario's questions. He felt that a very
critical issue this morning was, who speaks for
whom in this outfit. Milton, for example, recently
has been saying: 'we said, we said, we said.'
Who is we? In other words, what I am saying is,
when you said "wc said," who is the "we" that said
any place who in is the "v7e" said says, either
side or inside, or in between, and this is vi/hat
a superintendent on the Board also has to take
into consideration. I wonder if we could spend
'just a little time on that.
Yes, who'd like to comment on this?
I would. I'd like to begin by saying that this,
you see, again reflects this whole tragedy of
being caught in the process of number kinds
,
which
is one of the pitfalls of a democracy. That is,
if somebody speaks, if he speaks anything, my
first cons idc r n L ion should not be 'how many people
he is speaking for, or how many people he has
behind him.' if t’nc issues is 'is he right, or is
he vrrong,' and if he's right, then 1 should try to
pursue what oth.er recommendation or policy he has
outlined; or if I'.u is wrong, I should refuse to
support him. In other words, what I am saying,
Bernic, is that numbers con be entirely irrele-
vant to moral issues, now they are not irrelevant
to political issues, and V7hen you get in a kind
of structure whetc you're v7orking with the labor
union, are working V7ith the school system, or
you ore working with the state legislature, you
have to consider numbers. But my criticism is
that we determine too frequently what is right
and V'^h at is wrong by nvunbers, and it is because
of this kind of .structure that black people,
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minority people, found themselves at a supreme
disadvantage in a democratic structure.
Ferretti: I'd like to say something to that. I realize
that you are a Reverend, Reverend Galamison, and
you must, of course, drill on the relevant.
I think that in case of Ocean Hill-Brownsville
,
for example, there are a great many moral issues to
my way of thinking, almost all of them on the
side of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville community;
and yet they lost everything. So I think in’that
pstticular case since we are talking about, the
numbers beat morality, and I think one of the
things that
. . .
Galamison
:
Not in the long run. In the short run, yes, but
not in the long run.
Ferretti: What's the long run?
Clark: Tomorrow.
Galamison Oh, the long run may be a week, it may be a year,
it may be the next generation, but not in the long
run. You have to believe that in the long run
what is right and decent will triumph even though
it may not win in your particular structure.
Ferretti: You are talking about hypotheses
. Would it be
a good thing, for example, to build up a consti-
tuency of such force that you could make your
representatives act morally?
Galamison This would be ideal.
Ferretti
:
And then we get into numbers again, do we not?
Galamison We would get into numbers again, but we would be
in a different kind of a ball game in the sense
that we would be educating people to the best of
our knowledge, to what is moral and what is good
and what is right, not for a segment of the people
for that we have class legislators, but for every-
body, so that we have democratic legislation in
the sense that people who initially conceived of
democracy thought legislation ought to be or ought
to become.
McCoy
:
Can I ask a question that is generally on this
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topic? When is it important to know who speaks
for whom? At what point is it important to know
who speaks for whom?
Clark; Rhody
,
I think that's an extremely important ques-
tion, because actually if you look at our social
political system, you see that there are some very
important decisions that are made in a democracy,
that no one raises the question who is speaking for
how many. For example, the draft - the draft
operated in America for decades without the question
of representation, or referendum, or participatory
democracy, and for to me there are pretty obvious
reasons, that if those kinds of questions were
raised, that if the machinery were settling them
in the usual nosecounting approach were developed,
you probably wouldn't have a draft. I think there
are questions of tacties. My hypothesis is that
when the decision makers of our society want to
make decisions that involve the reinforcement or
the expansion of the existing power, it does not
generally permit itself to get in the bind of
seeking democratic representation or evidence of
this. This might be biased in selective percep-
tion, but as I look at this society, issues and
the kinds of questions that Bernie raised and
obvious effect, are generally raised when there
is some kind of serious confrontation of people
without power seeking to get power. For example,
like I think I am - and I hope that I can conti-
nue the illusion of being the next bird on the
ghetto in America, when I look at the ghetto and
the social change processes in the ghetto, some
start ghetto by the way, and we've done something
on the kinds of things that we have precipitated
in the Haryou document of community action pro-
grams, etc., I don't think I found out within
two or three years after perpetrating on poor
powerless people what I thought was a device by
which they could democratically get more power,
was that that very device was used to getting
something, they need community participation,
etc. that I watched the Lindsay administration,
for example, on its housingj Dean Flaco enter
ghetto communities to organize the community so
that if he could get community consensus before
he moves on urban housing programs. Now Dean
Flaco was very effective in using the community
organization approach to get the kind of conflict
and confusion, etc., so that he now has a valuable
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device whereby non-movement can be justified on the
grounds that the people are divided, you know,
the Puerto Ricans, and the blacks in Southeast
Harlem aren't together, therefore you can't
really move teward a housing project there. Now
this is what's made, nobody asked those kinds of
questions in the decisions on Lincoln Center.
Lincoln Center moved in spite of more unity on the
part of the lower-class vi/hites who were being dis-
placed in that area not t3o bedisplaced and nobody
said 'you can't put up Lincoln Center because the
people object to it.' When you have powerless
people, it doesn't really matter whether they
object or agree, you use to v;in.
May I say something on this? Let me expand on this
a little bit, because it's so relevant. In this
democratic structure, one of the supreme techniques
by which black people are deceiving is the expan-
sion of the area of agreement, the expansion of the
area of plebiscite, let me put it that way. Let me
try to cite it in another way. Wlien we have been
through a period even in New York City where black
people in the ghetto couldn't even elect an assem-
blyiiian, because they didn't have that much politi-
cal strength, so then v?e got to the point where
they could elect an assemblyman, maybe they could
elect a senator, maybe even elect a congressman -
in Brooklyn, vdicre we have this tremendous concen-
tration of black people, they can at last elect a
congressman; but as black people move alone, could
they achieve 'whatever achievements they might make
by virtue of having been ghettoized, those who
are in power expand the area of political thrust
so that what v;as concentrated and effective is
reduced to ineffectualness. Now this would be
true with the current process of electing Board
of Education members in New York City. It will
be almost impossible in Harlem, now, and he is
going to have to be a good Negro to be elected
in Harlem, to elect a black person or a Puerto
Rican person to the Board of Education, because
if yoi' expand as we have expanded the area of
political thrust to a borough-wide basis which we
had done on Staten Island, in Brooklyn, in Queens,
in the Bronx, it will be almost impossible to
elect a minority person. The same thing has gone
on in Boston, Massachusetts, in this area where
the control of the school system has been extended
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beyond any kind of lower fj'amewoik t o a whole city-
wide kind of thing whereby somebody in the suburbs
will determine the destiny of the I'eoplc wlio live
in the bl-ack ghetto; as in New York City, some-
body out in Staten Island who now determines the
destiny of biack people on a school borrd, or v-lio'd
lived in Brooklyn, or in Harlen. So as we move
along and we get even into a position where we
numerically can take advantage of tlie democratic
process, somebody, or some upshot is maneuvering
continually to make the base so lar out that our
urbanization and our ghettoizat ions are ineffec-
tual ones in this process. Now ir. you don't under-
stand it, you don't understand wlmt's going on.
I think there is another point, Hilton - excuse
me, go ahead.
Well, I think, Milton, you've dc-fe ate.d your own
argument and v/e hod this discussion tv.’o sessions
ago, and I disagreed with you then, and obviously
I disagree with you again, and that is, that it is
in misinterpretation and tlic abuse of numbers
and the democratic process that is doing wliat you
are suggesting the democratic process is doir.g,
and you hit on a very saiient point in term.? of
what political scientist.^ call city-wide elections
versus ward district elections. Nov/ I recall, a
couple of months ago, I got a conm'.nn i eat ion from
the people out at L.A.
,
from the /'.CLU asking me
'could I get them together data io support the
notion of ward election,' and I v/roto back and
said: 'political scientists have r: jected ward
elections over the last tv;cnty ye-nvs .ns being
outmoded.' Now, you knov.^, there i ; a very real
argument that in cities like Dotroif and Los
Angeles for ward elections to get black represen-
tation, and the social scientists th-'msclves liave
not produced any data to substantiate that cause.
It was the misinterpretation, in effect, on tltcir
part - the goo-goos, the reformers of city govern-
ments, vjho said over the last twenty or thirty
years that you had to have city-wi^ue electioiws
because that seemed to be more representative.
They were wrong. The fact is that './ird elections
tTiay produce the more I'cpj'esent ati ve kind of
government. Now for you to argue neytinst the
more representative form .saying 'tlw-t's what
defeats black people,' I tliink is a misinterpreta-
tion.
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:
I didn't understand that that was what Milton
was saying.
Galatnison
:
Marily in your eagerness to disagree
. . .
Gittell; Well, because you've used this argument several
times
.
Galamison I am using it because it's so fundamental.
Gittell! You see, I think Ken makes the more relevant point
in saying 'those processes will be set uo on high
as an argument against getting more black repre-
sentation,' just as I recall very clearly that
when the union first came out blasting the elections
in Ocean Hil 1-Brownsville
,
the argument was not
enough people voted. We made a great effort at
that time, you remember Rhody, to estimate pre-
cisely the percentage of eligible voters who are
voting, and it came out to something like twenty-
five per cent. Now we get the city-wide decentra-
lization elections figures, all which arc, in
almost every district, below twenty-five per cent.
No one is arguing the validity of those elections.
The very same people who argued against the vali-
dity of the Brownsville Board because it was
elected by twenty-five per cent of tlie people,
and I think that's more to your point, Ken, that
people are going to misuse concepts for whatever,
in whatever way they want to , and it's a constant
battle to throw it back at them.
Clark; To keep people without power from getting power.
Gittell
:
Right. I just want to go back to what Bernie
asked, and I think it's relevant to tliat. As a
political scientist functioning over a fifteen-
year period, I am embarrassed to say, 1 never once
heard raised the question of who speaks for the
community, or is this political leader who is
elected representative of the community, or even
the political leader who emerges out of the commu-
nity, whatever community you are talking about,
is he representative, who is he talking for - I
never heard those questions raised until the
sixties, until black people started to arise as
community leaders. And 1 think that there is
firm evidence to this, Bernie, that social scien-
tists, political leaders themselves, never challenged
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someone who seems to be a leader just on that
basis, who spoke up. He didn't even have to be
representative, he didn't have to have this base
of power that one could count the numbers of
because he was elected, or because he could go
back to his local clubhouse, that is, to get
support on an issue. If someone emerged as a lea-
der v;ho was accepted as - he was a leader. The
only time those questions seemed to be raised, and
I observe this everywhere now, this is a constant
question that arises, 'who is he speaking for,
whom does he represent, who elected him, how
many people?' These are questions that political
scientists never even conceived, and I do think
that, it's related to racism in our society.
I think it is, too, but I think you have to reali-
ze something else, and I am delighted that you
are young enough to have only been in the business
fifteen years. Fifteen years ago and before that
there wasn't any argument from anybody anyplace.
The man who spoke for the community - whoever he
was - there wasn't anybody up there challenging
him because he spoke for the dominant community
and in generally speaking - they are all alike,
you knov7. But now, you sit there and the man steps
up before the Board of Education and says, 'I
talk for the community and I say do this,' and the
next fellow up there says he doesn't talk for the
community at all, 'I talk to the community and I
say do the opposite,' it's an entirely different
ball game. I wouldn't doubt for what the issue of
minority group coming to a position where they
want power from the majority has a lot to do with
it, but you can't evade the question by philosophy.
You have to answer to a superintendent anyplace.
Two men stand up in front of you as they did in
Ocean Hill, by the way, and one man says, 'l speak
for this community and we want this , ' and another
man - and right or wrong I am not arguing on that
at all - another man says, 'just a minute, I speak
for the community and we want sometliing different.'
Somebody has to decide where the weight is. Now
Milton says you decide on the side of right. Now
right is not an egalitarian procedure, that there
are a few of us who are endowed with the knowledge
of what is right and everybody else is wrong.
Right is very difficult - it's just like Chris-
tianity, it's never been tried. But a superinten-
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dent doesn't sit there to write a book. He sits
tlicre and the Board of Education sits there lis-
tening to opposing points of view, both of whom
present to some extent reasonably strong cases.
You sense a little more right on one side than
the other - you sense it in a matter of morality,
but let's not brush off the fact that there are
many people today speaking for what they say is
this, that, or the other group, and somebody has
got to think about it.
Bernie, the point that is somebody is trying to
make here is that this is an innovation of deter-
mining response to a community. And the truth is -
and I V7ant to add this - that this whole concept of
a great many people is a mythological procedure,
is a mythological concept with which the American
people have lived because the majority of people
never really decided anything. They may decide
within a certain framework that has already been
established for them, and if you are going to
vote, you got to vote for the only two or three
candidates who are on. But something has already
been predetermined. I would argue that everything
that's ever been decided of any importance is
decided by a niinority people, a few people who sit
in a room somewhere and say women are going to
wear short skirts next fall, women are going to
wear long skirts next fall, or, you know, some
other . .
. . .
very bad example. . .
Some argue that minority makes the important
decisions, never the majority. The majority deals
with, you know, what few shortages arc give to
them.
Before we get off from Bernie 's point, I'd like
to throw in my share of problems. Bernie, in the
operation of the Board of Education, there are
decisions, you know, that are made in terms of
contractors, capital expenditures, decisions in
terras of publishers, textbooks. It isn't, you
knov7
,
the questions of representation and all,
and vv»ho is speaking for whom, are not salient
questions in those capital expenditures. But
when it comes to the community being - now, let
me be more specific here - when it comes to a
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previously denied community raising issues of its
share of the educational resources, then these
kinds of question are more likely to be raised.
Am I right?
I mean the fact is that - I think it has very often
been said, a community in Staten Island, for ins-
tance - because they pretty much agree because they
all look alike - they don't have major issues that
separate them. You get a reasonably tolerable
community like, but Ocean Hill-Brownsville
,
Harlem,
Bedford-Stuyvesant
. . . Take Harlem, for instance,
the issue of 201. Helen Testimas said that she
spoke for the community, equally adamant was Spen-
cer, who said he spoke for the community, both
right. They both had a problem, they both had
convictions and the point that I am making here
is what you are saying is absolutely right, but
the reason for it is that there is a division in
those communities, that they have not yet pulled
themselves together and realized the strength in
working together, as a block. I mean this is it
for real
,
because when Wilson Riles was almost
defeated in California for that same thing, because
Julian Nova ran in the primaries and they almost
knocked themselves out completely, because they
split the minority board out there. But fortuna-
tely, Riles managed support enough to get a . . .
against Rafferty. But this is the same situation
that the reason that you don't have the kinds of
conflicts and the kinds of questions in the "colored
communities" or the white communities or the homo-
geneous communities, is that you don't have the
arguments about who leads and what the issues are.
Now they may be issues perhaps, been resolved
before they got to the Board of Education whereas
when you get Dave Spencer, Helen Testimas, both
right, both . . .
,
both with good causes, then
it's the problem for the superintendent and the
Board of Education to make a decision as to which
one really is the representative.
May I throw in here that .... superintendent
.... that goes with that position, but I think
I know it's not, I don't think that anyone can
ever determine precisely where a community is
,
really, because so often the community doesn't
know where it is. Buy maybe there may be some-
one who can articulate it. The community is some-
18d
Swanker
:
Clark:
Donovan
:
Clark
:
Donovan
:
where, v/e know, but where there is someone who
can articulate where they are, well - it's hard
to say where they are.
I think this goes back to the very issue that we
have discussed on in the first session and that
is the question of a power block and of the pcrwer-
lessness of the black community, and I think this
really is answering one of tlie questions you
raised at that time, why, tViat is why the black
community or the minority community is powerless,
and I think perhaps one of the answers - now 1 am
not saying it is the only answer - but one of the
answers is that they are divided among themselves.
But in the other community, in terms like Marilyn
said, that Nixon was elected by a minority in the
last electorate. She reminded me so was Lindsay,
and so was Buckley. Being divided is not peculiar
to a black comimmity
,
or the Puerto Rican commu-
nity. However, the fact of divison can be more
effectively used against powerless communities.
Ken, I think there is another part to it. I think
the white community, ns you say, is divided amongst
itself, maybe in a different way, but it is
divided - it is in one community, but because they
are all part of the dominant community when they
differ and they fall out, so tliey fall out and one
fellow wins and the other fellow loses . . .
And the decisions are made independently.
Then that's a way. Now, unfortunately, in recent
time, when there is a power struggle when the
black community Vvas coming up, and if one faction
won and wanted to got something then somebody
agreed with, tlicn the other faction would take
steps to block it to cut in to. 'not have it done
that way, you didn't listen to us.'- This is,
I think, part of growing up, of coming into the
business of trying to be like the majority and
trying to get some political power not having had
it, and it creates, really, a lot of problems for
the people who have to make decisions. And you
might say, 'well', a man who has to make the deci-
sion' -a.s Rev. Oliver says- 'should be a Salomon.
Well, I wish wc had one around someplace, I don't
find in any other city, state or federal level-
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;
Clark:
Calvin
:
Not even amongst community action agency do I
find any. We don't have them, we don't even have
one half of a Solomon around. So we live from
day to day with this unfortunate
. . . the deci-
sion making on what is pressure, and most of us
liope that he had got some morality behind us,
you know, you don't do things if you're in power
if you can help it. But you got an awful lot of
pressures in there.
Let me break in for a minute because Dr. Clark has
told me that he is going to have to leave at four,
and he certainly has a lot of input that's impor-
tant, and I am sure that's true for the other
people around the table who have - let me speak
directly to another point. One of the reasons why
I am trying to get his cast into a particular struc-
ture is that this vehicle that v^7e are working on
serves two forms and one has to relate to the
constraints that Rhody is under. Rhody really is
working very hard to make an effective contribution
to education. One of the things that you need in
order to do that is a particular kind of piece of
paper, and in order to get that piece of paper and
to v/ork with it, certain things have to be put in
a certain form. That's perhaps the reason for
some of the particularly peculiar language, but I
certainly would not want to have Dr. Clark leave
v;ithout commenting on certain things in a parti-
cular . fashion
,
maybe just to meet the constraints
of the educational bureaucracy that exists up in
Amherst. But I want to interject, because I see
vjhat Rhody went through in certain other things
and I just feel that he won't speak up because of
his respect of the people around the room, and so
1 am going to kind of speak up without that . . .
, . that last remark?
Yes, so I am just going to say that I'd like Rhody,
I'd like to get this now into a format, because one
of the reasons that this is important is because of
you people. I mean if it were just a gathering
of ordinary people, this wouldn't have the weight
it has, and when Dr. Clark leaves and certain other
people leave, then it's not going to have the im-
pact that it has wliile you people are in the room.
So, I don't want to take any more time, but I
would like to get this into the kind of educational
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leads which is necessary with the - as a graduate
dean and I am sure he'll understand what the
message is.
Donovan: I think we ought to defer to you, because you are
the only man I ever saw that ever made Rhody drop
his pipe. That's a sign that he's nervous.
Calvin: Do you want to comment on that?
McCoy
:
Now, I'd like to follow it in a little different
way at the moment, because I've listened, which
is unusual for me to just listen, but I've heard
some things here which I think you've called sub-
stantive things that have created a number of ques-
tions in my mine, and I have them in two categories;
the first one has to do with the political arena and
the second one has to do with the identification
of the parties, as Mario suggested. Now, under
the political - and if I can get some reactions
from the panel on this, on these for quick ques-
tions. and then under the second one, I just have
two. I hear you saying that political reform can-
not be made when the issues are basically those of
morality. And the second one I hear you saying
is that conflict is inherent in reform. And the
third one I hear you saying is that of established
coalitions for compromise, that is, if you are
going to try to make any kind of refrom, you are
going to have established coalitions that basically
will come off with some sort of compromised posi-
tions. And finally, I guess this is from my one
bias, I hear that reform must consider the covert
issues. Now if those are the general kinds of
things that I am hearing, then, okay, but it's
not going to have some sort of . . .
Ferretti
:
I'd like to speak to the third point you mentioned,
the coalitions for compromise. I would say, now,
let's put this in the form of a semi-hypothesis,
in so far as the lesson of Ocean Hill-Bro^^sville
is concerned and from what we can see in the wake
of the local community board elections here in
New York City right now. I think coalition for
compromise is perhaps not correct. I think what
should be considered by groups is a coalition for
power, because I think that the educational estab-
lishment in particular in this city as evidenced
in Ocean Hill-Brownsville and as evidenced today,
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:
Ferretti
:
Oliver:
Clark:
Oliver
:
Ferretti
:
they do not move unless they are pressured by
power
.
Just before that, Rev. Oliver, I heard somebody
say something that said that one of the decisions
confronting, or one of the problems confronting
a 'superintendent' is, that here we have two
people standing up in front of him saying that he
recognizes both representing the community because
they both say so, and also I think I heard. Dr.
Clark referred to the fact that you are dealing
with powerless people, and so the question I've
got to ask in that sense, if what you are saying
is so, is that if you have a total coalition of
powerless people, you are still not going to be
able to deliver any kind of reform. I think Mil-
ton said that he had people in Albany consistently,
right? But they didn't represent that kind oi
clout
.
No, what I am saying is that you have groups of
powerless people who, with numbers can force legis-
lation, can force morality, if you will.
Along that same line, I think there is something
that does need consideration of having gone into
and that is the role of the opinion-makers as
over against the decision-makers. When you think
of decision makers you think maybe of the Mayor,
and . . . But really he's not the decision maker.
He responds to opinions that are created and the
opinion makers are the ones who determine those
decisions, and well, I think of Ocean Hill-Browns-
ville and the news media. It was the opinion that
they put out of Ocean Hill-Brownsville that deter-
mined the decisions that were made by Ocean Hill-
Brownsville. I think this . . .
Are you thinking in particular of the Martin Mayer
piece in the Sunday Magazine section of the Times ?
Right
.
Well, as a member of the medium, let me talk about
that. I don't think, well, the media is divided
into two categories: there are those wlio fought,
and there are those who attempt to formulate opi-
nion, or to influence opinion. I think. Dr.
Clark mentioned the Martin Mayer piece. I think
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that goes to the hear of something I want to say,
that it was basically a dishonest piece of jour-
nalism. I think that in so far as reporters,
. . . their reports is concerned, all they can
do is to report honestly.
Galaraison
:
That they can't honestly?
Ferretti: Oh, yes, they can.
Galamison They would like to report honestly, but when man
is raised with biases, and ignorances
. . .
Ferretti
:
But he still is reporting honestly.
Galamison It's very difficult to writea news piece that isn't
to some degree slanted, in fact it's almost impossible
to write things that isn't to some degree slanted.
And what happened in this vjhole process in the
sixties is that the news people, while they helped
all these efforts greatly by misgiving some public
airing, did formulate opinions and did interject
their biases and their prejudices in reporting,
and it added up, I think in the long run it was
a great detriment of some of the things that we
were trying to accomplish.
Oliver
:
A good example of that was that some newsmen, or
some of the new media at times would play me off
against McCoy, and play me up, play McCoy down,
and other times they played him up with me down.
And other times they pitted me against Sonny Carson
and made me like the nice sweet guy that should
have been listened to and he the bad guy who could
not be listened to and at another time they played
around
.
Donovan
:
Unless you think you are alone. Reverend.
Fantini: I have my own gripes about it.
Donovan
:
A new one, and look from my position. I could
claim the same thing. I could claim that undue
publicity was given to Rhody, everything he said
I had to respond to. You know, as you look at
these things
,
you can say that if you wish to -
I don't choose to say it at the moment, but I
want to say that I don't think anybody is ever
satisfied with his own image - whoever portrays
is portaying it improperly.
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Okay, we've now got roughly ten or fifteen minutes
left. I'd like to put out some concrete alterna-
tives and get some reactions, if I can. One
thing, one strategy that we tried when we were in
Chicago with Dr. King, and one strategy that we
suggested to McCoy, and one strategy that you might
consider, and I'd like your reaction to it, is to
get a kind of blue ribbon advisory board that re-
presents all kinds of opinions. For example, Neal
Sullivan and a large number of other educators v;ho
are willing to go to the legislature, black and
white, not only educators but all kinds of people,
to support Ocean Hill-Brownsville
,
and it was
possible to maybe put together an advisory board
with people from King's group and white conserva-
tive groups, all kinds of groups together in an
advisory board that would in a sense give an um-
brella. Now I have never see this tried in educa-
tion. Mac vetoed this at that time because he
thought it wasn't an appropriate strategy. I v;on-
der what your reaction is to it, why it has never
been tried, for example, in Washington, or - Dr. .
Clark gave me his kind of grimace, like now, let's
talk about that - but why not, what's wrong with
the idea of getting all kinds of people in at
the beginning, not just those who are engaged, and
using them as an umbrella technique. We use it
all the time in everything else.
But they are powerless, too.
Well, don't kid yourself.
Well, I think we did have an example of that. We
had the Bundy panel, I mean, it was a blue ribbon
panel
.
Marilyn, a very powerful school group in New York,
even PTA or . . .
Yes, but did they represent industry?
Oh, no, they didn't represent industry, but there
were people who did represent the industry, for
example local 1199 - during this whole thing, no,
let me say this. We met with people once a week
in a hotel for breakfast who represented about nine
or ten labor unions, every - you know every
- but
they didn 't.liave the weight that Harry Van Arsdale
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had had, they didn't have
. . .no, let me say
it, you see, I want to, and this is my last
attempt to philosophize here. What we are doing
here is saying in a sense that you can have a
society without leadership - really let me finish
this please - that you have a society without cha-
risma, that you could have a society without the
kind of prophetic, of you know, leadership that
people have given in every age to every society which
v;ould imply that it would have everybody on the
same level, thinking the same thing, and that some-
how numbers determine what is right and what is
wrong. And what I am saying is while all of this
would be very wonderful if it were possible or
practicable, that there are times in life when
the people who have prophetic concepts and ideas,
with people who do have leadership, with people
who do deal with tomorrow and not with today,
have to just get out and say, 'doggone it, this
is it, and this is where I am going, and if I
can't stand by or for by myself, I won't stand
for it at all, and if everybody leaves me alone,
this is what I am going to do.' Now this is the
way I saw Ocean Hill. This is the way I see every
significant reform movement in America. If you
could get a whole lot of people to support you,
it v;ouldn't be a reform movement. Then you have
the v.’ay a whole lot of people think. When would
it make you a leader? You would be saying which
way does the crowd go, I am going to lead them,
you know, get out there and get out in front.
So what we are arguing for even if we are trying
to deprive society of one of the most significant
elements that has ever existed, you know, in any
society as long as you had society, and that is
people v;ho get the visions, people \>?ho get the
concepts, people who fall in love with an ideal
or an idea and say, 'here I go, and if somebody
follows me, fine, if somebody doesn't, then I am
standing with this idea.'
Donovan
:
Do you remember the time when Charles Duval came
down the stairs and not well and his wife said,
'my God, he's . . . (rest not clear on tape)
Oliver: One of the most difficult things for anyone who
is in a leadership position is to really know
what the sympathies are, and that is where a commu-
nity is. I think that was always, and still is,
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tlie problem - where is the community? And there
were times when we thought they would be right
there and other times we didn't expect them and
then they were there by the hundreds, so it's
very difficult.
Let me try a dimension on the second question that
had to do with the people, which gets back to you,
Milton, but don't philosophize this time. The ques-
tion I am raising in terms of what I have been
hearing is that if the people identified leadership
or spokesmen, the institution will only deal with it
to the degree of a confrontation. Is that, that's
legitimate of what I am hearing? I am talking
about
. . .
Well, I think that
. .
. .
.
people emerging from
. .
That they'll deal with him until he challenges
their power.
In terms if we had a confrontation, is that
. .?
I li.'ould do it. I just want to answer a question
and present the final hypotheses. I think what
yon are talking about is the strategy which is
secondary or even way down the hill. I mean,
I wouldn't put it out of hand, but I remember
when I came in to work with the Bundy panel, I
kind of thought to myself, 'this is not possible,'
I mean, you've got the whole powerhouse here, you
got Bundy, you got the Governor, and the Mayor,
and every - you know, the power basis, if any
political scientists looking at this would think
would put the thing over. I can even - and I
tell this all the time - but I can remember saying
to Bundy on the first day I met him in this dis-
cussion that this kind of institutional change
that we are talking about has never happened in
history without revolution. And he agreed. But
v;e proceeded to work with the Bundy panel, assuming
that that - and this is the way that I interpreted
it at that time and I still interpret it that way -
that the people up there had nothing to loose by
this; that they were giving up just the power of
t!ie middle-class professional if they were giving
up anything. Wliat I think was misread by people
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like Bundy, and Lindsay, and Rockefeller
- if I
may say so - was the power of the union and that
middle group of professionals. They thought that
they could give away that power. The didn't have
it to give away. And that's where the confronta-
tion came. But what I want to say is that that
was the strategy of the Bundy panel, that you get
a representative blue ribbon group together who you
thought can manipulate it through, and 1 think you
are misreading New York City politics, if I may
say so, which is quite different from Chicago poli-
tics, or - each of these cities have a political
^*jlture of their ov?n. And the business community
in New York has never played a role in education.
That's one thing, nov^7
. .
Calvin
:
Was the President of IBM and the President of US
Steel on the Bundy panel?
Gittell
:
No.
Calvin Well, then, you are saying that industry is repre-
sented you - you are talking about a different
game? Right?
Gittell
:
No, no, no.
Galamison
:
Well, the President of RCA vuis Involved.
Gittell
:
No, no, later on . . .
Galamison Yes, ho played a very significant role.
Gittell: Yes, Milton's right - the operational thing of
it, but I think you misread New York City politics.
I mean if you could convince Oavid Rockefeller,
let's say, to move in on the critical issues,
which he wouldn't because of his brother, you
might have - then yon have b.is support in advance,
but there are other kinds of business leadership
that you might find functioning, let's say, in a
city like Pittsburgh or Cincinatti, which really
doesn't function here, labor unions run this city,
and you are not going to get Harry Van Arsdnle to
be on the side of that red i str Lljution of power.
Calvin
:
I think that's an important point.
Gittell
:
Can I just - and I don't think there was a chance
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Swanker
:
in hell to get the support of Harry Van Arsdale.
I really do believe this. And I think there were
real efforts made to do this, but - I mean he knows
where he is at and where he is going, and this is
not, and this had no advantage for his union mem-
bership, in fact, he saw it as a threat. I would
like to hypothesize this; that the structure of
power in America makes it impossible to achieve a
redistribution of power without confrontations and
conflicts; that changing institutions in America,
and that means mainly educational institutions,
requires that redistribution of power; therefore,
what we are faced with is what kinds of strategies
can you develop that people without power can use
to get a wedge in the door to create some kind of
power base which they can use for the redistribution
of power. And I think for that I'd go back myself
to theories of social change, and either you can go
to Barrington Moore and say, 'this requires a cumu-
lative long-time confrontation kind of thing, which
we deny calling violence, but may very well include
it in Ocean Hill-Brownsville ,' may in effect be one
of the stages of that cumulative action, because I
certainly notice around the country that whereas
two years ago people talked about Ocean Hill-Brov;nsville
like a catastrophe, now they are looking at it
in the perspective of history. And I think that
may be one possibility. And the other is Parson's
notion of the accident of history. The social
change can come from some guy who doesn't read
clearly that what you are doing is moving him over,
that is, he's trying to get, pull you in to subli-
mate you and prevent you from gaining power, but in
doing so he gives you a wedge in the door and you
can capitalize on that. That's another possibility.
I mean these are threads which don't help other
cities, frankly, 1 mean, because it's terribly
discouraging, but I think the picture is discoura-
ging, and I don't think we should move away from
that
.
I want to pick up a point that Marilyn gave, and
I think a thought that will emphasize the point
you made, as well, and that is she mentioned the
fact that the union and CSA were threatened, their
power was threatened by the demonstration districts.
I would like to propose that the union and the
CSA gained power through this, that in this realign-
ment of power, the union and the CSA came out much
stronger than they had been before. The union at
that time was very unpopular, they had just comple-
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ted a very unpopular strike the previous year and
tliey were very unpopular in the City with the
parents and the - with most groups in the City.
But as a result of the publicity given to them as
a result of Ocean Hill-Brownsville
,
is a result
of the sympathy that they drew from labor and from
working families, and so forth, whose labor sym-
pathies supported the union and from the CSA
. I
would say that they gained, no only did they gain
in power, they gained in membership, people who
had previously not joined, joined because they
saw themselves threatened by this, the CSA certainly
gained in power and in strength as a result of this.
Now this is a negative move as far as this parti-
cular group is concerned. In other words, it's
a change, and it's a power of the alignment and as
far as v^e are concerned, it's in the wrong direction
but going back to Dr. Calvin's point, what could
be proposed and what could we theorize for other
cities who might be facing the same situation.
This is something that they might gain, in looking
at these events that led to this and what happened
as a result, in other words, this realignment of
power in strengthening the very groups who opposed
to change, and see if there was some possible ways
and moves that might have been made
,
that might have
made a difference in that particular case.
Gal aniison
:
Could 1 suggest one that might have been made? I
think it might have been possible to duplicate
some of these positions that were threatened if
\<ic could have found the amount of money and the
understanding - to put into the total picture -
in other words, if some principal were threatened
by the innovation of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, then
some structure might have been set up whereby
we could have two principals in the school, one
an administrative principal and one another kind
of principal. Or the same thing with an area
superintendent, that some structure may have been
set up whereby we could have created a dual supe-
rintendency. I just want to throw this at you,
Ken. You can knock it down if you want to.
Donovan
:
I'd like to knock it down, okay? Because I don't
think education is run by compromise. I just don't
think you get anyplace. We gave eighty-nine
additional positions to Ocean Hill-Brownsville
to get tlie union off the backs of the Board for
Clark;
one year, for tilio rest of that year eighty-nine
positions were given to retain the teachers that
Ocean Hill had hired in good faith by itself, and
also retained union members who still stayed. I
remember the figure eighty nine. At the end of
the year that eighty nine ran out, they had to
decide which teachers, you know ... it was done.
The principals weren't done, but Milton, tliat
,
too,
is a temporary compromise that settles nothing.
It just delays to make a decision.
That's a good one within the conflict of the rational
approach to the resolution of problems, and in that
way we propose that because in proposing that you
demonstrate tiiat your ministerial Christian saying
is very much a part of you
,
because you ignore a
very important part of the problems in New York
City which differentiate this from Washington,
Chicago, Detroit, etc. The fact of the matter is
that Ocean Hill-Drovmsviilc and the whole decen-
tralization issue came in New York City within the
context of racist, ethnic, locks, and exclusion,
and it Vv/as not just the issue of counting positions,
etc. A realist ic look at tlie structure of power
in Nev; York City in education, labor, you know,
shows that New York City is a free, free, free
city. Now, tiiere was once the Board of Education
was organized on the basis of three Catholics,
three white Protestants, three Jews. You look
at labor unions in New York City.
.
.
yes, when
the Negroes moved in, they moved in at the expense
of one of the v;hite. Protestant positions, you see.
All riglit. So you vjeren ' t just dealing with shear
economic, or displacement of members, you were
dealing vjith status, racial complexities, you
were asking an institution in the City that was
an integral part of the ethnic organization of New
York City to reorganize its ethnic perspectives.
I have an hypothesis which we'll never get data
on. That if Rhody McCoy had been a white adminis-
trator, and preferably a Jewish administrator in
the Ocean Hil 1 -Brownsville thing; first, his
style would have been different in terms of how
he did what ho did, but u'hat he did that allegedly
precipitated the thing, v;ould not have been a state
of calamity or crisis, that actually - you know,
Bernie, tliat these arrangements drew debate and
whereby administrators, shift people or get them
around - but for the first time you had a black
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Galamison
:
area administrator, or superintendent, saying
tliat some white teachers were incompetent, and
patticularly in a school in which black students
were the people whom they were being frightened.
Now New York, with the reputation of being the
most cosmopolitan city in this country, with
sometimes the exception of San Francisco, is the
last city in which that kind of thing could be
tolerated, and there isn't any way a formula could
have done anything. It is more likely to be tole-
rated, well, not tolerated, but is not likely to
have the same intensity of crisis now, because
Oliver and McCoy were the commandos in breaking
that kind of ethnic unquestioned etiquette.
Could I say this, though, Ken, there is no question
that there are racial overtones and other over-
tones in this, but it's very difficult to get to
them, and I believe Shanker used them for all
that it was vv7orth, but it's very difficult to get
to them.
Donovan
:
By the way, I think Shanker used them genuinely,
I don't think
. . .
Galamison Rut when you are dealing with a situation where
somebody has to be displaced because somebody
else takes his job. In other words, it would be
perfectly normal in a sense for a teacher, no
matter x-jhat color she wears, if she belonged to
a imion, to feel that she V\?as being displaced
because somebody else took her job. Now, true,
Rhcdy hired more white teachers than he hired
block teachers.
Donovan Yes, but he was firing whites and xvho was doing
the displacements?
Galamison Weil, I am not debating that. I am just saying
it's awfully hard to get to that when you turn
tlie school system in this country or any system
in this country into a back alley, where people-
have to fight so that somebody else is getting a
job alx^;ays means somebody's displacement. And
whal I would have done, you know, if I'm not
being Monday morning quarterback, if I really
had wanted to carry this tiling out peacefully,
xv»as to make sure that anybody who felt threate-
ned had some kind of, you know, satisfaction, you
Calvin
:
Gal amison
:
Clark
:
know, some kind of guarantee so that I could make
room for the innovations without creating the kind
of public and social tensions.
Milt, was anybody fired? Was anybody actually
fired; wasn't it a transfer?
No, nobody \;as actually fired, no - but when the
nc-Hi;spapGrs for six weeks keep saying people were
fired, then people begin to believe that they
Vv’ere fired
.
Milton, before I leave, there is one other thing
I wanted to say to reinforce my judgement to you
as a Christian ... is that fact that you got
graciously the nature of the 201 crisis that came
after. You remember when, what's his name.
Chuck Wilson made some administrative decisions
as to when his teachers should or should not be
in the school. It wasn't firing. It was a black
administrator being presumptions enough to believe
that he should make decisons about white teachers.
It wasn't a due process problem there. There
wasn't a losing job, it v;as just authority - the
teacher. Shanker made no bones about the fact
that he questioned the right of a black adminis-
trator to take literally authority and power to
make now, if the white can be satisfied with
money, ritual tokens, possessions, he doesn't -
you don't have to worry about anytiiing
,
you know,
to deal with him like v?ith other people, you call
liim by his first name, and he'll call you by - if
you're white - your first name, but when we really
get problems and difficulties, is when a black
borough president decides that they are going to
use the office of borough presidency the v^ay white
borough presidents had previously used it, then
you not only get problems, but you get reorganiza-
tion of municipal codes, and you get the borough
presidency reduced . . . Black and wliite Chris-
tians, unlike social scientists, can face these
kinds of realities whicli lie in the face of myth
of removing and making racial progress. And I
am fascinated and I v^ill tell my students that
Hilton Galamison. a good, sound, American democrat
Gal amison
:
No, I have no argument v;ith what you are saying
and it is undeniably true, but what I am saying
is it's awfully difficult to get to that in teims
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of other circunir^Lances
,
and in terms of the Illus-
trations that you have just pointed out, having
been on the hoard of Education and having studied
the bureaucracy as I had an opportunity to study,
I think there v/oul.d have been some resentment and
some liostility against anybody who made a decision
whicli might countermand for it, or disagree, or
even indicatf* that somebody had the power to make
the decision, M)at the structure at 110 Livingston
Street hadn't made itself. Now this is not going
to take away from what you were saying, I hope
not, because I think what you were saying is unde-
niably true, but there are other factors here,
too, that I think, Ken, liavc to be dealt with, and
that is the sharing of power with anybody, and
maylie wc can say especially with sharing it with
block folks.
Particularly vdien the predicament of black men in
America has iK-en a predicament of differential
power and any confrontation of black make will
be a confronl at j on that is essentially giving more
power
.
Keu, can I ask you a question just a little diffe-
rent before you run, and omit a word, but I just
heard you say that the stronger a man in control
'you can write par t icii)ation
,
and add money, and
arc thu.se things the more precise is the effort
is on the part of the institution to neutralize
those efforts.
To neutralize and evade, or ignore. Initially
it would seem to me that tlie tecliniques would
be l)ec:ause generally these kinds of confrontations
are made v;itli good people, or fairly good people,
and they are not going to start out be reacting
to them in terms of flagrant forms of resistance.
The initial forms of resistance will be quite
reasonable. Tlic lav;, v;hat the cliche one is 'we
agree with your objectives but we really don't
like your methods,' and this kind of thing, so
you didn't liave to suffer through a process of
education in terms of convenient methods. If you
don't learn, it your cultural deprivation is such
that you become preoccupied, you know, and compul-
sive and obses:;ive about your goal, your objec-
tives, then reforms over resistance liave to be
stepped out.
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McCoy
:
Clark
Gittel 1
:
Clark:
Calvin
:
Clark:
Donovan
:
Calvin
:
Clark
:
Then you get chucked?
Not always, you'll get, you know the first sign
is a tendency to ridicule, or to describe you in
vjays that question your intelligence, that method
because actually it's agreed that you are cultu-
rally deprived anyway, well, your personal stabi-
lity - and these arc not peculiar to white black
thing you do this with dissident whites, whites
can threaten other v;hites that have to be dealt
with with varying degrees of social control. In
the black situation you can do, when you are really
pushed to the wall the way Shanker was, you really
can get so intense and so emotional as to build up
the van and the other thing to a point of real
threshhold if not beyond social irresponsibility.
By that time all of the issues of Ocean Hill-Browns-
ville, not only educational, but, you know, autho-
rity, the relationship between the Central Board
or local, became totally subordinated to the emo-
tional issue of black anti-Semitism, and then you
were lost. I just didn't see any way that you
could have won once that issue became transformed.
But you notice it didn't start that way. It started
v;ith due process and the usual.
4
So, wliat you are really saying, Ken is so long
as Brownsville didn't back down, you would pre-
dict that being an accelerated kind of . . .
Absolutely. The only alternative to that was
confession to the right of the community to make
this its decision and to go back to Bernie's
initial issue, to be the instrument of accounta-
bility .
Is there a strategy?
The instrument of accountability, Bernie , without
authority and power, etc.
I am not arguing with that.
Dr. Clark, is there a strategy that can be adopted
to avoid this problem? Is there a way, is there
any kind of strategy that can be - or option, or
alternative, or one which . . .
Now your question gets me back to why I was so
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Galamison
:
unclear about the original
. . . Frankly, I
arn now telling you the conclusion of this ’book
that I am writing on the subject - that there is
no alternative to this except going through it.
Going through what, Ken?
Gittell: Through
. . .
Calvin
:
Are you any further ahead than we were before?
Clark: Not necessarily. Nobody can guarantee that you
are going to bo successful.
Calvin And thciE is no strategy that you can see.
. .
Clark
:
To guarantee success?
Calvin No, to avoid tlie problem itself, or to at least
. .
Clark Yes, ttiere is a strategy to avoid the problem -
not making the original confrontation.
Gittell : You are not seeking reform, but
. .
Gal amison But here again, could I just, let me just make
. .
Clark: 1 don't think you can do that.
Galamison: I don't think that anybody can say at this point
whetiier Ocean Hill was a success or not, you see.
For tliose, you know, wlio look for tlie immediate
achievement of immediate goals, as heaven knows
i do, you know, maybe we should say Shanker
walked away with all the marbles. I wouldn't want
to . . .
.
,
but this v;ould not mean to me that
Ocean Hill has not succeeded in terms of the seeds
that have been planted, in terms of the social
consciousness, social awareness which have been
created. Every college student is interested in
education all around the country is interested in
Ocean Hill, 201, and what happened to Two Bridges
in the Nev; York situation during tliose years, and
it's thoroughly possible that a seed has been
planted in our society which will openly bring
about the phase that Rliody McCoy and Oliver and
their group tried to do. Now, you know the fact
is, you don't win right av/ay
,
the objective gone
doesn't mean that you didn't win at all and whether
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you succeed or fail or not, is not - can't be
determined by what happened externally either,
you know, it's what happens within people.
Donovan
:
Milton, I am inclined to agree with you. If I
would have to say the whole thing, I would say
that Ocean Hill-Brownsville was a success, but we
haven't seen it yet. In other words, it was an
immediate failure perhaps in terms of the people
there getting exactly what they wanted, but I
think the repercussions of it, this shaking up
that it did, even though it resulted in a stronger
union and all this kind of stuff that came out
of it, in the long run it has changed a lot of
people's thinking, or at least made them think-
if it hasn't changed their thinking about what's
going on. Eventually I would hope that it would
pay off. I don't really consider it a defeat,
I think it's a kind of a delayed victory, maybe
that's the way I ought to put it.
Gittell: Well, there is a success on certain levels we can
put it on, immediately that I think you would
agree with, Bernie, and that is like they appoin-
ted the principals, that some of the things that
are going on now in New York, which I don't think
could happen five years ago. And you have made it
more palatable to say that the community confused
the principal Benjamin Franklin, which would
have been unheard of five years ago in that respect
Donovan: But it still has to be settled.
Gittell
:
All right, yes, but I think Ken left that open
in terms of it's possible, but there is no
guarantee
.
Donovan The people of Ocean Hill may not at the moment
see any great reward out of it, you know, but I
do think there is a residue there that will get
stronger as time goes on.
Gittell
:
Well, at least it's possible.
Calvin
:
Mac, do you want to break here until the next
session. Is this a communion place? How does
everybody feel? It would be extremely helpful
from a point of view of let's say certain educa-
tional constraints at a higher level if each of
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you . . . Seriously, each of you could write a
little bit about - v/cll, maybe we'll wait until
after the fourth or fifth thing, but we are going
to need some help from you on this in some other
ways, and ways that may not seem to be - you see,
what's coming out of this that I can see is there
really is beginning to emerge not a panacea or
solution for other people's problems, but really
some ideas that I think are going to be useful
as the dickens looking towards for a beginning
because you can't get this group around the table
without a bunch of ideas coming out that will be
useful to people, at least to consider. So we
may ask for your help after the fourth or fifth
session in putting your ideas in a form you'd like
to see. and maybe as appendages to a document that
Rhody is getting ready to submit. So-but I thought
this is a very useful and constructive kind of
session, and I know I speak for Rhody in thanking
you all for coming.
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I guess I have been one of the few people who've
had an opportunity to look through all three trans-
cripts and see what the direction is we've been
going, very exciting, and I guess basically, in
the three transcripts we sort of have identified
very clearly a chronology to search the background
as we did in the first session, and outlined a
series of issues which was in the last panel, and
in looking at all three of the recordings, we find
some cohesion and some articulation which begins
to make a lot of sense, gives a lot of direction.
And obviously, I am concerned about where the next
two panel sessions will lead us. The design of
this project was laid out clearly in the beginning
as trying to look at the New York crisis, look at
the critical incidents and issues and see if from
it we could put together some options, some con-
ditions that would lead to certain kind of respon-
sive behavior and so forth, and having the luxury
of being in school now, being in college, some
other things have been happening. One in parti-
cular which I think is very significant, and I'd
like to use that as a point of departure for today's
panel. I would hope everybody is aware of what's
happening in Newark right now. My feelings are
that it's almost an identical relationship of peo-
ple around an educational issue, as it happened in
New York City and in Ocean Hill-Brownsville in par-
ticular. One of the latest experiences I had was
watching the television, and television gave an
accounting of the Newark situation, and in a very
long news broadcast, it started out, I think, with
Ken Gibson, and the questions that were asked
almost dictated the kinds of answers that he had
to give and it was centered around LeRoi Jones's
participation in the government, and the school
strike in particular, and then the news broadcast
suggested that the next person to speak was the
black school board president, and made it a point
of reference that the school board was black, and
then the president of the Newark teachers, a
young lady, spoke, and her concerns were - let me
back up and say that the board member said that
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his concern was particularly in education, and then
the president of the teachers' association spoke
and her concerns were why were the black militants
bombing her car, fire bombing and inciting and doing
all these things, when actually what they were trying
to do was to get better teaching conditions for the
teachers so that obviously they could get better
educational programs for the kids. And then the
next person who came on was LeRoi Jones
,
and they
asked him a question which I think was just lost
in the translation, asked him a question about why
were they attempting to bust the union, and he said
they weren't attempting to bust the union, what
they were trying to do is to get an ethnic repre-
sentation of the people who work in the community
and allow some decisions be made by people in the
community as related to their own children. And
then Bayard Ruskin came on and he said that this
was just an intolerable situation and if you really
looked at it, it was the black militants who are
responsible for all these problems, and so forth.
And then finally the union representative came on-,
not the teachers' union, but the labor union's
representative came on, and he deliberately threa-
tened the situation by saying that if it was an
attempt to bust the union, they would not in any
way tolerate it, if they had to tie up the entire
eastern seaboard or bring the entire labor move-
ment and its pressures, but this was a test situa-
tion which they weren't going to allow the union
to be busted because they had fought too long for
gains that it had. That was the chronology of
the people who spoke on television and very obvious-
ly, you, I, think, all around the table can under-
stand how it was frightening as being a replica of
Ocean Hill. The two most prevalent concerns that
I had - one was that, and I attribute this to
you - at the last meeting, to talk about how peo-
ple sit around the table and discuss an issue in
isolation, when in fact the discussions centered
around an educational issue and nowhere in the
discussions was education discussed, it was purely
political, the power and pressures generated by
the power entity; and secondly, I looked at it
•\jQxy carefully in terms of the kinds of responses
that came from each of the people who represented
a constituency, and even in their ability, or
attempts I should say, to address themselves as
to why are the teachers striking in Newark and
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F antini
:
why the conditions are so deplorable in order to
protect their respective constituency it was ob-
vious that they couldn't talk about education. So
with that kind of background for today, I thought
maybe we could look at it two or three ways with
a clear understanding of its relationship on what
are the possible duplications in Ocean Hill as to
two parts in relation to it; one is the opinions
about the Newark situation and two, are there any
inputs to this that we can make around this table,
obviously the position of this panel that may re-
solve the impass. Those are the two levels I want
to start off with and then move to another level,
which will sort of wind this panel up today.
Incidentally, if we can look at it this way, and
I recognize that it may be rather difficult, I
think it'll really put some substance in the New
York Crisis and Ocean Hill, that's translation,
but I would appreciate it if anybody would have
any opinions about the Newark situation, and two,
do you have any idea what inputs we could make
around this table as to what may be some of the
possible solutions.
Well, I am not as close to the Newark situation
as to New York, but I can - I could formulate an
hypothesis that New York City .
.
you can look at
New York City as being farther along in the stage
of deterioration, if you will, in other words
the concentration of forces that is shaping the
whole society, particularly at work in New York
City, and has become as a matter of fact in the
concerns of people who use institutions which are
not working for their behalf and that in education
which took the form and shape in New York City,
a stage of conern on the part of particularly
the educational consumers, have been concerned,
that they had to literally intervene in what was
happening and they called it ...
,
which was to
establish a different type of relationship, try
to make institutions work for them, they are not,
these were public institutions, and my hypothesis
is that New York is at one stage of development,
and other cities are at different stages and that
continues. And if the conditions remain unaltered,
that is, if the basic concern for education - it
is so important that if you don't have it, you
don't have access to this kind of society we have;
if doesn't - your options are limited, and not only
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are your options limited
,
but we have a - without
education perpetuated things that happened again,
and right now education is vital to survival, and,
so therefore, to deny human beings education today
is to deny them the means of survival, and it is
not surprising that this is the case. That those
who are affected will have to reach a stage of the
reigns, then in which they try to do something
about it. Now New York, in Ocean Hill was an attempt
to look at Ocean Hill this way and now tliat you
say, 'well, look at Newark, this is a parallel,'
that's not surprising to me that it is a parallel,
because the same conditions are at work, the same
frustrations, the same needs and people are going
to watch your change, they are going to express
themselves. The irony of it, and the one we talked
about last time, was that institutions have their
own, they have their own character, and try to -
any entity, they try to preserve themselves so
that we have those on the inside who are trying
to preserve it, trying to justify it in one way,
and those on the outside seeking some form of
redress; but those who do not have access to power
are trying to challenge it. And I think that the
unfortunate part of this theory is that it seems
to be inevitable that there is no way of altering
this; it seems to be that the forces arc so con-
centrated, so power-laden right now that to try
to create a counterforce to remedy a deteriorating
situation, first is politically non-tenable and
that -economical- the situation in the community
can't, even if you could do it politically, you
can't sustain it, because exactly the people who
are the most affected are the people who are
trying to monopolize that power, and that - if it's
true what Dr. Clark or Dr. Gittel said the last
time - that you really to affect, to try to inter-
vene in a situation of this kind, is not only con-
troversial and sort of hazardous, but in many ways
it can't work, so that the fundamental irony here
is that we can see these symtoms, we can see these
things that are parallel in Ocean Hill, but I don't
see much that we can do about it. So, my theory
is that New York was at a certain stage of develop-
ment, others have forces that are shaping New York
that are shaping other cities so that the condi-
tions developed have not been a change that cause
this, and therefore you have a Newark and we are
going to have other cities that will have the same
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kinds of conditions. So there will be other Ocean
Hills that will be taking different forms, but
essentially the same characteristics.
Ferretti
:
There is another dimension in Newark; this is a
funny city. It's a city without any tax base at
all right now. All of the white middle-class peo-
ple have moved out and the blacks that were there
are poor in this city. The only businesses of note
are downtown, Prudential Insurance, as I recall,
some of the breweries. So there is really no money
in Newark. Newark is a businessman's town. People
come in from East Orange, or from Bergen country,
so that at the end of the day, they go home at
five o'clock and it's a ghost town at night, and
there is really no money unless the people
. . .
to do anything in Newark these days. And when I
hear the teachers or the teachers' association, as
I recall the first two or three days in the strike
talking about nothing else but 'the package has
to be bigger or we don't talk.' There was no
talk about education at all; the package has to
be bigger - there is no way of making the package
bigger. But you know, of course, you go along
with the political ramifications. What's signi-
ficant to me was the appearance on the scene of
Bayard Rustin. You know when Bayard Rustin shows
up, you know that he goes there with the teachers'
union approval and he says things that will be
approved by the teachers. So I don't count on him
anything more than a piece of litmus paper, as we
say
.
F antini
:
When you say it's bankrupt, I want to follow through
on that - when you say that there is no money there,
but there is a need, then it seems to me that
this is - it only reinforces the kinds of concerns
that I have, that if they wanted to find money and
if there was a national priority declared, that
was a, you know, if there is a flood, you have an
emergency, - we even have special executive powers
to make money available, well this is the stage
that education is in, and therefore you have it
deteriorate like this; you have people who are
trying to get some kind of regress from injustice;
and then finally you have that what leads - the
only thing that comes out of this is repression.
This is another indication that things are not
going to change. It's going to be inevitable.
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and that they even - concerns, you know, the fact
that there are all kinds of ways camouflaging it -
you could get people who have a vested interest
in seeing to it that things remain as they are
saying, 'look, who is involved in this, look at
sll these people who are wild,' and camouflage it
. . . the problems, but that's the irony of the
whole thing. The general public, as you were saying
earlier, is not aware that the emperor wears no
clothes. You know that there is a fraud here going
on, something the general public is not aware of,
so they throw out these political things and they
see a person like Bayard Rustin, who seems to be
a reasonable man, very
. .
.
you know, since they
are away from the problems, they . . .
., and the
kids remain a sacrifice. To me
,
I don't know how
you relate them.
McCoy: Can I ask it in a different way? If what I am
hearing you say is so, let me pose it in the form
of a question, if in the Newark situation it is
obviously apparent to me that every one of the
people to whom I have talked see what the fiasco
is, obviously know much more. I mean, I think
the nation knows he's bankrupt because he's been
appealing to the federal government for help, so
if they know that and obviously there must be some
role that they are playing and a script they are
following to make those kinds of demands. Now
let me put it into New York. If what I think
hearing you is so, even in New York, before Ocean
Hill, with the more sophisticated people, obviously
knew that these - of this stage of development that
you are talking about, were there. So I guess
that the last thing I am saying is if you are
identifying the fact that education in this coun-
try is not a national priority, which we all
believe, then you are saying that people all over
the country as they reach this stage of develop-
ment will become involed in this struggle, and
those who are vested interest groups can expect
those kinds of behavior. But then if that's how
it is right now, then does it get to a stage like
it is in New York, or like it - I mean like it
was in New York, or like it is in Newark? I mean,
the vested interest groups knowing this phase of
the struggle and seeing the signs . . . can expect
certain kinds of behavior.
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Fantlni: Rbody, that presupposes that vested interests have
the public interest at heart.
Oliver: I remember back in '68 when an issue came before
the Governing Board, that is also involved in the
Newark situation, and that is the binding arbitra-
tion, and at one time we were confronted with a
choice of accepting binding arbitration and we did
not go along v;lth that because it seemed as though
we could see that the kind of binding arbitration
that we would have gone along with would have been
detrimental to us. So we didn't accept it, and
I see that this same issue is in Newark. As far
as Rustin is concerned, he never - even though he
came out against, publicly against the Governing
Board's, spoke against it - he never once to my
knowledge set foot in Ocean Hill-Brownsville to
ask anyone there what their issues were. He never
tried to find out, and without trying to find out
or to see it from another side, he publicly took
sides against the Governing Board and with the
UFT, and I hove the feeling that he is practicing,
the same there. He was and remained out of con-
tact with Ocean Hill-Brownsville and I rather sus-
pect he is still out of cont;act with the people
in Newark. But it does appear right now that the
young people, the children, the students in the
New York City public school system are the captors
of the UFT. They are, they arc colonies now of
the UFT, and unfortunately there is not . enough
policing of the UFT to make them produce what
they are being paid for, so they have pretty much a
dictatorial system of control over the students,
and if the union with the backing of the UFT and
with backing of labor is successful at Newark, I
am afraid that those who v;ant communities to be
more involved are going to suffer another defeat.
I don't think that education made advances in the
defeat of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, and what's going
on there now, I think is evidence of that. I can
only hope that Newark won't go that road.
Fantini
:
You arc supporting my statement; it's inevitable,
you came close, you caught a glimpse of something
other than what it is, and that's part of the
reason that you really shouldn't have travelled
that road at all, you were never meant to travel
that road, you were never meant to have the
212
community have that much. When they found out
what was happening here, they quickly moved to
establish an equilibrium which served, you know,
the status quo, because there were vested interests
associated with it, and I think that what has
happened is that before
. .
.
(not distinguishable
on the tape)
. . Ocean Hill triggered an awareness
coast to coast, it also triggered and the way it
was played, it was a negative rather than a posi-
tive thing, at least that's the way it was communi-
cated, but it signaled the people who have vested
interest whether it is community organizations or
what
,
that they have to become more aware of the
educational consumer than they have in the past.
So they devise mechanisms that appear to satisfy
the public code, you know, the past, or you know,
by developing notions of participation which are
still controlled by those who are the power, so
that they have advisors' groups, and they do have
parent participation, but it's of a sort that is
tolerable to those who are present and when they
do talk, and another thing, they came out of the •
whole decentralization community control with the
whole issue of accountability. And now, you see,
they are - we got to be accountable, but they
capture that, they know this, and they say, 'look,
we are, we'll create a -Dr. Clark, you know, he's
wearing no clothes,' and so the people say, 'nov/
here . . .
'
(indistinguishable on the tape)
. . .
and we, the people who are charged to conceal
this reform, are put in a position of trying to
justify what can be very unreasonable, and then
you have people like LeRoi Jones and v;hat . . .
that kind of up to the American public, and they
say, 'look, if you have people like that, what
good becomes of something like this,' you see,
and this cycle continues, this is ray whole point.
I don't know how to deal with it, it's inevitable,
and Ocean Hill came closest in the history of
American education for a short period of time
to demonstrate what a ... at least in terms of
government might be relationship between the
schools and the community for the purpose of
improving education of children we've never gotten
to that because we have been thick in the clouds
of politics. And, you know, one of the questions
I remember that was raised with you, Rhody , is
that, refers to the clouds of politics were so
thick, what words, what . . . quality of education
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during that process, you know, when you did have
a chance in those moments, did you, were you able
to
. . .
Before you raise that question with Rhody, I'd
like to go back to the initial question that Rhody
raised about the similarities between Ocean Hill-
Brovvrnsville and Isewark, because I think in order
to see the similarity, maybe we ought to see the
differences, too. As I see the Newark thing, the
major triggering v/ith the teachers' strike in Newark
was economic, was the political or the community
control or who has the control over the public
schools in Newark and the prerogatives of criti-
cizing, and what not, was not the board's concern,
it's basic concern in Newark was the type of variety,
union's concern was protecting the economic, the
labor interests of the union's members, and this
apparently cuts through obviously the first thing
that goes is educational concerns, economic,
largely economic picture of an inequality in subor-
dinance, just as the unions in New York, or fire-
men or policemen, etc. It's not their concern
who pays as long as it isn't that the union in
Newark, and certainly race is irrelevant on the
leisure level; the fact that the leader of
that union in Newark is black, sex is apparently
irrelevant because she is also female, and you
don't have the structure of, you know, more
convenient personification that evil which we had
was a white, male Shanker in New York, and the
only part of it on television that I saw, Rhody,
was what I thought was a pathetic appeal of Bayard
to, I think, predominantly black teachers, when
he V7as trying to convince them for basic support
for strike; and the segment I saw, he didn't seem
particularly too decisive, nor did he seem parti-
cularly convinced himself. He seemed as if he
were going through a routine that has become his
role, particularly in regard to teachers' strikes,
because apparently Bayard has focussed his produc-
tion of his role as the liaison between disadvan-
taged black minority and the "disadvantaged labor
movement," and he becomes the agent of clearance
or alliance here. And sometimes he obviously has
difficulty in this role, so as I see this Newark
thing, it - in many basic ways, is different. Now
in some ways it is similar. But to me the simi-
larities are deep beneath the surface, in a way
21A
maybe more insidious, because the growth of orga-
nized labor movements, unions, in the educational
field is a kind of a danger and a fact which was
highly focussed in the Ocean Ilill-Brownsville
thing, because what made there was to take them-
selves against the people of a community, 'look,
we sued you, we have the power to block you,'
as it turned out they did. But let me take the
.
look at Newark, in Washington, in other sections
where you have strong, or varyingly strong teachers'
union movements, you have what I would consider the
contemporary form of a significant interference
and contamination of the educational process by
a power group that is not particularly interested
in education, that's interested in using the edu-
cational process as an instrument of its power.
But I declare this kind of danger and desire for
educational virginity or purity was put in the dark
form of preventing the politician from raping the
educational process, in other words, all good libe-
rals mobilize themselves to effect education from
political interference and by political interfe- •
rence you mean the hack politician,
. . . teachers,
area supervisors, and what not, in fact some of
our reforms that have since become abuses were
attempts to deal vjith that, such as the civil
service exam, or the Board of Examiners. These
were attempts to maintain the purity and virginity
of the educational process and educational deci-
sions from being abused and raped by non-educators.
When I . . . the danger of raping and contamina-
ting the education process by some other kind of
power changed somewhat; here it took the form of
the American Legion or rightist. people
,
or people
who had a particular kind of ideology that they
wanted to see that the schools would not go against
so all good liberals mobilized themselves to pro-
tect the virtue or the virginity of education
from this kind of raping by the writers, the ideo-
logists who are generally the conservatives, in
fact, reactionary who wanted to control the schools
And somehow or other we fought that through with
some sort of success, but I will go to Newark,
there is a new kind of rapist, a new kind of power
structure that is seeking to contaminate tlie edu-
cational process and subordinate it to their
issue, but now the danger is not as apparent
because these are allegedly people within the
educational issue - they are allegedly educators.
and
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I
I
I
so the fact that they are really alien to educa-
tional concerns takes a long time for anybody to
see, and you can't look at them as if they were
^
hack politicians, or as if they were reactionary
I because you have a Bayard Rustin, you get the libe-
ral labor movement mobilizing to come to their
defense, and if they succeed, not only will the
local community people not have control over educa-
tion a la Ocean llill-Brownsville
,
but the Mayor
Butler won't have control over education, nobody
will have control over education, including nice,
conservative, middle-class people everywhere, they
will readily be relegated to the irrelevant, and
the last people who will have control of education
will be the central boards of education and bureau-
cracy if this particular power, as I see it without
regard to the justice or injustice of their econo-
mic, if you want, I am not in a position to say
whether the teachers in Newark are underpaid or
overpaid, nor am I in a position to say whether
the city or the state can find the money or not
find it. These are not questions which I have
any pipeline to doubt. The other . . I feel I
can say is that if teachers' unions continue to
grow in power, as tliey appear to be, and are sup-
ported by the labor movements in genreal
,
then
education becomes a form of labor movement, and
what the American Legion and the Birch Society
and the others did not succeed in doing, that
the hack politicians did not succeed in doing,
the liberal labor movement would have succeeded
in doing.
\
I Ferretti: What better ... to leverage . . .
« McCoy: It puts a different context on it to analize this
; as you just did. Mario mentioned or Reverend
Oliver quoted Vv’hat Mario mentioned indirectly,
*, that there is some concern on the part of the
people, one to hold somebody accountable for the
performance of these educators, and you alluded
to the fact that they mentioned this in the rhe-
toric so that the public would think that they
are addressing themselves to it. ... the tea-
chers in the next few lines which says . . .
Clark: Well, they watch the smile on Shanker's face on
the front page of the T ime s
.
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McCoy: Which really says in effect, 'we are going to have
to work out a situation where we can look at this
thing objectively,' which is almost tantamount to
impossible. On the other hand, you touch bases
with the last body who doesn't have an effect on
education, that's the Board of Education, so what
I am saying is that you almost paint a hopeless
picture of 'the people who are supposed to be in
education' being involved in education, or you are
bringing
. . .
Clark: Well, they will be involved, Rhody, in the sense
that they will be the agents by which the union con-
tract will be negotiated, that is clearly as the
unions become stronger, their contracts will demand
. . . if you look at the contracts which the Board
of Education will be required to negotiate, they'll
be negotiating any way.
Fantini
:
How many contracts are negotiated now as part of
protection of the people? How many police are
there at school? That's part of the contract, is
it not? (Tape is damaged here.) . . . correct,
in other words, you can perpetuate this system
and if, the irony is, I don't think that there is
any way that you can deal with it. This is exactly
the levels of analysis that Ken said. . . the only
thing here is that what you have is an unquestioned,
critical mass of kids who are not being educated,
a critical mass. Now . . .
Clark: Why would that be a concern of the union? The con-
cern of the union is to protect its members.
Fantini
:
No, let me say this, this is in my own way of how
this is a concern of the economy, it is a concern
of the pocketbook in the sense that it is a way,
because there is a major process which is the dri-
ving force of the American people, one reality, one
motivation of force is the pocketbook what effects
it has. Now if somehow there is a benefit which
shows a relationship between their education about
which there is no question about, and the fact that
people have or are entrenched in this economy as a
result of that that they have to pay for welfare,
part of the welfare costs, and so forth, that it
may be possible to convince the public, you know,
not for any reason but that if you had a better
system which kids were educated, you could save
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some money, and that may be the only other major
strategy which, an economic one, which you havejust ... as far as I am concerned. There is now
how to make this argument, who makes it, but it
is a national trend now that people even in so-called
suburbs are vetoing the rising costs, it's just
that they don't feel that they are getting, they
just can't afford to
. . , more money, and they
don't think they are getting that much out of it.
There are all these symptoms that are characteri-
zing education. Now if it's possible to get busi-
nesses and industry, this is the only other major
force. We tried the political one, and before
that we tried to be reasonable, we tried to appeal
to justice and the like, and then we moved into
the political realm, and into the economic realm,
say education, the drain that it has where the
school, where why people ... in terms of the kids
wanting to go to school, the fact that they are
not being satisfied they turn to other forms of
trying to satisfy
. . . the deterioration of the
cities, business and the industry have to relo-
cate, all kinds of expenses, too. The business
and industry have to re-educate, they have to recy-
cle their
. . . They have to create their own
educational system in order to salvage people so
that the manpower needs are met, and it seems to
me that for, as far as I can see, the kind of ener-
gies to it that's necessary to deal with this dimen-
sion is its problem, packed in our times the econo-
mic. I mean, I just don't think that the - it's
such a monumental kind of thing, that unless you
get it to the educational consumer. . . where you
begin to get power
. .
. the giants of industry,
the pressure of politics, . . . then action might
be taken, but as far as, you know, trying to say
that the communities, who for the right reasons
want to get a better education and they want to
intervene with a basically bankrupt system, when
it's not worth it, and that they can organize
themselves and sustain any kind of reform movement.
I just think that that's what we learned, we can't
do it, the sources of energy are very, very minimal
for the kind of bureaucratized institutions that
we have with the power that's inside trying to keep
it going. The only counterforce I can see; well,
you first tried the political force, you see
that . . .
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McCoy
:
Let me back up and put it two ways. First of all
you started off mentioning the number of security
guards at school. The question I am raising in
that vein borders on racism, because you don't
pull this in a white community. Now, hold that.
I'll talk - the second part goes back to some of
the things that you alluded to and Fred opened it
up by saying that the Newark teachers demanded a
package, if the taxpayer is cognizant of the fact
that "higher" or more money to be poured into edu-
cation regardless as to what the quality is, and
this attitude is a growing one, then how do you
account for the Newark situation as a package, as
a union package? Number one. And, two, I don't
see how you can possibly discount that it isn't
the politicians in the political arena. I think
they are the most devastating. Senator Markey is
proposing a bill, at least they say he is propo-
sing a bill. How can you discount the politician
in that thing? You know what I am saying here is
that these characters work together.
Fantini
:
Yes, but who is pushing the politicians? That's
my point. You have, you know, common folks trying
to push them, you have business and industry saying,
'look, we got to do this because it's going to
affect our profit, ith going to affect'. . .well,
then they act. Busloads from Ocean Hill warned
the legislators very little, but, you know, in
terms of your concept of overall power of who
makes decisions.
McCoy
:
I guess I have problems v^ith that, and I am looking
at New York and Newark, and Washington and Chicago,
it's very simple. I mean if you look at the natio-
nal budget on welfare expense, it's almost an un-
beleivable figure.
Fantini
;
That's economic.
McCoy: Yes, so obviously if you are saying that if you
begin to appeal to the taxpayer in terms of where
it hurts his pocket, then you get this tremendous
escalation in the welfare system.
Fantini: I say that you can use that to get better educa-
tion .
McCoy
:
That . . . that strategy.
219
Ferretti: I wouldn't completely discount politics myself.
I think there has to come a time on the part of
the poor and black people, or the minority people
of this country, where some kind of a viable coali-
tion must be formed to get political club. 1 think
there hove been people toying with this, notably
Herman Bedia in tViis town, who has tried over the
last two or three years to create this kind of
thing. 'Wliether he is going to be the man big
enough to do it or not, I don't know. But I think
if something like that could be created, then I
think things can be moved. I am a firm believer
in politics, I really am, for good or evil, but
it has to be a kind of politics not appealing to
reason, as it suggested, but appealing to power,
or you will do it because I think this is the
way any vested interests react.
Fantini: The institution, the way it's structured now, is
so potent in terms of the lives of the people in
it, that is goes beyond racism that Ken found,
you know, he pointed out in Washington and in
Newark the people in the union, black or white,
that once they're in and assume certain roles that
are appropriate to being that kind of member in
a school situation, you assume those attitudes,
it's not compounded in New York City, but cer-
tainly there. The teachers were motivated not
so much by education, but by their own elevation
of status in terms of power.
Clark: Let me remind you, gentlemen, in terms of politics
that in the Ocean llill-Brownsville situation and
in the decentralization laws, struggle, politics
was very much involved , but the control of the
political apparatus of this particular issue was
in the hands of the union, the UFT and the central
labor council and that actually the people in the
local communities had no direct political access
or power or what have you.
Ferretti: I think the thing to do is to build up, build up
that political club.
Fantini: Yes, but in the meantime, I don't know how
many
generations you are going to have to . . .
McCoy
:
Can I go back to follow something that Ken said
to some sort of conclusion. If, in the beginning
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F antini:
McCoy
:
Clark:
Fantini
:
Clark:
Fantini
;
you said there was a stage that New York suggests,
a quick example in Newark, obviously the people,
or certain kinds of people
. . . of development,
I mean the fact that Gibson took over a bankrupt
city and you begin to make certain of appeals,
obviously the people appeal. I am saying, obviously
What? I am not sure. New York City thought it
was bankrupt.
I mean dollars and cents there. The question I
am saying is, if people can see these signs, based
on some sort of historical recognition of it hasn't
taken place somewhere else, how do you account for
the length of time from the beginning of the school
to certain time of in the absolute concretized
polarization of various people on the part of each
one of these accidents. I mean, in other words,
I am saying how far
. . . and I would say,
. . .
got to the people the other times said, 'look,
let's take this money situation, and show you that
if you spend the money, you get a better education.
That'll cost you less money in the end,' So what
I am saying is simple . . . the problem, because
you'd be addressing yourself to . . .(Panelist
interrupting)
.
.no, frankly, I can't. That's
what I'm dealing with, but I am saying to you,
if what you are saying is the money, you know,
where it hurts in the pocketbook, you say to the
people, 'listen, if we expend this money and we
get a better education, it'll cost you a lot
less money in the long run.' But it would seem
to me a simple solution that teachers would give
money, right? Who, the other people . .
That is not - you are saying that society should
run according to rational . .
No I didn't, not at all, absolutely not. I am
saying here, we are trying to look over a situa-
tion, I am saying one way to lock at it is look
at the forces . . . urban consumer, urbanization,
one, density of population, where are these forces,
institutional, you know, the . . .
Factories in the urban cities. .
All right, and I am saying that white New York
happens to be because of its size and all of the
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factors, at one stage, and others are at different
stages. Now just take the school situation and
when you have masses of kids not being educated
when you know that education is important, when ’the
parents in the community realize this, they want
to try to do something about it. It took a form
in New York, ... In Newark it takes another
form. I am not sure because I don't know enough
about this local situation whether it's the same
thing is clear that people inside will try to pro-
tect what's theirs, because that means the normal
way of behaving, if you are inside that system.
It has nothing to do with the guilt-learning, child-
ren and so forth. You know, I have certain rights,
and I need more money, that's how everybody is
doing it, and I am organized politically in the
power terms so that I, you know, I protect, and I
say that's from coast to coast. Then when they
are jolted somewhat, as they were in New York,
they pick up strategies to deal with it; accounta-
bility is to deal with it one way ,' participation
they'll deal with, but not with community control,
that's not right, but with participation - sure,
we'll participate for our term, we'll tell you
how to particpatc, and they can literally control
all of the issues that are brought up and the
continuing goes on, and the injustice goes on.
I am saying there is no critical man for dealing
with this, and politicians right now they want to
respond just to beat the injustice of it, can't -
because people are controlling the politicians,
and I am saying right now organized in New York,
organized groups who had a lot to lose on this
mobilized because they could, they had the money
to do it, and they defeated it. So people who
were most affected or people who are pov.-erless
can't move into it. Now, the only cycle, I mean
that's a very bleak picture, and if you want to
intervene and really are serious about it, what
was put out at the last session was that if you
intervene it's controversial, and you are going
to be clobbered as a result of it, because you
are going against, .you are swimming upstream.
All right, my point is, that you could try these
things, but ultimately the only way for this
society to deal with these problems is by busi-
ness and industry being affected, by the fact
that the manpower aids as served by the schools,
are not, you know, they are just not producing.
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they have to duplicate a lot of the efforts, theyhave to
. . . very inconvenient for them to ’move
and therefore they will affect ...
’
Ferretti
:
Look, Mario, it's good business to have baseball,
but how far ... ’
F antini
:
That's why I am saying, that's why I say that you're
saying why don't you go around saying or tell
the public that, you know, we tell the public
every day that people are starving all over, they
don't pretend^ it makes any difference.
Panelist What's going to be the difference here?
F ant ini; The people who control want power, they have to
be affected by this. They have not yet been
affected, and until they do, you know, it's not
going to change. Now your point is that there
is a - there are energy sources that have yet to
be organized and tapped. And I am saying, 'fine,'
and I encourage that, but in the meantime the
medium .... (Tape is indistinguishable)
. .
and perpetuating
. . .
Ferretti I couldn't agree with that.
F antini
. . a certain status and
. . .
Ferretti: How does one make . . .
Oliver
:
Where are the people going to be during all this
time that industry is becoming aware?
Fantini I say that they are going to be more and more
frustrated and the way they deal with it is that
your frustration will appear to be, you know,
you get angry, and look at the people, they are
angry, they look like people who are not in con-
trol of themselves, you know, and they'll put
labels on them, they are extremists, they are
militant, and so forth and so on, and everybody
says, 'yeah, that's correct.' It is just shame-
ful and I don't know how to . . .
Ferretti
:
Your example, I think, is proper. I have a friend,
a very good friend, who is an executive at the
New York Telephone Company, and every single
thing you said is q>plicable to the New York Phone
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McCoy
:
Clark
Company, the training, to everything else. But
yet, they do it, they are doing on a massive scale
massive scale, all over, yet there is no political’
discussion and there seems to be no inclination on
the part of that company that I know of to influence
anything. Tehy just simply take and do, you know,just do it because it's there, and charge you more,
but there is no philosophical ...
Let me turn this around just to ask another ques-
tion because I have an idea in my head that I
don't want to put out just yet, but - are you really
saying, Mario, that given what the situation is
in Nevi/ark, that may happen again somewhere else
and so forth and so on, there is nothing you can
do - number one, because of the reasons that you
have given, controversial, power, assigned gimmicks,
and strategies, and so forth; or is there such a
thing in terms of another kind of a strategy, ano-
ther level of strategy, and I don't know fits into
your ... or not, but is there such strategy that
can be pulled in a situation like Newark where it
comes off literally at this point as a compromise
because basically what I see happening here is
people
. . . but usually that they can be pulled
off by whom and how that can neutralize the pre-
sent situation and both parties seek some degrees
of compromise, but a compromised situation, and
then how can the people sustain it. Let me say
what my prophecy is, if they destroy Newark, it
will be an added-on kind of thing that reinforces
of what you said about the professionals raping
the educational system and having absolute control.
But I see it going much further than that of having
national education, the minorities say, 'every time
you . .
.
you don't bust it open, then you destroy
it and so forth,' and that will dissipate other
kinds of movements all over the country in smaller
communities or communities \-aho are equally power-
less, and so forth. Now, is there a provision
that can be captured out of the Newark situation
that will allow some sort of compromised position
for the powerless so that they sustain in terms
of delivering something else? Because if they
destroy it, 1 mean, historically . . .
The black militants of New York are trying to
answer your question affirmatively by being
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I
Fantini
:
openly, overtly and some people even say violently,
opposed to the unions. My own hunch is that this
bring forth sympathy for the union among
middle-class blacks and whites what one ordinarily
would expect. Just 5.n terms of data it is also
becoming the union admiring something, which I
doubt that is what they are going, and I should
quickly balance this by the way with the fact that
I see no such indications in Washington, where you
have a pretty confused situation, blacks, whites,
unions, an upper middle-class, black militant
board members who you know, and their confused
splinter black militant group that seems to be in
some kind of unstable equilibrium. In Ocean Hill-
Brownsville you had more than Newark is having,
or Washington is having. I suspect and this is
a sheer destiny that the minorities who are really
hurting though obviously hurting from the ineffi-
ciency of urban public education in spite of Bayard
Rustin, and if you reproduced Bayard a hundred
fold, are not going to be particularly sympathetic
to unions who have to operate in terms of their •
own interests and who clearly exhibit only lip '
service, if that, to a concern for the predicament
of ... in the schools, and my guess would be
that the only effective counterforce to the increa-
sing growth and power and control of unions,
teachers' unions, that I can see on the horizon,
would be the melting pot or the concern, but -
and the danger here, as I see it, again as a
social analyst, is that this fight precipitates
middle-class white allegiances to the unions, and
the only way you ever get back is voting down
bond issues, but not particularly to curb the power
of unions particularly if they can continue to
protect their children in parochial schools and
independent schools or private schools. I offer
that merely as a draft, a hypothesis of what the
picture will bring.
In New York, and correct me if I am wrong, we had
a growing paraprofessional public, if you want
to call it that, I forget the numbers, but they
-
teacher aides and the like, and mostly these were
supposedly to provide facilities for new careers
for the poor, so-called. Now as I understand it,
they are now members of the UFT . They are mostly
black middle-class but they are now being protec-
ted and they will enter the inevitable cycle.
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Clark: They are another color section.
F antini
:
Well, but they arc in action, nevertheless, and
once they are in the UFT and subjected to the
whirl of the
. .
Clark: Mario, the fact of the matter is that they are
not in the UFT. They are colonial subjects to
the UFT.
Fantini
:
If they are not, they are only roles to what they
have to pay the . .
Clark: They do not, they will not have a school voice,
you remember that I said as a manner without
knowing that they do not have a single representative
on the governing council of the UFT
F antini
:
But when they do in my hypothesis, very few of
them will have, you know, will survive the process
and then become . .
Clark: Do you think the parents know that after the UFT's
flamboyant demonstration of protection of para-
professionals, that fifty per cent of them lost
their jobs? And not a single strike?
Fantini
:
Well, that is just one of . .
McCoy
:
That hurts .
Clark: That is a fact.
McCoy
:
That's just one of the institutional characteris-
tics .
Ferretti
:
That reminds me of another thing. You know we
were talking about a situation parallel to Ocean
Hill-Brownsville . There is even one more perti-
nent than Newark today. It's a school out in
Queens called Shimmer Junior High School. Little
background. It has about thirteen hundred students,
it's in an all-black neighborhood, the student
body is about ninety-nine per cent black, the
other one per cent is Spanish-speaking. The
teachers are about sixty-forty whites and you
have this situation where parents looking to
control some aspects of the educational process
rebelled against a local elected board, and you
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have twenty-two teachers transferred involuntarily.
You have a principal fired - all white. Now the
principal is black, and I believe seventeen of
the teachers of the twenty-two are black and all
of them appealed to the UFT
,
of which most were
UFT members, and they were told that the union
would support them if they went in court. It's
very interesting.
Clark
:
But those teachers who were transferred in Ocean
Hill-Brownsville didn't have to go to the court
and you know this precisely.
Ferretti
:
Because you now have a board, an elected board
that can cut this local election which really just
tore that apart. We have a section of Queens where
this school is called Jamaica, South Jamaica, which
is a black ghetto, and for the purposes of the
election became three school districts. For years
and years and years it was represented by one
state assemblyman, one city councilman, and so
on. All of a sudden it is now three school dis--
tricts with no power whatever. You have a whole
community disenfranchised. This is what happened.
Fantini
;
They were involuntarily transferred?
Ferretti: Yes, and 1 can give you a whole . .
Fantini
:
Without due process?
Ferretti
:
Without due process I
Clark: What does the New York Times say?
Ferretti
:
The New York Times is carrying a piece now which
I have been in consultation with the guy who is
writing it, because there are too many details
and he won't be able to go into the UFT depart-
ment .
Clark: Oh, that's interesting.
Ferretti
:
Which is really all of it, it's all the UFT. Very
interesting, a very interesting thing.
Clark: Well, would a letter - and you don't usually put
these things on tape - but would a letter to the
editor pointing out the important details that
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have not gone into
. . .
Ferretti: It might be appropriate.
Several
Panelists
:
You ought to investigate it . . . talk to
. . even
if they put it in, my guess is that they'll put
it on page 37.
Ferretti
:
Well, they are timing it to go with a piece of a
news story that's going to come out on Friday,
talking about an arbitration on both sides,
accepting arbitration. If you are interested,
Mario, I will send you the piece I wrote on it.
F antini
:
It would really be good.
Ferretti Okay
.
Oliver
:
There was the public meeting in Ocean Hill-Browns-
ville of the new local board, and at that meeting,
there was someone from the New York Times. I was
not present but was informed of it but was told
that they had an outburst of violence there and
the man was trying to get on the stage how it
would be . . . chairman of the board
,
and the
New York Times was there and they did nothing
about it, and two days later a member of the
board was shot in the stomach. We don't know
whether this was an outgrowth of that violence,
but . . .
Clark: Well, I don't . . . the fact that maybe the appa-
rent reasoning is that now that it is free of the
mad people in Ocean Hill-Brownsville and does not
have to deal with minor matters such as shooting
in Ocean Hill-Brownsville.
McCoy
;
Obviously, you have been reading Shanker's piece
that went along with the Newark situation in which
he says that you suggested, the press carries off
some dual sets of standards that when black tea-
chers and black people, you know, go back against
the union, but if the white guy says . . . against
the union, it has to do with black cats to the
white cats.
Clark
:
Shanker said that? Who else reads Shanker's adver
tisement?
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Ferretti
:
I do only before breakfast.
Fantinl: That theory
. . why is that
.
. . MARC is taking
a stab on the fact that the UFT or anybody for
that matter, would take an ad out like this? And
they can do conditionally, look back at the New
York Times
.
Ferretti The columnist
. . . out with Shanker.
Fantini
:
That's right, and if this is ... he is using a
blackboard which is just not equally available.
I think that this is
. . . obviously an advocator
has certain.
. .
Clark
:
When we talked last with the Ford Foundation v/e
obviously don't have the resources to counter
that
.
Fantini
:
Well, this is all part of what you see
. . .
and
that's why I say it was never meant to happen in
Ocean Hill
.
Clark
:
q
What wasn't meant to happen?
Fantini The experiment itself, that was not, you know,
it wasn't supposed to be that way.
Clark
:
Well, Mario, isn't that one of the cleverest
things that the establishment, I think Bernieeven
agrees, denying that, the establishment
really didn't intend for natives to take seriosly.
Ferretti
:
You did use the word natives.
Clark: Well, the natives get restless, you sell them a
little of conciliatory gestures, but when you
. . .
troubles, when they are naive and uncivili-
zed about who believes, that . . . and, you know,
take seriously control and power and the rest of
it, then you have to make them more sophisticated
You have to make them understand that, you know,
that's not the way it really is.
McCoy
:
Mario and Ken, let me ask . . .
Fantini
:
Along certain quarters, it's attitudedly the so-
called liberals who also are people who were
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involved with the Ocean Hill, some o£ them said
exactly what Ken said, •well, we're going to haveto show them that they can't do it.' In other
words, they wanted to have the experiment as proof
that the communities couldn't do it without those
. . . and they are not even coming to that, and
that, you know, I actually have heard it over and
over again. The other things in this and I can -
when you are serious, especially when you are new
to playing games, when you are there, then okay,
the community has a right, then momentarily you
have provided the means to do it. Those, you
know, foundations and every other
- you know, the
things, the means for continuing that are quickly,
are quickly closed, in other words,
. . . means
foundations are
. . .(Tape is indistinguishable)
. . . embarrassment that goes along with this
and one of the questions, you know, id dealing
. .
prove it, that is vi^hat it reaaly worth it, was it
an
. . . was it a kind of thing, was it a fraud
all the way around, was it - you see, the people,
I don't have the
. . .
Clark: Why are you asking this question in the light of
what happened, man. If you want the ansv^er to
your questions, look at the decentralization bill.
Look at what happened with it.
Fantini: Simply in terms of Ocean Hill.
Clark: Well, that is even more obvious. Look at what
happened to Ocean Hill.
Fantini: Well, it may be that some of us were, you know,
who were - took it seriously, also were pawned
to deal with this
,
because I was involved as a
staff person as irrelevant of that thing, and I
took it seriously.
Oliver
:
Where are you now?
Fantini
:
Well, I think this is one of the reasons that,
all the time, if foundations exist to serve the
public . .
.
you got to be out of that problem.
Clark: Well, in less official terms that they can't do
it embroiled in controversial obvious power con-
flicts
,
where powerless people who are trying to
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Fantini
;
Clark:
Fantini:
Clark:
Fantini:
Oliver:
get power and everybody knows that they aren't
really able to use it. Everybody knew that the
Egyptians really couldn't operate the Suez Canal
when the British left. Gee, I don't know how they
do it, so they are obviously inferior people, you
know, the Europeans could operate the Suez Canal.
This is correct, it's attitudinal, it's the atti-
tude, but the point is that the so-called sophis-
ticated people have been proffered into all these
roles, communications.
Mario, don't you know that Rose Shapiro knew more
about public education than Reverend Oliver?
She sure does.
And that - you know Rose was to protect Reverend
Oliver from his own ignorance, and - didn't you
know that?
Of course I knew that, I had lunch with her.
. . . very clear, I think in Ocean Hill-Brownsville
now we have a bowl cheer of political experiment
now that has been set up by the legislature with
its cooperation of the central Board of Education,
and they have pretty much turned everything over
to one man. But now, how is that working out?
A month ago I heard that a meeting that had been
held, it was a public meeting, one, it was held
at 137, and it was surrounded by Young Lords, and
they told this board, that you are just not going
to do what you think you're going to do, you are
going to have to work V7ith the people. The gover-
ning board never had this kind of threat from any
local group. Just yesterday, I learned that a pro-
gram . .
.
(interrupted briefly by a panelist)
. . .
with the programs now, is they are requiring
a community action agency to sign the proposal.
They are insisting now that the local board get
another agency, but when we had it I signed it
and they looked at the governing board as a commu-
nity action agency. But how has it worked out -
this came out to me yesterday - was that someone
from the Board of Ed. called the district superin-
tendent, the district superintendent called Mr.
Wright, and Mr. Wright himself chose the community
action agencies, which wasn't held - community
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council, it is his political role. Of course
this was in a meeting that I heard about it, I
opposed it there, but how can one man choose a
community organization. I don't know whether they
will back away from this, 1 hope they will. But
this is the kind of thing that is going on and
when the community and the community is finding out
more and more about these things, they are just
not going to survive, there'll be terrible in the
end
.
Yes, but if I were seriously
- you are dealing
with something that
. . . deal with at a level
of justice, injustice, and so forth. If I were,
you know, for me it's very easy to say, we found
this place such a mess, that governing board that
just left that we have to really start below zero,
and you know, we are trying, and so forth, but the
blame will be cast and since the unions already
exist in the mind of the public that people, you
know, were militant in that period of time, you
know, 1 can understand is and so that is the end
of that.
I v;ant to give another explanation of Mario's.
. . . Reverend Oliver, will be that Wright is
being more realistic and sophisticated in the
transmission of power and he is building for
control of Ocean Hill-Bro^Nnasville
,
the school dis-
trict, a power base that will be much more diffi-
cult for a union or the guy who defeated you guys,
in a sense of the review of the old boards had to
be sacrificed in terms of - very quickly without
regard to evict the walls of rightness or wrong,
this is the fact that you guys were defeated meant
that you didn't have the power not to be defeated.
I don't know whether Wright is virtuous or not,
I don't know what he is, I don't know what his
concerns are about education, but if it is possi-
ble for him to build in Ocean Hill-Bro\imsville the
kind of political climate that this society tradi-
tionally respects and thereby protects, whatever
he is doing in those schools, he clearly would
have been more effective than you guys were. Is
that making any sense? Is that a clear, amoral . .
You are not suggesting that he might be doing that?
Well, if he can get, for example, the Times to
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respect his political position enough not to report
a shooting, or a fight and not to present him as
you know,
. .
.
generally by the media, as a kind
of a irrational,
.
. . making, crazy
. .
.
you
know, and they could get away with this. And when
somebody tells you v,/hat
. .
.
you say, 'my God,
this guy is soft-spoken.' Well, now, Wright has
eventually some kind of hold, or magic, over the
image-builders, or the image projectors, that
obviously must reflect their estimate of power or
something that they have to ascribe, and we may
not use that immediately to raise the reading level
of a single kid in any of those schools one half
a grade in the next two or three academic years,
but what is happening, I hope, is that something
about power is happening there, you know, something
about somebody black or native to go direct, is
beginning to take things in his - and it might
turn out like in Brooklyn, it might have to per-
sonal as hell, you know, initially, and with all
the trappings of democracy you have an authorata-
tive hold there until they get hold of those damn
schools and then somebody overturns them to take
those schools and make responsive to those kids.
Oliver: I don't think the establishment for a moment
would allow him to gain that kind of power if he
is going to use it for the benefit of the black
people, and I think that the only reason that he
can do what he is doing is so that he can hold
the lid on and keep the natives happy.
C 1 ark
:
Well, suppose he - like my friend Malcolm X who
understood the importance of a dual role, the public
role as opposed to a private agenda role, I would
call it and I don't know if it's this what he's
doing or protecting him or with authoratative in-
tent to whatever, he may be very direct, naive,
but suppose he says okay, the white establishment
will not willingly give up power that considers
itself being challenged of the power of the black
people. It will play that it's only if this is
expense that which will be for their convenience.
As a politician, this is not foreign to me to ope-
rate in terms of what other people make it appear
to be my . . .
,
so I won't operate this way. But
my private agenda is to really get the kind of
controlling power of these schools that Oliver and
McCoy were trying to administer. They couldn't
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do that, because they made the confrontation in
ways that had to be resisted. I am going to pro-
fit from their mistakes, I am going to seem to
be their enemy, I am going to seem to - you know -
. . . with you guys, take a lot of
. . . This will
take years of white middle-class or black middle-
class to do this because this is the only way that
I am going to be able to really get control over
these schools, and when I do this, and when I get
the control of these schools, then I will confront
the white establishment with the fact that these
kids are being taught. End of dream, my dream.
If you had this outlook, it would have been my
. . . to have come up with . . . somewhere in the
last three years, but it has never
. . .
Let's put it differently. I think that's a - no,
I think that's a very astute analysis of
. . .
power consideration, but . . . back, one of the
political strategies were, that our society would
not . . . unlikely, initially, the road we wanted
to take was not unlike what Ken just said and that
for a variety of reasons, the road that was taken
was not necessarily that v/ay
,
a more direct and
more, you say, 'why not go directly to it,' and
the kinds of coalitions that are necessary, all
of the stages ... as a deterrent, people in
the establishment as well as on the outside, that
those were not necessarily forged, it seems to
me that perhaps the situation called for. They
were, they are, I think, that people look back
and say, 'sure, you can go back and look at it
as a lesson,, that'sa pun.'
I remember, you know, when we used to . . .
You mean to tell me that we don't have the intelli-
gence to say, you know, of getting some things done
of sorts, that it called for a type of compromise
(interference on the tape) . . . the types of
new schools who are gold , which may appear to be
at the time, you know, in certain quarters and
is selling out. That there, you know, there is
a whole system of checking bases with all kinds
of political figures that would give some indi-
cation, but not enough was done on this, not enough
for v^hatever the reasons. Not enough was . .
of tying into whether it is the political figures
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who were there, but rather we are going to do this,
you know, we are going to go it alone.
You guys gave me in twenty- twenty hindsight the
impression that you really believe that righteous-
ness would prevail.
You really say that, that's funny. There is no
way to argue with that.
And I'd like to get a working newspaperman's view
of this hindsight view.
Well, you know, it's nice to say that one believes
that righteousness will prevail, but it so seldom
does. I think, you know, it was sad to see, you
know, I think the impartial observer out at Ocean
Hill-Brownsville every day could not fail to see
the rightness and the wrongness of the situation,
but that very seldom enters into it.
I am sort of hung out in those kinds of promulga-
ted confessions. Let me say it in a different
way, and I respect the fact that there is a poli-
tical machine that you've got to deal with, but
there is a coalition of forces as you move into
certain kinds of urban areas that you have to
deal with. I would say that the educators have
never been free of politics, never have been . . .
You guys were trying to make it free of the tradi-
tional kind of bureaucratic and political controls.
. . .
talking about what's right and what's wrong.
I am talking about the right of the community to
control the schools and the. destiny of its kids.
This was their basic appeal.
Yes, you see, as I hear this, and I am talking
about looking to some sort of future, that's
why I want to go back to Newark in a minute, is
that, and I am using . . ., you can't deal with
this in isolation, you can't deal in the political
arena along.
Rhody, let me assume . . .
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McCoy
:
If it wasn't for the moralistic aspects of this,
meaning the plight of poor black children
- you’
never got this thing off the ground to start with
so that there has to be some
. .
Clark: Rhody, you have to look at who took that moralis-
tic appeal seriously.
McCoy I think nobody did.
Clark: Yes, you did. Reverend Oliver, Rhody McCoy, the
Governing Board, you know, when those people
(tape interference)
. . . right throughout Ocean
Hill-Brownsville
,
you just couldn't escape being
a part of the sincerity, the genuine concern of
the people, you know, there is no question about
that. But after you react, the present arose
people who were immediately and directly involved.
For example, when I came over to visit you, Rhody,
and (tape interference again)
. . . and your con-
cern.
. . I went outside and the kids, and I lis-
tened to them . . . what's going on there, you
know, . . . that's a part of reality that has no-
thing to do with race or, I suppose, in fact,
it doesn't even have anything to do with social
economic status, because I guess this is the
general pattern in the suburbs, you know, that
many people who arc not directly involved in the
critical issues are pretty apathetic or bored
about it, or don't understand it. My . . . of
isolation or the . . . but looking back on it
now, you guys were more isolated than you reali-
zed, and the illusion of not being isolated was
perpetuated by the media that focussed upon indi-
viduals and the conflict and tlie controversial
aspects for their o\im purposes, and they, a lot
of us, were feeling that we were really dealing
v^7ith a pervasive community issue, you know, an
issue that pervaded the entire area, when actually,
. .
.
like that, which was, that was the people.
McCoy
:
. .
.
done by the State Department, made the
contract
.
Ferretti
:
What was the feeling, Rhody?
Clark: Well, they kept telling me that, too. Nordos
particularly would tell me this, in other woids .
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McCoy
:
. . . such a committee that I am aware of
.
. .
Clark; When you guys knew this community backing in sup-
port, it seems to me you remember
. . .
Oliver
:
But we knew that it was there, we knew that it
was there even though it may not have become
physically
.
Ferretti: Well, it almost seems that in that case it should
have been visible.
McCoy I can't deal with that because I was called humor-
ously at the moment when \<iQ marched across the
bridge, it took something like five hundred kids
from the one end and the next issue carried some-
thing like three thousand people. I mean I trans-
late it - even at the meeting at 271 when all the
auditorium was packed, and if you looked at the
photographer who took the pictures he got the first
row v^here nobody sat in the first row except.
. .
The auditorium was packed, kids were sitting in .
the aisles, with parents. But I mean that's part
of that kind of strategy which leads me to ask
you this other question. The bureaucracy and this
what occurs to me about Sam Wright, too, and where
Reverend Oliver the bureaucracy does have the peo-
ple, it does have - even an almost intitutive
sense, to know when it is being challenged. I say
intitutive, I talk about being things the 'kinds
of CIA' tactics that they use and all the funny
kinds of things that they do, but I am saying is,
if they are that sensitive, perceptive, have the
resources, then they can literally read those
signs of stages of development, and predict cer-
tain kinds of behavior. Is that reasonable
when it comes a little jaded and jaundiced in
something?
Fantini
:
Wliat is instinctive . . . can be challenged.
Clark: Particularly after response to your . . .
Fantini Right, we are talking about a rational, you
know, exceptions that the, you know, I at least
have thought that way. Stages of development
are only appropriate for analysis here, it has
nothing to do vi/ith . . . you know when you are
in it yourself, we are just standing the part.
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I am saying one way to look at is
.
. .
McCoy
:
Let me back it off.
F antini
:
Two people looking at the stages of development,
that's a very sophisticated term.
McCoy Chicago, let's look at Chicago.
Fant ini; Detroit, that's decentralized.
McCoy Yes, I won't go far away. But the plight, I mean
the scions were being reared by "the people in
the power," and they commissioned a legislative
body to begin hearings on alternatives to the
schools, that's the way it was called.
F antini That's economic.
McCoy Yes, the whole discussion around that thing was
all about community control. In other words, it
had been predetermined by the structure of what it
was going to talk about, meaning community control,
and they read all the signs, they had all the
indications of the community unrest, they
. . .
the lack of tax base in such a mobile population.
They had everything. .But what I am saying is as
they structured the hearings which basically
were an alternative, the language that they used
had to do with decentralizqtion
,
and all the wit-
nesses that they paraded in in those ten sessions
were asked very specific questions. They say,
'what's your reaction to community, I mean decen-
tralization.' In other words, well, you got a
variety of witnesses responding - depending on
who was representing there - for instance, when
they called the president of the teachers' union,
and she said, 'I am for it,' as long as teachers
have more oney they are not interested in any of
them, you know that kind of argument.
Ferretti
:
Well, she didn't say that but you could read it.
McCoy
:
They called in the superintendent, the supervisors,
the president of the supervisors' association,
and he said, 'I have hard problems of drawing the
line between decentralization and community control;
I mean it is cute, the language that each of the
constituencies is using. Now wViat I am saying to
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to you, the bureaucracy in that instance was so
far ahead; the opening statement when they intro-
duced me was, I am just going to tell you briefly
about how I had been had, because I was said
. . . ^
lot about
. . and said, 'come out and talk to the
people on community control,' and I get there and
they close the hearing. This is so, so whatever
I said, and I called them all kinds of MF ' s and
FB's and told that they were
. . . and so forth,
and what I am saying is that given the situation,
you know, the press carried a statement, you know,
that they had conferred with Mr. Urban Education,*
you know, just to legitimatize the positions.
Well, what I am saying is they read all the signs
and
. . .
Well, that's not the point.
Wait a minute, I just want to ask you, they'll
accept
. . .
Then they'll
. . .
Okay, but I am saying that they ... be able
to predict certain kinds of behavior or responses
out of meeting all of those concerned.
Who is they?
The bureaucracy . . . okay, then how do you
account for Ocean Hill in one sense and Newark
in another sense?
I don't see the rationales of your question, Rhody,
I don't see the sequitur. The bureaucracies read
these signs, and they read some sign more clearly
than others, or area than others, this is better.
But what does that have to do with Newark, and I
don't understand your tying Newark to Ocean Hill.
Number one, I would say that in the Newark inci-
dent, I believe that if they had a legitimacy of
another purpose, meaning education, that they
could have minimized this confrontation.
Who?
The school board, not the school board, but all
the parties who are presently in the position
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that they are in, that are like the union and the
Then you don't buy my differentiation that the
Newark thing is more a garden variety - unions,
economic class issue that is a community control,
you know, an educational issue.
No, what I am saying, Ken, in that response is
that I believe that if the bureaucracy knowing
what the signs were would take certain kinds of
steps to
. . .
Specifically what kinds of steps did you
.
I can't answer that, I mean, for instance, that
they knew
. . . okay, but Gibson has been appealing
to the federal government and to the state for
massive help.
Yes, but Gibson
. . .
I wasn't saying that he was going to get help,
what I am saying is that if he was reading the .
sign, which I think the bureaucracy can, maybe
in his . . . has not been
. . . but if you arc
reading the sign that goes on to the state legis-
lature and say, 'look, we are going to have this
massive strike, you have blacks fighting blacks,
and whites and blacks fighting and . . .
But, Rhody, what' the . .
.
you read Newark off
the map ... I really . . . they did this years ago.
I understand, but what I am saying is that they
could neutralize this situation. Now, if the
conception here is that they couldn't and didn't,
then my answer is that there must be another
reason
.
Should they neutralize this, Rhody?
It's like Shanker says, 'you got to destroy this so
that the people won't rise up again and start
some fooling .
'
Rhody, I can honestly say that I do not quite
understand the putting together of Newark and
Ocean Hill.
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Except in a racial context, I - that's the only
way that
.
. .
^
I can accept the bankrupt system on the part of
education of the kids.
And the Newark teachers' union is not addressing
Itself directly or indirectly to that, no matter
what the negotiation is, if the government helps
you out, the ... we want money, and it's related
to New York, only in the sense that New York has
got the money, you know the teachers' union in
New York got the money
. . . bankrupt the educa-
tional business make
. . .
I get the impression that you feel that there is
something happening that could be good for Newark
among black folks. Over here in New York, the UFT
senses they have some connection with forcing the
situation in Newark in order to nip something in
the bud that just might get off the ground. This
is pretty much
. . .
I really am lost on this, you got to develop that
for me, man.
What I am saying is that if - let's just stay in
Newark, let's take Gibson - he knows that he
doesn't have money. The teachers are demanding
money; if he is reading the signs like you say
that these signs are obvious in the stage of deve-
lopment, that he would have told somebody, let's
call it the federal government, the state govern-
ment, and say, 'look, we have a race riot in Ne^^;ark,
let's come on and have some money,' so that some-
body, let's call it the state legislature
,
will
send a representative down and say to these tea-
chers, 'look, we know you V\»ant these dollars and
so forth and so on, these dollars are not forth-
coming, but these dollars are forthcoming, just
don't create this pandemonium, and when we get
this . . . and so forth back on the map, we can
negotiate.' In other words, what I am saying
is that they could have neutralized, and if they . .
And if they could, because they didn't there is
a reason, they were incredibly . . . that's the
reason, I think the reason, I think it's a racist
reason, I think it's the same reason that's at
2A1
the bottom of it. But I think that ... and I
think it's all that, maybe it's racist, too.
Clark
:
But that goes so far beyond Ocean llill-Brownsville
.
McCoy That's what I am saying. Ocean Hill was like
Lesson one, Newark is like Lesson two, if I can
use it in that sense; Lesson two in Chapter Two,
because.
. .
Clark Well, Newark is Chapter Two.
Fantini
:
Okay, now wait a minute, again I am not.
McCoy Because they are really overplaying the militant
role in that situation.
Clark: Who?
McCoy Parents, teachers' union . . .
Fantini Well, that's the same as in Ocean Hill. They
played the militant role.
McCoy
:
I said they are overplaying it.
Fantini
:
They are overplaying. Ken was just saying this
. .
McCoy: Well, that maybe, let's say they are overplaying
it even at the grassroots level, how is that?
And I said that earlier. You have feelings in
Newark has some impact on how Gibson has run this
bus iness
.
Ferretti: It's my feeling from conversations I had - this
goes way back, three years ago - I did most of
the interviewing that went into the Governor
Hughes' riot commission report and city govern-
ment were all, you know, ... on down, and it
was my feeling then that LeRoi Jones is a power-
ful man, not as a . . . but as a functionary in
that city, he had an awful lot to say today. Yes,
I do, I really think so.
McCoy
:
It's just reinforced, and I don't buy that, I
told you that, it just reinforces what I am saying
is that if that is an acceptable fact that the
establishment has recognized, then they are going
to play this Newark thing out to the point so
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that when they move, it's total destruction.
I
Of who and what?
Any concept of black people becoming cohesive
without any issues.
. . the same thing Shanker did.
I'd like to speculate that if the realities of the
Newark situation, and to me the principle reality
is there that they don't have the money and they
can't possibly mortgage the future of education
the way Milton says in the Shanker UFT strike,
they just don't have enough money, and my guess
which twenty-four hours from now is likely to be
shown to be absolutely wrong, is that the union
won't be able to win that strike in Newark. No,
that the union
. . .
But with other labor unions backing up on that.
There will be no money, simply no money to spare.
There is no money in that treasury.
There is no money, and there the state doesn't
have an income tax, you see. ... in Newark so
far has been to walk around and see where the
dirty streets were and ask the people why they
didn't clean it up, and if they had a little bit
of money, they are not going to give it to Ken
Gibson, you know, from the state.
Ken Gibson is the loser, perhaps, and then the
union, but Ken Gibson . . .
Well, I believe in stern . . .
Newark is the loser because it's a black city,
and I tend to . . .
And it might be a graveyard of the burgeoning
power of the UFT, you know, it might be, and if
Mario weren't here and willing to accuse me as
he alv/ays is of Machiavellianism, I would express
what seems to me to be a perfectly mathematical
formulation, namely that the more the UFT and its
dignitaries and functionaries, such as Sheldon
and Shanker become identified with the Newark
union case, which I think is a 'no win case,
the more they put in there, the greater the stakes
2A3
that they build in that, the better in the long
run it will be for our kids, because they can't
win in Newark, Newark can be a kind of a battle
of the Bulge for the UFT
.
McCoy
:
Ken, you are really frightening me, that really
frightens me. What I am liearing you saying is
which is bothering to me and that is frightening
is that this is a head-on confrontation with the
union in an area which tliey have not anticipated.
. . . might be, and if that's so, I am going to
suggest to you - you talked about making
. . .
change like overnight - that they are going to
find the money, or they are going to find a way,
an option, for that union. They've got to.
C 1 ark I would like to see where it can be
. . .
Ferretti: Well, it would be very interesting to do that
because, you know, when they are saying there is
no money, there is no money, I really mean it.
McCoy But, man, the union has to recognize this, too,
they are not crazy I
Clark: Yes they are, yes they are.
Ferretti: Rhody, in every other circumstance, you do it and
you find the money, that's the answer. It works
in every major issue. They'll find the money,
they'll just not find it this time.
Clark: Except that they don't realize that they don't
find the money in Newark.
McCoy
:
If they found the money, and what you are saying
is . . .
Clark: If they found the money, the union is strong as
hell throughout the nation.
McCoy You better believe it. In addition to that, so
would Gibson be strong.
Oliver
:
But they might find the money after Gibson had
it
.
Clark: I don't think the primary problem here is Ken
Gibson
.
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McCoy
:
Newark is a black town.
Clark: No, I think the cities are bankrupt, there are
cities with black mayors that are doubly bankrupt
because that's the only way that they are going
to get black mayors.
. . . unions are stupid
enough not to understand that basic system of
American democracy that is
. . .
Oliver
:
. . .
doesn't know exactly what they are doing.
I was beginning to wonder
. . they know exactly
what they are doing, and maybe Grace doesn't
know what she is doing, perhaps if they do that
some of the black folks don't know v/hat's going
on, but I think that maybe somebody behind her
really knows what is going on.
Clark: Let's make this, you know, head-on confrontations
of the ... my friend . . . has to say, 'oh, to
hell with this,' you know. It is very unusual
for a mediator to make the kinds of statements
we made yesterday, unless he is apparently an
ass, and I can't imagine that. He really has to
have come to the end of his tether to say, 'look,
I want to be relieved.'
McCoy: Let me say this in a different way, just for
kicks, and somebody who is a member of Parlia-
ment I say this to him. Right now, with the
Newark situation where it is, is it conceivable-
I don't know how many adjectives I can put in
this as far as this to tell you . . . (the rest
in indistinguishable) . . . but, anyway, let's
take Newark, right now fifteen, twenty people
left, like Julian Bond and Brooks and you and
me, and Whitney Young all V\’ent to Newark.
Clark: On whose side?
McCoy: Neutral
.
Clark; No, I couldn't . . .
McCoy I told you, damn it, in all those things, try to
be reasonable.
Clark: But this hypocrisy is beyond my imagination. If
I went to Newark I would have to go against the
union
.
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McCoy
:
Well, okay, but I mean then you would come up
with some answers, but anyway, if they went over
and tried to take this neutral position to negotiate,
to get a compromise out of that situation, if that
body of people, qualified at politics, would know
how to negotiate a compromise position that would
at least allow a community some substantive gain
that they could sustain and work on it to develop
to a later point - I think you made an allusion
to something that Mario said that it may take
years, two, three, four generations and for people
to be killed in the process, but what you are saying
here now is that there is nowhere a resolution to
Newark. It's just a matter of what the final
blow is going to be and who delivers it.
Clark: I think there is a resolution in New York - a
defeat of the union with appropriate face-saving.
McCoy
:
It won't be a defeat.
Cl ark: It will, because actually he is not getting the •
money that they Vv?ant, that Eddie . . . support
from the money that the New York teachers got,
would have to be a defeat, because that's what
they want. Novv, if that defeat could be packaged
in v;ays which may the union . . . and, by the way,
I think we have an example of it in the garagemen
union settlement where the garagemen didn't get
any more what they expected . . . the garagemen
rejected. That is a possible way for the union
to come out with its skirt being extreme and down.
McCoy
:
That's because of . . .
Clark: Yes, but if anyone probed behind that, one would
see that the teachers' union movement suffered
a severe blow which hopefully will be transferred
elsewhere
.
Ferretti: But, what they are asking for, too, is a kind of
public relations effort following this which
would tell everybody how badly the teachers did,
so it would be impressed qxn the media.
McCoy
:
You are all hanging me out, because I see two
levels here. Wliat I am saying if if there is
a position that you are saying that the union
does in fact suffer out on education, at least
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on the economic level, that it can be packaged
in such a way that the images that they didn't
leave to, which is what I am saying, the bureau-
cracy does all the time anyway, regardless of how
it gives them a position, then the same kind of
strategy ought to be applicable to the community
people. I don't know what the compromised situation
would be, but they ought to be able to gain some-
thing out of
. . .
Clark
:
But, Rhody, you are
. . . fanatical, which is
unusual. The community people - they are not
active participants, exept the militants who I
think are right, by the way, in the sense of Ocean
Hill-Brownsville
.
McCoy My definition of community in this sense is our
kids
.
C 1 ark
:
Yes, the kids have
. . . that is wrong.
Ferretti
:
Kids can't play with a union boss, or they . . .
union loss and document it.
Clark: In other words, a political black because he
does it.
Fantini: My o\>m sense of it was that you were saying,
'whichever way it goes, somebody wins,' in the
sense that if the union wins the capability . . .
have a control . . . education of kids because that's
the way it works. On the other hand, if Ken
Gibson wins, and his association with LeRoi Jones
and others, nobody is going to allow anything like
that because you can't deal with it in terms of,
you know . . .
Clark: Except that Ken Gibson can only win on the basis
that he is bankrupt
.
Oliver
:
But can he lose on that?
Clark: He could lose in terras of the struggle with the
union on that basis.
Fantini
:
Now with the union, but if he wins, the question . .
Clark: . Mario, as I said, that he cannot concede to
the union's salary demands.
2A7
Fantini: This is correct and that's a victory, and a ques-
tion, a basic question is, 'will he ever get money
. . . the negotiation?
'
Clark: The thing that disturbs me about this discussion
is that we are making it for Rliody's dissertation
and it is clear that Rhody's dissertation will not
be written until all our speculations have been
washed away by reality, and that's not the way
you have a doctor s dissertation. You have a
doctor's dissertation as unassailable, so we ought
to be profound
. . in the next two or three weeks
we will know how
. . .
Panelist
:
We may be very profound, thinking of how profound
he will be.
Clark: Well, there is nothing like, you know, cold
. . .
embalming your prophecies - that will be found
wrong
.
Oliver
:
Every case that we've heard always been in the
last hundred years is centered around activities
on the part of
. . . they bury themselves. The
civil rights struggle gets away from that, but
it always inevitably gets back around to that.
But, I wonder, if you are trying to get back
through it there is some obstacle there. I won-
der if it could be that the UFT now is in fear
of opposition to black control, or black progress
in education. If it weren't for that, it Vs’ould
probably be something else. Right now, they did
those things in Ocean Hill-Brownsville and cer-
tainly blackened the situation. . . Shanker's
article in the New York Times last Sunday that
which lie wrote in the news that if the black
revolution - something in . .
.
(the rest is
indistinguishable on the tape.)
Clark
:
Well, I think that's basic to the ... I skim
through this . . . the kindlessness without re-
gard to whether the union wins or loses in Newark,
the fact is the union has emerged as the contem-
porary chief opposition without regard to Bayard
Rustin, through the legitimate educational aspi-
rations of American minority people, particularly
colored minority.
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Oliver: They are protected by being a union and the favors
that unions have in this country, they'll oppose
them as . . . bad guys
. . the union. It's not
really a union, in that sense of term, it's not,
it's a labor union term.
Ferretti
:
All their trucks in the last three or four years
have been on non-union management
. . . they have
been on . . . management.
Clark: Yes, but they clear the money for it.
Ferretti I am not talking about contract negotiations, I am
talking about all of the power play, all the public
like things they have done, all have been on social
issues
.
Oliver: And where a Board of Education might not be able to
cope with the . . among black, the union is better
able to do it. Maybe the Boards of Education can
serve their usefulness now and the • educational
opponent that they have to deal with.
Clark: You know, I should go into the Hof fa - a bit of
information that supports your statement. I was
shocked and reflecting my own naivete, to discover
in the first decentralization proposal in Albany,
that the positions of the Board, the Council of
Supervisory Association, and the union were iden-
tical, that actually Shanker when he spoke before
the legislators . . . for that legislation was
speaking for Rose Shapiro, or he was speaking for
Degnan and they accept this as fact, and I was
also naive enough to be shocked to be, you see,
I raised this question in the Board of Regents,
namely who was protecting the public interests
when the Board that was supposed to be represen-
tatives of the public was in the same bag with
the power, vested interest groups, that is supposed
to be on the other side, and the supervisees and
the intermediary who are now a part of organized
labor, that in the realm of education in that area
there was no public interest spokesman because the
polarization had occurred in terms of white and
black and that the Board of Education saw itself
as having more in common with the union and the
supervisory such as you ... in Ocean Hill-Biowns-
ville. Well, my colleagues on the Board of
Regents didn't understand my position, and the
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Ferretti:
McCoy
:
other thing that fascinated me was that the same
legislature that had these decentralization bills
that merely were at the dictate of the union and
the Board, except the last one which abolished
the Board, in the same session had a ... so when
they could divert the issue from these blacks, they
are not pro-labor, then they only pull labor when
the issue
. . . was put in terms of black teachers,
which I think
. . .
That observation that the Board, the ;CSA and the
union were together was just one
. .
.
you know,
because when the local school boards, the boun-
dary lines were drawn, the UFT drew them. That's
a fact, they drew them, and they were presented
to the State Legislature by the Board of Education,
the UFT drew them, the UFT chapter chairman.
I, for what it is worth, I still believe that,
maybe it's almost a paranoia, but I still believe
that there has to be some underlying strategy which
may well be what we are talking about, raoism or
what not. The union threatening the power on the
other hand, but what I am saying is that if these
conditions are allowed to come to a point of
coalition was for a very deliberate reason, and
if I now talk about the institution of education,
somehow or another it should have the same kind
of resources that the bureaucracy has that would
at least get some sort of substantive things out
of these various conditions that would affect
education. Now I haven't discounted what you
were saying about what appears to be the union's
position as being the - for black and other mino-
rity positions I recognize that, but that has so
many ramifications that it goes all the way back
to the federal government, and so forth. But
the lessons that were learned in Ocean Hill was
the question is what unions did we see, because
those games, and I am saying if we are sophisti-
cated enough to see those games, so is the esta-
blishment to see those games. They ought to find
a way to - we use the word repeatedly in all our
discussions we saw a glimpse. Somehow or another
they manage to close that glimpse off, so obviously
their ability to perceive these things is as good
as ours if not better, given the kind of resources
that they have. Unless I hear you saying that -
which I hope is not so - that \^7e are going to lose
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lots of children continuously until some sort of
race riot or revolution takes place, then Newark,
Ocean Hill, Chicago, Detroit, anywhere else, in
Washington, it's all a hopeless thing, that
education doesn't have a place in this society.
Clark: Yes it does, but not for underprivileged people.
Education is very important in this society
. .
society is
. . .
but not the union, because it's
so important.
Fantini
;
The unions deny education is relevant to kids,
over thirty-six days were, they were, you know,
. .
.
people something
. . too important that
they would do anything you know, in Ocean Hill
or anywhere else, to
. . . You can't tinker with
education for white people
. .
conflict and
anger. . .
Clark:
. . .
can't get away with anything.
Fantini
:
You know, when he said that we are going to
stop it for everybody, it was over.
Ferretti: Yes, you know, as long as it was a limited walk-
out . . . the previous May and June in Ocean Hill-
Brownsville was fine, it was fine.
Fantini
:
You can't . . . education . . run, you know, . .
report that . . You can't deny educational to
the Jewish is you wish to . . . too long before it
. . .
You can't do it, it would be a . . . played
a very important role.
McCoy
:
I got to go back and set the stage to what Ken
said before, he said he was making an analysis
on a very simple mathematical basis. Right? I
am saying is unless the statistics are wrong the
vast majority of the population is in the inner
cities
.
Clark: But the majority of the school population in the
inner cities are irritating and disturbing facts.
McCoy
:
Okay, but also the vast majority of professional
people are still in the inner cities.
C 1 ark Well, then they have to send their kids to the
same kinds of schools that you have to send to
your school
.
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Oliver
:
But they get their employment there.
Clark: Wliy do you think we are building the highways?
Why do you think we are going to talk on A1
Shanker's commuting problems?
. . . anything?
Oliver: Well, I don't see going through another Ocean Hill-
Brownsville again, just like I don't see going
through a . . . so I think there > is a lesson from
that, and I think one lesson is that there has to
be a much more, a total effort made, a much more
comprehensive and without the faith in the system
that we have. . . . that came out of that, but
a wish on my part that this a reflection of what
became of mind dying. \^Jllen Kennedy charged that we
couldn't read the mind of the public, and he
thought he was in touch with the public, but he
was completely out of touch with them eventually,
we thought that he could run the country without
. . .
and he could not and he eventually got his
o\^m head cut off.
Clark: So what have we got in Viis place?
Oliver
:
We got a coronary, but we had a . . . who was
trying to force democracy on a nation that didn't
want democracy, and then decided to force . . .
on hand but at least if somebody has to see the
particular shape we are in, but I am saying,
that he has to move in the direction of taking
the whole world, and this is a difficult job,
but there is no playing around, we have played
around for a long time, but I think we have gone
through a lot of playing around and I don't think
that . . .
Fantini
;
Who is we?
Oliver
:
Well, right now I talking specifically of black
people and their struggle in this country, because
where we make some headway, and when it looks
like we are going to get somewhere, the white
population gets upset, and they rather tear it
down even if it hurts themselves, destroy them-
selves rather than the black man, and I think
we are aware of them now so plans have to made
with that in mind, so . . . progress.
Fantini
:
How are you going to play that kind of game?
I just don't see it unless that's the name o£
the game now and unless the people in power
.
Clnrk: I really don't know what you guys ore talking
about by "that," tliat what? Scliools?
Oliver: No, no.
. .
McCoy
:
I am glad you answered that. Rev. Oliver.
Fantini: What is the
. .
Clark; What is that "that?"
F ant ini
:
The "that" to me is that tliere is no apparent
alternative
.
Clark
. . , within the system.
Fantini: Yes, thcr is no way that I can see now to do
these kinds of changes, and, you know, that's
the ball park to that theory, and what I am
saying is that tlic allcrnativc is . . .
Panelist
;
. . .
resources.
Fantini;
. .
can not be, you know, one that is democratic,
participatory, you know, that had all the elements
you know, that are at work, you know, this
country stands for In terms of rhetoric, parti-
cipation, tlic public schools, accountability,
all these exist for that purpose. All that was
done, you know, in tlie name of tlie game of power,
and if you arc going to play that game of power,
you have to have power.
Ferretti
:
That's what 1 said before.
Fantini
;
This is correct, it ' s
a
pol itical one, and educa-
tion becomes important as a means of power and
what you were trying to do was obviously the oppo-
site, that is gain power to suspend education or
use education as a way of gaining power, and I
really have no way of dealing with tliis except
that this is not a solution at all
,
it just
seems to be a way that the dynamics unfold,
namely that the ... of the whites then they
will then say, 'okay, it's in their times, it's
their decisions,' and the kids will continue to
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be thwarted. I am saying that this is why we,
you know, that wasn't one alternative or move
with an issue that you can throw into it, it's
not very much and it's very squashed. I don't
know how to deal v;ith it.
Ferretti: You conjure up things like this, for example, the
black population of New York City is considerable,
they pay a considerable tax, the taxes help to
support public school systems. Wliat if the blacks
did not pay taxes? Somebody is listening.
McCoy
:
You know, let me ask that in a different way and
address it specifically to change.
Clark: You are talking about alternatives to Ocean Hill-
Brownsville that presumably would lead to non-
defeat
.
Ferretti
:
We are talking about power, ways to exercise power,
to make your voice heard, only massively, boycotts
McCoy I want to redirect this, I want to rephrase it
and then ask Ken a specific question. What you
are defining for me is the taxes, paid some
massive educational programs, it takes the same
kind of enforcement that white America uses to
put people in the line, so again I am seeing
this situation .
.
(Panelist interjecting some-
thing) . . that's not within a category, within
my ability to measure. Nov^/, to rephrase it and
let me ask it another way: Is there such a thing
as a . . I mean options, Ken, I mean given
what the President . . .
Clark: I am the last person you should ask that in the
light of the bloodiness you should see on my
ears and all over me with my Washington battles
and I ... in Washington . . . achievements on
the assumption that, you know, the one thing that,
that I could say to the young people, because if
you stick to this kind of no-win operation long
enough you get one reward, and that is that every
day you learn something new, no matter how old
you are, and one of the things that l‘ve learned
about Washington was that, you know, I was naive
as hell to believe that because a predominantly
black board invited me in and that you were going
to get a black superintendent and that you have
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Panelist
:
Clark:
McCoy
:
Clark:
a blackhead of the teachers' union and you have
a black majority in the city, a city that the
whites really don't want to give up totally because
they have invested so much in the marble, I assume
that they do - white marble as it is, but you
know, these were all big catches, so all you have
to do is to go out a simplistic regarding for aca-
demic achievement of black kids predominantly, and
they welcome you with comfort and the next thing
you know you have some black marble statues erec-
ted
. . .
In Pennsylvania or Constitution?
Ah, U Street
. . . battles of the world, if you
teach black kids you got all the power failure
going your way, the only way to look at, another
glorious defeat. Not as dramatic as Ocean Hill-
Brownsville, because here the forces were much
more polite.
What does that mean?
Yes, the whites did not have to surface, they
had blacks tearing each other apart, the only
right v>7hites had to do is to v/rite polite edito-
rials on the one hand and on the other hand, you
knov7, everybody knows you can't really come in
and teach black kids, and if you get a black
superintendent saying this and a black union
man doing his job of being with the union members,
they can get out of everything, you know, well . .
the last group of people to be talked for are
dead. I am trying to deal with my own romanticism
that I deal with on some of these things, and
I have to say that Washington also taught me that
the parents were not as outraged as they should
be and there was no mass grassroots, indigenous
support behind the Clark I know for teaching kids
how to read or write; the letters to the, well,
of course, one of the . . might show that the
letters to the editor were all from middle-class
whites who were saying that to teach black kids
to read would be to dehumanize them, and I never
realized that the only reason that the parents
didn't write vzas because they were never taught
to write, you know. So you are asking me for
alternatives? See me tomorrow.
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Fantini: The only alternative that I see - it's not an
alternative, it's a compromise alternative, wlUch
may not even be valid, because it's such a com-
promise, and that is that an infiltration of
the structure of the educational system at diffe-
rent levels of it, forming therefore easy
.
Clark: Infiltration by whom^
Fantini
:
By those who arc - you know, have fought, you
know what the problem is.
Clark: What makes you think that they will not become
indistinguishable from other view of the fact
successfully infiltrating?
F antini: Well, you are now saying, you know, you are now
giving the only reason why this may not be valid,
but I am saying, when you are searching
. . .
Clark: Let's go back to the question, I really don't
know.
F antini
;
I would say that you need to
. . .
Clark: . . . King. . .
Fantini: Who? Excuse me.
Clark: A man by the name of King v;ho was the deputy
superintendent last before it Vv7as public. He
could have been considered as infiltrator.
Fantini: Now, what do they mean, they mean that organiza-
tions like MARC and some others will have to . .
Clark: We've got our share of bureaucrats.
F antini: I am saying that you have a kind of transitional
. . .
the system will corrupt you, there is no
question about it, and will and the \cay . . .
Clark: Either it will corrupt you or destroy yen.
Fantini: All right, but there are ways, you know. There
are people around this room that in some way
managed to maintain some semblance . . (Panelists
interjecting something) . .no, but I am just
saying - asking for an alternative- what is an
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alternative to it? I mean, it's such a bleak
picture, and I am saying that on the one hand
you have to affect the economic structure and
vouchers of places like this, or in a sense the
business and industry might look at education as
an economic market place and maybe get better educa
tion through that means, and again there is no
control in terms of parents, and just simply let
somebody else try to do it and it may be advanta-
geous economically, but that being right, because
they'll make money on it. That's one overall stra-
tegy. The other one, you know, is if you start
this kind of an infiltration where you are in the
school system, some of ... or somewhere else,
and form a coalition which provide alternatives.
You kind of create a different process, very slow
and it will continue to die in that sense. But
those are the only operational ones that I can
come up with. You know, established the teachers
are opposed the vouchers, oppose the performance
contracting, they have the
. . .
and all that
kind of stuff and so those are not likely to get
too far, but these are the only alternatives that
I can think of.
McCoy
:
Let me just backtrack for a minute. You said
something - maybe you passed over it lightly,
Ken didn't hear you, I didn't see his ears prick
up, but you said something like MARC starting
its o^>m schools.
F antini
:
Not in this sense . . .
McCoy That's what he said, now I didn't ask you to . .
Fantini: MARC is identified in that work across the coun-
try with people who are committed, and there is
a certain sense that you can clinically accept
I said whether somebody is . . . and whether you
can train him or not if you are going to use
those talents, a phase, you know, you go into an
enviornment in which it is possible to make it
. . .
not be compromised and try to keep, try to
convert what's there and coming back to get fuel
into this strategy and what have you, you keep
coming back and forth, and the whole notion of
you assigned to Washington was in essence to be
able to do this and to bring some resources and
maybe rechannel that energy and that power in
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Ferretti:
F antini;
McCoy
:
Clark:
a certain way. You couldn't do it, well, okay,
that's difficult and then that's it. You may
have brought in some people at different levels,
you may have tied up with a college, and so forth.
. . . the way to do it, but it is possible to cap-
ture and turn it around somewhat
. . . the stage
of deterioration is so bad that they might allow,
right now, you know, some
- you know people say
it's so bad that
. . .
In their area, they might allow
. . .
Sure, they'll say go ahead.
Well, let me back up again if what I was saying
when you said that, because if your original
statement was when you talked about some options
of business and progress and us not having any
control over it, and by us, I mean the minority
not having any control over it, that's sort of a
different perspective at this point. Now, what
I am saying is even if we were able to educate
all the black people, I mean substantial numbers
of them, business still controls the job market,
business still controls the political scene, so
in that sense you are building another level of
frustration and I would see the bureaucracy moving
just executively closed eyes. In other vrards,
you got to educate them if this infiltration
process you are talking about became a reality,
because it's so bad, they say, 'go ahead and do
it,' the bureaucracy v;ould again move, and move I
guess even more expeditiously because the real
forces arc being confronted and challenged, and
they'd stop the job market, an even worse job
than they are presently doing, and its controls
.
. .
meaningful in a sense to use public educa-
tion as a v;eapon.
I really say that I have to believe in Mario's
optimism, because if you don't, don't do anything
and you are very cleverly defeated and you know
this is similar to . . . if you don't do it you
are bound to lose, and if you do something, you
have a fifty-fifty chance to do something. Well,
I got to believe that because if I didn't believe
that I would make really an honest living I am not
sure enough at MARC going to hide in the academic
sanctuary at 42nd Street graduate center. I do
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F ant ini
:
Clark:
want to remind you, though, if Rhody is going to
take seriously your invitation that is someone
who has been involved in the struggle for democra-
tization of our public schools from the old-fashio-
ned ancient days of the struggle for Brown and
desegregation, what I have really learned during
these last three years with the disturbingly
staxk clarity was that the resistance to educating
our kids under any conditions is greater than the
resistance to desegregation, now that is an appa-
llingly disturbing lesson.
Say that again.
That the resistance - I thought that in the early
stages, you know, in the struggle with the roya-
lists, that the desegregation finishing as we have
to raise the quality of education for our kids that
that was the maximum level of resistance which
you are going to find in the arena of education
and civil rights in America. I thought, you
knov;, when I was threatened in South Carolina
and otlier places, you know, hell, the man is
really fighting his last ditch racial fight and
if we v/ere to win this, the rest is easy sailing.
I may say many confessions of ignorance and
naivete, I mean get self-conscious about it, and
I didn't realize that that was almost child's
play compared to the resistance against any way
of increasing the quality of education for our
children, that any serious proposal to have our
kids academically competitive to allocate, is
going to meet a furious resistance initially dis-
guised under all kinds of procedural matters, due
process, sometimes even humanistic concerns,
namely not wanting to frustrate our kids, that
wasn't meant to liavc the same kind of neurotic
hangups that the kids who go to Harvard have,
and sf)metimes they come under real heart rende-
ring concerns, but if you keep pushing you aren't
going to get but hard, sparse, bludgeoningly
,
God damn it no - the things that we get initially
in desegregation and interestingly enough I think
even more vehement than in the desegregation strug
glc. Now I don't know if that means it's hopeless
Where those that those of us who study the history
of race-, relations in America knov; that the first
civil rights struggle was the fact that the ques-
tion of whether the Africans should be taught to
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Panelist
:
Clark:
Ferretti:
F ant ini:
McCoy
:
Clark
McCoy
;
read or not, and that's the same thing with the
rights struggles, how do you keep people
in slavery if you give them the academic and
intellectual skills to
.
. .
Obviously.
Yes, and this is what the issue is although it
was not generally put that starkly.
When yoir education system - the result of John
Dewey equips
. . . children to fit into society
so that they can to question society.
That's the whole adjustment, that's correct, that's
very critical.
I go back again because there is really something
I want to tell you, but I still haven't found
the focus to make it stand up, but what I am saying
is - let's ask this question - education in this
country
- public education - is still controlled
by white America and they are using every gimmick
in the books to - what shall I say -
keep control.
not only keep control, but to put it in a profit-
making - let me change the subject just quickly.
The University of Massachusetts has a tuition fee
of two hundred dollars per student and every dime
of that tuition fee goes back to the State, I
mean it goes back to the fund, you know, it goes
right through the University, goes through right
on back to the State and they have already ear-
marked that money for something else, and I am
saying that white America is doing the same thing.
All of the - as you put it - voucher systems,
programmed instruction, all the gimmicks that
they are using in education, they are perpetrating
these on both white and black, but more appropria-
tely on black people. It seems that they - lite-
rally what you are saying - that they are for
what they are worth - gimmicks - and they are
designed, still designed to see to it, give the
illusion that they are doing something, but yet
they definitely preventing the educational attain-
ment on the part of minority students and so
forth. If that's the case, what can - I don't
want to say it the way I fear it sounds - but
what can be done about exposing these characters?
I mean
. . . society, but you have to talk about
it and recognize, except that the mass of the
people don't recognize it. It's like the union.
The teachers in the union are not making small
wages don't really know what the union leadership
is really into.
Ferretti
:
You ask the editor of Fortune to lunch.
Clark
:
I am not at Rhody's invitation to exposure, I want
to maintain my status as a moderate and understan-
ding person who can communicate with white Ame-
ricans in the same -.way as I can with
. . .
McCoy Is there a role for the cat who wants to expose
you?
Ferretti: He makes the New York Times.
Clark:
. . .
can expose all he wants, at the moment he'll
get in the exposure bag, then you are an extre-
mist, and then your phone should be tapped - there
should be some of us who are softspoken, academic,
philosophical, understanding, and that's the role
I have chose for
. . . and you find some other
exposers - and Mario who is another minority that
is often disguised as a minority status by his
preoccupation with others, ought not be asking
to take any more exposure roles if he is to be the
School of Education, the establishment.
McCoy
:
You are destroying the hope factor by those kinds
of standards.
Clark: I am saying that we have to accept division of
labor, and Mario and I have decided at eleven or
eleven thirty today what role we are going to
take, we are going to deal with . . .
McCoy Oliver, you and I have to get together and esta-
blish our roles.
Clark: We are rational describers of the way in which
the establishment can be more efficient and
that's not exposure, you interpret. I have a
candidate for exposure - two: Bernie Donovan
and Esther Swanker.
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McCoy: That's on the record man - oh, God, I am, I don't
believe it - I am sorry about that. I know that
you know.
C 1 ark
:
Well, they are much more invulnerable to attacks
in being extremists than Mario, the minority, and
I guess I am a minority. You certainly have to
interpret the
. .
Ferretti: Of course.
McCoy Let me throw this last thing in.
Clark: And you guys, expenditure, exposure bag.
McCoy Well, look, let me just ask this last question.
I planned it for the last panel, but I read the
transcripts pretty accurately, and I have been
reading a lot of what I call supportive literature,
and I am convinced that there was a predetermined
script, that script has been written and regardless
of who this person is fitting into the roles the
main characters in that script, they are going to
play those roles. They have no choice. They do
either because they have read the script, or they
do it intuitively being in the roles, and I sus-
pect what I am saying is if education is going to
change the minority, you got to write another
script
. . that. This script is like preordained.
Clark: The script of frustration, you are welcome.
Ferretti: A new script - how do you write the new script?
McCoy
:
Well, that's a question, maybe , . .
Ferretti
:
Well, what should the new script do? What should
it say?
Clark: You start a book, you know, a la college? Open
enrollment, open admissions, knowing full well . .
Panelist Compensatory education.
Clark: Compensatory education . . .
McCoy
:
Now you are talking about a compromise script.
Clark: No, we are talking about the opening theme of the
new script, which we already have . . .
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McCoy
:
Yeah, that's not a new script, that's part of
. . .
Clark: Ocean Hill is the last I see of tlic old play
we got it, we got a lot of people taking this role
or this approach and sustaining it as long as they
don't look at the statistical reality, you know,
that just accounts for an embarrassingly small
percentage of human beings who relate tliis - but
it is doing good, you know. This is a real refor-
mation
.
McCoy It's not going to be a new script then.
Clark: Write a new script.
F antini: You are going to be another employed actor.
McCoy
:
I am already in that stage.
F antini
:
All right, you want a script in vdiich you are
employed?
Clark:
. . .
impossible
. . . about this compensatory
programs, so people are really going to get money
out of it.
F ant ini: Right down at the time v/hen you laugh so it hurts,
because you laughed at it, you know, but one stra-
tegy is to go in saying compensatory education
. .
.
process of education, it's certainly sensi-
ble and the like, and you go in and try to capture
that, convert it slowly, you know, to me that is
difficult, I can't see hov^7 this can happen.
McCoy
:
I agree
.
Fantini: It's a matter of only an appendage and they are
sticking out there. . . even say we need more
money
.
McCoy
:
I agree with that wholeheartedly, but for a diffe-
rent reason. Wliat 1 am saying is that the people
and their allies who have written the script for
years and updated the play and updated the script,
and so forth, are not going to bo able, are not
going to be allowed to write the nev; script.
Clark: We must now take the role and analyze it, I
think initially, dispassionately. . .
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Panelist
:
That's correct.
F antini: I am not the one of man
. . .
Clark:
. . and among the things you learn is tliat you
are expendable.
F antini: You know, I have learned, people will say you
know
. . .
McCoy
:
Do I have to say V7hat I am learning?
Clark:
q
Well, you got to v/rite a dissertation
. . . they
are going to ask that your dissertation tells
something about what you've learned.
McCoy That's why I meant
. . .
Ferretti: Why not say what you meant?
McCoy You don't listen to me, fellows, do you?
Clark: You're expendable and in a good position a moderate
for good causes.
Fantini: That's right. I understand that's what Payard
Rustin said, 'whatever happened to Rhody McCoy?'
Ferretti: That's right, I tliink I've heard you say it.
Fantini
:
He's still around.
Ferretti
:
Writes, teacher, and everything . . .
Clark: Rhody has gotten an invitation for a testimonial
dinner with A1 Shanker . . black tie . .
Fantini
:
. .
can say A1 Shanker was right.
Clark: In that that he had the power . . at political
times when I need it.
McCoy
:
Do you say that benediction or do I have to get
a neutral minister?
Oliver
:
No, you are regularly licensed.
Clark: We love you, Rhody, and we arc glsd that you v^erc
out there. In fact, Mario and I did the fact
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McCoy
:
Clark:
McCoy
Clark:
McCoy
Clark:
McCoy
:
Clark:
McCoy
Clark:
taking care of the logistic:,.
I heard that last weel;. WclJ
,
1 am afraid this
has been the bleakest panel :;es.sion that wc ' ve
had
.
I think it has been (>ne of the ^>o.st enjoyable.
It*s been awfully enjoyable, no question, but it
has been undoubtedly the most bleak.
I didn't realize the perspectives of the comic
quality of the union, particularly
. .
. . the person who is going to record it, I put
in parenthesis after that: (.sarcasm) 'Clark added.
No. I really love it. I really think tliat the
stark quality of comic tragedy inherent in a
struggle for power depends o:t liuman beings to
control their own destiny in liui face of other
people having this power and u.nwilling to do with-
out, it's exciting kids, people like you are
concerned about that. It's a n^'cessary part to
report of hunger; it's like my good friend, Les
Dunbar, ironically, received ar. ovation lor infor-
mation that is . . . in other words . . society
such as ours really doe.sn't give a damn whether
kids starve or not. lie got an ovation for summa-
rizing that fact. I really was embarrassed. For
again, if you look at that, it's a tragic commen-
tary - we are bringing democracy to Vietnam, and
we will democratize tliem if wo h.ave to destroy
them, and this is not an invention, of mine, this
is a high military . . that i tliis Lovar has to
be saved, and the only way that it could be saved
is to destroy it.
And then what you said before, the coalition, the
reaching out to these people and, meaning the
economic power and so forth, it's just another
exercise .
No, we do it.
I didn't ask you whether you do it or not, I am
asking just to exercise it.
You do it, because if you don't do that, you do
nothing
.
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McCoy
:
Yes, but in the absence of any new script, new
play
,
new actor
,
then you know you are in
. .
Clark:
. .
.
possibility of a new plot.
McCoy
. .
.
just being an old play.
Fantini
:
. .
.
years and years of talking, you know, it's
just power, and I want to get in on it, I want
to take it.
McCoy That's so elusive and so nebulous.
Fantini: No, it isn't, it isn't, it's very clear.
Clark: Rhody wants us to be a magician
. . .
McCoy
:
Nope
.
Clark: in the v/ave of a magic wand you say, 'here, we've
gone from educational injustice to educational
democracy .
'
McCoy
:
No, I really don't think that, Ken, what I am saying
is the old warriors who have gone out and got this
manuscript out, I mean, I know that they are a
little . .
.
(interrupted)
.
.
yes, I know that.
But I am saying that as a result of those experie-
nces, some of those inputs can be substantial in
writing a new script, because as I see and read -
it's just a rehashing of the old script, and as
you were just making in the last statement, I feel
that this is . . .
F anti n i
:
From what the alternatives thrown out at this
table has any, you know . . .
Ferretti: You are right, it is a contest, it is a fight
against labor, but it's also yet you must outdo
it to have change, you have to have power, that's
the way this country works. It doesn't work just
out of the goodness of its heart, it really
doesn ' t
.
McCoy
;
You couch that out as a concession that you can
reach up for, but you know that . . . paying the
graft you can't get through.
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Clark: What do you want us to do for you, Rhody? Do you
want us to say, 'here it is, the answer, here is
the new script.'
. . can't do it. We can do it,
but it has nothing to do with reality.
Fantini
:
You take the same theme, but with a different orches-
tration, same notes and everything else, you can't
do - those you are the same - it's reality, you
know, if you don't touch that, you know, then you
are not playing the game, and I am saying, you
know, that we believe in schools.
Clark: I have a friend who says that the only way you
can deal with this problem is to abolish all
schools, you know, get rid of them.
Oliver:
. . abolish the children.
McCoy
:
When you tell me that one of the strategies is to
infiltrate the system in the form of coalitions
around people who have certain delivery capacities
. .
Fantini
:
Right, they really don't have the source of power,
1 know you can't - no locomotion whatsoever.
McCoy
:
Maybe not.
Fantini
:
They'll plug into a certain power source.
McCoy
;
What I am suggesting to you is that the very esta-
blishment that has the present controls and manages
to keep them and shift them from the fullback to
the quarterback, or from fullback to the running
halfback who is going to see you infiltrate and
is going to create the same atmosphere of frustra-
tion for you . . .
Clark: No co-option.
McCoy; Of course, that's what you are saying, the co-option
will destroy you.
Clark: But, look, you'll be taking up some time on this.
Fantini
:
Not only be taking up some time, but you will be
able to - for a limited period of time - to divert
some energies . It may take you less far - you
really have to go light years - but I don't know,
you know.
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Clark: Why are we permitting Rhody to put us into the
role of consoling him.
McCoy
:
You told me I was joining the ranks of the unemployed,
you got the confrontation with exposure, what else
can I take?
Clark: Well, have to run things if the establishment is
. . . which is closed to us now, my expectance is
confrontation and exposure, that's what they learned
. . . make no mistake about it, the establishment,
bureaucracies are very resilient. I'm sure I have
been most helpful to you, Rhody.
McCoy In more ways than one, Ken, I want to be honest
about it, this is going to make me, when I come
back at it the next time - make some more help.
Clark: Next time is the last time?
McCoy Yes.
F ant ini:
. . . can only deal with reform is, if you want
to call it that, to beat them at their own game.
McCoy
:
Yes, but what you are saying is
. . .
Fantini
:
Yes, and you can't beat them. I mean my point is
have all the values that they grcv; past, those
sacred values, and develop a proposal that is
based on that. Now, one
. . .
Clark: . . . has anything to do with the experimental
districts
.
Fantini This is correct, and they now might have learned
some things about participation, what you should,
what participation is legitimate and what is not.
C 1 ark I keep listening at great length about the experi-
mental districts approach . . . and he is all
gung ho about the experimental districts.
McCoy Mario has somehow or other tried to convince me
to get in this car again and I am to play in
there with no hands and no cars, but I am . .
Clark: . . . told you.
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McCoy
:
Well, even so you've got to get it from the guy
who ran the
. . . Okay, Dixie, thank you, and he
don't sell to black people. I know I won't sleep
tonight behind this one.
F antini
:
But I do have a proposal for next time. I want
to save this for the last.
Moon
:
Do you want to have that on the record, Rhody?
McCoy What? Yes, he got it. I am going to hold him to
it, too.
Clark: I'll list the first two: that there is revelation
of Ocean Hill-Brownsville in terms of plusses and
minusses
,
but if you look at, for example, of
how Ocean Hill-Brownsville operated as if it had
power, which was probably the only way it could
have done, but when the clench came, it really
didn't have the power. Is that part of your
. .
."
Fantini: Yes, that's power of justice.
Clark: And power of concern.
Panelist
:
And power of rhetoric.
Fantini Power of dignity.
Oliver
:
The fact that it has for three years, though,
the fact that it has survived three years v;ith
all the waste that this government has
. . .
Panelist . . by foolishness it survived.
McCoy I haven't been very religious . . . turn out to
be a real . . .
Clark: The name you call that, does that account to some-
body in Albany? You get rid of Firman?
Fantini
:
Yes, but in comparison, ratio-wise . . .
Clark: We had a lot of little victories, we had a lot
of small victories.
Fantini: As far, you know, you could muster.
Clark: Victories to be penalizing . . get rid of . .
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Fantini
:
Clark:
You can - all the lives of the other will degene-
rate .
We even survived Martin Mayer*.
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Good morning to the panelists and let me just
bring this up to date. This is the last panel
session and obviously I want to express my appre-
ciation for the kinds of cooperation I have had
up to this particular point and suggest further
that the kinds of inputs that the panelists have
made, lias made this study of mine exciting and
profitable for me. Unlike most of you, I have
had an opportunity to read all of the transcripts
and I suggest to you that each one of the panelists
has been productive, that is in terms of provi-
ding information and direction. The last panel
session we had at MARC I think was indeed very
substantial, but it certainly was kind of discou-
raging in terms of what the future of the educa-
tional arena looks like; it appears to me in
terms of what my proposal is, that is participa- .
Lion, I think it really put the lead on the skele-
ton. As a result of reading and looking at all
the panels and obviously being concerned what's
liappening now in Nevv^ark, Detroit, Chicago and
other big cities, and sort of comparing what
happened in 1967, '68, and '69 in New York and
what's happening now in New York, it led me to
only one kind of frame of reference in trying
not to look at options necessarily because I
guess 1 am of the opinion at this particular
point that if there are some, I don't have the
wisdom and the ability to see them at the pre-
sent time, but I do think there is some sort
of predictable behavior that we can look at, and
I think as compared to the note that you have
there, someone suggested that we can - and if I
use this kind of quote "infiltrate the system" and
support people who want to try to bring about
reform and maybe the time will come when other
people will become conscious of the need of change
in education and use these people, different peo-
ple. In front of you I have put together six or
seven items which obviously reflect two things,
one, what inputs we received from the panel and
how the panelists have perceived the kinds of
'
' conditions that we discussed, and two, some of
my personal observations and not only my obser-
1
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vations, but the roles and involvement I had in Ocean
Hill and New York City, So if we can take today
and each one of us address ourselves at some point
to each of the seven items there, I think we will
have done more than I can expect. I think I can
round out this dissertation and make it a document
of acceptance. So if we take the first item -
anybody like to volunteer to start out? I am going
to play a different kind of role today, as you
respond - I am not just going to take notes, but I
am trying to just be a little provocative using
substitute of the panelists and so I'd like to be
gracious
.
Clark: So you are being gracious, Rhody?
McCoy: Well, I have to say that Ken because as I said at
the last panel, you all really did my mind up
pretty good.
Clark: Well, I don't know whether I can meet your require-
ment of being gracious, but I'll certainly try my
hand at the first item of the behavior of the
various parties or entities was the only option
available to them, that is, there were no other
options in those cities employed. I suppose I can
identify it with the position pretty consistently
in these discussions that which was a certain kind
of inevitability in the Ocean Hill-Brov>/nsville - an
inevitability of how each of the workers who were
in contact and in conflict with each other had to
behave, and this perspective of inevitability is
based upon general theories of power and what is
involved when an existing power situation, bureau-
cracy, or social system is challenged or confron-
ted by an individual, or individuals or groups
that are making the challlenge precisely because
they are not part of the status quo, and who by
making the challenge are clearly critizing, threa-
tening, challenging the people who control the
existing system. I think the last time you were
here at Automation House, if not at MARC, I tried
to make a distinction between serious challenges
and the kinds of challenges which will not lead
to any serious confrontation. I think that the
problem v^ith Ocean Hill-Brownsville was that for
some reason the community people, the Board, the
administrator, and the people who supported the
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McCoy
:
Clark:
adminis tr alor in Ocean llill-Brownsville were serious,
or certainly communicated a sense of seriousness, they
communicated that they were really seriously concer-
ned about the education of these children and belie-
ved that a genuine form of decentralization would
increase the cliances of effective education for
the children; and something about their manner and
their style and their presence that communicated that
this could not be taken frivously by the status quo,
that for some reason - what I really don't know,
Rhody
,
is why did these people in the community,
you and Rev. Oliver and others, take this goal so
seriously as to communicate to the bureaucracy
and their agents that you could not be co-opted,
that you couldn't be played with or brought within
the system of good boys until this goal was attained.
Whatever the reasons are that you gave this impres-
sion, the fact is you gave it, and Mr. Shanker and
the people at 110 Livingston Street were not making
up fantasy, I mean they weren't engaging in fan-
tasies when they decided to stand and fight. They
V7ere correct from their point of view, that they .
had no options because if you really did some things
that a decentralized system for operating the
schools in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville district did
in fact lead to a more effective education for
tliose children attending those schools, that would
be really a most serious and devastating criticism
of the existing system. So they really had no
options except to fight you on all technical grounds
or on due process grounds, to invent grounds - you
had to be. defeated, and - I know I said this before -
that actually you had to be defeated so clearly
that differences among the groups of people who
were allied together in defeating you weren't
actually subordinated. If there were any diffe-
rences betv;een the union and the Board, they had
to be subordinated to the fact that they had to
join forces to see that you and your allies did
not make the devastating criticism of the existing
system.
Ken, isn't that a predictable behavior?
Yes, I think that the lack of options on the part
of your adversaries is clearer to me than the lack
of options on the part of your allies. What is
still left unclear to me is why did your Board,
and you and some of your principals and some of
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your supporters in the conmunity take so seriously
this need to really test another approach for a
more effective education. Why did you just be
good boys and girls and go through the motions of
decentralisation and save yourselves a lot of
Sturm and Drang, etc.? Why weren't you cooperative
gracefully?
Ferretti: Before Rhody answers, I'd just like to throw in -
the way that's worded is interesting: the behavior
of the various parties or entities were the only
options. That word option substitutes either
tactics or reaction, and I think you can say some-
thing. I think that tlie UFT and the local board
as the two protagonists, the initial protagonists
in this thing, the UFT ' s options or tactics I think
v;cre clearly defined. They knew exactly where they
were going to go at every step. They knew what
tliey were going to do. On the other hand they
gambled on your reactions and I think they won
in every case. They knew how you would react to
each piece of pressure that they brought against
you, so that the Number One becomes a truism, that
Lliey v;ere tlie only options available. I think
they were almost programmed options on the part
of the UFT. This is what I think. Do you agree?
McCoy: 1 was very facitious when I hear . .
Oliver; I don't agree at all with that. 1 don't think
that the union was that knowledgeable about the
board or the community as to play the game that
way and anticipate what we would do. I don't
think that we were that knowledgeable about what
we were doing in the community or the board. At
the time vv/hen it was proposed that we accept bin-
ding arbitration, I think it was perhaps thought
th.at this would end the whole thing, but the commu-
nity people and the board looked at that whole
situation and could sec that if we went along
with binding arbitration, it was taking the power
out of the hands of the black community and putting
it literally back into the hands of people who
have not demonstrated an interest in educating
black children. And the board simply could not
go along with that. Not that they opposed the
principle of binding arbitration, but when that
principle is used as a gimmick to stop black
people, then we saw through and said "no" to that.
Ilk
Ferretti: I think what I said - don't you think you were
in effect supporting what I said - they gambled on
your reactions and won in almost every case.
Oliver
:
I don't mean that they expected us to Lurn them
down
.
Ferretti
:
You don ' t?
Oliver: No.
Clark
:
What I would like to ask Rev. Oliver, there are
other black communities in New York City, why
was the Ocean Hill-Brownsville Board and officials
so much more adamant about the need to control the
education of their children? Other black communi-
ties have similar problems, you know, tliey have
the history of inadequate education for their chil-
dren, but they didn't make the stand, now IS 201
is an exception. Why were your options in terms
of goals or relationships with the governing struc-
ture of education and the powers that control educa
tion in New York City, why were your options limi-
ted and why were your tactics and strategy limited
compared with other black communities that accept
what is, and even this year there seems to be very
little struggle on the part of black communities
for the kind of direct, immediate control which
the board you headed wanted.
Oliver
:
Well, a number of the members on the Board were
people who had themselves experienced through
their own families, the experience of the frustra-
tions of their children in scliools not receiving
education. I, for one, experienced that when I
moved here from Birmingham, Alabama, when my son
was doing above the national average in mathema-
tics, and one year in Brooklyn he was failing
mathematics and I couldn't get the teacher to even
give him a book to study from. And when I. went
to the schools to try to do something about it,
I had to get through so many intermediaries before
I got to the principal that I finally had to say,
'I want to see the principal and I am not going
to talk to the rest of you, I want to see the
principal . '
Clark: This is not uncommon, this is not uncomraon in
New York City.
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Oliver
:
Clark:
Oliver
:
C 1 ark
:
McCoy
This helped me to be more determined to change
this thing if ever I was in a position to make
a change; you know, there were a number of people on
the Board who felt that way and we had a man like
Mr. McCoy who didn't have to make the sacrifices
that vie did but who could see the problems and
is.svies and who was willing to make this fight along
wit’ll grassroots people from the community. I think
that the Board simply was just not for fooling
around, we were in business, and I think that's
the only way that we'll ever go and get anywhere
is to have people who really mean business. I
wouldn't want to . . .
But that was the basis of your problem, the fact
that you meant business.
Then, are you saying that we should not mean
bu.siness in America?
No, T am just addressing myself to Rhody's first
quc.stion, that because you meant business your
options were limited.
Well, let me try to put that in another phrase,
anoliier context, and these are just four little
concerns that I have. Number one is that in that
cnviornment you had all of the ingredients present,
of people who had different kinds of concerns,
housing, etc., etc., that if some cohesive ele-
ments were brought together, you could find that
their commitments would be the same, whether it
vjas housing or employment or what have you. The
second ingredient was that there you had persons
who themselves had been in the system for a number
of years and who saw how the system was functioning,
did a lot of homework to knovj where it is vulnerable
and vjhich forms of pressures to make some sort of
change and then look at it in terms of concerns
for the education of the children, which can many
times be awfully . . . saying . . other look at
education. Take those three elements and put them
together and the thing that made Ocean Hill diffe-
rent than any others was because almost immediately
our first objective was to establish some visible
change, or what I call, some visible suggestions;
local people running their own election and coming
out on top. I think if you go back and check
the records we put together that election in twenty-
Fantini
:
one clays and
. . . was how people canvassed the
comriuinity
,
not only about the education concerns
of the community, but their housing concerns, sani-
tation department and employment concerns, and
while v/e v;ere overtly talking about education, we
were trying to address ourselves to those to keep
that "powerless community" in some sort of spear-
head to attack the whole spectrum of education.
And then beyond that, if I can couch it in one
way, v.'as the competence of the people who were invol-
ved. It may not have been necessarily a formal
competence, but the competence in terms of their
concerns and their ability to get something deli-
vered, mixing with the formal competence made us
quite an "instrument" and we saw the possibilities.
My ov7n sense of it, Ken, was that the seriousness
of purpose of . . . v;as carried around by indivi-
duals. They didn't know what to do with it, faced
with tills amorphous educational system and what
was conceived here was a rudimentary form for
organization in which you can collect people who
were .serious and put them in a position initially
of governmental responsibility. So what happened
here under the, I think the acceptable bureaucra-
tic pattern, that experimentation is, you know,
an okay thing and the fact that they had gone
through various stages of participation, advisory
councils and the like, that these experiments
whether they were completely understood by the
people who were involved in it, and 1 am talking
now about the people who were in a position to
legitimize it or to least make an operational,
whether they understood completely the serious-
ness of it or the implications I am not sure, but
you have to understand that there were other peo-
ple involved besides the community here. I myself
and tlie Foundation was involved and if you want
to say that this was one of the allies and was
a povjer source to contend with the fact that we
Vv^ere involved in the initial meetings at which
time they - the fact that the seriousness of pur-
pose was reflected in the proposals, and so on,
the fact that the Ford Foundation at a certain
stage actually funded the planning for it, the
fact that the Mayor's office v^as supportive, the
fact that decentralization had been mandated or
at least a plan had been mandated by the legis-
lature, so that you did have some allies who
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joined the serious community in an attempt to
develop an alternative to urban school reform on
the guise of experimentation, that is these are
three years to test some things out. Initially,
even the union had been involved; the union had*
been involved in developing the proposal. Now,
so that you had in a sense the community, you had
some indication of support from the state, you
had the city government which was, I think, respon-
sive to it creating a certain climate, and you had
the Ford Foundation. Now this was a type of coali-
tion which I hadn't seen until now, and for a
brief moment, I think the community felt that they
had some means, you had some money, you had your
own headquarters, that this might indeed be a
different type of ball game. And when the serious-
ness took the next - when the act actually began
to put some specificity to the seriousness, namely
that, you know, we are going to look at accounta-
bility, this was part and parcel of seriousness,
that performacne was important, well, I think,
you began to lose some of your allies one by one,
because they realized that something had to be
done about it, but they really didn't fully under-
stand what was involved in the pursuit; and I for
one tried to keep one of these forces connected
with you for as long as it was possible, but
this was a political process, this was the use of
power to bring about fundamental change and when
you deal with politics in this way, then I think
you are dealing with controversy and you are
dealing with the use of power, and the resiliency -
what surprised me was the resiliency of the so-
called bureaucracy when tliey were challenged, in
other words, the same energy which could be used
to educate children, you know, the same vitality
that we still exhibit to defend their own interests.
It was not necessarily seen in the advancement of
education for children. So that I am saying what
you had was a force field of some kind v7ith the
beginnings of coalitions, political coalitions
formed, and when the politics flared, because it
would, because you are dealing with a coordination
of energy sources around a problem of developing
an alternative for urban school reform, when this
began to unfold then you began to have repercussions
so that City Hall was put on the spot, certainly
the Regents and others were bombarded with letters
of protest and certainly the Ford Foundation was
McCoy
;
Clark:
McCoy:
Fantini
:
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was deluged with concern that they had overstepped
their boundaries, and if you look at these and if
you look at the fact that these were from predomi-
nantly white organizations beginning to develop a
relationship with a predominantly black community,
and then down the road, you know what it means to
be associated with serious, with a serious attempt
at reform to bring about better education for black
children, and the fact that the politics, one by
one it seems to me that your allies left you and
you were left alone. And since you started out
powerless but with a sense of purpose and since the
people who could feed you some energy and some
power left you, at the end of the scenario
- you
were there alone, but communicated to the end that
you were serious and that you would not compromise
because obviously, the name of the game on the
way was to compromise
.
Ken, let me strike out to you to get a different
kind of reaction. At the beginning of this session,
you stated that this whole atmosphere was permeated
by individuals.
That is correct.
Well, let me address myself to the allies. The
question I am raising is: one, my perception at
the moment is that the allies were people who
were waiting in the wing who had two basic concerns,
one - those who make these reforms who saw the
tragedy and I put you in that category, and once
the action started the liberals who took the side
of the underdog, which is typically an American
kind of thing , but at some point it changed, and I
guess the question I am asking you is the reason
that we lost the allies or in some instances the
reformers changed for a reason other than what we
are saying here, I mean challenges to the power
structure, if that is in itself being the only
kind of reason.
No, I think my own sense of it is that you lost
the organizations with which the individuals were
associated. You didn't lose the individuals. I
mean Kenneth and I were always looking for alter-
natives, to be serious in terms of wanting reform,
'l am,' and so forth. He represents an organiza-
tion in the sense I do, and you represent still
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Clark:
another, the emergence of community, but when you
deal with the game of reform and given the fact,
you know, that all the forces that Kenneth outlined
and the inevitability of certain consequences
,
either it was very naive on our part to have entered
the game at all or we just kept trying that this
time maybe in the dynamics sometliing would happen
that would not normally happen. But we were all
sober about the conseqr.ences of this. So we are
still together as individuals, but it was very
difficult to develop an organi^ational capability
to deal with these problems, as individuals I think
have the same kind of conmiittment
,
the same kind
of feeling, but your ability to deal with this
capability in a community to in a sense say that
the community is with you at all times, or for me
to say that the Ford Foundation is always with us,
or the Regents, is extremely difficult to develop,
as you preceded
,
as your seriousness began to take
hold and people began to realize \;hat seriousness
meant, and at that time, you see, v;e remained as
individuals, but it was very difficult to . . .
I’d like to pick up on your term what seriousness
meant. Looking back now on Ocean Hill -Brownsville
to me this seriousness meant that the Board, the
Ocean Hill -Brownsville Board, the unit administra-
tor, Rhody McCoy, place the education of these
children and the right of these children to receive
a better education than the central Board has so
far provided them above everything else, and you
certainly initially made this absolutely clear.
The other component of seriousness which I sav'/
in looking back on it 'was that there was a kind
of absolute inflexibility in the attainment of this;
that the Board and the administrator probably were
all in . .
.
justification of support employed, so
that this particular assignment and this particular
way of obtaining effective education for their
children had to be given in spite of the fact that
it was coming in conflict u’ith the whole cascade
of positions, stagnations, the prerogatives of
supervisors and associations and prerogatives of
the UFT
,
and once that became clear that there was
no room for any of this , once it became clear that
Rhody McCoy really believed that he would be given
the power to remove teachers in the system and on
the basis of his ovm judgement, once he believed
that he had authority and power which other people
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Oliver
:
Clark:
Oliver
:
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:
Oliver
:
had and could not afford to grant him that, then
there was no option. The only option then would have
been from him to give up trying to act on the basis
of his beliefs. The only option for the Governing
Board would be to say, *well, we have whatever
power you let us have and no more.' Now, maybe
one of the other options would be that they could
have said these things accepting a face-saving way;
Rev. Oliver, be a little more flexible, Rhody McCoy,
be more administrative, versatile, could have sat
down with the Board, with the Council of Supervisory
Association, with the UFT and worked out a face-
saving way in which they could appear to have power
without actually having the power and respecting
their betters, but if they didn't do that, then
they were lost and they couldn't win.
Well, I don't think that there was any effort on
Mr. McCoy's part on the basis of his own judgement
to try to put this thing through. These matters
came before the Board.
Why not, why not if he were as interested? Why
wouldn't he try to . . . that power?
The Board insisted on McCoy being an employee of
the Board, and they insisted on having a board
and an exchange of personnel, or a . . . and he
did have a voice in that, and a number of times
McCoy was overruled, so it was not that he was. . .
- by the local board?
By the local board, and at times everyone was
overruled, matters that came before the Board.
At times I was not the . . . the times was wrote
spent . . in ways that I personally did not approve
of
.
. .
.
power within . .
. . .
not a struggle for power. As chairman of
the Board, I tried to insist that any decisions
coming out of that Board would be the Board's
decisions
,
the majority of that Board . Not my
decision, not my purposes, but it was the majority
of the Board that voted on what came out as a
result
.
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Fiinl 1 nl
:
IJut McCoy had a
. . . there was room for executive
Judf^eimint
.
Oliver
:
Yes, there certainly was room for that. But on
the matter of transfer of teadicrs, that matter
carno before the Board and
. . . individualize assign-
ment there.
Pnnt'l isl.: Sliould
. . the same Board?
Oliver
:
We fc:lt so, we felt so and we insisted on that
rij’Jit at the time.
C 1 ark
:
But the incident precipitated the fight - you were
saying that that v;as a Board decision, but the
rcconiinendations for this came from the professionals.
Oliver: It came from the professional and also the perso-
nnel committee of the Governing Board. The Gover-
ning Board had a personnel committee that worked
with the administrator and the two of them united
on that action in May, 1968.
McCoy
:
Depending on which side .... action ... I
recall that the Governing Board in its early stages
said we are going tlirough the organizational pro-
cess. We had a number of teachers who came in at
the same time.. . . . but it didn't work. But, 1
guess . . . the Board itself gave me free permis-
sion to hire my own staff wliich wanted to be involved
in the selection of the advisory, the supervisory
staff, principals, assistants and teachers and I
think liistorlcally they interviewed something like
three luindred prospective candidates in a week.
The point I'm making v/as wlrich I said before In'
putting together a cohesive, visible package that
people could deal with the system in relation to
education was tliat I refused to hire anybody inclu-
ding my own staff, and they interviewed them and
so forth . . . Let me just jump quickly to that.
Dr. Clark, you recall that all during that time
after the - some of the incidents that took place
which maybe . . . complication - there was some
dialogue between myself and you on a number of
occasion.s and I always had tlie impression that I
had a different kind of person who could see things
objectively based on the experiences and the advice
that was offered in some instances offered in the
tactics of the strategy. But what I am saying is
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Clark:
that you must h;we perceived not only the serious-
ness of it but tlie possibility of us making some
sort of inputs in that stage of the educational
arena.
. . recall, I called you on the phone and
talked to you about Franklin K. Lane and what they
are doing to the
. , . Tins is information that
had come to us from the results of our own students
who were in our community, that Franklin K. Lane
was - he v\/as not an issue problem. Ocean Hill v;as
in the context of confrontation, but your resources
moved almost immediately past the issue that did
it, we began to alleviate that situation which
helped at this stage of the game. So I am saying,
I guess I am asking the kind of question is that
individuals that you were referring to, do have
some leverage in trying to alter the tactics in
the assignment whether their agency goes along
with the public . . .
I guess from one perspective one can say that what
happened at Ocean Hill-Brownsville in spite of
the limited options implicit in your first point
had some positive things. One of the positive things
is that you made it rather clear that it got people
discussing this issue of the responsibility of local
people for the education of their children. It
certainly became a basis for continuing discussions
at the point of the crisis and during the crisis
and it involved - as Mario pointed out - many forces
of power within the community, in the large commu-
nity and in the initial phases some of the power
bases were aligned on the side of the people of
Ocean Hill-Brownsville, you know, and its Governing
Board. The Regemts, the State Education Department,
initially was sympathetic with . . . one of the
Regents himself, and, you know-, there were people
who believed in this experiment and believed that
it should be giver, a chance. And this was dealt
witVi . . . without any substantial source of power
even temporarily aligned with the desire on the part
of the comraunitiviS to control the education of
their children. In terms of what actually happened
.
.
got a decentralization bill that was realis-
tic in keeping the power where it was before, but
because .... at least they used the term of
decentralization, at least they talked about local
boards and made some obeyance to that even though
the actual control of pow’cr was pretty much to
where it was before.
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Oliver
:
Fantini
:
I think there was a reason at Ocean Hill of
why the Board and the community found itself
alone, and I think this is understood that the
whole conflict, the community understood, that
was that the UFT and certain elements in the news
media used the gimmick of anti-Semitism
. . .
plastered the community with that and plastered
the Governing Board with that, and plastered the
country and the VN^orld with that.
. . , myself
. . . declare Henry Ford the First who rode
. . .
into Ocean Hill-Brownsville and his protocols were
citing as something that influenced the Board in
support of Ocean Hill-Brownsville and that here
was a group of black people trying to get some-
where and they are anti-Semites and Ford, who had
a supposed history of anti-Semitism came in and
helped them, and this was
. .
- and Ford was made
to look as an evil institution, an anti-Semitic
institution. There were times when I ran into
the most violent audiences that I have ever met,
and one time I had to v>/alk out on an audience of
about five hundred people . .
.
(Tape is indistin-
guishable here)
. .
and when I attempted to speak
they gave me such .... I attempted to walk out.
They asked me to stay . . . I once spoke at
lunchtime
. . .
Albert Einstein Hospital and
invited there by union . . never let me out.
I had to have police protection to get out of
there. Actually, literally they had to put me in
a police car and drive through crowds of people
whooping "nigger" and all that. This is between
them, I think it was the publicity that the union
gave to this over a period of seven months that
made people, I think, withdraw from Ocean Hill-
lirouTisville . That is to me a most powerful injus-
tice upon a community.
This was made . . . also by the Mayor's appearance
at one of the synagogues . . . and, you know, the
effect of what you are talking about had a toll
on him, as well, and certainly on tlie Ford Founda-
tion, not only in anti-Semitism, but in the econo-
mics. Ford dealers were boycotted, and, you know
that liad nothing to do with the Ford foundation but
the people picketing certain show rooms, for example.
We V7cre deluged with letters, and so forth. No
this is what - these are the things that I was
talking about, as you move into a political arena
in \:7hich seriousness and purposefulness, you try
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to implement it without compromise, that the conse-
quences on the participant, you know, down the road
are very serious indeed, so that you ultimately -
because you did not compromise
- you were left out
there by yourself while the problems continued.
And what has happened is that the rhetoric of reform,
decentralization, participation and so forth is now
used but is encaptured by those who are to an extent
still in control of an educational system which is
not working.
Ferretti: Mario, you are absolutely right, and Reverend Oliver
is right except that it is what Number Two is all
about, which reads: the actions of the various
parties are of no consequence who happen to be
community people working was interpreted as confron-
tation. That's precisely what happened.
Clark
:
But it wasn't a confrontation.
Ferretti: Of course it was confrontation, but a subtle con-
frontation initially, and then it was so easy to
make it a physical thing, with the use of rhetoric
and thus all issues were obscured and the parties
on both sides were in a position of saying, 'here
is charge A' made by one side,' charge B would
respond
,
charge B would in turn make its charge
which would be responsive by the other side,
and so on, so that that's all that was left.
Clark: Rev. Oliver . . . point . .
Ferretti: . . . television is devoted to, news is devoted
to instead of the real issues involved.
Oliver
:
I would disagree with you on what you say about
confrontation. If standing up for the rights of
black children to get a decent education, then it
is confrontation.
Clark: Well, that's exactly what it is. If you are standing
up to a system that has consistently and traditio-
nally not educated black children and you tell
them now you want to do it and here are the con-
ditions under which we are going to do it, if
that's not confrontation, you will have to do . . .
the only way they are going to get it, the only
way that you are going to kick the bureaucracies
as I see it is by confrontation, because they are
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not going to change it. And when you confront them,
you are going to get these charges such as ...
.
That was one of the most
. . . tliat was probably
the most effective weapon to sliift general public
opinion on pro-Jews or in-between to shift it
toward the negative, and it was very effective in
New York City because what you had running against
you was that it was in fact a substantial propor-
tion of the education in New York City is Jewish
and the UFT and A1 Shanker , .
.
(tape is indis-
tinguishable).
. . stupid, Shanker takes that and
. . . close it off. You can viev; it these tvjo
ways, that was a very risky, dangerous, irrespon-
sible thing for him to do, but it was also a very
shrewd thing to do, it was shrewd because it shif-
ted public opinion away from tVie neutral, away
from the
. . .
and then look upon Ocean Hill as
a mass of black, barbaric . . .
Ferretti
:
To the point where you have an organization such
as the Anti-defamation League v;hich. has a stake
in anti-Semitism, you knovj, it's really coining
out with tliis absolutely atrocious vilification . .
Fantini; Reason was suspended . . .
McCoy
:
Let me try to project this on two levels and I
guess I am talking about the language, because
in being involved in the formal structure of
education, it raises a number of questions. Let
me use an example first and then say v;hy I used
it. On one occasion T called the principal of
271 into my office and suggested that some of the
things that he was all about in doing was creating
dissension among his own faculty, students and
the community. I talked to him at great length
about it and I suspect - you used the word naive
before - I suspected tliat he would accept that
from one professional to anotlier, particularly in
the role that I had, wliich was a mistake, and sub-
sequent to that time given his continued actions
in this same vein, I have been on top of the
faculty ... I had access to information that
they were going, some of the community people were
prepared to come in and move him out, physically.
So I invited him over to my office and told him
that I wanted him to stay over ti'.ere with me for
a few days until the matter got cooled down. I
got a telephone call from Dr. Donovan, who said.
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that principal is not to leave that building unless
I give him the word.' Subsequent to that time he
apologized for what he was doing, he used - was doing
the same thing with remote control, but I guess
what I am saying is when you talk about confronta-
tion, it's how one perceives the action. In other
words I am saying, being an assistant for a long
time I knov7 I have transferred student's work, I
know some of the kinds of off-handed and under-handed
ways that they were doing it, we were within the
confines of the lav;, really - so therefore it was
translated for other kinds of reasons as confron-
tation. So I am saying that that whole use of
interpretation in language answers the question as
to what I am saying that nothing that we did was
of any consequence after we had taken our initial
stand. I suspect also that - if I can put it in
this language and Mario, you know this to be a
fact - if we could have demonstrated through P.R.
that we had in fact begun to change the flow of
education in that community, they would have found
an attack equally responsive. I think Ken alluded
to here, if you are showing them that you can
educate these kids
,
they would have devised another
tactic anyway.
Fcrretti
:
If you can show them that you are educating, that
in itself is confrontation.
Clark; That's right. That's the ultimate kind of confronta-
tion .
F ant ini; That would be the one - you talk about strategy,
tactic, that if you - in retrospect - look back
saying what precipitated this chain of events
v-;hich dwarfed then anything you could do, if you
had made a decision not to cause that kind of
eruption that early, if you said the name of the
game for us will be in our own way avoid, minimize
the politics and emphasize the education, that is,
'we are going to demonstrate beyond any shadow of
a doubt that we can provide quality education for
our kids and v;e are going to do it this way.' But
in a sense you couldn't. You took the system on
in its own terms, power terms, you didn t have
enough power to do this and therefore, you know,
the political analyst, you know, it was inevitable
that you would lose, that is we, only the people
who were associated with it, and therefore one of
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:
Fantini:
the lessons is that if you can surround yourself
with a force field component with certain allies
behind, that the priority - the manifestations of
the priority on the part of education would have
been education, not politics; that you had enough -
it seems to me you had enough energy to take this
for a few years - could have protected that experi-
ment and you could have had much more educational
inputs, and then you could have gone back to the
allies and say, 'now, look here is the evidence and
in terms of our relationship, you know, we need
to make this salient.' But what we had to make
salient was the politics rather than the education,
not clear therefore to anybody because of the bom-
bardment, the political bombardment, and anything
educationally worthwhile that took place in Ocean
Hill except you know, in terms of people floating
in and out and saying 'the climate is better and
certain things are happening there,' but we never
did come to the conclusion that better education
is provided. It seems to me that that's the ulti-
mate weapon and if we were to pass on our learning,
if you will, to some others, it v;ould be that; it
would be that if you really have achieved a poli-
tical coalition of this dimension that we are
talking about and instead of using .... but
instead of playing out their chips so early, brings
confrontation of the type that would generate
retaliation, that - you know - you protect your-
self and try to move in just in the limited time
you've had in terms of educational pace. Now that
may have been inevitable, but I am simply saying . .
. . or impossible.
may have been impossible, but I am simply saying
that that to me was the priority, that should have
been the agenda and that's what it was all about.
But as soon as we went in, we were babes in the
woods and literally, \<ie \<ieve taken apart by forces
that were completely, you know, superior to us.
It was ridiculous to go in and try to take some-
body along in that arena. I am just saying that
if I had to go back and if we had to put our collec-
tive wisdom on the table at that time, which we
couldn't do because everybody was in distant
stations
,
but at that time I think that if we
were to form allies we would have not supported
that type of . . . because we didn't understand
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Ferrc.tti
:
Fiintini:
completely all of the dimensions that would neces-
sitate it, hut it seems to me now .... that
could .... would have been wiser to
. . . that.
(Clark briefly interjecting something.) Remember
I called you and said if it is at all possible to
minimize this, not to take it on, that we were all
going to blow our chips at this time, that's the
end of the educational ... We have a certain
amount of money and once that's used, that's it.
And you v/ere going to use it at that time. There
was no reserve on which to call on, and therefore
you had really no energy left to put into educa-
tion. But that's
. . .
On the other hand, isn't it a fact, however, that
you were ... in the educational basket, you still
could not have done otherwise because as far as
the union and the school establishment is concer-
ned, the only educational, viable educational
change so far as they were concerned out there
(Tape is indistinguishable) . . . and you were
having no part of that at all. This was an ini-
tial confrontation and unavoidable.
No, I think you made that, I think you had enough
collateral in a sense to get by that, because that
was - the original coalition on the. part of the
UFT and the community was on the basis of the
community to buy more such and such; it did not
buy, so that the union pulled out. The others did
not - no, no, that's all right, but to then abuse
the relationship by saying, 'okay, we didn't come
together on more effective schools because, you
know, that's not our prescription, that's yours,
that we still have to engage in ours,' but once
you have done that to come back and beat them by
saying, 'we'll also want to take some of your
people and got them out,' . . . section of . . .
let me just finish, then I think you had no choice
but to do tliis. Now, if you had gotten by in a .
sense that IS 201 had gotten by, I have no way of
knowing whether the quality of education has been
improved, but the reports, editorials in the New
York Times have begun to demonstrate this. But
you had a different type of - it seems to me that
you had coalitions which could have really taken
anybody on in terms of performance. You could
have said 'more effective schools cost this much
and so forth and so on,' or whatever it is, and
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Fantini
:
C 1 ark
:
what really have they demonstrated because it is
a compensatory program versus your approach, but
there is no appro aclij what is it that you are
putting down as an educational plan? They at least
have more effective schools, I could question this,
but you never hod a chance to come up with yours
what you educational program would be.
The fact of the matter is though that you will have
to agree that probably the most important factor
in improving quality education in. schools is the
right to select and evaluate teachers, and actually
this is ... to this initial confrontation. Rhody
,
for some reason or other, backed by his Board and
in consultation with his Board, believed that the
attack that they were confronted with in this expe-
riment district of improving the quality of educa-
tion for these children vyould be a charade if they
didn't have tlie power to make judgements about
quality of teachers and to take action on the basis
of their judgemc.nt. How could they have gotten
around that witliOuL being involved in a charade?
Well, one .... concern and I mean everybody is
v^7atchiag you t’ue first time a game like this is
being played; people are on edge and all of a
sudden it appeared to everybody that this v?as a
dismissal which v;as based not on the fact that the
people there couldn't teach as effectively as others,
but on the basis that the people there were allied
with the union c’.nd were there in a sense politically
in causing some problems for the Governing Board,
that there wore political reasons not educational
reasons at that game.
I got the impre.s.sion that the administrator believed
that it was his prerogative, in fact in all proba-
bility his obligation, to make judgements of the
teachers, I don't, think he even knew initially
whether they vjere union teachers or not; but my
recollection war; that certain information that had
come to the attention of the administrator up the
line from the principals and others in the schools
and this information added up to the fact that
these yere. not competent teachers. Therefore, they
did not expect tliem to provide high quality educa-
tion for tlie children, and it was on the basis of
this that they '..’ere transferred. This is his con-
frontat ion
.
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Ferretti: I was going to say that even more basic than that
is the fact that Rhody McCoy was asking as the
District SuperintendcmL to have the same power as
any other district superintendent in the City, and
to some of the cynical fellows, 1 think that was
his mistake.
Fantini
:
Well, I would raise questions about the fact that
at that time within the press of all of these
forces that a statement, you know, that way, released
that way was in a sense politically the thing to
do when at any given time you trigger an eruption
that would stop you from doing anything else, and
there probably were alternatives and this is the
point that we were - there probably were alterna-
tives to . . .
Clark
:
l-/hen would have been the time to do that?
McCoy Mario, before you ansvjcr that, let me take a prero-
gative and also make an announcement. I just keep
getting signals and people keep running tlie finger
under your throat and I don't knov.’ wliether lliis is
designed for me or what have you, but let me just
leave three thoughts for you so that when \.t recon-
vene we can take it from that. I believe Rev.
Oliver is chafing at tlie . . . to get to that.
You talked about the survival of 201, you talked
about something in terms of a model for compro-
mise if you had taken a compromised position and
just stuck with education, vjhich vje'll get back
to. And thirdly, the discussion is what attain-
ments educationally were made j.n Ocean Hill? .lust
in the context of those three things \vhich we can
talk about v;hen we come back, if you recall in
looking at two, after the confrontation nothing
was of consequence, then you can understana v.'hy
no one really had an opportunity or wanted to and
I emphasize wanted to, to look at education rather
than to look at the confrontation situation because
it was, as Ken says, touching some sore points with
a population that presently was in control. So,
hold those three points. I'll open up when v;e come
back from lunch to get to those because I thine
they encompass all the remaining four or five items
on that sheet of paper. Okay? I don't know what
lunch is or wliere it is, but let's adjourn.
(LUNCH BREAK)
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McCoy
:
Just before we broke for lunch - and might I add
that tlie audio is pretty rough upstairs - that's
what they tell me - so would you all speak a little
louder - but just before we broke for lunch we
talked about three - left three things hanc'ing out.
One was the survival of 201 and some rationale for
it in terms of the strategies that it tiiay have used
to survive; the otlier left hanging out v;as a model.
You talked about a model which ]. iterally addressed
itself to - if education was the priority and if
we had stuck to a compromise and did some other
things, you probably could have sustained yourself,
and thirdly the educational achievements in Ocean
Hill, or educational achievements being initiated.
And Mario, I suggested to you ju.st before tve broke
that I'd like you to start with 201 and maybe tie
the other two together. I am really concerned about
how you perceive 201 at the present time.
Fantini: Well, as I recall, IS 201 had their confrontation
earlier. They (loud noises on the tape) . . . the
decentralization process was started at IS 201 in
the Fall of 1966, and so they v?ere in tlicir stages
of confrontation a little earlier, but it seo;.ms
to me what they decided to do was to maintain . .
(the rest of Dr. Fantini 's comments were completely
indistinguishable due to the tape.)
McCoy
:
Let me see if I can raise a question here. If I
hear you correctly . . .(the tape again is indis-
tinguishable) .
Oliver
:
. . .
of reading scores . . and in the nai. ion. Soir.c
of them V7ere. as low, some grade.s were as nmeh as
ninety per cent below the average reading level,
and apparently the public has taken tliis very
quietly and who cares? Nobody is vjorriec .about it
and the parents out there who v.’ere trying to do
something about it have nowhere the time, so it
does appear that as long as blacks and Fuerto
Ricans are not being educated, it's perfectly all
right. So how else can you avoid the kind of
confrontation in order to change this program:
Fantini
:
(Dr. Fantini' s remarks are again lost at the begi-
nning and end of tins section due to the tape.)
... he reports that the standardized tests of
achievement in academic . . . the children were
doing as well as anywhere else and no . . vas
involved
.
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Clark:
McCoy
:
Fantini
:
We had an interview with
. .
.
(The rest is lost
in the tape.) This system is not just accidental,
seeking not to educate lower status kids, but that
is systematically involved in this conspiracy to
see that lower status kids are not educated in spite
of all the compensatory programs and all that kind
of nonsense.
Let Tru.; ask you - in a different form - take off
where Rev. Oliver left off. There is, these kinds
of leaders emerged dealing with blacks and Puerto
Ricans
. . . and see what
. . . would survive, who
attempted to reform the system and my suspicion
is that if they are going to continue, the outcome
is going to be predictable, and I guess the ques-
tion I am raising is will they continue to have
some sort of support until a head-on confrontation
takes place and if we gain anything from itl For
instance, at the last panel, Ken, you said that it
is pretty clear in your mind that it's more diffi-
cult to update education for a minority than it
was to make gains in segregation. So, you know,
the quest Lon I am saying is really unless we can
look at it differently you can . . . union attempts
on the part of the "blacks" . . . (The rest is
lost in the tape.)
That confrontation is necessary and if you are
going to engage in confrontation ... no end. .
this Is no kind of strategy anyvi7ay. You can slice
it, the fact that kids are first affected under
any circumstances, then it seems to me that the
alternatives or options that you are talking about
in Number Seven, and at the last panel suggested
that in dealing with, this ball game, the only way
I can see having any payoff for the kids is to make
a ... a profit-making kind of . . . that is to
deal v;ii-.h the profit motive and to say that the
welfare children . . . involved and let the busi-
ness and industry come in and make money on . . .
problems, and in exhange for it, for making money,
. .
and that's as simply as I can put it. That
through contracts or through vouchers to whatever
that v.’liat you are saying is that, you know, we
continue to write off one generation after another
with democratic v;ays of trying to form community
invc>lvcment and so forth and so on, that it may
be what w'e need is another American activity,
namely enterprise, free enterprise, and then you'd
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say, 'look, have our kids reading and you get paid
for it,' and since we are finding no other alterna-
tive, so deadly, 1 don't know liow you can beat
this in terms of ihe Inevitability of defeat
. . .
establish povver l)ut you can't do it, so therefore
the only power source that has to be topped
. . .
(The rest is lost in the tape.)
. .
.
you can say,
'look, it is - you can make money if our kids can
read and write.' Now, that's one alternative, let's
paint a picture of alternative and - appeal - the
particular economic ijcriod that we are in this might
have some appeal. So take it out of our hands, and-
you take the other major power source in this
country, not political, but economic, and simply
negotiate with them in terms of money, and say,
'our kids can't read and we'll pay you if they can
read.' This is at least one alternative. Then
you are talking about what's the alternative if
you arc going to continue the seriousness of pur-
pose and hold the interest of children to be the
priority, then it seems to me that given the con-
text in which wc find ourselves, given the power
arrangements, that the next stage in negotiations
with the most powc-.rful, or potentially the most
powerful force that wc have - business and indus-
try, cut tliem in and in an exchiauge for that pro-
fit the children can read and write.
Mario, really, v.'h.'.t makes you think that business
and industry would do that?
For profit
.
Well, but the schools today as structured are
structured so that blacks and Puerto Ricans are
there to be cduc.etcd just enough to fill unskilled
and semi-skilled j..bs, and once they begin reading
too much, then I t'nink you arc going to get confron-
tation again. 1 a.gs'oe with Dr . Clark wholehear-
tedly on the . . .
You were saying that this conspiracy . . .
Reword the conspiracy.
No, I want to use it because I think it is appro-
priate tc> use 5 this conspiracy is so pervasive that
it cuts against one of the most instinctive drives
in free entcrpri.';e - the profit, that people will
Fantini
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put profit and cut their profit as long as the
conspiracy continues. That's what you are sayine.
All right, that's a .
. .
Clark: I think we have some evidence in support of this
in terms of the conspiracy between labor unions and
management which certainly is to the detriment of
Ferretti
:
The labor unions in this town are choosing to die
rather than to allow blacks in; the construction
trades - it's incredible.
Fan t i ni
:
That's an immediate job right now. But talking
about elementary schools that aid children, you
are talking about education as an economic market
place, you are talking about businesses coming in
with materials for which they will be paid, scores
and so forth, thus for teaching children - it has
nothing to do with what
. . . once they know how
to read and write what happens to them. It just
simply is the fact that if right now kids can't
read or write on the assumption that if they can
read and write something happens to their mobility
and their competitiveness, which is debatable,
but say that does happen, then it seems to me that
one way of dealing with just the fact that you want
kids to read and write who are now being short-
changed is to make it a money-making proposition
for those who would otherwise not consider it.
Cl ark; Mario, what is more vital to economic success and
profits than control of the labor market, and when
business and industry permit a racially exclusio-
nary union to dominate the labor market and there-
by control unofficially the available labor supply,
is this not to their economic detriment?
McCoy
:
Let me just jump here for a minute, Ken.
Clark; Just a minute. Actually, it would seem to me that
if business and industry would give priority of
profits over racism, they should be impeccable
enemies of racially exclusionary or . . . unions,
because opening up the unions would certainly open
up labor supply, it's just like natural resources
and raw materials. Scarce raw materials increase
prices. I would like to believe that what you
were suggesting is an out, and it would be an out
if it weren't for racism, but how do you get around
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the racist part of it that's contaminated every-
thing including
. . .
Oliver
:
I think that right in this same connection, exploi-
tation of ignorance is itself more profitable
and easier than exploitation of intelligence so
the profit motive is operative now - very much so,
but it's living on exploitation of people who
don't have
. . .
Clark; Who are not equipped.
Oliver: Right
.
McCoy
:
I was going to propose it in almost the same way
but just a little different. For instance, I find
it very difficult having been an administrator
to just sort of envision of what you are saying as
a contention for an option, because right now
white America is practicing its repressiveness in
education and all the other tax still controls educa
tion. For example, what I am saying is they still
control the textbooks, the publishing, the pur-
chase of them, etc., etc., regardless of whether
the kids pass or fail, read or write; they still
control construction, they control the economics
of the "teaching profession" they are in control,
and what you seem to be saying is that creating
this viable process where business says, 'if you
do such and such, it's profitable.' It's just
another gimmick, because they have all those
controls now. If you had guarantee performance
now and if you look at the guaranteed performance
contracts, the people who make the assessment
that in fact something has happened are the ones
who still control education today. They use the
same gimmick. We talk about accountability, new
kinds of assessment instruments, new kinds of
evaluative process - all that you need, so I don't
see it as really being an option.
Clark: . . . couldn't be distorted as the detriment of
our kids. I say that what we are saying . . .
McCoy: You still talking about white America legitimati-
zing education for all people.
Clark; Mario, it's a very difficult thing for a kind of
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:
person to accept, you know, that there is probably
nothing that this society could not destroy for
the detriment of kids whom it seeks to reject and
to destroy. If you look at the various education
acts, certainly provision for the upgrading the
(Quality of education for culturally deprived or
economically disadvantaged kids and consistently
you find that these are more often used for the ad-
vantaged. In Nev; York City you find it difficult
to find out where Title III money goes, and I
could see firms coming in with performance contracts
making big fanfare, getting profits and people
winking their eye at the fact that the average
scores of kids in predominantly black schools
haven't moved one iota. Now this sounds paranoid
but I don't know whether you read the recent front-
page New York Times story of the accountability
fiasco, where there was Shanker smiling, Degnan
smiling, Scribner smiling, Berstrom smiling - there
v^;asn't a black face in that picture - that's why
they could all smile the way that
. . . but, you
know, v^?hen you read this alleged accountability,
you found it was the biggest shell game. This guy
Dyer and EPS already have used the term accounta-
bility to mean non-accountability, so you could
get that same kind of relativism perpetrated at
predominantly black and minority schools where
the guys could cream off the profits and hand in
some elaborate mathematical formula to prove
that they had done something, but the kids still
can't read, because there it is that the accounta-
bility formula would say. Well, that sounds, I
know I guess it is - if tliat sounds paranoid, I
guess it is a kind way which comes out of exper-
ience with the establishment and that prestigious
black mentor of the establishment - the Board
of Regents, you knov>7 - what greater prestige
do you want? But these are what the elaborate
meclianisms are designed to do, to obscure the
fact that nobody is going to do a damn thing by
way of any effective education for black or
lower status kids.
Ken, can I just capture one of your statements
about saying to be a kind man to say the things
I am going to say is rather crude. You mentioned
earlier that these are elementary school kids
that you are talking about in terms of projection
and very liglitly you touched on the fact that
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after they learn to read and write you can't account
for what happens after that, and I suggest to you
at all the schools of education, if that's a pre-
mise, just start preparing for psychiatry, because
if these kids do in fact "begin to master the tools"
to put them in a competitive position in society
and the present "employment picture" continues and
the present disease of racism continues to the
degree that it is, you are just going to have thou-
sands and thousands of frustrated kids who are
going to end up as "mental cases."
Oliver: And there is already a well-prepared group to study
them and to make the loom off of studying them to
find why they act that way.
Clark: We've set up another department in MARC to get some
of that money.
F antini
:
Well, all I am trying to do is to come up with
some options. I know that we are very skilled at
knocking them down, and I am trying to probe the
vested interest that I see operating and trying
to turn it around in a kind of reverse psychology.
If it's true - and I think that it is - that
schools and education is an integral part of life
in a city, that is whether the city is considered
to be prosperous or not, whether it's a place of
danger or not that the schools play a vital role
that there is a stage of disfunction in terms of
just urbanization which sets in, at which point even
racism might take a back seat in terms of survival.
I am talking now about survival and how to put
the education of kids in that context, that busi-
ness and industry, as I understand it, are beginning
to move out of the city because of the deterioration
of it to which education contributes and at what
point, if at all, because evidently if you take
Newark that has already gone by and nobody has,
you know, it really hasn't made that much difference,
but New York is a center of dominance - economi-
cally, politically, and so forth - at what point
does indeed - you get a rearrangement even tempo-
rarily of the priority so that good education is
just simply something you are going to have to do
in order to survive, the white establishment to
survive, so that I am just wondering at this
state - and that's the other reason why I keep
coming in with that business and industry - because
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without it this country doesn't go too far and
the fact is that it has to be cast in such a way
that they are tempted to say, you know, 'it's to
our best interest - survival, profit, and every-
thing else to do this, otherwise, things are going
to get so bad that we have to get out of here and
we are going to lose a lot of money, and so forth.'
I'm not talking about altruism, but just simply
very, very selfish - survival, economic profits
and so forth that are being jeopardized here to
a degree that people are forced to rearrange even
temporarily. I am not vouching for what would
happen afterwards when people come and qualify
for jobs, that's another ball game, but at this
stage, it seems to me that I have very few options
with enough magnitude powerwise to intercede in
the dimension of the problems that we have out-
lined. We've talked about the politics of it
and that's certainly one power source that could
be brought to bear, but we saw the consequences
of that in New York. You know, not to wait for
an even greater political - you know, I don't
know how long you'll have to wait; in the meantime
kids are not educated. So I go to the next power
source which is business and industry and trying to
tap in on that on this problem. You know, we've
gone to the people, we've gone to the community,
and so forth - you know, maybe the next generation
which is the other source of energy which is
critical, you know, which has the scope of which
could deal with this problem. But I don't know
how else to do it. Now the other alternative
that I see is that this discontent with public
education is beginning to find its roots in the
suburbs and certainly with the youth and I wonder
at this time how to capitalize on this other type
of discontent - it's not divorced from the city,
the suburban discontent, middle-class content with
V7h at ' s going on; the so-called movement for alter-
natives, free schools, open schools, people already
know hov7 to read and write, but they need to be
made more humanistically oriented, and so forth.
There is an opening now for structuring of alter-
natives within the framevjork of public education.
There is a demand - the whole suuply and demand
type of thing, and I am wondering to what extent
we can ride herd on demand for alternatives within
the structure of public education so that some of
the innovators and some of the people who want to
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make a difference with the kids can be somehow
grouped to do this. So those are the only two
alternatives that I have, one is economic - business
and industry, profit, the other is this new diver-
sity in the society, the fact that a lot of people
are discontent and if this makes a demand on the
public schools and one of the ways of dealing with
that is to open up alternatives within the structure
and identify people, teachers who want to move with-
in alternatives and parents who want that alterna-
tive and the like. But those are the only the only
two I can find, beyond that - I can't think of any
more. That's it. This is the last session. Those
are the only two I have for the reform of American
education. And both of them have tremendous holes
in them so you can see where we are
.
I am addressing myself to your first part - business'
self-interest. I think that is in concept a good
idea, but I keep seeing instances and I speak of
New York because everything gets magnified in this
town, I see self-interest thrown aside in the
interest of racism, I see contractors who would
sooner pay time-and-a-half, double time and triple
time to unions which don't have enough membership
than to force these unions to admit black and
Spanish-speaking people, and I think when you
start talking about self-interest, business self-
interest you have to address yourself to the lar-
ger question and how you abolish racism, I don't
know. A lot of people who . . . have talked about
that for a long time. And until you can address
yourself to that problem then self-interest has
almost no meaning.
But that itself is an education problem - racism.
If you don't really - if the next generation goes
through the same processes that I went through and
others went through, you come out racist. Now,
you know, - due process it's educational. Now if
there is no change in the educational process then
this is just a perpetuating cycle, no end to it.
I think there is a reason. Let me go full circle.
In the beginning when you opened the discussion,
Ken, you talked about the seriousness of Ocean
Hill . . . concerned about housing, we were con-
cerned about the. health pi'oblem, we were concerned
about employment, if you recall . . . living in
300
substandard housing conditions before the city
owed the contractor, we had the same concerns year
after year
. .
.
public didn't perform well
. . .
the two didn't have blacks in it. If you look
at it now, one of the reasons we arc fighting Sam
Wright, but can't even move
. . .
Panelist: He isn't fighting heroically.
McCoy: Maybe not for the same reasons that we arc talking
about, but a concern is to put people in that so
that he can
. . , rhetoric giving them jobs, and
so forth, which is part of their self-interest, so
I guess what I am trying to say - likely liavc gone
through the amount of money we spent on the Police
Department ... so that to continue to keep people
in - it's like the Highway Department - to put
money into it to keep certain kinds of control.
So, really I don't see either of those two being
options. The discontent of "the suburban," of
youngsters and their families may be a viable alter
native for some people, but when it gives on that
racism, or borders on racism you know which per-
vails. Let me capsulize that long story. 1 am
absolutely amazed that a guy like Martin for >.jhat-
ever his reasons is talking about the present
time lowering the dropout age. Wliat I hear him
saying to me is that education is going to work
out like it seems to be in Europe - for the very
select few - and I obviously see that as . . .
unfortunately, and it also taught me what the six
or seven items say on this paper th.at there are
no options at the . . . for black kids to get an
education to be assimilated in this society.
Clark: I think though, Rhody, in this context of what
you are saying, is that v.^hile this might be t)’ue,
we have no alternative except to act as if th.ere
are options and to fight as if there are options
and maybe the only consequence of that will be
inconvenience, inconveniencing those in control
because actually they don't want to be inconven-
ienced, they don't have to devote as much time
and energy, etc., to you guys if they had to end
maybe this is the major strategy that there must
be crazy people who don't understaiwi that tricy
can't win and fight as if they could and if you
get enough of these people, you'll divert enough
energy and time and what not so tliat in the long
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run it might be - in the long run, I don't know
how long that is - more economical to bring about
some changes than to keep fighting one Ocean Hill-
Brownsville, Oliver and McCoy and others, and that
this be part of a lot of things that people try,
may be that v^e are reduced to trials and error,
that confronted with the problem we have to act like
mice in mazes to keep running and running assuming
tliat there are going to be some that are not blind
alleys. My philosophy now is function in spite of
obstacles or else you don't function at all and if
that rat in the maze doesn't run, you never are
going to get any food, it'll just die.
That's a very good note on which to end the panel
except chat I'd like to ask
. . .
Except that we hopefully will get some food.
Yes, I'd like to add two dimensions for I think
that Ocean Hill is end was a memorial, unfortuna-
tely - in meiTioriam, and I think it served an educ^a-
tional les.son to the public that the powerless are
going to do just as you say - operate in that maze
until .some change, is evident, and it is my strongest
conviction tliat euiybe I was about - when I listened
to you cowards the end - I was thinking about a good
legit iinate reason for the continuation of Black
Studies, that is if there is still enough pride
in those, people you ought to let them know v;here
the predictable is and let them know what the
commit tine nt has to be and perhaps, as you say, we
may get t.'iat food. Are there any other comments
tliat an\ panelists like to make before we turn
off the microphone? If not, thank you.
Don't you think Rev. Oliver should have the last
word?
It's almo.st like a benediction.
Well, I don't think that Ocean Hill-Brownsville
was in any way a failure. I think in some res-
pects it was a real success in that it pointed
up the problems in the educational structure that
I don't liiink could have been discovered in any
other vJuy . And 1 think it demonstrated that for
once in modern times, black people have not come
vjith hat in hands to the structure, we are part
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of this structure, we arc tcixed to support part
of it and I do think that l''inck people perhaps
maybe, the burden of taxe.^- in this country, and
they go all around the world so there is no need
for us to have hat in hand and I am j>roud of
Brownsville because - Ocean Hill - Brownsville,
because this was maintained there and I think it
has to be maintained if po>'.>ple are going to have
any kind of dignity. I think the educational changes
that came to Ocean Hill-Brownsville were signifi-
cant in there were new programs that were brought
into the district, first of all into the whole
educational structure of New York City through Mr.
McCoy's leadership, the bringing in of parapro-
fessionals to help teachers to create a more stable
atmosphere in the schools I think was a very, a
beautiful thing, and it reached a high proportion
in Ocean Hill -Brov.’nsville and it's now all over
the City. Programs like the Becker-Engerman pro-
gram where children in kindergarten after spending
a year could read on tlie first-grade level and
this came as a result of parents having made a
choice of a particular program and v.^ere given the
privilege of having this kind of prograr.i. I think
the fact that there has not yet been an evaluation
of Ocean Hill-Brownsville i.s in itself - it belies
the interest of education. K’e would v?elcorae such
but somehow this has been aborted and the district
has been practically dismantled without ever
finding out whether we failed, and I think that
if we had absolutely failed, it \\’ould have been
easy to demonstrate it, but somehow this v-;as not
done and I think this is a plus for Ocean Hill-
Brownsville. I'll stop on that.
Shall 1 say "thank you?"
Can we keep these for . . .?
It would indeed be a privilege to have you keep
it
.
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